{"title":"Morality and Everyday Life","authors":"Barbara Herman","doi":"10.5840/APAPA201396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/APAPA201396","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":443144,"journal":{"name":"The American Philosophical Association Centennial Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116238318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In his address to the Pacific Division last year, Barry Stroud called attention both to the ubiquity of appeals to naturalism in the contemporary philosophical arena and the lack of anything approaching a consensus concerning the meaning of the term.' As he noted, the varieties of naturalism run the gamut from highly restrictive forms, such as physicalism and naturalized epistemology, which are exceedingly controversial, to more inclusive forms, which preserve their popularity by avoiding a commitment to anything recognizably "naturalistic" beyond the rejection of appeals to the super-natural. In the case of the latter forms, Stroud remarks sensibly, the term 'naturalism' is often reduced to an empty slogan, which could more appropriately be rendered by 'open-mindedness.'2 There is, however, at least one central area of philosophical inquiry where naturalism is not only alive and well but has a fairly determinate sense, namely the question of free will or agency. In spite of an ongoing debate around the edges of this topic, for some time the ruling orthodoxy has been a form of compatibilism that is naturalistic in the sense that it dismisses any account of agency that is not positively related to the framework of nomological explanation operative in the natural sciences. For upholders of this point of view, action descriptions may have their own language (that of reasons) and need not be reducible to physicalistic or neurophysiological accounts; but at the end of the day these descriptions must be mappable on to the causal order of nature, which, in contemporary terms, is usually thought to involve either token-token identity or supervenience.3 Moreover, there appears to be much in favor of this approach, since human beings are parts of nature and their intentional actions can be regarded as events in the natural order, even if, considered as actions, they are taken under different descriptions. Nevertheless, not all philosophers have been willing to accept this naturalized conception of agency, which, in one form or another, has been with us at least since the 17th century. One who did not is Immanuel Kant, and it is his views that I shall discuss tonight. My main text will be Kant's famous remark in the Groundwork that "to every rational being possessed of a will we must also lend the Idea of freedom as the only one under which he can act."4 In his metaphysical lectures he makes essentially the same point by claiming that, "Freedom is a mere Idea and to act according to this Idea is what it means to be free in the practical sense." And he adds that, "Freedom...is practically necessary-man must therefore act according to an Idea of freedom, and he cannot act otherwise."5
{"title":"We Can Act Only Under the Idea of Freedom","authors":"H. Allison","doi":"10.5840/APAPA201372","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/APAPA201372","url":null,"abstract":"In his address to the Pacific Division last year, Barry Stroud called attention both to the ubiquity of appeals to naturalism in the contemporary philosophical arena and the lack of anything approaching a consensus concerning the meaning of the term.' As he noted, the varieties of naturalism run the gamut from highly restrictive forms, such as physicalism and naturalized epistemology, which are exceedingly controversial, to more inclusive forms, which preserve their popularity by avoiding a commitment to anything recognizably \"naturalistic\" beyond the rejection of appeals to the super-natural. In the case of the latter forms, Stroud remarks sensibly, the term 'naturalism' is often reduced to an empty slogan, which could more appropriately be rendered by 'open-mindedness.'2 There is, however, at least one central area of philosophical inquiry where naturalism is not only alive and well but has a fairly determinate sense, namely the question of free will or agency. In spite of an ongoing debate around the edges of this topic, for some time the ruling orthodoxy has been a form of compatibilism that is naturalistic in the sense that it dismisses any account of agency that is not positively related to the framework of nomological explanation operative in the natural sciences. For upholders of this point of view, action descriptions may have their own language (that of reasons) and need not be reducible to physicalistic or neurophysiological accounts; but at the end of the day these descriptions must be mappable on to the causal order of nature, which, in contemporary terms, is usually thought to involve either token-token identity or supervenience.3 Moreover, there appears to be much in favor of this approach, since human beings are parts of nature and their intentional actions can be regarded as events in the natural order, even if, considered as actions, they are taken under different descriptions. Nevertheless, not all philosophers have been willing to accept this naturalized conception of agency, which, in one form or another, has been with us at least since the 17th century. One who did not is Immanuel Kant, and it is his views that I shall discuss tonight. My main text will be Kant's famous remark in the Groundwork that \"to every rational being possessed of a will we must also lend the Idea of freedom as the only one under which he can act.\"4 In his metaphysical lectures he makes essentially the same point by claiming that, \"Freedom is a mere Idea and to act according to this Idea is what it means to be free in the practical sense.\" And he adds that, \"Freedom...is practically necessary-man must therefore act according to an Idea of freedom, and he cannot act otherwise.\"5","PeriodicalId":443144,"journal":{"name":"The American Philosophical Association Centennial Series","volume":"138 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127015919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Voluntarism and the Foundations of Ethics","authors":"J. Schneewind","doi":"10.5840/APAPA201357","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/APAPA201357","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":443144,"journal":{"name":"The American Philosophical Association Centennial Series","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127885739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Early Greek philosophers doubled as natural scientists; that is a commonplace. It is equally true, though less often remarked, that numerous historical philosophers doubled as cognitive scientists. They constructed models of mental faculties in much the spirit of modern cognitive science, for which they are widely cited as precursors in the cognitive science literature. Today, of course, there is more emphasis on experiment, and greater division of labor. Philosophers focus on theory, foundations, and methodology, while cognitive scientists are absorbed by experimental techniques and findings. Nonetheless, there are sound reasons for massive communication between philosophy and cognitive science, which happily proceeds apace. On this occasion I shall not try to enumerate or delineate these lines of communication in any comprehensive fashion. I just wish to illustrate the benefits to philosophy in two domains: the theory of mind and moral theory. Though this may sound like an ambitious agenda, I shall in fact examine just a single phenomenon: empathy. Using that term first broadly and later narrowly, I shall argue that empathy may be the key to one sector of the philosophy of mind and to several sectors of moral theory. But whether empathy can in fact unlock any doors depends heavily on the outcome of empirical research in cognitive science.
{"title":"EMPATHY, MIND, AND MORALS","authors":"A. Goldman","doi":"10.5840/APAPA201321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/APAPA201321","url":null,"abstract":"Early Greek philosophers doubled as natural scientists; that is a commonplace. It is equally true, though less often remarked, that numerous historical philosophers doubled as cognitive scientists. They constructed models of mental faculties in much the spirit of modern cognitive science, for which they are widely cited as precursors in the cognitive science literature. Today, of course, there is more emphasis on experiment, and greater division of labor. Philosophers focus on theory, foundations, and methodology, while cognitive scientists are absorbed by experimental techniques and findings. Nonetheless, there are sound reasons for massive communication between philosophy and cognitive science, which happily proceeds apace. On this occasion I shall not try to enumerate or delineate these lines of communication in any comprehensive fashion. I just wish to illustrate the benefits to philosophy in two domains: the theory of mind and moral theory. Though this may sound like an ambitious agenda, I shall in fact examine just a single phenomenon: empathy. Using that term first broadly and later narrowly, I shall argue that empathy may be the key to one sector of the philosophy of mind and to several sectors of moral theory. But whether empathy can in fact unlock any doors depends heavily on the outcome of empirical research in cognitive science.","PeriodicalId":443144,"journal":{"name":"The American Philosophical Association Centennial Series","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1992-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117271178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Naturalist View of Persons","authors":"A. Baier","doi":"10.5840/APAPA201310","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/APAPA201310","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":443144,"journal":{"name":"The American Philosophical Association Centennial Series","volume":"23 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1991-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132364255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I will be addressing 1 and not 2 or 3. I think 2 can be decisively answered in the negative. Since programs are defined purely formally or syntactically and since minds have an intrinsic mental content, it follows immediately that the program by itself cannot constitute the mind. The formal syntax of the program does not by itself guarantee the presence of mental contents. I showed this a decade ago in the Chinese Room Argument (Searle,1980). A computer, me for example, could run the steps in the program for some mental capacity, such as understanding Chinese, without understanding a word of Chinese. The argument rests on the simple logical truth that syntax is not the same as, nor is it by itself sufficient for, semantics. So the answer to the second question is obviously "No".
{"title":"Is the Brain a Digital Computer","authors":"J. Searle","doi":"10.5840/APAPA2013194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/APAPA2013194","url":null,"abstract":"I will be addressing 1 and not 2 or 3. I think 2 can be decisively answered in the negative. Since programs are defined purely formally or syntactically and since minds have an intrinsic mental content, it follows immediately that the program by itself cannot constitute the mind. The formal syntax of the program does not by itself guarantee the presence of mental contents. I showed this a decade ago in the Chinese Room Argument (Searle,1980). A computer, me for example, could run the steps in the program for some mental capacity, such as understanding Chinese, without understanding a word of Chinese. The argument rests on the simple logical truth that syntax is not the same as, nor is it by itself sufficient for, semantics. So the answer to the second question is obviously \"No\".","PeriodicalId":443144,"journal":{"name":"The American Philosophical Association Centennial Series","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115358738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Descartes held that the will is perfectly free, "so free in its nature that it cannot be constrained."2 "Let everyone just go down deep into himself," he is reported to have said to Frans Burman, "and find out whether or not he has a perfect and absolute will, and whether he can conceive of anything which surpasses him in freedom of the will. I am sure that everyone will find that it is as I say."3 Not everyone has so found, and one might think: "No wonder! We aren't gods. How could our wills not have their limits, like our digestions? Don't we quite often--or occasionally, at a minimum-have no freedom of will, in some matter or other? And mustn't it be like that? Whatever the will is, or was, mustn't it, under whatever name or names, be good for something? And in our case, mustn't it be something in the world that the will is good for? But if so, its freedom can't be perfect and unconditional. What in the world, that might reasonably be called a freedom, could be so absolute? If the will in the world were some faculty, say, of never mind what, wouldn't it be possible somehow to restrict its exercise? How could that be impossible? No doubt we're free as birds. We know it, God knows how, or as good as know it. Or better than know it, as perhaps we better than know that twice two is four. But how free are birds? Let no bird preen itself on its freedom. There are cages. There are tamers of birds. There's a lesson in birds, namely that a certain modesty about our famous freedom is very much in order, in the order of nature to which we so palpably belong." One might think something like that. Nevertheless, I am inclined to agree with Descartes. And of course I have some company. Foreigners, mostly, but there it is. Not much company, however, as far as I know. Most philosophers seem to think it quite easy to rob the will of some freedom. Thus Elizabeth Anscombe, in an essay called "Soft Determinism," appears to suppose that a man who can't walk because he is chained up has lost some freedom of will. He "has no 'freedom of will' to walk," she says, or, again; no "freedom of the will in respect of walking."4 "Everyone will allow," she says, "that 'A can walk, i.e. has freedom of the will in respect of walking' would be gainsaid by A's being chained up."5 And again, "External constraint is generally agreed to be incompatible with freedom",6 by which she seems to mean: incompatible with perfect freedom of will, because incompatible with freedom of will to do, or freedom of the will in respect of doing, whatever the constraint prevents.
{"title":"Freedom of Will and Freedom of Action","authors":"Rogers Albritton","doi":"10.5840/APAPA2013150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/APAPA2013150","url":null,"abstract":"Descartes held that the will is perfectly free, \"so free in its nature that it cannot be constrained.\"2 \"Let everyone just go down deep into himself,\" he is reported to have said to Frans Burman, \"and find out whether or not he has a perfect and absolute will, and whether he can conceive of anything which surpasses him in freedom of the will. I am sure that everyone will find that it is as I say.\"3 Not everyone has so found, and one might think: \"No wonder! We aren't gods. How could our wills not have their limits, like our digestions? Don't we quite often--or occasionally, at a minimum-have no freedom of will, in some matter or other? And mustn't it be like that? Whatever the will is, or was, mustn't it, under whatever name or names, be good for something? And in our case, mustn't it be something in the world that the will is good for? But if so, its freedom can't be perfect and unconditional. What in the world, that might reasonably be called a freedom, could be so absolute? If the will in the world were some faculty, say, of never mind what, wouldn't it be possible somehow to restrict its exercise? How could that be impossible? No doubt we're free as birds. We know it, God knows how, or as good as know it. Or better than know it, as perhaps we better than know that twice two is four. But how free are birds? Let no bird preen itself on its freedom. There are cages. There are tamers of birds. There's a lesson in birds, namely that a certain modesty about our famous freedom is very much in order, in the order of nature to which we so palpably belong.\" One might think something like that. Nevertheless, I am inclined to agree with Descartes. And of course I have some company. Foreigners, mostly, but there it is. Not much company, however, as far as I know. Most philosophers seem to think it quite easy to rob the will of some freedom. Thus Elizabeth Anscombe, in an essay called \"Soft Determinism,\" appears to suppose that a man who can't walk because he is chained up has lost some freedom of will. He \"has no 'freedom of will' to walk,\" she says, or, again; no \"freedom of the will in respect of walking.\"4 \"Everyone will allow,\" she says, \"that 'A can walk, i.e. has freedom of the will in respect of walking' would be gainsaid by A's being chained up.\"5 And again, \"External constraint is generally agreed to be incompatible with freedom\",6 by which she seems to mean: incompatible with perfect freedom of will, because incompatible with freedom of will to do, or freedom of the will in respect of doing, whatever the constraint prevents.","PeriodicalId":443144,"journal":{"name":"The American Philosophical Association Centennial Series","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1985-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133575575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
You may guess from my title that I am going to talk a good deal this evening about the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. While the guess is correct in that I will make frequent reference to Kant's writings and occasionally quote some of his remarks, I want to emphasize at the start that my primary concern is not that of a Kant scholar urging an interpretation of Kant. My concern is rather with epistemology and the approach to it that gives rise to the Kantian notion of a thing in itself. In my efforts to clarify this approach I will contrast it with others, and I will say quite a bit about the views of C.S. Peirce. When I speak of the approach as Kantian, I am not concerned to argue that it is the approach Kant himself always followed, but only that it is the one we should follow if we begin in epistemology as Kant did. For those of you who have a special interest in Kant's moral philosophy, let me add now that I distinguish sharply between the role of a thing in itself in epistemology and its role in Kant's moral philosophy. I comment briefly on this distinction near the end of my paper.
{"title":"Things in Themselves","authors":"Manley Thompson","doi":"10.5840/APAPA2013135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/APAPA2013135","url":null,"abstract":"You may guess from my title that I am going to talk a good deal this evening about the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. While the guess is correct in that I will make frequent reference to Kant's writings and occasionally quote some of his remarks, I want to emphasize at the start that my primary concern is not that of a Kant scholar urging an interpretation of Kant. My concern is rather with epistemology and the approach to it that gives rise to the Kantian notion of a thing in itself. In my efforts to clarify this approach I will contrast it with others, and I will say quite a bit about the views of C.S. Peirce. When I speak of the approach as Kantian, I am not concerned to argue that it is the approach Kant himself always followed, but only that it is the one we should follow if we begin in epistemology as Kant did. For those of you who have a special interest in Kant's moral philosophy, let me add now that I distinguish sharply between the role of a thing in itself in epistemology and its role in Kant's moral philosophy. I comment briefly on this distinction near the end of my paper.","PeriodicalId":443144,"journal":{"name":"The American Philosophical Association Centennial Series","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1983-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114780654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The New Need for a Recovery of Philosophy","authors":"J. Smith","doi":"10.5840/APAPA2013120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/APAPA2013120","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":443144,"journal":{"name":"The American Philosophical Association Centennial Series","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1982-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132138402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Philosophers today are deeply divided by issues of a kind that can be described as "metaepistemological" -issues concerning the concepts and methodology appropriate for a philosophical investigation of human knowledge. In thinking about some of these controversial issues it seems to me helpful to draw a distinction between two kinds of epistemic merit intrinsic and instrumental. There are many things that can possess epistemic merit: educational practices, methods of scientific inquiry, moral and religious doctrines, constitutional provisions for freedom of speech and inquiry, and so on indefinitely. But I shall be talking today about the epistemic merit of propositional attitudes; and for simplicity I shall concentrate attention on just one of these, the attitude we have toward a proposition in believing it. What I shall have to say about the epistemic merit of believing can easily be extended to other attitudes like disbelieving, suspending judgment, assuming for the sake of the argument, accepting subject to further investigation, and so
{"title":"Epistemic Merit, Intrinsic and Instrumental","authors":"R. Firth","doi":"10.5840/APAPA2013111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/APAPA2013111","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophers today are deeply divided by issues of a kind that can be described as \"metaepistemological\" -issues concerning the concepts and methodology appropriate for a philosophical investigation of human knowledge. In thinking about some of these controversial issues it seems to me helpful to draw a distinction between two kinds of epistemic merit intrinsic and instrumental. There are many things that can possess epistemic merit: educational practices, methods of scientific inquiry, moral and religious doctrines, constitutional provisions for freedom of speech and inquiry, and so on indefinitely. But I shall be talking today about the epistemic merit of propositional attitudes; and for simplicity I shall concentrate attention on just one of these, the attitude we have toward a proposition in believing it. What I shall have to say about the epistemic merit of believing can easily be extended to other attitudes like disbelieving, suspending judgment, assuming for the sake of the argument, accepting subject to further investigation, and so","PeriodicalId":443144,"journal":{"name":"The American Philosophical Association Centennial Series","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1981-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128799386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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