Pub Date : 2012-09-10DOI: 10.2224/SBP.2012.40.8.1319
Ji‐Hwan Lee, Chul Choi, Jae Min Kim
This paper investigates whether the social capital of outside directors has an impact on firm performance and value, using a sample of 480 outside directors from 125 large publicly traded Korean companies. In order to measure social capital, we map out the social networks of outside directors on the basis of their personal affiliation in terms of educational and career backgrounds. Then, we apply betweenness centrality and closeness centrality — two commonly used complex network analysis measures — to capture the social capital of individual outside directors. A review of existing literature leads us to propose two competing hypotheses: one that posits a positive relationship between boards’ social capital and firm performance and another that posits a negative relationship between the two. The results of our empirical examination report a negative impact of outside directors’ social capital on firm performance and value.
{"title":"Outside Directors' Social Capital and Firm Performance: A Complex Network Approach","authors":"Ji‐Hwan Lee, Chul Choi, Jae Min Kim","doi":"10.2224/SBP.2012.40.8.1319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2224/SBP.2012.40.8.1319","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates whether the social capital of outside directors has an impact on firm performance and value, using a sample of 480 outside directors from 125 large publicly traded Korean companies. In order to measure social capital, we map out the social networks of outside directors on the basis of their personal affiliation in terms of educational and career backgrounds. Then, we apply betweenness centrality and closeness centrality — two commonly used complex network analysis measures — to capture the social capital of individual outside directors. A review of existing literature leads us to propose two competing hypotheses: one that posits a positive relationship between boards’ social capital and firm performance and another that posits a negative relationship between the two. The results of our empirical examination report a negative impact of outside directors’ social capital on firm performance and value.","PeriodicalId":444911,"journal":{"name":"CGN: General Management (Topic)","volume":"153 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127280679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Property theory is thriving. Having been long dominated by a disintegrative approach building up on the bundle of rights concept, scholars are now reexamining essentialist models of property, with the right to exclude featuring prominently as property’s prospective core. These theories study various resources, from land to intellectual property, to pinpoint such an essence. Oddly enough, largely missing from these accounts is the most prominent source of wealth in today’s world: the business corporation. While corporate law theory is increasingly looking beyond the nexus of contracts theory to illuminate the firm’s proprietary foundations, property theory has yet to fit the business corporation into its newly integrative framework. The paper argues that this deficiency is not merely a coincidence. In many ways, the business corporation undermines the paradigms of current property theory. To start with, Berle and Means’s underlying notion of divorce of ownership from control in the business corporation seems antagonistic to the owner’s right to exclude or to ‘set the agenda’ for the resource. In addition, while property theory recognizes the need to pool together resources and overcome collective action problems, conventional models of property governance such as residential community associations seem alienated from the power relations and vertical authority within the business firm. Specifically, the setting of a majority shareholder enjoying a control premium alongside owing fiduciary duties to dispersed minority shareholders is allegedly at odds with the horizontal governance assumption in property theory. It may be even unfavorably viewed as reminiscent of obsolete modes of status-based stratification in property, going back to feudalism. This inconvenience does not release, however, property theory from accounting for the core nature of the business corporation. Moreover, the paper argues that once we move from a model of substantive essentialism to one that identifies the institutional and structural traits of property, then the business corporation becomes a much better fit for current property jurisprudence.
{"title":"Onerous Property: Why the Business Corporation is Missing from Property Theory","authors":"Amnon Lehavi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2096936","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2096936","url":null,"abstract":"Property theory is thriving. Having been long dominated by a disintegrative approach building up on the bundle of rights concept, scholars are now reexamining essentialist models of property, with the right to exclude featuring prominently as property’s prospective core. These theories study various resources, from land to intellectual property, to pinpoint such an essence. Oddly enough, largely missing from these accounts is the most prominent source of wealth in today’s world: the business corporation. While corporate law theory is increasingly looking beyond the nexus of contracts theory to illuminate the firm’s proprietary foundations, property theory has yet to fit the business corporation into its newly integrative framework. The paper argues that this deficiency is not merely a coincidence. In many ways, the business corporation undermines the paradigms of current property theory. To start with, Berle and Means’s underlying notion of divorce of ownership from control in the business corporation seems antagonistic to the owner’s right to exclude or to ‘set the agenda’ for the resource. In addition, while property theory recognizes the need to pool together resources and overcome collective action problems, conventional models of property governance such as residential community associations seem alienated from the power relations and vertical authority within the business firm. Specifically, the setting of a majority shareholder enjoying a control premium alongside owing fiduciary duties to dispersed minority shareholders is allegedly at odds with the horizontal governance assumption in property theory. It may be even unfavorably viewed as reminiscent of obsolete modes of status-based stratification in property, going back to feudalism. This inconvenience does not release, however, property theory from accounting for the core nature of the business corporation. Moreover, the paper argues that once we move from a model of substantive essentialism to one that identifies the institutional and structural traits of property, then the business corporation becomes a much better fit for current property jurisprudence.","PeriodicalId":444911,"journal":{"name":"CGN: General Management (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131288325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper shows that top management structures in large US firms radically changed since the mid-1980s. While the number of managers reporting directly to the CEO doubled, the growth was driven primarily by functional managers rather than general managers. Using panel data on senior management positions, we explore the relationship between changes in executive team composition, firm diversification, and IT investments – which arguably alter returns to exploiting synergies through corporate-wide coordination by functional managers in headquarters. We find that the number of functional managers closer to the product ("product" functions i.e., marketing, R&D) increase as firms focus their businesses, while the number of functional managers farther from the product ("administrative" functions i.e., finance, law, HR) increase with IT investments. Finally, we show that general manager pay decreases as functional managers join the executive team suggesting a shift in activities from general to functional managers – a phenomenon we term "functional centralization."
{"title":"Who Lives in the C-Suite? Organizational Structure and the Division of Labor in Top Management","authors":"Maria Guadalupe, Hongyi Li, Julie Wulf","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2179524","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2179524","url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows that top management structures in large US firms radically changed since the mid-1980s. While the number of managers reporting directly to the CEO doubled, the growth was driven primarily by functional managers rather than general managers. Using panel data on senior management positions, we explore the relationship between changes in executive team composition, firm diversification, and IT investments – which arguably alter returns to exploiting synergies through corporate-wide coordination by functional managers in headquarters. We find that the number of functional managers closer to the product (\"product\" functions i.e., marketing, R&D) increase as firms focus their businesses, while the number of functional managers farther from the product (\"administrative\" functions i.e., finance, law, HR) increase with IT investments. Finally, we show that general manager pay decreases as functional managers join the executive team suggesting a shift in activities from general to functional managers – a phenomenon we term \"functional centralization.\"","PeriodicalId":444911,"journal":{"name":"CGN: General Management (Topic)","volume":"290 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124181481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper the educational background of the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of Large U.S. Firms are examined. Specifically, the educational background of CEOs from large U.S. firms, as identified in the Forbes 800 Compensation List, are examined. Information concerning the number of Chief Executive Officers that received their undergraduate and graduate degrees from 463 institutes of higher education are compiled. We find that most CEOs have an undergraduate degree, while about half possess a graduate degree. The results indicate that there are preferred educational backgrounds for selection as the CEO of a major corporation. We also examine how the educational background of the CEO is related to the CEO’s total compensation. The evidence indicates that those CEOs that do not have a degree earn significantly more than those CEO’s that do have a college degree. We find little evidence that the school attended affects the compensation that the CEO receives. Finally, we examine firm ROA and Tobin’s Q based on the educational background of the CEO. We find an association between possession of a degree as well as where the degree was earned and the ROA and Tobin’s Q of the firm.
{"title":"Does School Matter? An Empirical Analysis of CEO Education, Compensation, and Firm Performance","authors":"Terrance Jalbert, R. Rao, M. Jalbert","doi":"10.19030/IBER.V1I1.3882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.19030/IBER.V1I1.3882","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper the educational background of the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of Large U.S. Firms are examined. Specifically, the educational background of CEOs from large U.S. firms, as identified in the Forbes 800 Compensation List, are examined. Information concerning the number of Chief Executive Officers that received their undergraduate and graduate degrees from 463 institutes of higher education are compiled. We find that most CEOs have an undergraduate degree, while about half possess a graduate degree. The results indicate that there are preferred educational backgrounds for selection as the CEO of a major corporation. We also examine how the educational background of the CEO is related to the CEO’s total compensation. The evidence indicates that those CEOs that do not have a degree earn significantly more than those CEO’s that do have a college degree. We find little evidence that the school attended affects the compensation that the CEO receives. Finally, we examine firm ROA and Tobin’s Q based on the educational background of the CEO. We find an association between possession of a degree as well as where the degree was earned and the ROA and Tobin’s Q of the firm.","PeriodicalId":444911,"journal":{"name":"CGN: General Management (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134574041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-11-26DOI: 10.1504/IJSCM.2009.031412
Paul M. Vaaler, G. McNamara
A simmering debate in strategic management pits two conflicting views on the impact of corporate-level factors on affiliated business units. 'Mainstream' proponents hold that corporate effects on business performance are substantial, while 'revisionist' proponents hold that corporate effects are insubstantial compared to the impact of industry-related and macroeconomic factors shaping business performance. We provide a basis for reconciling these opposing views. With a broad sample of operating returns for US firms, we estimate corporate and other variance components of business performance in 17 successive four-year moving windows from 1979 to 1997. Corporate variance components of business performance shift from modest (5%) in the early-1980s as proposed by revisionists to quite substantial (33%) by the mid- 1990s as proposed by mainstream proponents. We conjecture that new theoretical insights on and practices developing the strategic capabilities of corporations through more focused diversification have promoted this evolution and reinvigorated the corporate strategy field.
{"title":"Changing Corporate Effects on US Business Performance Since the 1970s","authors":"Paul M. Vaaler, G. McNamara","doi":"10.1504/IJSCM.2009.031412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJSCM.2009.031412","url":null,"abstract":"A simmering debate in strategic management pits two conflicting views on the impact of corporate-level factors on affiliated business units. 'Mainstream' proponents hold that corporate effects on business performance are substantial, while 'revisionist' proponents hold that corporate effects are insubstantial compared to the impact of industry-related and macroeconomic factors shaping business performance. We provide a basis for reconciling these opposing views. With a broad sample of operating returns for US firms, we estimate corporate and other variance components of business performance in 17 successive four-year moving windows from 1979 to 1997. Corporate variance components of business performance shift from modest (5%) in the early-1980s as proposed by revisionists to quite substantial (33%) by the mid- 1990s as proposed by mainstream proponents. We conjecture that new theoretical insights on and practices developing the strategic capabilities of corporations through more focused diversification have promoted this evolution and reinvigorated the corporate strategy field.","PeriodicalId":444911,"journal":{"name":"CGN: General Management (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125094042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Compensation, status, and press coverage of managers in the U.S. follow a highly skewed distribution: a small number of 'superstars' enjoy the bulk of the rewards. We evaluate the impact of CEOs achieving superstar status on the performance of their firms, using prestigious business awards to measure shocks to CEO status. We find that award-winning CEOs subsequently underperform, both relative to their prior performance and relative to a matched sample of non-winning CEOs. At the same time, they extract more compensation following the award, both in absolute amounts and relative to other top executives in their firms. They also spend more time on public and private activities outside their companies, such as assuming board seats or writing books. The incidence of earnings management increases after winning awards. The effects are strongest in firms with weak governance, even though the frequency of obtaining superstar status is independent of corporate governance. Our results suggest that the ex-post consequences of media-induced superstar status for shareholders are negative.
{"title":"Superstar CEOS","authors":"Ulrike Malmendier, Geoffrey Tate","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.972725","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.972725","url":null,"abstract":"Compensation, status, and press coverage of managers in the U.S. follow a highly skewed distribution: a small number of 'superstars' enjoy the bulk of the rewards. We evaluate the impact of CEOs achieving superstar status on the performance of their firms, using prestigious business awards to measure shocks to CEO status. We find that award-winning CEOs subsequently underperform, both relative to their prior performance and relative to a matched sample of non-winning CEOs. At the same time, they extract more compensation following the award, both in absolute amounts and relative to other top executives in their firms. They also spend more time on public and private activities outside their companies, such as assuming board seats or writing books. The incidence of earnings management increases after winning awards. The effects are strongest in firms with weak governance, even though the frequency of obtaining superstar status is independent of corporate governance. Our results suggest that the ex-post consequences of media-induced superstar status for shareholders are negative.","PeriodicalId":444911,"journal":{"name":"CGN: General Management (Topic)","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117234250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The goal of this research is to identify antecedents that significantly contribute to U.S service firms' levels of global intensity. Six possible antecedents of global intensity are proposed and the relationships between the antecedents and global intensity are examined. The antecedents are firm size, management attitudes, barriers to entry, international scope, strategic motivation to internationalize, and market entry modes. The empirical results provide insight into the influence of each antecedent in predicting the global intensity of service firms. Management attitudes towards operating internationally are found to be the most important exogenous factor for predicting a service firm's global intensity.
{"title":"Antecedents to the Internationalization of Service Firms: An Empirical Analysis","authors":"D. S. White, R. Javalgi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1369642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1369642","url":null,"abstract":"The goal of this research is to identify antecedents that significantly contribute to U.S service firms' levels of global intensity. Six possible antecedents of global intensity are proposed and the relationships between the antecedents and global intensity are examined. The antecedents are firm size, management attitudes, barriers to entry, international scope, strategic motivation to internationalize, and market entry modes. The empirical results provide insight into the influence of each antecedent in predicting the global intensity of service firms. Management attitudes towards operating internationally are found to be the most important exogenous factor for predicting a service firm's global intensity.","PeriodicalId":444911,"journal":{"name":"CGN: General Management (Topic)","volume":"259 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132914302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The ultimate objective of financial reporting is to provide transparent financial statements and disclosures that meet the informational needs of investors and other users of financial statements. One of the primary goals of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (USHR 2002) is to provide more reliable financial reporting, thereby restoring public confidence in the U.S. markets. But what do restatements say about financial statements filed by public registrants and audit reports issued by their external auditors? Restatements provide prima facie evidence of inaccurate and/or incomplete financial reporting and audit failures. This paper contributes to the existing restatements literature. Using data collected from Audit Analytics™, restatements are analyzed over a ten-year period (2000-2009) based on market capitalization, audit firms, and accounting and reporting issues. To provide a broader context, restatements are juxtaposed against total audit opinions issued during the period under review. The results show that after six years on the rise (2001-2006), the number of financial restatements filed in 2009 fell for the third consecutive year (2007-2009). However, the analysis also unearths some important issues that bear concern. For example, local and regional firms are associated with 58.1 percent of all restatements filed by non-accelerated registrants during the ten-year period. These firms are associated with over half of all non-accelerated restatements filed during five of the ten years (2005-2009). Local and regional firms are associated with a disproportionate percentage of restatements filed by accelerated registrants when compared to total audit opinions issued by these firms. These firms have significantly higher ratios of total restatements to total audit opinions than Big-4 firms or national firms. The number of annual audit opinions issued by Big-4 firms to non-accelerated registrants has declined each year during the ten-year period. The lion's share of these non-accelerated audits have been assumed by local and regional firms. These data support the assertion that non Big-4 firms have absorbed relatively small, marginal audit clients shed by Big-4 firms (Rama and Read 2006), and thus, a new wave of restatements may be on the horizon.
财务报告的最终目标是提供透明的财务报表和披露，以满足投资者和其他财务报表使用者的信息需求。萨班斯-奥克斯利法案(USHR 2002)的主要目标之一是提供更可靠的财务报告，从而恢复公众对美国市场的信心。但是，对于公共注册机构提交的财务报表及其外部审计师发布的审计报告，重述说明了什么?重述提供不准确和/或不完整的财务报告和审计失败的初步证据。本文对现有的重述文献有所贡献。使用从Audit Analytics™收集的数据，根据市值、审计公司以及会计和报告问题，对十年(2000-2009年)的重述进行了分析。为了提供一个更广泛的背景，重述与审查期间发布的审计意见总数并列。结果显示，在经历了6年的上升(2001-2006)之后，2009年提交的财务重述数量连续第三年下降(2007-2009)。然而，分析也揭示了一些值得关注的重要问题。例如，在10年期间，本地和区域公司与非加速注册人提交的所有重述的58.1%有关。这些公司与十年内(2005-2009年)五年内提交的所有非加速重述的一半以上有关。与本地和区域公司发布的审计意见总数相比，加速注册公司提交的重述所占比例不成比例。这些事务所的总重述与总审计意见的比例明显高于四大事务所或全国性事务所。十年间，四大会计师事务所向非加速注册会计师发出的年度审计意见数量逐年下降。这些非加速审计的大部分是由本地和区域公司承担的。这些数据支持以下断言:非四大会计师事务所已经吸收了从四大会计师事务所流失的相对较小的边缘审计客户(Rama and Read 2006)，因此，一波新的重述浪潮可能即将到来。
{"title":"Financial Restatements: An Analysis Pre-and–Post Sarbanes-Oxley (2000–2009)","authors":"Helen M. Roybark","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1863284","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1863284","url":null,"abstract":"The ultimate objective of financial reporting is to provide transparent financial statements and disclosures that meet the informational needs of investors and other users of financial statements. One of the primary goals of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (USHR 2002) is to provide more reliable financial reporting, thereby restoring public confidence in the U.S. markets. But what do restatements say about financial statements filed by public registrants and audit reports issued by their external auditors? Restatements provide prima facie evidence of inaccurate and/or incomplete financial reporting and audit failures. This paper contributes to the existing restatements literature. Using data collected from Audit Analytics™, restatements are analyzed over a ten-year period (2000-2009) based on market capitalization, audit firms, and accounting and reporting issues. To provide a broader context, restatements are juxtaposed against total audit opinions issued during the period under review. The results show that after six years on the rise (2001-2006), the number of financial restatements filed in 2009 fell for the third consecutive year (2007-2009). However, the analysis also unearths some important issues that bear concern. For example, local and regional firms are associated with 58.1 percent of all restatements filed by non-accelerated registrants during the ten-year period. These firms are associated with over half of all non-accelerated restatements filed during five of the ten years (2005-2009). Local and regional firms are associated with a disproportionate percentage of restatements filed by accelerated registrants when compared to total audit opinions issued by these firms. These firms have significantly higher ratios of total restatements to total audit opinions than Big-4 firms or national firms. The number of annual audit opinions issued by Big-4 firms to non-accelerated registrants has declined each year during the ten-year period. The lion's share of these non-accelerated audits have been assumed by local and regional firms. These data support the assertion that non Big-4 firms have absorbed relatively small, marginal audit clients shed by Big-4 firms (Rama and Read 2006), and thus, a new wave of restatements may be on the horizon.","PeriodicalId":444911,"journal":{"name":"CGN: General Management (Topic)","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126815354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4468/2005.1.03SALVIONI
Daniela M. Salvioni
Corporate governance is a complex activity evolving in parallel with change within internal and external contexts. In particular, global competition shows how maintaining the conditions for company effectiveness implies: reviewing the corporate governance approach, emphasising relations between governance and management control and developing appropriate skills to adapt to the variables being monitored. The new outlook companies are up against tends to determine revising important critical factors for company success and changes resources important for the creation and maintenance of positive company/environment relations. More specifically, certain elements are taking shape that-though with different characteristics and importance based on specific company contexts and interaction with the environment-are proving to be dominant success factors. These include: corporate culture; information system; brand equity.
{"title":"Corporate Governance, Management Control and Global Competition","authors":"Daniela M. Salvioni","doi":"10.4468/2005.1.03SALVIONI","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4468/2005.1.03SALVIONI","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate governance is a complex activity evolving in parallel with change within internal and external contexts. In particular, global competition shows how maintaining the conditions for company effectiveness implies: reviewing the corporate governance approach, emphasising relations between governance and management control and developing appropriate skills to adapt to the variables being monitored. The new outlook companies are up against tends to determine revising important critical factors for company success and changes resources important for the creation and maintenance of positive company/environment relations. More specifically, certain elements are taking shape that-though with different characteristics and importance based on specific company contexts and interaction with the environment-are proving to be dominant success factors. These include: corporate culture; information system; brand equity.","PeriodicalId":444911,"journal":{"name":"CGN: General Management (Topic)","volume":"97 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124676211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：