International Journal of Economic Theory最新文献

We propose and characterize a new value for TU cooperative games based on egalitarian distribution of worths in smaller coalitions and players' marginal productivity in larger coalitions. This value belongs to the class of Procedural values due to Malawski. Our value is identical with the Shapley value on one extreme and the Equal Division rule on the other extreme. We show that our value is identical with the solidarity value due to Bèal et al. of the dual game. However, by duality, our characterization intuitively improves over the axiomatization of this solidarity value. We also provide a mechanism that implements our value in sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Finally, a generalized version of this value is proposed followed by its characterizations.

We introduce a new family of values for TU-games with a priority structure, which both contains the Priority value recently introduced by Béal et al. and the Weighted Shapley values (Kalai & Samet). Each value of this family is called a Weighted priority value and is constructed as follows. A strictly positive weight is associated with each agent and the agents are partially ordered according to a binary relation. An agent is a priority agent with respect to a coalition if it is maximal in this coalition with respect to the partial order. A Weighted priority value distributes the dividend of each coalition among the priority agents of this coalition in proportion to their weights. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the family of the Weighted Shapley values without the additivity axiom. To this end, we borrow the Priority agent out axiom from Béal et al., which is used to axiomatize the Priority value. We also reuse, in our domain, the principle of Superweak differential marginality introduced by Casajus to axiomatize the Positively weighted Shapley values. We add a new axiom of Independence of null agent position which indicates that the position of a null agent in the partial order does not affect the payoff of the other agents. Together with Efficiency, the above axioms characterize the Weighted Shapley values. We show that this axiomatic characterization holds on the subdomain where the partial order is structured by levels. This entails an alternative characterization of the Weighted Shapley values. Two alternative characterizations are obtained by replacing our principle of Superweak differential marginality by Additivity and invoking other axioms.

We consider an environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) under price competition in a product differentiated duopoly and formulate an extensive endogenous timing game where firms choose ECSR and subsequently choose prices. We show that a successive sequential-move appears in the equilibrium wherein an ECSR leader adopts a lower degree of ECSR and thereupon chooses a price leader. Therefore, the firm with a low degree of ECSR becomes a price leader while the firm with a high degree of ECSR becomes a price follower but earns higher profits, that is, a second-mover advantage with ECSR-induced higher costs appears.

This paper considers the possibility of technology licensing via fixed-fee, royalty or two-part tariff and tacit collusion between firms that produce homogeneous goods under asymmetric cost structures and compete in quantities. In contrast to Lin (1996), all forms of licensing facilitate (obstruct) collusion, if the initial cost difference between the firms is relatively less (more). Technology will always be licensed, and the optimal form of licensing is either fixed-fee or royalty or two-part tariff, but collusion may or may not be possible post-licensing. Welfare decreases after licensing if the firms collude only after licensing but not collude under no-licensing.

We analyze the effect that the presence of a standard-setting organization (SSO) has on firms' choices of product quality and costly research and development (R&D) investment when consumers face uncertainty regarding product standardization. We construct a theoretical model with competing firms and compare frameworks where: (i) an SSO is exogenously absent and (ii) an SSO is present. Our first finding is a negative relationship between firms' product-quality choices and R&D investment. The presence of the SSO standardizes quality which can be profitable for firms. Finally, we find conditions where the presence of an SSO could lead to welfare enhancement.

We consider capital structure including equity, straight bonds (SBs), and contingent convertibles (CoCos) for nonfinancial firms. We price equity and CoCos by a utility-based method. We show that benefits from issuing CoCos increase dramatically with idiosyncratic risk and risk aversion. The firm value is concave in CoCos' conversion ratio and the optimal conversion ratio increases with risk aversion and idiosyncratic risk. If risk aversion is sufficiently high, shareholders' risk-shifting incentives disappear, and the firm issues less CoCos and equity and more SBs as idiosyncratic risk rises. The higher the idiosyncratic risk or risk aversion, the higher the leverage.

It is a well-known observation that, in the overlapping generations (OLG) model with the complete market, we can judge optimality of an equilibrium allocation by examining the associated equilibrium price. Motivated by recent development in decision theory under ambiguity, this study reexamines the above observation in a stochastic OLG model with convex but not necessarily smooth preferences. It is shown that optimality of an equilibrium allocation depends on the set of possible supporting prices, not necessarily on the associated equilibrium price itself. Therefore, observations of an equilibrium price do not necessarily tell us precise information on optimality of the equilibrium allocation.

The General Deviation Measure introduces a progressive definition for financial risk measurement, which presents an alternative to the Coherent Risk Measure. This definition replaces the Translation Invariance and Monotonicity axioms with the Shift Invariance and Nonnegativity axioms, and it includes the Mean Absolute Deviation measure and other variations of the Value-at-Risk measurements. This research shows that Coherent Risk Measure holds an intrinsic contradiction regarding riskless assets, and it proves that the Gini coefficient is also a General Deviation Measure. These contributions improve the efficiency of risk measurement and asset pricing in the financial markets.