If we want to know whether it is useful to examine picture set discriminations, we need to ask which of these reasons lies behind the experiment in question. Of course, things are never as simple as that. Researchers are not always either clear or consistent about why we do experiments, and often more than one of these motivations may be detectable in the design and description of their research. Furthermore, those who read and cite research often attribute motives to the researchers that they did not in fact hold, or interpret results in ways that the original authors would not endorse. Nonetheless, the research techniques that are appropriate depend critically on which of these motivations are operative, and it follows that how we should assess the experiments and our results depends critically on which of these goals they are aiming at. In this commentary, I argue that the underlying motivation for most of the research that Weisman and Spetch (2010) discuss is (c) above, to investigate object representation. However, much of Weisman and Spetch’s (2010) critique assumes that it is (a), to investigate the discriminability of the real objects. They build a damning case against the use of much of the published research to answer that question. But it is not clear that there is anyone in the dock – and in any case, it will be argued below that it is not improper to argue from the discriminability of pictures to the discriminability of the objects depicted, though the converse argument does indeed fail. Weisman and Spetch (2010) also argue strongly for the use of playback experiments, which are indeed the most usual and useful method for answering questions driven by (b) above, discovering the releasers of natural responses, but of limited use if what we are really interested in is object representation.
{"title":"What's the use of picture discrimination experiments?","authors":"S. Lea","doi":"10.3819/CCBR.2010.50010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3819/CCBR.2010.50010","url":null,"abstract":"If we want to know whether it is useful to examine picture set discriminations, we need to ask which of these reasons lies behind the experiment in question. Of course, things are never as simple as that. Researchers are not always either clear or consistent about why we do experiments, and often more than one of these motivations may be detectable in the design and description of their research. Furthermore, those who read and cite research often attribute motives to the researchers that they did not in fact hold, or interpret results in ways that the original authors would not endorse. Nonetheless, the research techniques that are appropriate depend critically on which of these motivations are operative, and it follows that how we should assess the experiments and our results depends critically on which of these goals they are aiming at. In this commentary, I argue that the underlying motivation for most of the research that Weisman and Spetch (2010) discuss is (c) above, to investigate object representation. However, much of Weisman and Spetch’s (2010) critique assumes that it is (a), to investigate the discriminability of the real objects. They build a damning case against the use of much of the published research to answer that question. But it is not clear that there is anyone in the dock – and in any case, it will be argued below that it is not improper to argue from the discriminability of pictures to the discriminability of the objects depicted, though the converse argument does indeed fail. Weisman and Spetch (2010) also argue strongly for the use of playback experiments, which are indeed the most usual and useful method for answering questions driven by (b) above, discovering the releasers of natural responses, but of limited use if what we are really interested in is object representation.","PeriodicalId":44593,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3819/CCBR.2010.50010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70233519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In their target article, Weisman and Spetch (2010) question the validity of pictures to present real things to birds, mostly because pictures are primarily made for the human eye, and not for the eye of birds with different functional properties. Here, we argue that this issue of picture validity is similarly critical for primatologists, even when they study the "higher" nonhuman primates with a more similar visual system, and emphasize cognitive limitations in referential abilities that may be an important source of differences in picture processing modes between human and animals. In their target paper, Weisman and Spetch (2010) review the literature on picture perception in birds and adequately question the validity of pictorial stimuli (photographs, digitized pictures, and movies) to present real objects or scenes to these animals. In their review, they raise the important issue that with the current technology, pictures are primarily designed to be perceived by human eyes and might therefore, not be well adapted to birds possessing a different visual system. They document the risk for anthropocentric errors in experimental research using pictures with birds, and call for new empirical evidence showing a correspondence between the perception of pictures and the perception of objects in birds. Despite the widespread use of pictures in animal psychology, investigators have rarely questioned the realistic nature of pictures and their ecological validity. In that respect, Weisman and Spetch's paper (2010) is among the very few to explicitly do so (see also Cabe, 1976, Fagot 2000). They must be applauded for bringing back this important issue to the attention of the field. In general, we are supportive of their position that a greater care must be given to the use of pictures in experimental animal research. However, consideration of the primate literature suggests that
{"title":"Picture perception in birds: Perspective from primatologists","authors":"J. Fagot, C. Parron","doi":"10.3819/CCBR.2010.50007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3819/CCBR.2010.50007","url":null,"abstract":"In their target article, Weisman and Spetch (2010) question the validity of pictures to present real things to birds, mostly because pictures are primarily made for the human eye, and not for the eye of birds with different functional properties. Here, we argue that this issue of picture validity is similarly critical for primatologists, even when they study the \"higher\" nonhuman primates with a more similar visual system, and emphasize cognitive limitations in referential abilities that may be an important source of differences in picture processing modes between human and animals. In their target paper, Weisman and Spetch (2010) review the literature on picture perception in birds and adequately question the validity of pictorial stimuli (photographs, digitized pictures, and movies) to present real objects or scenes to these animals. In their review, they raise the important issue that with the current technology, pictures are primarily designed to be perceived by human eyes and might therefore, not be well adapted to birds possessing a different visual system. They document the risk for anthropocentric errors in experimental research using pictures with birds, and call for new empirical evidence showing a correspondence between the perception of pictures and the perception of objects in birds. Despite the widespread use of pictures in animal psychology, investigators have rarely questioned the realistic nature of pictures and their ecological validity. In that respect, Weisman and Spetch's paper (2010) is among the very few to explicitly do so (see also Cabe, 1976, Fagot 2000). They must be applauded for bringing back this important issue to the attention of the field. In general, we are supportive of their position that a greater care must be given to the use of pictures in experimental animal research. However, consideration of the primate literature suggests that","PeriodicalId":44593,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3819/CCBR.2010.50007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70232821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
G. Vallortigara, L. Regolin, C. Chiandetti, R. Rugani
Studies on human infants, focused on the ontogenetic origins of knowledge, have provided evidence for a small set of separable systems of core knowledge dealing with the representation of objects, number, and space. We investigated core knowledge systems from a comparative perspective, making use of the domestic chick as a model system, and filial imprinting as a key to animal mind. Here, we discuss evidence showing precocious abilities in the chick for representing: (i) the cardinal and ordinal/sequential aspects of numerical cognition, and (ii) the distance, angle, and sense relations among extended surfaces in the surrounding layout. Some of the abilities associated with core knowledge systems of number and space were observed in the absence of (or with very reduced) visual experience, supporting a nativistic account of the origins of knowledge.
{"title":"Rudiments of mind: Insights through the chick model on number and space cognition in animals","authors":"G. Vallortigara, L. Regolin, C. Chiandetti, R. Rugani","doi":"10.3819/CCBR.2010.50004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3819/CCBR.2010.50004","url":null,"abstract":"Studies on human infants, focused on the ontogenetic origins of knowledge, have provided evidence for a small set of separable systems of core knowledge dealing with the representation of objects, number, and space. We investigated core knowledge systems from a comparative perspective, making use of the domestic chick as a model system, and filial imprinting as a key to animal mind. Here, we discuss evidence showing precocious abilities in the chick for representing: (i) the cardinal and ordinal/sequential aspects of numerical cognition, and (ii) the distance, angle, and sense relations among extended surfaces in the surrounding layout. Some of the abilities associated with core knowledge systems of number and space were observed in the absence of (or with very reduced) visual experience, supporting a nativistic account of the origins of knowledge.","PeriodicalId":44593,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3819/CCBR.2010.50004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70232873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A picture is something in which objects can be recognized, even though the objects themselves are not actually present when it is observed. For observers to recognize objects in a picture, visual inputs have to be matched to the representations of the visual objects in memory. Patients who suffer from visual agnosia often exhibit greater impairments in recognizing line-drawings and photographs than real objects, while leaving abilities of perceiving 2D features intact. Hiraoka, Suzuki, Hirayama, and Mori (2009) reported a patient who does not show apparent impairment with real objects and even their photographs, but has difficulties in recognizing line-drawings and silhouettes (i.e., the stimuli are missing much of 2D features of the real objects). In contrast, Turnbull, Driver, and McCarthy (2004) reported the performance of a patient on a variety of experimental tasks that investigated the patient’s ability to extract 2D and 3D information from 2D stimuli. His performance was relatively intact on the 2D tasks (e.g., picture-matching across rotations in the picture plane), but was greatly impaired on the 3D tasks (mental rotation in depth, relative depth judgments within line-drawings and shaded photographs, and the discrimination of line-drawings depicting “possible” and “impossible” 3D objects). The finding suggested that his difficulties in recognizing visually presented objects was due to the deficit in deriving 3D structure from the pictorial depth-cues within 2D images. It has also been reported that patients with agnosic deficits often show a greater impairment in the recognition of visually presented living things (e.g., animals) as compared to non-living things (e.g., tools). Wolk, Coslett, and Glosser (2005) argued that such category-specific visual agnosia suggests that information about an object’s form, as well as sensory-motor information specifying the manner of manipulation, may contribute to object recognition. Generally, visual agnosia is assumed to be derived from impairments in the processes by which visual information contacts stored knowledge of objects or representations of 3D objects in memory.
在一幅画中，物体是可以被识别出来的，即使在观察它的时候，物体本身并不存在。为了让观察者识别图片中的物体，视觉输入必须与记忆中视觉物体的表示相匹配。患有视觉失认症的患者通常在识别线条画和照片方面表现出比真实物体更大的障碍，而感知二维特征的能力却完好无损。Hiraoka, Suzuki, Hirayama, and Mori(2009)报道了一名患者，该患者对真实物体甚至照片都没有表现出明显的损伤，但在识别线条画和轮廓方面存在困难(即，刺激缺失了真实物体的许多二维特征)。相比之下，Turnbull, Driver和McCarthy(2004)报道了患者在各种实验任务中的表现，这些实验任务调查了患者从2D刺激中提取2D和3D信息的能力。他在2D任务中的表现相对完好(例如，在画面平面的旋转中进行图片匹配)，但在3D任务中(深度的心理旋转，线条图和阴影照片中的相对深度判断，以及描绘“可能”和“不可能”3D物体的线条图的区分)，他的表现大大受损。这一发现表明，他在识别视觉上呈现的物体方面的困难是由于在从2D图像的图像深度线索中导出3D结构方面的缺陷。也有报道称，与非生物(如工具)相比，患有失认症的患者在识别视觉上呈现的生物(如动物)方面往往表现出更大的障碍。Wolk, Coslett和Glosser(2005)认为，这种类别特异性视觉失认症表明，关于物体形状的信息，以及指定操作方式的感觉运动信息，可能有助于物体识别。一般来说，视觉失认症被认为是由于视觉信息接触过程的障碍，存储的物体知识或三维物体的表征在记忆中。
{"title":"Do animals recognize pictures as representations of 3D objects","authors":"M. Jitsumori","doi":"10.3819/CCBR.2010.50008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3819/CCBR.2010.50008","url":null,"abstract":"A picture is something in which objects can be recognized, even though the objects themselves are not actually present when it is observed. For observers to recognize objects in a picture, visual inputs have to be matched to the representations of the visual objects in memory. Patients who suffer from visual agnosia often exhibit greater impairments in recognizing line-drawings and photographs than real objects, while leaving abilities of perceiving 2D features intact. Hiraoka, Suzuki, Hirayama, and Mori (2009) reported a patient who does not show apparent impairment with real objects and even their photographs, but has difficulties in recognizing line-drawings and silhouettes (i.e., the stimuli are missing much of 2D features of the real objects). In contrast, Turnbull, Driver, and McCarthy (2004) reported the performance of a patient on a variety of experimental tasks that investigated the patient’s ability to extract 2D and 3D information from 2D stimuli. His performance was relatively intact on the 2D tasks (e.g., picture-matching across rotations in the picture plane), but was greatly impaired on the 3D tasks (mental rotation in depth, relative depth judgments within line-drawings and shaded photographs, and the discrimination of line-drawings depicting “possible” and “impossible” 3D objects). The finding suggested that his difficulties in recognizing visually presented objects was due to the deficit in deriving 3D structure from the pictorial depth-cues within 2D images. It has also been reported that patients with agnosic deficits often show a greater impairment in the recognition of visually presented living things (e.g., animals) as compared to non-living things (e.g., tools). Wolk, Coslett, and Glosser (2005) argued that such category-specific visual agnosia suggests that information about an object’s form, as well as sensory-motor information specifying the manner of manipulation, may contribute to object recognition. Generally, visual agnosia is assumed to be derived from impairments in the processes by which visual information contacts stored knowledge of objects or representations of 3D objects in memory.","PeriodicalId":44593,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3819/CCBR.2010.50008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70232991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
My motivation for co-authoring the target article (Weisman & Spetch, 2010) was two-fold. First, l hoped it would restimulate discussion and consideration of the questions, issues and limitations surrounding the use of pictures as surrogates for real world objects in comparative cognition research (Bovet & Vauclair, 2000; Fagot, 2000). Second, I hoped it would encourage more research aimed at assessing the real world validity of findings from animal research using pictures. The commentaries on our target article reveal a spicy variety of reactions and opinions, which is encouraging for the first goal. The commentators made many excellent points, some which I agree with and some which I question. My coauthor, Ron Weisman has provided a detailed reply to many of the commentaries so I will limit my reply to a few selected points.
{"title":"Understanding how pictures are seen is important for comparative visual cognition","authors":"M. Spetch","doi":"10.3819/CCBR.2010.50013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3819/CCBR.2010.50013","url":null,"abstract":"My motivation for co-authoring the target article (Weisman & Spetch, 2010) was two-fold. First, l hoped it would restimulate discussion and consideration of the questions, issues and limitations surrounding the use of pictures as surrogates for real world objects in comparative cognition research (Bovet & Vauclair, 2000; Fagot, 2000). Second, I hoped it would encourage more research aimed at assessing the real world validity of findings from animal research using pictures. The commentaries on our target article reveal a spicy variety of reactions and opinions, which is encouraging for the first goal. The commentators made many excellent points, some which I agree with and some which I question. My coauthor, Ron Weisman has provided a detailed reply to many of the commentaries so I will limit my reply to a few selected points.","PeriodicalId":44593,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3819/CCBR.2010.50013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70233478","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the study of comparative cognition and perception, disparities in the diverse approaches that researchers take in studying behavior sometimes obscure the interpretation of a particular empirical finding. We describe an approach to the study of comparative cognition and perception which focuses on explaining the ways in which different biological systems solve the computational challenges that are posed by their natural environments. Within this investigative framework, the task of detecting correspondence between a three-dimensional object and its two-dimensional photographic representation falls outside the mainstream of most research in animal visual cognition and is of limited value for divulging the principles or mechanisms that underlie the visual abilities of animals. More productive pursuits seek to elucidate the principles and mechanisms of object recognition and categorization, and to illuminate how they contribute to the animal's survival in the visual world.
{"title":"Comparative Vision Science: Seeing Eye to Eye?","authors":"Fabian A Soto, Edward A Wasserman","doi":"10.3819/ccbr.2010.50011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3819/ccbr.2010.50011","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In the study of comparative cognition and perception, disparities in the diverse approaches that researchers take in studying behavior sometimes obscure the interpretation of a particular empirical finding. We describe an approach to the study of comparative cognition and perception which focuses on explaining the ways in which different biological systems solve the computational challenges that are posed by their natural environments. Within this investigative framework, the task of detecting correspondence between a three-dimensional object and its two-dimensional photographic representation falls outside the mainstream of most research in animal visual cognition and is of limited value for divulging the principles or mechanisms that underlie the visual abilities of animals. More productive pursuits seek to elucidate the principles and mechanisms of object recognition and categorization, and to illuminate how they contribute to the animal's survival in the visual world.</p>","PeriodicalId":44593,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3819/ccbr.2010.50011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"29291656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article considers the relation between language and categorical perception (CP) of colour. Two opposite theories are reviewed, the universalist position arguing that categories are universal with an essentially biological origin, and the relativist position that holds that colour categories are essentially arbitrary and derive from colour terms of the speaker’s language. A review of the human literature presents developmental, neuropsychological, cross-cultural, neuro-imaging and computer simulation evidence that CP of colours has at least partly linguistic origins. As animal studies also contribute to this debate, we then review evidence of CP in the visual and auditory domains, and pinpoint the inconsistencies of the literature. To make a direct comparison between humans and monkeys, experimental studies compared humans and baboons for their colour thresholds and in a recognition memory task designed to assess CP of colours. Only humans showed better between-category than within-category discrimination performance, suggesting species differences in the processing of a colour continuum. That study along with some of our previous research supports the theory of a linguistic origin for colour categories in humans.
{"title":"Cross-species Assessment of the Linguistic Origins of Color Categories","authors":"J. Davidoff, J. Fagot","doi":"10.3819/CCBR.2010.50005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3819/CCBR.2010.50005","url":null,"abstract":"This article considers the relation between language and categorical perception (CP) of colour. Two opposite theories are reviewed, the universalist position arguing that categories are universal with an essentially biological origin, and the relativist position that holds that colour categories are essentially arbitrary and derive from colour terms of the speaker’s language. A review of the human literature presents developmental, neuropsychological, cross-cultural, neuro-imaging and computer simulation evidence that CP of colours has at least partly linguistic origins. As animal studies also contribute to this debate, we then review evidence of CP in the visual and auditory domains, and pinpoint the inconsistencies of the literature. To make a direct comparison between humans and monkeys, experimental studies compared humans and baboons for their colour thresholds and in a recognition memory task designed to assess CP of colours. Only humans showed better between-category than within-category discrimination performance, suggesting species differences in the processing of a colour continuum. That study along with some of our previous research supports the theory of a linguistic origin for colour categories in humans.","PeriodicalId":44593,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3819/CCBR.2010.50005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70233102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The ability to categorize objects and events has long been an object of an intense interest and rigorous research in both humans and nonhuman animals (see Lazareva & Wasserman, 2008; Mareschal, Quinn, & Lea, 2010, for reviews). Until the seminal Herrnstein and Loveland’s study (1964), most of the comparative research used simple and well-defined stimuli (e.g., 1000-Hz tone or a 450 nm light) as discriminanda. Although easily controllable, such stimuli have little relationship to the tasks faced by animals in their natural environments: After all, discriminating a hawk from a conspecific is unlikely to be based on the difference in a single wavelength or pure tone.
{"title":"On Categories, Pictures, and the Goals of Comparative Psychology","authors":"O. Lazareva","doi":"10.3819/CCBR.2010.50009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3819/CCBR.2010.50009","url":null,"abstract":"The ability to categorize objects and events has long been an object of an intense interest and rigorous research in both humans and nonhuman animals (see Lazareva & Wasserman, 2008; Mareschal, Quinn, & Lea, 2010, for reviews). Until the seminal Herrnstein and Loveland’s study (1964), most of the comparative research used simple and well-defined stimuli (e.g., 1000-Hz tone or a 450 nm light) as discriminanda. Although easily controllable, such stimuli have little relationship to the tasks faced by animals in their natural environments: After all, discriminating a hawk from a conspecific is unlikely to be based on the difference in a single wavelength or pure tone.","PeriodicalId":44593,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3819/CCBR.2010.50009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70233127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a basic associative learning paradigm, learning is said to have occurred when the conditioned stimulus evokes an anticipatory response. This learning is widely believed to depend on the contiguous presentation of conditioned and unconditioned stimulus. However, what it means to be contiguous has not been rigorously defined. Here we examine the empirical bases for these beliefs and suggest an alternative view based on the hypothesis that learning about the temporal relationships between events determines the speed of emergence, vigor and form of conditioned behavior. This temporal learning occurs very rapidly and prior to the appearance of the anticipatory response. The temporal relations are learned even when no anticipatory response is evoked. The speed with which an anticipatory response emerges is proportional to the informativeness of the predictive cue (CS) regarding the rate of occurrence of the predicted event (US). This analysis gives an account of what we mean by "temporal pairing" and is in accord with the data on speed of acquisition and basic findings in the cue competition literature. In this account, learning depends on perceiving and encoding temporal regularities rather than stimulus contiguities.
{"title":"Time and Associative Learning.","authors":"Peter D Balsam, Michael R Drew, C R Gallistel","doi":"10.3819/ccbr.2010.50001","DOIUrl":"10.3819/ccbr.2010.50001","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In a basic associative learning paradigm, learning is said to have occurred when the conditioned stimulus evokes an anticipatory response. This learning is widely believed to depend on the contiguous presentation of conditioned and unconditioned stimulus. However, what it means to be contiguous has not been rigorously defined. Here we examine the empirical bases for these beliefs and suggest an alternative view based on the hypothesis that learning about the temporal relationships between events determines the speed of emergence, vigor and form of conditioned behavior. This temporal learning occurs very rapidly and prior to the appearance of the anticipatory response. The temporal relations are learned even when no anticipatory response is evoked. The speed with which an anticipatory response emerges is proportional to the informativeness of the predictive cue (CS) regarding the rate of occurrence of the predicted event (US). This analysis gives an account of what we mean by \"temporal pairing\" and is in accord with the data on speed of acquisition and basic findings in the cue competition literature. In this account, learning depends on perceiving and encoding temporal regularities rather than stimulus contiguities.</p>","PeriodicalId":44593,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3045055/pdf/nihms207291.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"29704702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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