Pub Date : 2023-12-16DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2023.2273117
Aderonke Ajiboro, Edwin Etieyibo
The existence of current feminist thought in Africa is tainted by colonialism. Colonial and postcolonial anthropological thought and Eurocentric scholarship have misrepresented Africa as a society ...
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Pub Date : 2023-12-16DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2023.2273031
Simphiwe Sesanti
In 2021, bell hooks, an African-American anti-colonial education and feminist educator, passed on. hooks’ passing coincided with the 40th publication anniversary of her book, Ain’t I a woman: Black...
2021 年，非裔美国人、反殖民主义教育家和女权主义教育家贝尔-胡克斯（Bell hooks）逝世。胡克斯逝世时，恰逢她的著作《我是不是女人》（Ain't I a woman）出版 40 周年：黑人...
{"title":"bell hooks’ feminist, and ancient Egypt’s philosophy of education for an enabling Afrocentric education","authors":"Simphiwe Sesanti","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2023.2273031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2023.2273031","url":null,"abstract":"In 2021, bell hooks, an African-American anti-colonial education and feminist educator, passed on. hooks’ passing coincided with the 40th publication anniversary of her book, Ain’t I a woman: Black...","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138689225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-16DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2023.2283674
Edwin Etieyibo, Pedro Tabensky
In this preamble, we highlight some of the more recent work on gender and sexuality in African philosophy. We do this as a way of introducing the special issue on “African Philosophy, Women, and Fe...
{"title":"Feminism and women in African philosophy","authors":"Edwin Etieyibo, Pedro Tabensky","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2023.2283674","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2023.2283674","url":null,"abstract":"In this preamble, we highlight some of the more recent work on gender and sexuality in African philosophy. We do this as a way of introducing the special issue on “African Philosophy, Women, and Fe...","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"120 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138689226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-16DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2023.2273029
Julia Huysamer, Louise du Toit
A case has been made by various authors that the normative and processual notion of personhood found in African philosophy is discriminatory: it has been labelled as sexist, ableist and anti-queer....
{"title":"Non-binary gender in African personhood?","authors":"Julia Huysamer, Louise du Toit","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2023.2273029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2023.2273029","url":null,"abstract":"A case has been made by various authors that the normative and processual notion of personhood found in African philosophy is discriminatory: it has been labelled as sexist, ableist and anti-queer....","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138689222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-19DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2023.2250245
Tosin Adeate
Aribiah Attoe took issue with the materialist and the non-materialist African conceptions of death by arguing that the reality of death puts pressure on the human conception of life’s meaning. He admits the reality of an afterlife experience through a causal principle that sees events in the world as the product of interactions between predetermined past events. It is an afterlife where a decomposing body continues interacting with other things in the world, not an afterlife involving consciousness. While conscious meaning-making ends in the death of the body in Attoe’s materialist view, thereby affirming the conclusion that human existence is meaningless and the universe is purposeless, the conviction about life’s meaninglessness is also reinforced by the possibility of a second death, that is, the death of the transcendent consciousness in the traditional African view. In this article, I will mount two objections to Attoe’s submission. First, I argue that Attoe’s refutation of life’s meaning may be faulted by a world view devoid of the ideas of the afterlife and immortality. Life’s meaninglessness for him should have been limited to the facts of human existence in the world, not the human inability to continue meaning after death. Second, Attoe’s conception of death as finality questions his principle of causality that suggests the reality of an endless afterlife. Attoe’s overarching submission on life’s meaninglessness gives the impression that theories of life’s meaning must be anchored on the thought of an afterlife and immortality.
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Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2023.2250246
Maduka Enyimba
AbstractThe significance of scepticism for philosophical inquiry appears to have been well articulated by epistemologists in diverse forms, but none to the best of my knowledge has shown its place and significance in African (epistemology) philosophy. In this article, I engage Jonathan O. Chimakonam on his notion of “arumaristics” and unveil its sceptical nature by showing that conversationalism or conversational thinking promotes scepticism in African philosophy since it requires the suspension of judgement. The problem is that Chimakonam did not explicitly indicate this sceptical dimension of his thought. I argue that since arumaruka as “doubt” is the root word of “arumaristics” which is itself the bedrock of conversationalism as a method of the conversational philosophy, then “arumaristics” is sceptical in nature and conversationalism promotes scepticism, the type that focuses on “suspension of judgement”, in African philosophy. My primary aim is to expose the importance of the method of conversational thinking as a form of scepticism in African philosophy, the significance of which is to deepen our understanding, and further propagate the value of the method of conversational thinking as articulated by Chimakonam. I discuss scepticism from the perspective of Sextus Empiricus and my method is essentially critical, expository and evaluative.
摘要怀疑论对哲学探究的重要性似乎已经被认识论家以不同的形式很好地表达出来，但据我所知，没有一个人在非洲(认识论)哲学中显示出它的地位和意义。在这篇文章中，我与Jonathan O. Chimakonam探讨了他的“arumaristics”概念，并通过展示对话主义或对话思维促进了非洲哲学中的怀疑主义，因为它需要暂停判断，从而揭示了其怀疑的本质。问题在于，奇马科南并没有明确指出他思想中的这种怀疑态度。我认为，既然arumaruka作为“怀疑”是“arumararistics”的词根，而“arumaristics”本身是对话主义作为对话哲学方法的基础，那么“arumaristics”本质上是怀疑的，而对话主义促进了怀疑主义，这种怀疑主义在非洲哲学中关注“暂停判断”。我的主要目的是揭示对话式思维方法在非洲哲学中作为一种怀疑主义形式的重要性，其意义在于加深我们的理解，并进一步宣传奇马科南所阐述的对话式思维方法的价值。我从塞克斯图斯·恩皮尼基的角度讨论怀疑主义，我的方法基本上是批判性的、说明性的和评价性的。
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Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2023.2273119
Chrysogonus M. Okwenna
AbstractThis article proposes an alternative approach to social epistemology – a comprehensive approach. It argues that the dominant approaches to social epistemology, which it identifies as communitarian and veritistic, are inadequate. It observes that the nature of the emphasis that the communitarian approach places on the epistemic community foster mindless tolerance in epistemology, which makes the pursuit of the cognitive goal of truth difficult to attain. It also observes that the veritistic approach that seeks to refocus social epistemology on the pursuit of the cognitive goal of obtaining truth does this at the expense of the affective goals of social epistemology. To overcome the inadequacies of the communitarian and the veritistic approaches and to ensure that social epistemology effectively pursues its cognitive and affective goals, this article offers the comprehensive approach. This approach absorbs the virtues of the communitarian and the veritistic approaches while avoiding their errors. Hence, it thrives on a view of truth that posits an objective and a subjective dimension of truth. The objective dimension ensures that the community only fosters and never impedes social epistemological projects such that social epistemology continues to pursue the cognitive goal of truth. The subjective dimension guarantees that the concern for truth does not lead to the neglect or abandonment of the pursuit of the affective goals of social epistemology. The rationale behind this approach is that for social epistemological projects and practices to remain truly epistemological and social, they must always take into consideration the cognitive and affective features of knowledge and knowers.
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Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2023.2273122
Víctor Fernández Castro
AbstractIn recent years, there has been a renewed concern about the dangers of eliminative materialism, as well as several attempts to discuss alternative positions such as new versions of interpretivism or fictionalism. Although expressivism has also emerged as a possibility, the problems with hybrid versions of expressivism in applying it to attitude ascriptions have led to a strong rejection of the proposal. The aim of this article is twofold. First, it argues that there are still theoretical tools available to defend an expressivist analysis of mental state ascriptions. Second, the article contends that three of the most influential arguments in expressivism in meta-ethics and meta-epistemology are applicable to the case of mental state ascriptions.
{"title":"Folk psychology without metaphysics: An expressivist approach","authors":"Víctor Fernández Castro","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2023.2273122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2023.2273122","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractIn recent years, there has been a renewed concern about the dangers of eliminative materialism, as well as several attempts to discuss alternative positions such as new versions of interpretivism or fictionalism. Although expressivism has also emerged as a possibility, the problems with hybrid versions of expressivism in applying it to attitude ascriptions have led to a strong rejection of the proposal. The aim of this article is twofold. First, it argues that there are still theoretical tools available to defend an expressivist analysis of mental state ascriptions. Second, the article contends that three of the most influential arguments in expressivism in meta-ethics and meta-epistemology are applicable to the case of mental state ascriptions.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135718494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2023.2250247
Joshua M. Hall
AbstractIn this article, I build on my recent conceptions of law as poetry and of justice as dance by articulating three new conceptions of the relationship between law and justice. In the first, “poetry-based justice”, justice consists of a rigid choreography to a kind of musical recitation of the law’s poetry. In the second, “dancing-based law”, justice consists of spontaneous, freely improvised movement patterns that the poetry of the law tries to capture in a kind of musical notation. And in the third, “reciprocal-legal justice”, justice and law consist of a reciprocally determining artistic collaboration between the democratic dancing masses and the aristocratic poetising elites. Given that each of these predominates in one of three types of community, I then present a reclassification of right-leaning, centrist and leftist societies as dominated by “literalist”, “kinetic” and “mutualist” communities (respectively), and offer suggestions for legislators and activists working in each type. In conclusion, law and justice, qua poetry and dance, become more flexible, inclusive and open to creative improvising and collaboration, a new form that I name, after Astraea, Greek goddess of divine justice, “astral legal justice”.
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Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2023.2250244
Roger G. López
AbstractMy theme in this essay is the relation of misfortune – and other occasions for regret – to the affirmation of life. R. Jay Wallace believes there is an antagonistic relation that produces a schism between our affirmative attitudes and our reasons and considered judgments. On his view, our attachments to the persons and projects that give meaning to our lives lead us to affirm states of affairs it would be more appropriate to regret. I argue that the attitude of affirmation can acknowledge and do justice to reasons for regret. Wallace fails to appreciate the implications of the Nietzschean positions he cites as precedents; he assumes the past has a meaning that is fixed and insulated from the future. Drawing on Nietzsche, I argue that the affirmation of life is a coherent project of bestowing meaning on a historical sequence going forward into the future.
摘要本文的主题是探讨不幸和其他令人遗憾的场合与对生命的肯定的关系。R. Jay Wallace认为，在我们的肯定态度和我们的理性和经过深思熟虑的判断之间存在一种对立关系，这种关系导致了分裂。在他看来，我们对赋予我们生命意义的人和事的依恋使我们肯定了一些更应该后悔的事情。我认为，肯定的态度可以承认并公正地对待后悔的原因。华莱士没有领会尼采观点的含义，他引用尼采的观点作为先例;他认为过去的意义是固定的，与未来隔绝的。借鉴尼采，我认为，生命的肯定是一个连贯的工程，赋予意义的历史序列，向前进入未来。
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