Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2115608
Tosin Adeate
In a joint article1 with Wenceslaus Kwindingwi, Bernard Matolino declared an end to ubuntu. The declaration, they argue, is a result of the failure of ubuntu in practice and theory in modern African societies. This declaration triggered strong reactions, and an analysis of these responses suggests the need for continuous interrogations of African ideals and beliefs and their relevance to modern African thought. In this article, I argue that Kwindingwi and Matolino’s argument is in line with Matolino’s broader scepticism about Afro-communitarianism in general. In other works, he insists that attempts to theoretically and practically ground postcolonial African philosophy in ideas of Afro-communitarianism exaggerate its functionality. I aim to show that Matolino’s Socratic process and the outcomes, as demonstrated in the “The end of ubuntu”, aim to produce quality understanding and reasoned defence of the traditional ideas aimed to guide modern African thought. The rejectionist approach should be seen as a nudge to make the advocacy for African ideals and beliefs, such as ubuntu, match up with the knowledge of them and how they operate in reality.
Bernard Matolino在与Wenceslaus Kwindingwi的联合文章1中宣布结束乌班图。他们认为，这一宣言是乌班图在现代非洲社会实践和理论上失败的结果。这一宣言引发了强烈的反应，对这些反应的分析表明，有必要不断质疑非洲的理想和信仰及其与现代非洲思想的相关性。在这篇文章中，我认为Kwindingwi和Matolino的论点与Matolino对非洲社群主义的更广泛怀疑是一致的。在其他作品中，他坚持认为，试图在非洲社群主义思想中建立后殖民非洲哲学的理论和实践基础，夸大了其功能。我的目的是表明，正如《乌班图的终结》中所展示的那样，马托利诺的苏格拉底过程和结果旨在对旨在指导现代非洲思想的传统思想产生高质量的理解和合理的辩护。拒绝主义的做法应该被视为一种推动，使对非洲理想和信仰的倡导，如乌班图，与对它们的了解以及它们在现实中的运作方式相匹配。
{"title":"“The end of ubuntu”: An extension of Matolino’s scepticism","authors":"Tosin Adeate","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2022.2115608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2022.2115608","url":null,"abstract":"In a joint article1 with Wenceslaus Kwindingwi, Bernard Matolino declared an end to ubuntu. The declaration, they argue, is a result of the failure of ubuntu in practice and theory in modern African societies. This declaration triggered strong reactions, and an analysis of these responses suggests the need for continuous interrogations of African ideals and beliefs and their relevance to modern African thought. In this article, I argue that Kwindingwi and Matolino’s argument is in line with Matolino’s broader scepticism about Afro-communitarianism in general. In other works, he insists that attempts to theoretically and practically ground postcolonial African philosophy in ideas of Afro-communitarianism exaggerate its functionality. I aim to show that Matolino’s Socratic process and the outcomes, as demonstrated in the “The end of ubuntu”, aim to produce quality understanding and reasoned defence of the traditional ideas aimed to guide modern African thought. The rejectionist approach should be seen as a nudge to make the advocacy for African ideals and beliefs, such as ubuntu, match up with the knowledge of them and how they operate in reality.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"325 - 336"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46064555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2023.2206343
A. C. Terblanché-Greeff, Petrus Nel
Cultural values are often used to categorise groups, e.g. individualism versus collectivism. Often when cultural values are measured, etic scales are used without giving attention to cultural value nuances, e.g. different types of collectivism. An example of a nuanced cultural value is found in the interpretation of ubuntu as a context-specific presentation of collectivism in South Africa. In this article, which may be viewed as an instance of experimental philosophy, the concept of ubuntu will be introduced based on the work of the philosopher Thaddeus Metz by focusing on the distinct aspects of harmonious relationships of identity and solidarity. The theoretical basis was used to develop and validate the Metzian Ubuntu Inventory (MUI) with a sample of 316 respondents. This scale consists of nine items, and has reliability and validity in the South African context. In the conclusion, possible applications of the MUI are suggested.
{"title":"Measuring context-specific collectivism: The Metzian Ubuntu Inventory","authors":"A. C. Terblanché-Greeff, Petrus Nel","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2023.2206343","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2023.2206343","url":null,"abstract":"Cultural values are often used to categorise groups, e.g. individualism versus collectivism. Often when cultural values are measured, etic scales are used without giving attention to cultural value nuances, e.g. different types of collectivism. An example of a nuanced cultural value is found in the interpretation of ubuntu as a context-specific presentation of collectivism in South Africa. In this article, which may be viewed as an instance of experimental philosophy, the concept of ubuntu will be introduced based on the work of the philosopher Thaddeus Metz by focusing on the distinct aspects of harmonious relationships of identity and solidarity. The theoretical basis was used to develop and validate the Metzian Ubuntu Inventory (MUI) with a sample of 316 respondents. This scale consists of nine items, and has reliability and validity in the South African context. In the conclusion, possible applications of the MUI are suggested.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"401 - 414"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48135812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2023.2206202
Damon Mackett
This article explores a new form of epistemic injustice related to computers and data mining in our interconnected world. I argue that data mining, as it is currently practiced, not only perpetuates but also contributes to a moral injustice primarily driven by economic factors. By employing Gaile Pohlhaus’s theoretical framework, the paper establishes criteria that classify data mining as a form of epistemic injustice (P1) and demonstrates its differentiation from other known forms in existing literature (P2). Through a comprehensive analysis of data mining’s alignment with these criteria, the article highlights its unique nature and draws attention to its previously overlooked manifestation of epistemic injustice. By comparing data mining to established forms of epistemic injustice, this research underscores the urgent need for a critical examination of this ethical dilemma arising from technological advancements.
{"title":"Contracts and computers","authors":"Damon Mackett","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2023.2206202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2023.2206202","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores a new form of epistemic injustice related to computers and data mining in our interconnected world. I argue that data mining, as it is currently practiced, not only perpetuates but also contributes to a moral injustice primarily driven by economic factors. By employing Gaile Pohlhaus’s theoretical framework, the paper establishes criteria that classify data mining as a form of epistemic injustice (P1) and demonstrates its differentiation from other known forms in existing literature (P2). Through a comprehensive analysis of data mining’s alignment with these criteria, the article highlights its unique nature and draws attention to its previously overlooked manifestation of epistemic injustice. By comparing data mining to established forms of epistemic injustice, this research underscores the urgent need for a critical examination of this ethical dilemma arising from technological advancements.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"386 - 400"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41799326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2023.2206201
Kayleigh Timmer
The institution of marriage makes women vulnerable, as does being unmarried in a society that idealises marriage as the norm. It is argued that the use of civil unions as an alternative to legal marriage does not protect women from this vulnerability, and nor do proposed reforms to the institution. The institution of legal marriage therefore must be abolished. A hybrid of Clare Chambers’ piecemeal regulation of relationships and Elizabeth Brake’s minimal marriage, termed the anti-vulnerability approach to relationship regulation (or the AVA) is put forward as the best means to regulate relationships in a way that will protect women from vulnerability. The AVA is implementable in countries where Western marriage is not always the norm, such as South Africa, and is also strongly compatible with LGBTQIA+ relationship styles and arguments against marriage. However, as a piecemeal regulation of relationships cannot be implemented alongside holistic regulation systems, such as legal marriage, legal marriage would need to be abolished to create a system of regulating relationships that will be able to protect women from vulnerability.
{"title":"Abolish legal marriage: An anti-vulnerability approach to relationship regulation","authors":"Kayleigh Timmer","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2023.2206201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2023.2206201","url":null,"abstract":"The institution of marriage makes women vulnerable, as does being unmarried in a society that idealises marriage as the norm. It is argued that the use of civil unions as an alternative to legal marriage does not protect women from this vulnerability, and nor do proposed reforms to the institution. The institution of legal marriage therefore must be abolished. A hybrid of Clare Chambers’ piecemeal regulation of relationships and Elizabeth Brake’s minimal marriage, termed the anti-vulnerability approach to relationship regulation (or the AVA) is put forward as the best means to regulate relationships in a way that will protect women from vulnerability. The AVA is implementable in countries where Western marriage is not always the norm, such as South Africa, and is also strongly compatible with LGBTQIA+ relationship styles and arguments against marriage. However, as a piecemeal regulation of relationships cannot be implemented alongside holistic regulation systems, such as legal marriage, legal marriage would need to be abolished to create a system of regulating relationships that will be able to protect women from vulnerability.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"369 - 385"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49595273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2023.2230721
Motsamai Molefe
The question of the purpose of doing (or writing) philosophy can be a perplexing one. The literature on this subject is expansive, controversial and diverse. One useful way, however, is to construe philosophy as an intellectual service to humanity. I am not sure if Plato’s rendition of philosophy as a reflection on a problem until one reaches a state of “wonder” can be useful as a lens through which to make sense of the kind of intellectual service philosophy is to humanity. Kwame Gyekye’s adumbrations on the nature and function of philosophy, however, do shed some light on the kind of service that philosophy can and does offer to humanity. Note these reflections by Gyekye (1997, 6) on the nature and function of philosophy:
{"title":"Editor’s introduction","authors":"Motsamai Molefe","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2023.2230721","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2023.2230721","url":null,"abstract":"The question of the purpose of doing (or writing) philosophy can be a perplexing one. The literature on this subject is expansive, controversial and diverse. One useful way, however, is to construe philosophy as an intellectual service to humanity. I am not sure if Plato’s rendition of philosophy as a reflection on a problem until one reaches a state of “wonder” can be useful as a lens through which to make sense of the kind of intellectual service philosophy is to humanity. Kwame Gyekye’s adumbrations on the nature and function of philosophy, however, do shed some light on the kind of service that philosophy can and does offer to humanity. Note these reflections by Gyekye (1997, 6) on the nature and function of philosophy:","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"321 - 324"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47550420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2086741
Erdal Yılmaz
This article seeks the possibility of a genuine ethical dialogue based on Gadamer’s notion of a “fusion of horizons”. For Gadamer, the human being is blessed with the unique ability to understand, and understanding is modelled on the act of conversation in which we engage with others. The fact that different points of view of dialogue partners merge in the process of understanding leads them to a better and mutual understanding, which is a fusion of horizons. For some of Gadamer’s critics, in the fusion, the more dominant horizon assimilates the other, which is why Gadamer’s notion of understanding seems to be unethical. To avoid this misinterpretation of the process of understanding, I will interpret Gadamer’s notion of understanding as the fusion of horizons based on his analysis of the concepts of “dialogue” and “play” (Spiel). By doing that, I aim at showing that Gadamer’s notion of the fusion of horizons is a dynamic process and that the latter requires an “openness” of participants to each other, which leads their encounter toward a genuine ethical dialogue.
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Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2095163
J. Schrijvers
This essay joins the ongoing conversation comparing the thought of Bruno Latour to Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology in particular and the phenomenological tradition in general. The article queries whether or not there is a metaphysics at work in Latour’s philosophy and, if so, whether this metaphysics would be at a sufficient distance from what Heidegger labelled as ontotheology, “grasping” and “comprehending” being and beings in its totality. The essay finds that at crucial stages Latour repeats features of ontotheological modes of thinking that make for the fact that, despite all evidence to the contrary, Latour is not so distant from modern attempts that reveal beings as they truly are or even beings as they always will be. Throughout, we query what Latour’s account of scientific practice and its concomitant crossing of contingency and meaning can contribute to recent debates in phenomenology.
{"title":"Gaia and ontotheology – Latour, Heidegger and the debate with phenomenology","authors":"J. Schrijvers","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2022.2095163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2022.2095163","url":null,"abstract":"This essay joins the ongoing conversation comparing the thought of Bruno Latour to Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology in particular and the phenomenological tradition in general. The article queries whether or not there is a metaphysics at work in Latour’s philosophy and, if so, whether this metaphysics would be at a sufficient distance from what Heidegger labelled as ontotheology, “grasping” and “comprehending” being and beings in its totality. The essay finds that at crucial stages Latour repeats features of ontotheological modes of thinking that make for the fact that, despite all evidence to the contrary, Latour is not so distant from modern attempts that reveal beings as they truly are or even beings as they always will be. Throughout, we query what Latour’s account of scientific practice and its concomitant crossing of contingency and meaning can contribute to recent debates in phenomenology.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"275 - 291"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47395158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2095164
Hari Narayanan V
This article argues that there is no performative self-contradiction involved in reports of selfless consciousness, at least in the non-pathological sense of the term. This is because what is central to the experience of selfless consciousness is a different kind of relation of the self with the rest of the world and, therefore, it is not a case of dissolution or decimation of the self. Such an understanding of selflessness can easily distinguish spiritual selflessness from pathological forms such as depersonalisation. This article seeks to provide an explanation for why reports are made of there being no self or subjectivity by appealing to the notion of attentional saliency.
{"title":"Self model and selflessness","authors":"Hari Narayanan V","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2022.2095164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2022.2095164","url":null,"abstract":"This article argues that there is no performative self-contradiction involved in reports of selfless consciousness, at least in the non-pathological sense of the term. This is because what is central to the experience of selfless consciousness is a different kind of relation of the self with the rest of the world and, therefore, it is not a case of dissolution or decimation of the self. Such an understanding of selflessness can easily distinguish spiritual selflessness from pathological forms such as depersonalisation. This article seeks to provide an explanation for why reports are made of there being no self or subjectivity by appealing to the notion of attentional saliency.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"292 - 305"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42917011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2095165
L. Cordeiro‐Rodrigues
In the Western theist tradition, the conception of a person tends to be understood as an intrinsic property. Hence, the classification of someone as a person does not depend on relational aspects of that person. From this, Western theists often understand that their conception of God as a person does not clash with the idea of immutability. In this article, I challenge the idea that being a person and being immutable are compatible properties by using Afro-communitarian philosophy and, more specifically Afro-communitarian metaphysics of personhood. Afro-communitarian metaphysics is fundamentally relational, i.e. it understands that most properties of the world depend on the existence of other entities. More precisely, personhood is a property that depends on the existence of relatable beings. But if this is true, then it is not possible to hold that an entity that has the property of personhood also has the property of immutability. More specifically, an entity that is a person has to change due to the fact that personhood is a relational property. This is because it is a necessary condition for being a person that one relates to others, i.e. one only becomes a person when this relation occurs. Hence, the process of becoming a person requires a moment before the relation with another and one after; thereby, the feature of being a person requires the feature of change. With respect to the Christian conception of God, what this implies is that if theist philosophers wish to understand Him as a person, they have to also accept that God is not immutable. For if other beings besides Him are not eternal, then it is only possible that He can be a person when these other beings first started existing. This is the case because the kind of relationality needed to be a person is not simply to relate to something (like emptiness), but to do something that makes Him addressable (which requires that the thing He relates to has the capacity to address Him). This means there are two moments of existence where He has distinct properties and, therefore, is mutable.
{"title":"African relational ontology, personhood and immutability","authors":"L. Cordeiro‐Rodrigues","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2022.2095165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2022.2095165","url":null,"abstract":"In the Western theist tradition, the conception of a person tends to be understood as an intrinsic property. Hence, the classification of someone as a person does not depend on relational aspects of that person. From this, Western theists often understand that their conception of God as a person does not clash with the idea of immutability. In this article, I challenge the idea that being a person and being immutable are compatible properties by using Afro-communitarian philosophy and, more specifically Afro-communitarian metaphysics of personhood. Afro-communitarian metaphysics is fundamentally relational, i.e. it understands that most properties of the world depend on the existence of other entities. More precisely, personhood is a property that depends on the existence of relatable beings. But if this is true, then it is not possible to hold that an entity that has the property of personhood also has the property of immutability. More specifically, an entity that is a person has to change due to the fact that personhood is a relational property. This is because it is a necessary condition for being a person that one relates to others, i.e. one only becomes a person when this relation occurs. Hence, the process of becoming a person requires a moment before the relation with another and one after; thereby, the feature of being a person requires the feature of change. With respect to the Christian conception of God, what this implies is that if theist philosophers wish to understand Him as a person, they have to also accept that God is not immutable. For if other beings besides Him are not eternal, then it is only possible that He can be a person when these other beings first started existing. This is the case because the kind of relationality needed to be a person is not simply to relate to something (like emptiness), but to do something that makes Him addressable (which requires that the thing He relates to has the capacity to address Him). This means there are two moments of existence where He has distinct properties and, therefore, is mutable.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"306 - 320"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44278542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2087144
D. Griffiths
This article offers a prolegomenon for an African feminist philosophy. The prompt for this as an interrogation of Oluwele’s claim that an African feminist philosophy cannot develop until identifiable African worldviews that guide the relationship between men and women have been established. She argues that until there is general agreement about the nature of African philosophy itself, African feminist philosophy will remain impoverished. I critique this claim, unpacking Oluwele’s argument, and examine the contested nature of both African and Western philosophy. Drawing from the work of Mignolo and decolonial thinking, I then argue for the possibility of “epistemic disobedience” concerning the emergence of an African feminist philosophy. Engaging with precolonial African examples which disrupt modern normative gender assumptions and looking at the project of decoloniality, I issue a call for an African feminist philosophy unfettered by the falsely universal claims of modernity/coloniality. My call is for an African feminist philosophy from African loci of enunciation, rooted in the epistemes and experiences of African women. “Most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking” (Heidegger 1968, 6).
{"title":"Decoloniality and the (im)possibility of an African feminist philosophy","authors":"D. Griffiths","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2022.2087144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2022.2087144","url":null,"abstract":"This article offers a prolegomenon for an African feminist philosophy. The prompt for this as an interrogation of Oluwele’s claim that an African feminist philosophy cannot develop until identifiable African worldviews that guide the relationship between men and women have been established. She argues that until there is general agreement about the nature of African philosophy itself, African feminist philosophy will remain impoverished. I critique this claim, unpacking Oluwele’s argument, and examine the contested nature of both African and Western philosophy. Drawing from the work of Mignolo and decolonial thinking, I then argue for the possibility of “epistemic disobedience” concerning the emergence of an African feminist philosophy. Engaging with precolonial African examples which disrupt modern normative gender assumptions and looking at the project of decoloniality, I issue a call for an African feminist philosophy unfettered by the falsely universal claims of modernity/coloniality. My call is for an African feminist philosophy from African loci of enunciation, rooted in the epistemes and experiences of African women. “Most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking” (Heidegger 1968, 6).","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"240 - 252"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48970015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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