Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2087314
F. Asodun
Two critical questions spun the web of the Turing test debate. First, can an appropriately programmed machine pass the Turing test? Second, is passing the test by such a machine, ipso facto, considered proof that it is intelligent and hence “minded”? While the first question is technological, the second is purely philosophical. Focusing on the second question, this article interrogates the implication of John Searle’s Chinese room denial of machine intelligence. The thrust of Searle’s argument is that a machine lacks intentionality, so it can only simulate intelligence, not duplicate it. In his thinking, whatever a machine inputs to generate an intelligent output has no bearing on humanlike intelligence. Incidentally, Searle did not classify such a machine’s output as simulated and non-intelligent, nor did he explain how this output is actualised with mere simulation. The connection between “unintelligent machine’s input” and “intelligent machine’s output” is at this point shrouded in mystery. Consequently, the more Searle attempts a denial of machine intelligence in the Chinese room, the more he mystifies it. Using the method of critical analysis, this article advances three fundamental arguments to prove a machines’ obscurity in the Chinese room thought experiment. On the ground of Searle’s conviction, the first argument queries the absurdity in bypassing intentionality to produce intelligence; the second points out the obfuscation in generating intelligence with mere computation, and the third draws attention to the dilemma of classifying a machine’s output either as real-life intelligent behaviour or simulated intelligent behaviour.
{"title":"The paradox of denial and mystification of machine intelligence in the Chinese room","authors":"F. Asodun","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2022.2087314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2022.2087314","url":null,"abstract":"Two critical questions spun the web of the Turing test debate. First, can an appropriately programmed machine pass the Turing test? Second, is passing the test by such a machine, ipso facto, considered proof that it is intelligent and hence “minded”? While the first question is technological, the second is purely philosophical. Focusing on the second question, this article interrogates the implication of John Searle’s Chinese room denial of machine intelligence. The thrust of Searle’s argument is that a machine lacks intentionality, so it can only simulate intelligence, not duplicate it. In his thinking, whatever a machine inputs to generate an intelligent output has no bearing on humanlike intelligence. Incidentally, Searle did not classify such a machine’s output as simulated and non-intelligent, nor did he explain how this output is actualised with mere simulation. The connection between “unintelligent machine’s input” and “intelligent machine’s output” is at this point shrouded in mystery. Consequently, the more Searle attempts a denial of machine intelligence in the Chinese room, the more he mystifies it. Using the method of critical analysis, this article advances three fundamental arguments to prove a machines’ obscurity in the Chinese room thought experiment. On the ground of Searle’s conviction, the first argument queries the absurdity in bypassing intentionality to produce intelligence; the second points out the obfuscation in generating intelligence with mere computation, and the third draws attention to the dilemma of classifying a machine’s output either as real-life intelligent behaviour or simulated intelligent behaviour.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"253 - 263"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43612330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2087842
Emmanuel Odenigbo
The search for identity is at the core of African political philosophy. This has moved from its essentialist enclave to recent calls for cosmopolitanism or Afropolitanism in the African context. This article takes a critical look at Afropolitanism. While it accepts that Afropolitanism is important because of the nature of modern society, it queries Afropolitanism in the context of the peculiar nature of African nations that are still mere geographical territories in search of national identities. Hence, it argues that Afropolitanism alone will not be enough as a basis to construct African identity, rather it may worsen bourgeoning African identity crises.
{"title":"Afropolitanism and the search for identity in Africa","authors":"Emmanuel Odenigbo","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2022.2087842","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2022.2087842","url":null,"abstract":"The search for identity is at the core of African political philosophy. This has moved from its essentialist enclave to recent calls for cosmopolitanism or Afropolitanism in the African context. This article takes a critical look at Afropolitanism. While it accepts that Afropolitanism is important because of the nature of modern society, it queries Afropolitanism in the context of the peculiar nature of African nations that are still mere geographical territories in search of national identities. Hence, it argues that Afropolitanism alone will not be enough as a basis to construct African identity, rather it may worsen bourgeoning African identity crises.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"264 - 274"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45202802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2098455
J. S. Sanni, Mary Carman, Edwin Etieyibo
More recent discussions in African philosophy have focused on substantive issues than the largely meta-philosophical discussions that African philosophers engaged in between the 1960s and 1990s. This makes this special issue very important. Collectively the articles in the issue, among others, explore contemporary topics in African philosophy and studies in the area of the political philosophy of need, oral tradition in philosophy, majoritarian democracy and decolonisation, biomedical and relational conceptions of the body, an identity-driven approach to African studies, Plato’s crucible and contemporary African understandings of leadership and the metaphysical underpinnings in existing discourses on disability in Africa.
{"title":"Introduction: Themes and discourses in African philosophy","authors":"J. S. Sanni, Mary Carman, Edwin Etieyibo","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2022.2098455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2022.2098455","url":null,"abstract":"More recent discussions in African philosophy have focused on substantive issues than the largely meta-philosophical discussions that African philosophers engaged in between the 1960s and 1990s. This makes this special issue very important. Collectively the articles in the issue, among others, explore contemporary topics in African philosophy and studies in the area of the political philosophy of need, oral tradition in philosophy, majoritarian democracy and decolonisation, biomedical and relational conceptions of the body, an identity-driven approach to African studies, Plato’s crucible and contemporary African understandings of leadership and the metaphysical underpinnings in existing discourses on disability in Africa.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"121 - 130"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49290072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2059984
Mbih Jerome Tosam
In this article, I argue that every medical tradition is anchored in a certain anthropological understanding of the body, how that body can be afflicted by disease, and how best it can be treated. Also, each model of the body has implications for the nature of the patient-physician relationship and for quality of care. I compare two leading models of the body: the biomedical model, the predominant model in modern medicine; and the relational model, the leading model in indigenous sub-Saharan African medicine; and their implications on the conceptualisation of disease, the nature of the patient-physician relationship and quality of care. I show that because the biomedical model largely limits its clinical attention to the material body, it does not extend its gaze into the spiritual, social and ecological realms like the relational model, and in spite of the reforms it has undergone since the second half of the 20th century, this reductionist outlook has not faded. Also, because of the premium it places on rationality in the clinical encounter, the biomedical model emphasises individualistic values such as autonomy and emotional detachment of the physician from the patient. The relational model, on the other hand, though still uncharted, promotes inclusive values such as empathy, spirituality and harmony in health care. I argue that human nature is more complex than the biomedical and bio-psychosocial models construe; there are marginal models which may contribute to enhancing the biomedical model. Hence, there is a need to consider less-dominant medical approaches to the body.
{"title":"The biomedical and the relational model of the body, the meaning of illness and quality of care: A comparative analysis","authors":"Mbih Jerome Tosam","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2022.2059984","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2022.2059984","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I argue that every medical tradition is anchored in a certain anthropological understanding of the body, how that body can be afflicted by disease, and how best it can be treated. Also, each model of the body has implications for the nature of the patient-physician relationship and for quality of care. I compare two leading models of the body: the biomedical model, the predominant model in modern medicine; and the relational model, the leading model in indigenous sub-Saharan African medicine; and their implications on the conceptualisation of disease, the nature of the patient-physician relationship and quality of care. I show that because the biomedical model largely limits its clinical attention to the material body, it does not extend its gaze into the spiritual, social and ecological realms like the relational model, and in spite of the reforms it has undergone since the second half of the 20th century, this reductionist outlook has not faded. Also, because of the premium it places on rationality in the clinical encounter, the biomedical model emphasises individualistic values such as autonomy and emotional detachment of the physician from the patient. The relational model, on the other hand, though still uncharted, promotes inclusive values such as empathy, spirituality and harmony in health care. I argue that human nature is more complex than the biomedical and bio-psychosocial models construe; there are marginal models which may contribute to enhancing the biomedical model. Hence, there is a need to consider less-dominant medical approaches to the body.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"131 - 147"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41350364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2059985
J. S. Sanni
The social, cultural and economic history of Africa informs the various political narratives on the continent. Among these narratives birthing various intellectual discourses are the questions of personhood and communitarianism, socialism, independence, decolonisation and ubuntu. Implicit in these discourses, yet less theorised, is an African political philosophy of needs. By an African political philosophy of needs, I refer to a political philosophy that theorises about the social, economic and political realities in Africa, especially as they pertain to the needs that these realities engender. This article seeks to formulate a compelling, positive African political philosophy of needs. It does this by engaging Gyekye’s “moderate communitarianism”. It explores the various African political philosophical conceptions, thereby showing the need to theorise an African philosophy of needs adequately. The significance of this article is to address how various conditions, namely weak states (as a result of colonialism and postcolonial corruption), the complex history of leaders and massive underdevelopment of countries’ manufacturing capabilities in Africa are unable to respond to people’s needs, and how African political preoccupations, although important, have had deleterious effects on the political philosophy of needs. I shall argue on the capacity of African states to respond adequately to, and become responsible for, their citizens’ needs.
{"title":"Moderate communitarianism and the prospect of an African political philosophy of needs","authors":"J. S. Sanni","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2022.2059985","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2022.2059985","url":null,"abstract":"The social, cultural and economic history of Africa informs the various political narratives on the continent. Among these narratives birthing various intellectual discourses are the questions of personhood and communitarianism, socialism, independence, decolonisation and ubuntu. Implicit in these discourses, yet less theorised, is an African political philosophy of needs. By an African political philosophy of needs, I refer to a political philosophy that theorises about the social, economic and political realities in Africa, especially as they pertain to the needs that these realities engender. This article seeks to formulate a compelling, positive African political philosophy of needs. It does this by engaging Gyekye’s “moderate communitarianism”. It explores the various African political philosophical conceptions, thereby showing the need to theorise an African philosophy of needs adequately. The significance of this article is to address how various conditions, namely weak states (as a result of colonialism and postcolonial corruption), the complex history of leaders and massive underdevelopment of countries’ manufacturing capabilities in Africa are unable to respond to people’s needs, and how African political preoccupations, although important, have had deleterious effects on the political philosophy of needs. I shall argue on the capacity of African states to respond adequately to, and become responsible for, their citizens’ needs.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"148 - 158"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48138682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2073068
O. Balogun
In recent times, African countries like Nigeria have witnessed a lot of internal problems and challenges associated with their democratic system of governance. These problems have produced ethnic conflicts, security challenges, corruption, poor leadership, betrayal of trust and low quality of life. This article argues that a major cause of these problems is the uncritical adoption of a Western system of democracy and its concomitant structures of power in African societies. The article posits further that the neglect and despising of the indigenous African understanding of power is reasonably responsible for the unfettered flowering of corruption and ethnic conflicts in contemporary Africa. This article recommends decolonising the idea of power central to majoritarian democracy as a major pathway in addressing some pressing sociopolitical problems including conflicts in democratisation processes, injustice and the problem of dictatorships in contemporary African societies. While the indigenous notion of power binds the ruler to a covenant of commitment and performance with the society, this article contends that a reinvigoration of a decolonised notion of power is worth taking seriously.
{"title":"Decolonising power: A critique of majoritarian democracy in Africa","authors":"O. Balogun","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2022.2073068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2022.2073068","url":null,"abstract":"In recent times, African countries like Nigeria have witnessed a lot of internal problems and challenges associated with their democratic system of governance. These problems have produced ethnic conflicts, security challenges, corruption, poor leadership, betrayal of trust and low quality of life. This article argues that a major cause of these problems is the uncritical adoption of a Western system of democracy and its concomitant structures of power in African societies. The article posits further that the neglect and despising of the indigenous African understanding of power is reasonably responsible for the unfettered flowering of corruption and ethnic conflicts in contemporary Africa. This article recommends decolonising the idea of power central to majoritarian democracy as a major pathway in addressing some pressing sociopolitical problems including conflicts in democratisation processes, injustice and the problem of dictatorships in contemporary African societies. While the indigenous notion of power binds the ruler to a covenant of commitment and performance with the society, this article contends that a reinvigoration of a decolonised notion of power is worth taking seriously.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"195 - 204"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48983437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2094144
A. Ajah, J. Akah
In this article, we show how scholarly insistence on the preservation of a certain African tradition, heritage, or identity, inhibits agentic reflections and actions in response to contemporary developmental needs of African societies. This article attempts to answer this question: Of what use are the traditions, heritages and identities if they only enhance a sense of continental and cultural pride but do not enhance well-being, nor contribute to solving global human challenges? We argue that there is nothing special about traditional precolonial societies in Africa, except that: (i) they were traditional as different from modern; and (ii) they were precolonial. But they were not the only societies that had these features. Many scholars have ignored these facts because of a desire to emphasise Africa’s uniqueness in the face of, for instance, what is termed epistemic violence. We highlight three anti-development consequences of this approach for African studies. First, it normalises the marketisation of the knowledge-making process in Africa. Second, it justifies Wahbie Long’s submission that something is seriously wrong with African academia. Third, it inhibits agentic reflections and actions in response to the contemporary needs of African societies.
{"title":"Developmental consequences of identity-driven African studies","authors":"A. Ajah, J. Akah","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2022.2094144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2022.2094144","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we show how scholarly insistence on the preservation of a certain African tradition, heritage, or identity, inhibits agentic reflections and actions in response to contemporary developmental needs of African societies. This article attempts to answer this question: Of what use are the traditions, heritages and identities if they only enhance a sense of continental and cultural pride but do not enhance well-being, nor contribute to solving global human challenges? We argue that there is nothing special about traditional precolonial societies in Africa, except that: (i) they were traditional as different from modern; and (ii) they were precolonial. But they were not the only societies that had these features. Many scholars have ignored these facts because of a desire to emphasise Africa’s uniqueness in the face of, for instance, what is termed epistemic violence. We highlight three anti-development consequences of this approach for African studies. First, it normalises the marketisation of the knowledge-making process in Africa. Second, it justifies Wahbie Long’s submission that something is seriously wrong with African academia. Third, it inhibits agentic reflections and actions in response to the contemporary needs of African societies.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"216 - 228"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48696130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2059986
Edwin Etieyibo
In the last decade or so, some substantive work on disability in Africa has been done. Nonetheless, and this is so for different reasons, the nature and substance of disability in intellectual discourses in Africa still largely remain undefined and uncategorised. In this article, I aim to contribute to the scholarship on disability by examining if and whether one can talk meaningfully of metaphysical disability and how this notion of disability is related to other forms of disability or particular incidences of disability in an African cultural worldview. This discussion and exercise I believe not only sheds light on possible metaphysical underpinnings of disabilities in Africa, but also illuminates some aspects of the nature and substance of disability on the continent.
{"title":"African metaphysics and disabilities","authors":"Edwin Etieyibo","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2022.2059986","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2022.2059986","url":null,"abstract":"In the last decade or so, some substantive work on disability in Africa has been done. Nonetheless, and this is so for different reasons, the nature and substance of disability in intellectual discourses in Africa still largely remain undefined and uncategorised. In this article, I aim to contribute to the scholarship on disability by examining if and whether one can talk meaningfully of metaphysical disability and how this notion of disability is related to other forms of disability or particular incidences of disability in an African cultural worldview. This discussion and exercise I believe not only sheds light on possible metaphysical underpinnings of disabilities in Africa, but also illuminates some aspects of the nature and substance of disability on the continent.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"159 - 168"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49143433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2059987
Enoch Joseph Aboi
Virtue and vice, courage and cowardice, wisdom and folly are tendencies common to all humans without historical, geographical, colour, or gender exceptions. Granting that the aforesaid statement is tenable, this article engages Plato’s idea of a just city and a just soul in the Republic and considers how these might speak to contemporary African leadership deficits and societal ills. This appraisal is predicated upon the notion that a just city and a just soul or their approximation are attainable and worth pursuing in contemporary Africa. Thus, as answers are sought for the colonial legacies still haunting Africa, self-examination is necessarily part of the process. In the Wretched of the Earth for example, it is easy and maybe legitimately so, to focus on Franz Fanon’s fiery critique of the colonialists and miss his self-critical appraisal of African intellectuals and leaders whom he calls “[s]poiled children of yesterday’s colonialism and today’s governing powers” that “oversee the looting of the few national resources”. More than fifty years after colonialism, this critique still remains valid. I therefore explore Plato’s answers (or questions) to this age-old human crisis of self- and public governance currently amplified in Africa and hampering common good and progress. In the search for a just city characterised by common good, this article spotlights Nigeria to buttress Plato’s emphasis on state of the soul rather than class, colour or creed as a precursor to leading a just and eudaemonic life and good self- and public governance.
{"title":"No justice, no progress: Contemporary African leadership and society in Plato’s crucible","authors":"Enoch Joseph Aboi","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2022.2059987","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2022.2059987","url":null,"abstract":"Virtue and vice, courage and cowardice, wisdom and folly are tendencies common to all humans without historical, geographical, colour, or gender exceptions. Granting that the aforesaid statement is tenable, this article engages Plato’s idea of a just city and a just soul in the Republic and considers how these might speak to contemporary African leadership deficits and societal ills. This appraisal is predicated upon the notion that a just city and a just soul or their approximation are attainable and worth pursuing in contemporary Africa. Thus, as answers are sought for the colonial legacies still haunting Africa, self-examination is necessarily part of the process. In the Wretched of the Earth for example, it is easy and maybe legitimately so, to focus on Franz Fanon’s fiery critique of the colonialists and miss his self-critical appraisal of African intellectuals and leaders whom he calls “[s]poiled children of yesterday’s colonialism and today’s governing powers” that “oversee the looting of the few national resources”. More than fifty years after colonialism, this critique still remains valid. I therefore explore Plato’s answers (or questions) to this age-old human crisis of self- and public governance currently amplified in Africa and hampering common good and progress. In the search for a just city characterised by common good, this article spotlights Nigeria to buttress Plato’s emphasis on state of the soul rather than class, colour or creed as a precursor to leading a just and eudaemonic life and good self- and public governance.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"169 - 180"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46730322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2022.2088649
M. F. Asiegbu
In her relations with Africa, Europe advances a major migration claim about a “migration crisis” or “refugee crisis” in the era of globalisation. Although human mobility is a fact of human history, the search for greener pastures is ever expanding in a globalising world. Europe has insisted on the view that Africa-to-Europe migration attained a “crisis” point in 2015. Rather than this prevalent migration narrative, which privileges the European Union’s (EU) border surveillance measures, using sophisticated arrays of digital security gadgets that are gulping billions of euros, and the reports about some African governments’ lack of political will to police migration, and EU-AU anti-migration partnerships, etc. – all narratives being constructed from the European perspective – I advance the view for the need for a principal African migration narrative that focuses on the regeneration of Africa. Though this may be underappreciated, this narrative from the African perspective portrays the African embrace of pan-African philosophy emerging from African culture. Moreover, an alternative migration narrative offers a nobler conception of African migrants.
{"title":"Migration narrative: Towards a possible alternative for Africa in the 21st century","authors":"M. F. Asiegbu","doi":"10.1080/02580136.2022.2088649","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2022.2088649","url":null,"abstract":"In her relations with Africa, Europe advances a major migration claim about a “migration crisis” or “refugee crisis” in the era of globalisation. Although human mobility is a fact of human history, the search for greener pastures is ever expanding in a globalising world. Europe has insisted on the view that Africa-to-Europe migration attained a “crisis” point in 2015. Rather than this prevalent migration narrative, which privileges the European Union’s (EU) border surveillance measures, using sophisticated arrays of digital security gadgets that are gulping billions of euros, and the reports about some African governments’ lack of political will to police migration, and EU-AU anti-migration partnerships, etc. – all narratives being constructed from the European perspective – I advance the view for the need for a principal African migration narrative that focuses on the regeneration of Africa. Though this may be underappreciated, this narrative from the African perspective portrays the African embrace of pan-African philosophy emerging from African culture. Moreover, an alternative migration narrative offers a nobler conception of African migrants.","PeriodicalId":44834,"journal":{"name":"SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"41 1","pages":"205 - 215"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59257301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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