Pub Date : 2021-04-22DOI: 10.1017/S0898588X21000031
H. Blain
Abstract How powerful are national security bureaucrats? In the United States, they seem to be more than mere administrators, while remaining subordinate to elected politicians. However, despite a rich literature in American political development on bureaucratic autonomy across a variety of policy areas, national security remains undertheorized. Although the origins and evolution of the national security bureaucracy have received substantial scholarly attention, the individuals within this bureaucracy have not. In this article, I examine a case study of how one of these individuals bluntly ran up against the limits of his power. After the Second World War, J. Edgar Hoover's plans for a “World-Wide Intelligence Service” were swiftly shot down by the Truman administration, which adopted a sharp distinction between domestic and global intelligence instead. I pin this abject defeat on three interrelated factors: the resistance of President Truman, the array of bureaucratic competitors emerging from the Second World War, and deep aversion among key decision makers to the prospect of an “American gestapo.” While tracing this historical narrative, I also challenge accounts of Hoover as a near-omnipotent Washington operator, question the extent to which war empowers national security bureaucrats, and foreground the role of analogies in shaping the national security state.
国家安全官员到底有多强大?在美国，他们似乎不仅仅是行政人员，同时还从属于民选政治家。然而，尽管在美国政治发展中有丰富的关于各种政策领域官僚自治的文献，但国家安全仍然缺乏理论化。虽然国家安全官僚机构的起源和演变已经受到了大量的学术关注，但这个官僚机构中的个人却没有。在本文中，我考察了一个案例研究，说明这些人中的一个是如何坦率地挑战他的权力极限的。第二次世界大战后，j·埃德加·胡佛(J. Edgar Hoover)建立“全球情报机构”(worldwide Intelligence Service)的计划很快被杜鲁门政府否决，后者转而对国内情报机构和全球情报机构进行了严格区分。我把这次惨败归咎于三个相互关联的因素:杜鲁门总统的抵制，二战后出现的一系列官僚竞争对手，以及关键决策者对“美国盖世太保”前景的极度厌恶。在追溯这一历史叙述的同时，我也对胡佛作为一个近乎无所不能的华盛顿操纵者的说法提出了质疑，质疑战争在多大程度上赋予了国家安全官员权力，并强调了类比在塑造国家安全状态中的作用。
{"title":"No Gestapo: J. Edgar Hoover's world-wide intelligence service and the limits of bureaucratic autonomy in the national security state","authors":"H. Blain","doi":"10.1017/S0898588X21000031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X21000031","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How powerful are national security bureaucrats? In the United States, they seem to be more than mere administrators, while remaining subordinate to elected politicians. However, despite a rich literature in American political development on bureaucratic autonomy across a variety of policy areas, national security remains undertheorized. Although the origins and evolution of the national security bureaucracy have received substantial scholarly attention, the individuals within this bureaucracy have not. In this article, I examine a case study of how one of these individuals bluntly ran up against the limits of his power. After the Second World War, J. Edgar Hoover's plans for a “World-Wide Intelligence Service” were swiftly shot down by the Truman administration, which adopted a sharp distinction between domestic and global intelligence instead. I pin this abject defeat on three interrelated factors: the resistance of President Truman, the array of bureaucratic competitors emerging from the Second World War, and deep aversion among key decision makers to the prospect of an “American gestapo.” While tracing this historical narrative, I also challenge accounts of Hoover as a near-omnipotent Washington operator, question the extent to which war empowers national security bureaucrats, and foreground the role of analogies in shaping the national security state.","PeriodicalId":45195,"journal":{"name":"Studies in American Political Development","volume":"35 1","pages":"214 - 222"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0898588X21000031","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43889958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-21DOI: 10.1017/S0898588X21000018
K. Ramanathan
Abstract Family and medical leave policy in the United States is often noted for its lack of wage compensation, but is also distinctive in its gender neutrality and its broad coverage of several types of leave (combining pregnancy leave with medical, parental, and caregiving leave). This article argues that the distinctive design of leave policy in the United States is explained by its origins in contestation over the civil rights policy regime that emerged in the 1960s. In the early 1970s, women's movement advocates creatively and strategically formulated demands for maternity leave provision that fit an interpretation of this new policy regime's antidiscrimination logic. Because of this decision to advance an antidiscrimination claim, advocates became committed to pursuing a leave guarantee on gender-neutral grounds, which in turn enabled the broad-coverage leave design. This case study suggests that scholars of social policy and American political development should pay greater attention to the impact of civil rights on social policy. This article also contributes to the study of policy development by providing an example of how political actors cross boundaries between policy domains during the policy making process and by presenting a reconceptualization of “policy regimes.”
{"title":"From civil rights to social policy: the political development of family and medical leave policy","authors":"K. Ramanathan","doi":"10.1017/S0898588X21000018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X21000018","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Family and medical leave policy in the United States is often noted for its lack of wage compensation, but is also distinctive in its gender neutrality and its broad coverage of several types of leave (combining pregnancy leave with medical, parental, and caregiving leave). This article argues that the distinctive design of leave policy in the United States is explained by its origins in contestation over the civil rights policy regime that emerged in the 1960s. In the early 1970s, women's movement advocates creatively and strategically formulated demands for maternity leave provision that fit an interpretation of this new policy regime's antidiscrimination logic. Because of this decision to advance an antidiscrimination claim, advocates became committed to pursuing a leave guarantee on gender-neutral grounds, which in turn enabled the broad-coverage leave design. This case study suggests that scholars of social policy and American political development should pay greater attention to the impact of civil rights on social policy. This article also contributes to the study of policy development by providing an example of how political actors cross boundaries between policy domains during the policy making process and by presenting a reconceptualization of “policy regimes.”","PeriodicalId":45195,"journal":{"name":"Studies in American Political Development","volume":"35 1","pages":"173 - 193"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0898588X21000018","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47351989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-21DOI: 10.1017/S0898588X2100002X
Gwendoline M. Alphonso
Abstract The scholarship on race and political development demonstrates that race has long been embedded in public policy and political institutions. Less noticed in this literature is how family, as a deliberate political institution, is used to further racial goals and policy purposes. This article seeks to fill this gap by tracing the foundations of the political welding of family and race to the slave South in the antebellum period from 1830 to 1860. Utilizing rich testimonial evidence in court cases, I demonstrate how antebellum courts in South Carolina constructed a standard of “domestic affection” from the everyday lives of southerners, which established affection as a natural norm practiced by white male slaveowners in their roles as fathers, husbands, and masters. By constructing and regulating domestic affection to uphold slavery amid the waves of multiple modernizing forces (democratization, advancing market economy, and household egalitarianism), Southern courts in the antebellum period presaged their postbellum role of reconstructing white supremacy in the wake of slavery's demise. In both cases the courts played a formative role in naturalizing family relations in racially specific ways, constructing affection and sexuality, respectively, to anchor the white family as the bulwark of white social and political hegemony.
{"title":"Naturalizing affection, securing property: Family, slavery, and the courts in Antebellum South Carolina, 1830–1860","authors":"Gwendoline M. Alphonso","doi":"10.1017/S0898588X2100002X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X2100002X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The scholarship on race and political development demonstrates that race has long been embedded in public policy and political institutions. Less noticed in this literature is how family, as a deliberate political institution, is used to further racial goals and policy purposes. This article seeks to fill this gap by tracing the foundations of the political welding of family and race to the slave South in the antebellum period from 1830 to 1860. Utilizing rich testimonial evidence in court cases, I demonstrate how antebellum courts in South Carolina constructed a standard of “domestic affection” from the everyday lives of southerners, which established affection as a natural norm practiced by white male slaveowners in their roles as fathers, husbands, and masters. By constructing and regulating domestic affection to uphold slavery amid the waves of multiple modernizing forces (democratization, advancing market economy, and household egalitarianism), Southern courts in the antebellum period presaged their postbellum role of reconstructing white supremacy in the wake of slavery's demise. In both cases the courts played a formative role in naturalizing family relations in racially specific ways, constructing affection and sexuality, respectively, to anchor the white family as the bulwark of white social and political hegemony.","PeriodicalId":45195,"journal":{"name":"Studies in American Political Development","volume":"35 1","pages":"194 - 213"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0898588X2100002X","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47776865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-01DOI: 10.1017/s0898588x21000043
{"title":"SAP volume 35 issue 1 Cover and Front matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s0898588x21000043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0898588x21000043","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45195,"journal":{"name":"Studies in American Political Development","volume":"35 1","pages":"f1 - f3"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/s0898588x21000043","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41877072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-01DOI: 10.1017/S0898588X20000218
H. Bodenhorn
Abstract Historians have long recognized that one of the principal functions of early nineteenth-century American state governments was the distribution of economic privileges, including preferential grants of corporate privileges. North, Wallis, and Weingast label such regimes natural states and argue that government as privilege dispenser is a characteristic of most societies and, in some few instances, represents a transitional phase between traditional premodern societies and modern open-access democracies. This article documents the operation of the natural state in New York, focusing on how Martin Van Buren's Democratic coalition manipulated the distribution of bank and insurance company charters so as to advance the interests of their Democratic coalition. Consistent with the North, Wallis, and Weingast interpretation, the evidence shows that the transition to open access was neither smooth nor inevitable; Van Buren's Democratic coalition reversed the long-run trend toward greater access until they were unseated during the financial crisis years of the late 1830s.
{"title":"The Political Distribution of Economic Privilege in Van Buren's New York","authors":"H. Bodenhorn","doi":"10.1017/S0898588X20000218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X20000218","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Historians have long recognized that one of the principal functions of early nineteenth-century American state governments was the distribution of economic privileges, including preferential grants of corporate privileges. North, Wallis, and Weingast label such regimes natural states and argue that government as privilege dispenser is a characteristic of most societies and, in some few instances, represents a transitional phase between traditional premodern societies and modern open-access democracies. This article documents the operation of the natural state in New York, focusing on how Martin Van Buren's Democratic coalition manipulated the distribution of bank and insurance company charters so as to advance the interests of their Democratic coalition. Consistent with the North, Wallis, and Weingast interpretation, the evidence shows that the transition to open access was neither smooth nor inevitable; Van Buren's Democratic coalition reversed the long-run trend toward greater access until they were unseated during the financial crisis years of the late 1830s.","PeriodicalId":45195,"journal":{"name":"Studies in American Political Development","volume":"35 1","pages":"127 - 145"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0898588X20000218","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45772352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-01DOI: 10.1017/S0898588X2000019X
Matthew G. T. Denney
Abstract The FDR administration waged a war on crime starting in 1933. I argue that this war on crime had three primary effects. First, it created a ratchet effect whereby expanded institutions did not return to previous levels after the campaign ended. Second, it instilled enduring institutional and racial logics into law enforcement in America. By building a state through a war on crime, these leaders constructed a criminal justice system designed to make war. Moreover, they perpetuated the surveillance of Black leaders and eschewed calls from Black organizations demanding protection from widespread racial violence. Third, these political entrepreneurs induced an issue realignment that defined crime policy around a politics of consensus—a consensus that included every major political bloc but Black Americans, who unsuccesfully called on the federal government to hold local police accountable and address racial inequality. This coalition diffused their methods to states and deployed future wars on crime, and the racial logics cemented in the FDR era set the stage for these future wars to be deployed disproportionately against the Black community.
{"title":"“To Wage a War”: Crime, Race, and State Making in the Age of FDR","authors":"Matthew G. T. Denney","doi":"10.1017/S0898588X2000019X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X2000019X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The FDR administration waged a war on crime starting in 1933. I argue that this war on crime had three primary effects. First, it created a ratchet effect whereby expanded institutions did not return to previous levels after the campaign ended. Second, it instilled enduring institutional and racial logics into law enforcement in America. By building a state through a war on crime, these leaders constructed a criminal justice system designed to make war. Moreover, they perpetuated the surveillance of Black leaders and eschewed calls from Black organizations demanding protection from widespread racial violence. Third, these political entrepreneurs induced an issue realignment that defined crime policy around a politics of consensus—a consensus that included every major political bloc but Black Americans, who unsuccesfully called on the federal government to hold local police accountable and address racial inequality. This coalition diffused their methods to states and deployed future wars on crime, and the racial logics cemented in the FDR era set the stage for these future wars to be deployed disproportionately against the Black community.","PeriodicalId":45195,"journal":{"name":"Studies in American Political Development","volume":"35 1","pages":"16 - 56"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0898588X2000019X","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48248326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-01DOI: 10.1017/s0898588x21000055
{"title":"SAP volume 35 issue 1 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s0898588x21000055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0898588x21000055","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45195,"journal":{"name":"Studies in American Political Development","volume":"35 1","pages":"b1 - b4"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/s0898588x21000055","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44649118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-01DOI: 10.1017/S0898588X20000206
Timothy P. R. Weaver
Abstract Since the 1970s, the neoliberal worldview has become reflected increasingly in the policy ideas and institutional innovations advanced by both major parties in the United States. This is most obvious in the realm of economic and social policy, but especially evident at the subnational level, particularly in the city. I argue that neoliberalism, as an ideology, a set of policy prescriptions, and institutional designs, is conceptually distinct from liberalism, especially in its “New Deal” form, social democracy, and from conservatism. Moreover, it is having a developmental effect—neoliberal ideas and institutions have proved durable. This article argues that an urban lens most strikingly reveals the presence of a neoliberal political order that has also made its mark on national political institutions, particularly in the American political economy.
{"title":"Market Privilege: The Place of Neoliberalism in American Political Development","authors":"Timothy P. R. Weaver","doi":"10.1017/S0898588X20000206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X20000206","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Since the 1970s, the neoliberal worldview has become reflected increasingly in the policy ideas and institutional innovations advanced by both major parties in the United States. This is most obvious in the realm of economic and social policy, but especially evident at the subnational level, particularly in the city. I argue that neoliberalism, as an ideology, a set of policy prescriptions, and institutional designs, is conceptually distinct from liberalism, especially in its “New Deal” form, social democracy, and from conservatism. Moreover, it is having a developmental effect—neoliberal ideas and institutions have proved durable. This article argues that an urban lens most strikingly reveals the presence of a neoliberal political order that has also made its mark on national political institutions, particularly in the American political economy.","PeriodicalId":45195,"journal":{"name":"Studies in American Political Development","volume":"35 1","pages":"104 - 126"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0898588X20000206","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48774266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-24DOI: 10.1017/S0898588X22000190
J. Glock
Abstract Researchers have long argued that an important impetus for the creation of the administrative state was the desire to bring experts into government and especially into the regulation of business. Yet Progressive Era politicians did not focus on attracting experts when crafting one part of the administrative state, independent regulatory commissions. This article examines the contemporary understanding of regulatory commissions and shows that they were most often intended as a substitute for vacillating juries. Commissions’ most important advantage over juries was that they acquired experience in investigations of a single subject over time, not that their appointees were already academics or experts in a particular subject. This article also shows that appointments to these commissions did not demonstrate a desire for apolitical expertise. This is the first examination of all members appointed to the Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal Trade Commission, Federal Power Commission, Federal Communications Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission in the period from 1887 to 1935. This article finds that political and sectional balance, rather than previous expertise, were the most important criteria for these commissions’ members, at least until the late 1920s, after the end of the supposed Progressive Era.
{"title":"The Novice Administrative State: The Function of Regulatory Commissions in the Progressive Era","authors":"J. Glock","doi":"10.1017/S0898588X22000190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X22000190","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Researchers have long argued that an important impetus for the creation of the administrative state was the desire to bring experts into government and especially into the regulation of business. Yet Progressive Era politicians did not focus on attracting experts when crafting one part of the administrative state, independent regulatory commissions. This article examines the contemporary understanding of regulatory commissions and shows that they were most often intended as a substitute for vacillating juries. Commissions’ most important advantage over juries was that they acquired experience in investigations of a single subject over time, not that their appointees were already academics or experts in a particular subject. This article also shows that appointments to these commissions did not demonstrate a desire for apolitical expertise. This is the first examination of all members appointed to the Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal Trade Commission, Federal Power Commission, Federal Communications Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission in the period from 1887 to 1935. This article finds that political and sectional balance, rather than previous expertise, were the most important criteria for these commissions’ members, at least until the late 1920s, after the end of the supposed Progressive Era.","PeriodicalId":45195,"journal":{"name":"Studies in American Political Development","volume":"37 1","pages":"41 - 55"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49653780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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