J. Sadler, K. Fulford, A. Aftab, Anna Bergqvist, Mona Gupta, T. Thornton, M. Wong, Josephine Gough, P. Lieberman, Dominic Murphy, A. Morgan, M. Rashed, H. Carel, Greta Kaluzeviciute, Joshua Moreton
Abstract:The titular question, of what makes a disorder 'mental,' has an obvious answer: mental disorders are disorders of the mind. I argue that this is not so, before proposing a positive theory of what makes a disorder 'mental,' that what makes a disorder 'mental' is its relationship to psychiatry. The overall thrust of my argument is that mental disorder is mental in name only—to have a mental disorder is not to have a disorder of the mind. Instead, mental disorder is psychiatric disorder, a class of conditions grouped together not because of anything to do with the mind, but because of their relationship to psychiatry, a concrete group of methods, practices, and institutions.
{"title":"Introduction to the 30th Anniversary Issue of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology","authors":"J. Sadler, K. Fulford, A. Aftab, Anna Bergqvist, Mona Gupta, T. Thornton, M. Wong, Josephine Gough, P. Lieberman, Dominic Murphy, A. Morgan, M. Rashed, H. Carel, Greta Kaluzeviciute, Joshua Moreton","doi":"10.1353/ppp.2023.0000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2023.0000","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:The titular question, of what makes a disorder 'mental,' has an obvious answer: mental disorders are disorders of the mind. I argue that this is not so, before proposing a positive theory of what makes a disorder 'mental,' that what makes a disorder 'mental' is its relationship to psychiatry. The overall thrust of my argument is that mental disorder is mental in name only—to have a mental disorder is not to have a disorder of the mind. Instead, mental disorder is psychiatric disorder, a class of conditions grouped together not because of anything to do with the mind, but because of their relationship to psychiatry, a concrete group of methods, practices, and institutions.","PeriodicalId":45397,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Psychiatry & Psychology","volume":"27 1","pages":"1 - 10 - 101 - 11 - 12 - 13 - 14 - 15 - 2 - 3 - 35 - 37 - 39 - 4 - 41 - 43 - 45 - 5 - 51 - 53 - 6 -"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82304527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Debate about Assisted Dying for Persons with Mental Disorders: An Essential Role for Philosophy","authors":"Mona Gupta","doi":"10.1353/ppp.2023.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2023.0004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45397,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Psychiatry & Psychology","volume":"4 1","pages":"10 - 9"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81947022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Narrative Formulation Revisited: On Seeing the Person in Mental Health Recovery","authors":"Anna Bergqvist","doi":"10.1353/ppp.2023.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2023.0003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45397,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Psychiatry & Psychology","volume":"13 1","pages":"7 - 8"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78215263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:In this paper, I offer a philosophical critique of the Power Threat Meaning Framework (PTMF). This framework was launched in the UK in January 2018 as a non-pathologizing way of understanding mental distress. It argues that those experiences diagnosed as mental illnesses are better understood as meaning-based threat responses to the negative operation of power. My critique consists of three parts. First, the PTMF argues that it is opposed to a concept of mental distress as illness. However, the PTMF unfolds an account of mental distress that is very similar to other accounts of mental illness in the philosophical literature. The PTMF does not reflect upon, recognize or give an account of its own grounds for judging mental distress as distress. If it were to do so, I argue that it would produce an account of mental distress that is very similar to many other accounts of psychiatric illness or disorder. Second, I criticize the account given of meaning in the PTMF. I argue that this account is ultimately a reductive, behavioral account of adaptation that downplays important existential aspects of experience. Furthermore, the account of interpretive sense-making in the PTMF is conceptually confused. Finally, I outline a critique of the way that the concept of power, the great strength of the PTMF approach, is reduced to a concept of threat. I argue that this tends toward a linear view of causality that is reductive in its search for the meaning of mental distress.
{"title":"Power, Threat, Meaning Framework: A Philosophical Critique","authors":"A. Morgan","doi":"10.1353/ppp.2023.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2023.0011","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:In this paper, I offer a philosophical critique of the Power Threat Meaning Framework (PTMF). This framework was launched in the UK in January 2018 as a non-pathologizing way of understanding mental distress. It argues that those experiences diagnosed as mental illnesses are better understood as meaning-based threat responses to the negative operation of power. My critique consists of three parts. First, the PTMF argues that it is opposed to a concept of mental distress as illness. However, the PTMF unfolds an account of mental distress that is very similar to other accounts of mental illness in the philosophical literature. The PTMF does not reflect upon, recognize or give an account of its own grounds for judging mental distress as distress. If it were to do so, I argue that it would produce an account of mental distress that is very similar to many other accounts of psychiatric illness or disorder. Second, I criticize the account given of meaning in the PTMF. I argue that this account is ultimately a reductive, behavioral account of adaptation that downplays important existential aspects of experience. Furthermore, the account of interpretive sense-making in the PTMF is conceptually confused. Finally, I outline a critique of the way that the concept of power, the great strength of the PTMF approach, is reduced to a concept of threat. I argue that this tends toward a linear view of causality that is reductive in its search for the meaning of mental distress.","PeriodicalId":45397,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Psychiatry & Psychology","volume":"2015 1","pages":"53 - 67"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82764663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:In the fields of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, case study researchers rarely justify their knowledge claims on formal epistemological grounds. This poses several issues to the case study method. First, without articulating the standards by which our knowledge is being justified, we are potentially enabling the criticism that case studies are mere anecdotal reports and should not be treated as forms of evidence. Second, without the guidance of wider epistemological standards for case study research, we risk falling into arbitrary justifications of other as well as our own case studies. This paper seeks to address these issues by examining and developing epistemic practices in psychoanalytic and psychotherapy case studies. Drawing from different social science resources, the paper describes three epistemological concepts appropriate for case study research: retroductive reasoning, analytic generalization and working hypothesis. The paper demonstrates how each epistemological concept can be used in psychotherapy research and explicates specific methodological guidelines. Social science definitions and principles are applied in a psychotherapy and/or psychoanalytic research context, and further considerations about canons of evidence are provided. The impetus of this paper is to strengthen qualitative research standards, particularly case study research standards, in clinical case study writing.
{"title":"From Clinical Encounter to Knowledge Claims: Epistemological Guidelines for Case Studies in Psychotherapy","authors":"Greta Kaluzeviciute, Joshua Moreton","doi":"10.1353/ppp.2023.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2023.0015","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:In the fields of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, case study researchers rarely justify their knowledge claims on formal epistemological grounds. This poses several issues to the case study method. First, without articulating the standards by which our knowledge is being justified, we are potentially enabling the criticism that case studies are mere anecdotal reports and should not be treated as forms of evidence. Second, without the guidance of wider epistemological standards for case study research, we risk falling into arbitrary justifications of other as well as our own case studies. This paper seeks to address these issues by examining and developing epistemic practices in psychoanalytic and psychotherapy case studies. Drawing from different social science resources, the paper describes three epistemological concepts appropriate for case study research: retroductive reasoning, analytic generalization and working hypothesis. The paper demonstrates how each epistemological concept can be used in psychotherapy research and explicates specific methodological guidelines. Social science definitions and principles are applied in a psychotherapy and/or psychoanalytic research context, and further considerations about canons of evidence are provided. The impetus of this paper is to strengthen qualitative research standards, particularly case study research standards, in clinical case study writing.","PeriodicalId":45397,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Psychiatry & Psychology","volume":"45 1","pages":"79 - 98"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91335378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A lastair Morgan raises useful and interesting philosophical critiques of the ‘power-threat-meaning’ framework proposed by Johnstone et al. (2018). In what follows I make two suggestions that may clarify some aspects of the debate. First, to broaden the notion of threat: we can think more broadly about adverse life events as the source of mental suffering by broadening the notion of threat to what I term (in joint work with Ian James Kidd) Vulnerabilization. Second, I offer a distinction between de-pathologizing psychiatric disorders (i.e., removing stigma and negative stereotypes) and de-medicalizing such disorders (i.e., rescinding them from a diagnostic manual), in order to suggest that de-medicalizing on its own does not solve the problem of stigma, but de-pathologizing is a better candidate for achieving that.
{"title":"Vulnerabilization and De-pathologization: Two Philosophical Suggestions","authors":"H. Carel","doi":"10.1353/ppp.2023.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2023.0013","url":null,"abstract":"A lastair Morgan raises useful and interesting philosophical critiques of the ‘power-threat-meaning’ framework proposed by Johnstone et al. (2018). In what follows I make two suggestions that may clarify some aspects of the debate. First, to broaden the notion of threat: we can think more broadly about adverse life events as the source of mental suffering by broadening the notion of threat to what I term (in joint work with Ian James Kidd) Vulnerabilization. Second, I offer a distinction between de-pathologizing psychiatric disorders (i.e., removing stigma and negative stereotypes) and de-medicalizing such disorders (i.e., rescinding them from a diagnostic manual), in order to suggest that de-medicalizing on its own does not solve the problem of stigma, but de-pathologizing is a better candidate for achieving that.","PeriodicalId":45397,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Psychiatry & Psychology","volume":"40 1","pages":"73 - 76"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86735949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:The titular question, of what makes a disorder 'mental,' has an obvious answer: mental disorders are disorders of the mind. I argue that this is not so, before proposing a positive theory of what makes a disorder 'mental,' that what makes a disorder 'mental' is its relationship to psychiatry. The overall thrust of my argument is that mental disorder is mental in name only—to have a mental disorder is not to have a disorder of the mind. Instead, mental disorder is psychiatric disorder, a class of conditions grouped together not because of anything to do with the mind, but because of their relationship to psychiatry, a concrete group of methods, practices, and institutions.
{"title":"What Makes a Disorder 'Mental'? A Practical Treatment of Psychiatric Disorder","authors":"Josephine Gough","doi":"10.1353/ppp.2023.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2023.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:The titular question, of what makes a disorder 'mental,' has an obvious answer: mental disorders are disorders of the mind. I argue that this is not so, before proposing a positive theory of what makes a disorder 'mental,' that what makes a disorder 'mental' is its relationship to psychiatry. The overall thrust of my argument is that mental disorder is mental in name only—to have a mental disorder is not to have a disorder of the mind. Instead, mental disorder is psychiatric disorder, a class of conditions grouped together not because of anything to do with the mind, but because of their relationship to psychiatry, a concrete group of methods, practices, and institutions.","PeriodicalId":45397,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Psychiatry & Psychology","volume":"463 1","pages":"15 - 35"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85562193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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