Pub Date : 2023-07-07DOI: 10.1142/s0219198923500111
S. Vannucci
{"title":"Revealed VNM-Solutions: Characterizations","authors":"S. Vannucci","doi":"10.1142/s0219198923500111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198923500111","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43305893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-09DOI: 10.1142/s021919892350010x
Divya Murali, A. Shaiju
{"title":"Best-Response dynamics for evolutionary stochastic games","authors":"Divya Murali, A. Shaiju","doi":"10.1142/s021919892350010x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919892350010x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42874278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-07DOI: 10.1142/s0219198923500093
{"title":"Generalized Means and Randomization Scheme of Nash Equilibria","authors":"","doi":"10.1142/s0219198923500093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198923500093","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47723034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-30DOI: 10.1142/s0219198922500128
Shoude Li
In this paper, we formulated a dynamic game model of the firms’ process innovation with technological spillover under different market structures (market competition intensity) in a duopoly market, in which the firms are concerned about relative profits as well as their own profits and investigated the relationship between the degree of competitiveness faced by the firms and their R&D expenditure. Our results showed that, under certain conditions, the system always admits saddle point steady-state equilibrium under independent ventures and R&D cartel games, respectively, and although the process innovation investment under R&D cartel is higher than that under the independent ventures, whether the marginal production cost under R&D cartel is less (higher) than that under the independent ventures depends on the degree of technological R&D spillover and the market competition intensity. Furthermore, the marginal production cost under independent ventures is not monotonically decreasing with spillover for the given region of market competition intensity; while the marginal production cost under R&D cartel game always monotonically decreases with spillover for any market competition intensity.
{"title":"A Differential Game Analysis of the Firms’ Process Innovation with Technological Spillover Under Different Market Structures in a Duopoly Market","authors":"Shoude Li","doi":"10.1142/s0219198922500128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198922500128","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we formulated a dynamic game model of the firms’ process innovation with technological spillover under different market structures (market competition intensity) in a duopoly market, in which the firms are concerned about relative profits as well as their own profits and investigated the relationship between the degree of competitiveness faced by the firms and their R&D expenditure. Our results showed that, under certain conditions, the system always admits saddle point steady-state equilibrium under independent ventures and R&D cartel games, respectively, and although the process innovation investment under R&D cartel is higher than that under the independent ventures, whether the marginal production cost under R&D cartel is less (higher) than that under the independent ventures depends on the degree of technological R&D spillover and the market competition intensity. Furthermore, the marginal production cost under independent ventures is not monotonically decreasing with spillover for the given region of market competition intensity; while the marginal production cost under R&D cartel game always monotonically decreases with spillover for any market competition intensity.","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48041637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1142/S021919892250013X
G. Umbhauer
{"title":"Market Exit and Minimax Regret","authors":"G. Umbhauer","doi":"10.1142/S021919892250013X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S021919892250013X","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"24 1","pages":"2250013:1-2250013:34"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64370331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-11DOI: 10.1142/s0219198922500050
Pavel Naumov, I. Simonelli
This paper proposes a novel way to compare classes of strategic games based on their sets of pure Nash equilibria. This approach is then used to relate the classes of zero-sum games, polymatrix, and k-polymatrix games. This paper concludes with a conjecture that k-polymatrix games form an increasing chain of classes.
{"title":"The Polymatrix Gap Conjecture","authors":"Pavel Naumov, I. Simonelli","doi":"10.1142/s0219198922500050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198922500050","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes a novel way to compare classes of strategic games based on their sets of pure Nash equilibria. This approach is then used to relate the classes of zero-sum games, polymatrix, and k-polymatrix games. This paper concludes with a conjecture that k-polymatrix games form an increasing chain of classes.","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"24 1","pages":"2250005:1-2250005:17"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64370725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-17DOI: 10.1142/s0219199720990011
{"title":"Author Index Volume 22 (2020)","authors":"","doi":"10.1142/s0219199720990011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219199720990011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/s0219199720990011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48414255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-20DOI: 10.1142/s0219199719990013
{"title":"Author Index Volume 21 (2019)","authors":"","doi":"10.1142/s0219199719990013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219199719990013","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47868434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.4135/9789353885694.n11
{"title":"Is It Silly Season in Indian Telecom?","authors":"","doi":"10.4135/9789353885694.n11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4135/9789353885694.n11","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"65 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72560358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.4135/9789353885694.n28
{"title":"The Fine Art of Making Threats","authors":"","doi":"10.4135/9789353885694.n28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4135/9789353885694.n28","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84687941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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