Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.4135/9789353885694.n15
{"title":"Battles of the Bitcoin","authors":"","doi":"10.4135/9789353885694.n15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4135/9789353885694.n15","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"75 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86283867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.4135/9789353885694.n34
{"title":"Exaggeration in Brinkmanship is a Doubleedged Sword","authors":"","doi":"10.4135/9789353885694.n34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4135/9789353885694.n34","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91344512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.4135/9789353885694.n17
{"title":"The Hapless Fate of an Alleged Spy","authors":"","doi":"10.4135/9789353885694.n17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4135/9789353885694.n17","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"61 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80783526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.4135/9789353885694.n33
{"title":"North Korea Is Not Really Cuba","authors":"","doi":"10.4135/9789353885694.n33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4135/9789353885694.n33","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84410903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.4135/9789353885694.n14
{"title":"The Airtel—Jio Battle and the Limitations of Game Theory","authors":"","doi":"10.4135/9789353885694.n14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4135/9789353885694.n14","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89472363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.4135/9789353885694.n8
{"title":"The Vulnerability of the Chinese Corridor","authors":"","doi":"10.4135/9789353885694.n8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4135/9789353885694.n8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74320476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.4135/9789353885694.n49
{"title":"Re-Designing The Insolvency Auction to Optimize Value","authors":"","doi":"10.4135/9789353885694.n49","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4135/9789353885694.n49","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73665448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-06-30DOI: 10.1142/S0219198916400077
Petrosian Ovanes
New approach to the definition of solution in cooperative differential games is considered. The approach is based on artificially truncated information about the game. It assumed that at each time, instant players have information about the structure of the game (payoff functions, motion equations) only for the next fixed time interval. Based on this information they make the decision. Looking Forward Approach is applied to the cases when the players are not sure about the dynamics of the game on the whole time interval [0,T] and orient themselves on the game dynamics defined on the smaller time interval T¯ (0 < T¯ < T), on which they surely know that the game dynamics is not changing.
{"title":"Looking Forward Approach in Cooperative Differential Games","authors":"Petrosian Ovanes","doi":"10.1142/S0219198916400077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198916400077","url":null,"abstract":"New approach to the definition of solution in cooperative differential games is considered. The approach is based on artificially truncated information about the game. It assumed that at each time, instant players have information about the structure of the game (payoff functions, motion equations) only for the next fixed time interval. Based on this information they make the decision. Looking Forward Approach is applied to the cases when the players are not sure about the dynamics of the game on the whole time interval [0,T] and orient themselves on the game dynamics defined on the smaller time interval T¯ (0 < T¯ < T), on which they surely know that the game dynamics is not changing.","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"39 1","pages":"1-14"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/S0219198916400077","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64369875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-03-28DOI: 10.1142/S0219198915500164
D. Sheetal
This paper analyzes zero sum game involving hybrid controls using viscosity solution theory where both players use discrete as well as continuous controls. We study two problems, one in finite horizon and other in infinite horizon. In both cases, we allow the cost functionals to be unbounded with certain growth, hence the corresponding lower and upper value functions defined in Elliot–Kalton sense can be unbounded. We characterize the value functions as the unique viscosity solution of the associated lower and upper quasi variational inequalities in a suitable function class. Further we find a condition under which the game has a value for both games. The major difficulties arise due to unboundedness of value function. In infinite horizon case we prove uniqueness of viscosity solution by converting the unbounded value function into bounded ones by suitable transformation. In finite horizon case an argument is based on comparison with a supersolution.
{"title":"Viscosity Solutions of Hybrid Game Problems with Unbounded Cost Functionals","authors":"D. Sheetal","doi":"10.1142/S0219198915500164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198915500164","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes zero sum game involving hybrid controls using viscosity solution theory where both players use discrete as well as continuous controls. We study two problems, one in finite horizon and other in infinite horizon. In both cases, we allow the cost functionals to be unbounded with certain growth, hence the corresponding lower and upper value functions defined in Elliot–Kalton sense can be unbounded. We characterize the value functions as the unique viscosity solution of the associated lower and upper quasi variational inequalities in a suitable function class. Further we find a condition under which the game has a value for both games. The major difficulties arise due to unboundedness of value function. In infinite horizon case we prove uniqueness of viscosity solution by converting the unbounded value function into bounded ones by suitable transformation. In finite horizon case an argument is based on comparison with a supersolution.","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"18 1","pages":"1-26"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/S0219198915500164","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64369951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-12-01DOI: 10.1142/S0219198907001643
José Méndez Naya, Luciano Méndez Naya
The effects of tariff wars on welfare are analysed for the case of trade between two countries with outputs of the traded good given exogenously. Assuming mild conditions, it is shown that if there are non-zero tariffs for which welfare-maximizing equilibrium holds, then free trade is not strictly preferable when the countries' outputs are equal, and if they are not equal is strictly disadvantageous to the country with the smaller output. Therefore, the main result of the paper is that free trade is not sustainable in an asymmetric context nor in a symmetric situation.
{"title":"TARIFF RETALIATION AND THE FREE TRADE ARGUMENT","authors":"José Méndez Naya, Luciano Méndez Naya","doi":"10.1142/S0219198907001643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198907001643","url":null,"abstract":"The effects of tariff wars on welfare are analysed for the case of trade between two countries with outputs of the traded good given exogenously. Assuming mild conditions, it is shown that if there are non-zero tariffs for which welfare-maximizing equilibrium holds, then free trade is not strictly preferable when the countries' outputs are equal, and if they are not equal is strictly disadvantageous to the country with the smaller output. Therefore, the main result of the paper is that free trade is not sustainable in an asymmetric context nor in a symmetric situation.","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"09 1","pages":"657-666"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2007-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/S0219198907001643","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64369542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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