Pub Date : 2003-09-01DOI: 10.1142/S0219198903001008
R. Amir, J. Bergin, T. Knudsen
{"title":"PREFACE TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY 2000","authors":"R. Amir, J. Bergin, T. Knudsen","doi":"10.1142/S0219198903001008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198903001008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2003-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/S0219198903001008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64369422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-09-01DOI: 10.1142/S0219198903001057
Carlos Alós-Ferrer
This paper examines the stability of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of sym- metric games, viewed as population profiles in dynamical systems with learning within a single, finite population. Alternative models of imitation and myopic best reply are considered and combined with different assumptions about the speed of adjustment. It is found that specific refinements of mixed Nash equi- libria serve to identify focal rest points of these dynamics in general games. The relationship between both concepts is studied. In the 2 x 2 case, both im- itation and myopic best reply yield strong stability results for the same type of mixed Nash equilibria.
{"title":"Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria","authors":"Carlos Alós-Ferrer","doi":"10.1142/S0219198903001057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198903001057","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the stability of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of sym- metric games, viewed as population profiles in dynamical systems with learning within a single, finite population. Alternative models of imitation and myopic best reply are considered and combined with different assumptions about the speed of adjustment. It is found that specific refinements of mixed Nash equi- libria serve to identify focal rest points of these dynamics in general games. The relationship between both concepts is studied. In the 2 x 2 case, both im- itation and myopic best reply yield strong stability results for the same type of mixed Nash equilibria.","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"5 1","pages":"263-290"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2003-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/S0219198903001057","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64369470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4135/9789353885694.n19
{"title":"The NDA, THE UPA and TWO Types of Chicken","authors":"","doi":"10.4135/9789353885694.n19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4135/9789353885694.n19","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89136115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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