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The Tracking Theory of Claim-Rights 权利请求权的追踪理论
IF 0.6 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-10-06 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12247
Mark McBride

My task here is to articulate my own novel hybrid theory of (claim-)rights, namely, the Tracking Theory of rights. While new, it has historical antecedents. There is nothing (entirely) new under the sun. Its most vivid antecedents come from the fields of epistemology, in particular Robert Nozick's work, and legal philosophy, in particular Gopal Sreenivasan's work. I am happy to stand on the shoulders of giants. Here I want to freshly articulate the theory from the ground up. So the challenge will be to keep the articulation of the Tracking Theory front and centre, but, naturally, indebtedness to Nozick and Sreenivasan will be woven in at multiple junctures. My Tracking Theory will neither stand nor fall with Nozick's. The relation is more subtle. The strategy is to trade on the indubitable subtlety of Nozick's epistemology to capture the structure of a central normative concept.

我在这里的任务是阐明我自己的(主张)权利的新颖混合理论,即权利追踪理论。虽然是新的,但它有历史先例。太阳底下没有新鲜事。它最生动的前身来自认识论领域,尤其是罗伯特·诺齐克的著作,以及法律哲学领域,尤其是戈帕尔·斯里尼瓦桑的著作。我很高兴站在巨人的肩膀上。在这里,我想从头开始重新阐述这个理论。因此,挑战将是保持追踪理论的清晰和中心,但自然地,对诺齐克和斯里尼瓦桑的感激将在多个节点交织在一起。我的追踪理论和诺齐克的理论不一样。这种关系更为微妙。其策略是利用诺齐克认识论中不容置疑的微妙之处来捕捉一个核心规范概念的结构。
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引用次数: 1
Varieties of conceptual analysis 概念分析的多样性
IF 0.6 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-09-24 DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt211qvj5.5
M. Kölbel
: What exactly does conceptual analysis consist in? Is it empirical or a priori? How does it support philosophical theses, and what kinds of thesis are these? There is no consensus on these questions in contemporary philosophy. This paper aims to defend conceptual analysis by showing that it comprises a number of different methods and by explaining their importance in philosophy. After setting out an initial dilemma for conceptual analysis, the paper outlines a minimal ecumenical account of concepts, as well as an account of concept possession and concept employment. On the basis of these accounts, the paper then argues that there are both empirical and a priori forms of conceptual analysis, and that each can be defended as legitimate methods. The philosophical interest of conceptual analysis, however, resides in relying on all three types of method in the service of answering philosophical concerns. This is illustrated by three sample cases.
概念分析究竟包括什么?它是经验的还是先验的?它是如何支持哲学命题的,这些都是什么类型的命题?在当代哲学中,对这些问题没有达成共识。本文旨在通过展示概念分析包括许多不同的方法并通过解释它们在哲学中的重要性来捍卫概念分析。在阐述了概念分析的最初困境之后,本文概述了概念的最小合一解释,以及概念占有和概念使用的解释。在这些叙述的基础上,本文接着论证了概念分析有经验和先验两种形式,并且每一种形式都可以作为合法方法进行辩护。然而,概念分析的哲学旨趣在于依赖所有三种类型的方法来回答哲学问题。这是通过三个示例案例来说明的。
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引用次数: 2
Varieties of conceptual analysis 概念分析的多样性
IF 0.6 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-09-24 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12249
Max Kölbel

What exactly does conceptual analysis consist in? Is it empirical or a priori? How does it support philosophical theses? and What kinds of thesis are these? There is no consensus on these questions in contemporary philosophy. This study aims to defend conceptual analysis by showing that it comprises a number of different methods and by explaining their importance in philosophy. After setting out an initial dilemma for conceptual analysis, the study outlines a minimal ecumenical account of concepts, as well as an account of concept possession and concept employment. On the basis of these accounts, the study then argues that there are both empirical and a priori forms of conceptual analysis, and that each can be defended as legitimate methods. The philosophical interest of conceptual analysis, however, resides in relying on all three types of method in the service of answering philosophical concerns. This is illustrated by three sample cases.

概念分析究竟包含什么?它是经验的还是先验的?它是如何支持哲学论文的?这些是什么样的论文?在当代哲学中,对这些问题没有达成共识。本研究旨在通过表明概念分析包括许多不同的方法并解释它们在哲学中的重要性来捍卫概念分析。在阐述了概念分析的最初困境后,本研究概述了对概念的最低普世解释,以及对概念拥有和概念使用的解释。基于这些描述,该研究认为,概念分析既有经验形式,也有先验形式,每种形式都可以作为合法的方法进行辩护。然而,概念分析的哲学兴趣在于依赖于所有三种类型的方法来回答哲学问题。三个示例案例说明了这一点。
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引用次数: 0
Way and Whiting on Elusive Reasons 难以捉摸的原因
IF 0.6 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-08-11 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12223
Benjamin Cohen Rossi
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引用次数: 1
Teleological powers 目的论的权力
IF 0.6 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-08-10 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12245
Michele Paolini Paoletti

In this article, I develop a metaphysical account of final causes grounded on contemporary powers metaphysics. After having presented some key elements of an Aristotle-inspired teleology, i.e., the study of final causes within Aristotelian tradition, I introduce powers. Moreover, I present some theses about their nature and features. Afterward, I distinguish between two kinds of powers that are expected to play the roles traditionally attributed to final causes: weakly teleological powers and strongly teleological powers. Weakly teleological powers are those powers that ground the possession of all the other powers of a substance. Strongly teleological powers are those powers that ground the activation of all the other powers of a substance. Within this framework, I then develop some options to deal with human teleology, i.e., with the study of human behavior in light of final causes. Finally, in the last Section, I briefly compare my account with other accounts of teleology and of specific sorts of powers that somehow resemble teleological powers.

在这篇文章中,我发展了一个形而上学的最终原因的基础上,当代权力形而上学。在介绍了亚里斯多德启发的目的论的一些关键要素,即亚里斯多德传统中对最终原因的研究之后,我将介绍权力。并对其性质和特点进行了论述。之后,我区分了两种被期望扮演传统上归因于最终原因的角色的力量:弱目的性力量和强目的性力量。弱目的性的力量是那些为拥有一个实体的所有其他力量奠定基础的力量。强烈的目的性力量是那些使物质的所有其他力量的激活成为基础的力量。在这个框架内,我随后提出了一些处理人类目的论的选择,即根据最终原因研究人类行为。最后,在最后一节中,我简要地将我的描述与其他关于目的论的描述以及与目的论能力相似的特定类型的能力进行了比较。
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引用次数: 2
Practical reasons for belief without stakes☆ 实用的理由使信念无利害关系☆
IF 0.6 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-08-07 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12244
Shawn Hernandez, N. G. Laskowski

Pragmatic encroachment can be thought of as the idea that knowledge is in some way sensitive to practical considerations, including practical considerations involving what is at stake in getting things right. Recently, Mark Schroeder defends pragmatic encroachment by showing how it could be true. This paper argues that the view proposed by Schroeder is vulnerable to a simple but important objection. It also argues that the objection can be avoided by claiming that there are even more kinds of practical considerations that can be epistemic reasons than those kinds involving stakes.

实用主义侵占可以被认为是知识在某种程度上对实际考虑很敏感,包括实际考虑,包括把事情做好的利害关系。最近,马克•施罗德(Mark Schroeder)为务实主义侵犯辩护,他展示了这种侵犯为何可能是真的。本文认为,施罗德提出的观点容易受到一个简单但重要的反对意见的影响。它还认为,可以通过声称有更多的实际考虑可以成为认知原因,而不是那些涉及利害关系的考虑,来避免反对意见。
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引用次数: 0
Against normativism about mental attitudes 反对关于心理态度的规范主义
IF 0.6 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-07-27 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12243
Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini

Normativists argue that the mind is essentially normative and any adequate account of our mental attitudes must involve normative terms and judgments. In particular, one brand of Normativism defends the claim that mental attitudes are defined by constitutive norms. Against this, Anti-normativists have offered non-normative accounts of mental states.The goal of this paper is to bolster Anti-normativism by undermining one key argument in favor of Normativism.

规范主义者认为,心灵本质上是规范性的,任何对我们的心理态度的适当描述都必须包含规范性的术语和判断。特别是,规范主义的一个流派捍卫了心理态度由构成性规范定义的主张。与此相反,反规范主义者提出了精神状态的非规范描述。本文的目的是通过削弱一个支持规范主义的关键论点来支持反规范主义。
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引用次数: 0
Lacking, needing, and wanting 缺少、需要和匮乏
IF 0.6 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-07-23 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12242
David Hunter

I offer a novel conception of the nature of wanting. According to it, wanting is lacking something one needs. Lacking is not a normative notion but needing is, and that is how goodness figures in to wanting. What a thing needs derives from what it is to be a good thing of its kind. In people, wanting is connected to both knowledge and the will. A person can know that she wants something and can act on that knowledge. When she does, she is acting in light of that want and her want is a reason why she acted. There is a close connection between wanting and our wills, not just because we can sometimes choose how to get what we need, but because our choices can determine what we want. We can't simply choose to want something, but in deciding how to live our lives, who to be, and what to pursue, we are free to settle what we want, at least within limits. These connections to knowledge and the will make human wanting rich and morally relevant, but they don't transform human wanting into something special. Wanting is everywhere just a matter of lacking something one needs.

我对欲望的本质提出了一个新颖的概念。根据它,想要是缺少一个人需要的东西。缺乏不是一个规范的概念,但需要是,这就是善良如何体现为想要。一件事物所需要的,源于它是同类中的好事物。对人来说,欲望与知识和意志都有联系。一个人可以知道她想要什么,并能根据这一知识采取行动。当她这样做的时候,她是在按照那个愿望行事,而她的愿望是她采取行动的原因。欲望和我们的意志之间有着密切的联系,不仅因为我们有时可以选择如何得到我们需要的东西,而且因为我们的选择可以决定我们想要什么。我们不能简单地选择想要什么,但在决定如何生活、成为什么样的人、追求什么时,我们可以自由地决定我们想要什么,至少在一定的范围内。这些与知识和意志的联系使人类的欲望丰富,与道德相关,但它们并没有把人类的欲望变成特殊的东西。“想要”无处不在,只不过是缺少某样需要的东西。
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引用次数: 0
Quotational and other opaque belief reports 引用和其他不透明的信念报告
IF 0.6 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-07-21 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12239
Wayne A. Davis

In a novel move against Russellianism, Heck (2014) has argued that reports of the form S believes that p are semantically opaque on the grounds that there are no other means in English to report psychologically individuated beliefs, such as those Lois Lane reports using the names ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent.’ I show that there are several other ways to meet this need. I focus on quotational reports of the form S believes “p, which philosophers have overlooked or mischaracterized. I argue that reports of this form are no more metalinguistic than those using the complementizer that. In both, the meaning of the report depends on the meaning, not the form, of the complement. Some distinguishing features of non-metalinguistic quotational reports are that their complements force “deictic shift” and have no transparent interpretation. Free direct speech and thought bubbles have the same properties. The “q-ascriptions” McCullagh (2017a) proposed to defend Russellianism against Heck are not in common use and on his account are unsuitably metalinguistic. The fact that quotational belief reports are opaque without being metalinguistic makes the Russellian thesis that the meaning of a name is its referent untenable, thereby undermining Russellianism about belief reports.

在反对罗素主义的一项新颖举措中,赫克(2014)认为,形式S的报告认为p在语义上是不透明的,因为在英语中没有其他方法来报告心理个性化的信念,比如Lois Lane使用“超人”和“克拉克·肯特”的那些报告。我指出,还有其他几种方法可以满足这种需求。我关注的是S相信“p”这种形式的引用报告,这是哲学家们忽视或错误描述的。我认为这种形式的报道并不比那些使用that补语的报道更具元语言性。在这两种情况下,报告的意义取决于补语的意义,而不是形式。非元语言引语的一个显著特征是它们的补语强迫“指示转换”,没有透明的解释。自由的直接言论和思想泡沫具有相同的特性。McCullagh (2017a)提出的捍卫Russellianism反对Heck的“q-ascriptions”并不常用,而且在他看来是不合适的元语言。引文式的信念报告是不透明的,而不是元语言的,这一事实使得罗素式的“名字的意义就是它的指称物”的论点站不住脚,从而削弱了罗素式的信念报告理论。
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引用次数: 1
Paraphrase, categories, and ontology “释义、范畴和本体论”
IF 0.6 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-07-21 DOI: 10.1111/phib.12240
Jonah Goldwater

The method of paraphrasing away apparent ontological commitments is a familiar tool for trimming one's ontology. Even so, I argue that aiming to avoid commitment via paraphrase is unjustified. The reason is the standard motivations for paraphrase rest on implicit yet faulty principles regarding ontological categories and categorization- or so I argue. These results also provide indirect support for a permissivist approach to ontology.

改写明显的本体论行为的方法是修整本体论的一种熟悉的工具。即便如此,我认为通过意译来避免承诺是不合理的。原因是解释的标准动机建立在关于本体论范畴和分类的隐含而错误的原则上——至少我是这么认为的。这些结果也为本体的许可主义方法提供了间接支持。
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引用次数: 0
期刊
Analytic Philosophy
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