This paper looks at the metaphorical and metonymic expressions derived from nsa, ‘hand’. I will analyse and discuss hand metaphoric and metonymic expressions in relation with the universal concept of the agility and versatility of the hand as an important aspect of the human being. The paper projects the concept of the hand in the Akan cultural system and looks at how it has expanded into compound words, idioms and proverbs. We will look at the cognitive, semantics, sociolinguistics and pragmatics of nsa, ‘hand’. The paper is discussed under the theory of conceptual metaphor as expounded by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and followed by many scholars in the western world, Asia and Africa.
{"title":"Metaphors and Metonyms of Nsa, ‘the Hand’ in Akan","authors":"K. Agyekum","doi":"10.1075/PC.23.2.06AYG","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/PC.23.2.06AYG","url":null,"abstract":"This paper looks at the metaphorical and metonymic expressions derived from nsa, ‘hand’. I will analyse and discuss hand metaphoric and metonymic expressions in relation with the universal concept of the agility and versatility of the hand as an important aspect of the human being. The paper projects the concept of the hand in the Akan cultural system and looks at how it has expanded into compound words, idioms and proverbs. We will look at the cognitive, semantics, sociolinguistics and pragmatics of nsa, ‘hand’. The paper is discussed under the theory of conceptual metaphor as expounded by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and followed by many scholars in the western world, Asia and Africa.","PeriodicalId":45741,"journal":{"name":"Pragmatics & Cognition","volume":"23 1","pages":"300-323"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1075/PC.23.2.06AYG","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59060987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In his Theory of Controversies, Marcelo Dascal proposed three types of polemic exchange, in which Controversy was added to the classic types of Discussion and Dispute . For example, in Dascal’s lights, logic is associated with polemic discussions, power manipulations with disputes, and ‘soft logic’ with controversies. The theory was remarkably successful in providing a realist framework for polemic exchanges. In this paper, I provide a conceptually independent substantiation and expansion of the theory, by associating it with meta-ethical analysis of thick and thin concepts, indebted to Michael Walzer, Menachem Fisch and Yitzhak Benbaji.
{"title":"Marcelo Dascal’s Theory of Controversies: Reconsideration, adaption, and political implications","authors":"Aviram Sariel","doi":"10.1075/PC.23.3.07SAR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/PC.23.3.07SAR","url":null,"abstract":"In his Theory of Controversies, Marcelo Dascal proposed three types of polemic exchange, in which Controversy was added to the classic types of Discussion and Dispute . For example, in Dascal’s lights, logic is associated with polemic discussions, power manipulations with disputes, and ‘soft logic’ with controversies. The theory was remarkably successful in providing a realist framework for polemic exchanges. In this paper, I provide a conceptually independent substantiation and expansion of the theory, by associating it with meta-ethical analysis of thick and thin concepts, indebted to Michael Walzer, Menachem Fisch and Yitzhak Benbaji.","PeriodicalId":45741,"journal":{"name":"Pragmatics & Cognition","volume":"23 1","pages":"437-460"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1075/PC.23.3.07SAR","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59061936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Our claim in this paper is that a theory of “pretense” (in all its crucial uses in human society and cognition) can be built only if it is grounded on the general theory of “behavioral implicit communication” (BIC), which is not to be confused with non-verbal communication (with distinct notions being frequently conflated, such as “signs” vs. “messages”, or goal as “intention” vs. goal as “function”). Pretense presupposes some BIC-based human interaction, where a normal, practical behavior is used for signifying something, based on a sign that is not a conventional one. In light of BIC interaction theory, one can exploit this sign or message in a deceptive way in order to induce the other to believe that he/she is performing a given behavior or has a given mental state.
{"title":"Pretense as deceptive behavioral communication","authors":"C. Castelfranchi","doi":"10.1075/PC.23.1.02CAS","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/PC.23.1.02CAS","url":null,"abstract":"Our claim in this paper is that a theory of “pretense” (in all its crucial uses in human society and cognition) can be built only if it is grounded on the general theory of “behavioral implicit communication” (BIC), which is not to be confused with non-verbal communication (with distinct notions being frequently conflated, such as “signs” vs. “messages”, or goal as “intention” vs. goal as “function”). Pretense presupposes some BIC-based human interaction, where a normal, practical behavior is used for signifying something, based on a sign that is not a conventional one. In light of BIC interaction theory, one can exploit this sign or message in a deceptive way in order to induce the other to believe that he/she is performing a given behavior or has a given mental state.","PeriodicalId":45741,"journal":{"name":"Pragmatics & Cognition","volume":"8 1","pages":"16-52"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1075/PC.23.1.02CAS","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59060706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper addresses the question whether bullshit is a reasonable pragmatic category. In the first part of the paper, drawing on the insights of Harry Frankfurt’s seminal essay, bullshit is defined as an act of insincere asserting where the speaker shows (a) a loose concern for the truth, and (b) does not want the addressee to become aware of condition (a). The author adds to this definition the condition (c) requiring that the bullshitter expresses more certainty than is adequate with respect to condition (a). In the second part of the paper, it is discussed whether the above definition can cope with special types of bullshit considered to be a challenge to Frankfurt’s definition. These are evasive bullshitting , bullshit lies , and bald-faced bullshitting . It is shown that there is hope for establishing a reasonable pragmatic category of bullshitting if it is related to certain levels of pragmatic description, e.g. conversational implicatures, that can explain the putative challenges.
{"title":"Aspects of a theory of bullshit","authors":"J. Meibauer","doi":"10.1075/PC.23.1.04MEI","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/PC.23.1.04MEI","url":null,"abstract":"This paper addresses the question whether bullshit is a reasonable pragmatic category. In the first part of the paper, drawing on the insights of Harry Frankfurt’s seminal essay, bullshit is defined as an act of insincere asserting where the speaker shows (a) a loose concern for the truth, and (b) does not want the addressee to become aware of condition (a). The author adds to this definition the condition (c) requiring that the bullshitter expresses more certainty than is adequate with respect to condition (a). In the second part of the paper, it is discussed whether the above definition can cope with special types of bullshit considered to be a challenge to Frankfurt’s definition. These are evasive bullshitting , bullshit lies , and bald-faced bullshitting . It is shown that there is hope for establishing a reasonable pragmatic category of bullshitting if it is related to certain levels of pragmatic description, e.g. conversational implicatures, that can explain the putative challenges.","PeriodicalId":45741,"journal":{"name":"Pragmatics & Cognition","volume":"23 1","pages":"68-91"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1075/PC.23.1.04MEI","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59060869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The aim of this paper is to clarify the distinctive and the shared features of the three phenomena: irony, understatement, and litotes. These rhetorical figures have been defined as synonymous, distinct or overlapping in various accounts. This indicates an interrelation but also a need for clearer definitions. Here, each of these rhetorical figures is defined via two jointly necessary conditions. This approach sharpens the categories, enables clear-cut distinctions and helps to explain cases of overlap. German corpus data and examples from the literature as a basis, allow differentiating between cases of understatement as a means of irony, and cases of litotes as a means of understatement. Beyond that, litotes and understatement allow for non-ironic uses. Interestingly, litotic irony is built on litotic understatement. This is due to the overt contrast necessary for both understatement and irony.
{"title":"On the relation of irony, understatement, and litotes","authors":"L. Neuhaus","doi":"10.1075/PC.23.1.06NEU","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/PC.23.1.06NEU","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to clarify the distinctive and the shared features of the three phenomena: irony, understatement, and litotes. These rhetorical figures have been defined as synonymous, distinct or overlapping in various accounts. This indicates an interrelation but also a need for clearer definitions. Here, each of these rhetorical figures is defined via two jointly necessary conditions. This approach sharpens the categories, enables clear-cut distinctions and helps to explain cases of overlap. German corpus data and examples from the literature as a basis, allow differentiating between cases of understatement as a means of irony, and cases of litotes as a means of understatement. Beyond that, litotes and understatement allow for non-ironic uses. Interestingly, litotic irony is built on litotic understatement. This is due to the overt contrast necessary for both understatement and irony.","PeriodicalId":45741,"journal":{"name":"Pragmatics & Cognition","volume":"23 1","pages":"117-149"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1075/PC.23.1.06NEU","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59061059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper aims to differentiate between lying (seen as a type of deceiving) and irony, typically addressed independently by philosophers and linguists, as well as to discuss the cases when deception co-occurs with, and capitalises on, irony or metaphor. It is argued that the focal distinction can be made with reference to Grice’s first maxim of Quality, whose floutings lead to overt untruthfulness (notably, irony and metaphor), and whose violations result in covert untruthfulness (notably, lying, next to other forms of deception). Both types of untruthfulness are divided into explicit and implicit subtypes depending on the level of meaning on which they are manifest (what is said/made as if to say, or what is implicated). Further, it is shown that deception may be based on irony or metaphor, which either promote deceptive implicatures or are deployed covertly. Finally, some argumentation is provided in favour of why these cases of deceiving can be conceptualised as lying.
{"title":"Comparing and combining covert and overt untruthfulness: On lying, deception, irony and metaphor","authors":"Marta Dynel","doi":"10.1075/PC.23.1.08DYN","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/PC.23.1.08DYN","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to differentiate between lying (seen as a type of deceiving) and irony, typically addressed independently by philosophers and linguists, as well as to discuss the cases when deception co-occurs with, and capitalises on, irony or metaphor. It is argued that the focal distinction can be made with reference to Grice’s first maxim of Quality, whose floutings lead to overt untruthfulness (notably, irony and metaphor), and whose violations result in covert untruthfulness (notably, lying, next to other forms of deception). Both types of untruthfulness are divided into explicit and implicit subtypes depending on the level of meaning on which they are manifest (what is said/made as if to say, or what is implicated). Further, it is shown that deception may be based on irony or metaphor, which either promote deceptive implicatures or are deployed covertly. Finally, some argumentation is provided in favour of why these cases of deceiving can be conceptualised as lying.","PeriodicalId":45741,"journal":{"name":"Pragmatics & Cognition","volume":"23 1","pages":"174-208"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1075/PC.23.1.08DYN","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59061256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The question of context is fundamental in the debate on “What is art?” What the uses of the term mean colour all debates about life and art. Since I am interested in the interpretation and understanding of context in art, and also in life, as well as in how visual arts reinforce or change our mind-constructs either consciously (intentionally) or automatically, I investigate the place of context within this scheme, while referring to various approaches to context and raise series of questions that offer alternatives and point to difficulties.
{"title":"The Cobweb of Context: ImagINe — (or out of) — Context","authors":"L. G. Gold","doi":"10.1075/PC.23.3.03GOL","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/PC.23.3.03GOL","url":null,"abstract":"The question of context is fundamental in the debate on “What is art?” What the uses of the term mean colour all debates about life and art. Since I am interested in the interpretation and understanding of context in art, and also in life, as well as in how visual arts reinforce or change our mind-constructs either consciously (intentionally) or automatically, I investigate the place of context within this scheme, while referring to various approaches to context and raise series of questions that offer alternatives and point to difficulties.","PeriodicalId":45741,"journal":{"name":"Pragmatics & Cognition","volume":"23 1","pages":"376-389"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1075/PC.23.3.03GOL","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59061444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article surveys the history of “terror” vis a vis the development of international humanitarian and human rights law. During the French Revolution, the word “terror” was coined to describe a deviation from the laws of war. Justified by a mixture of ideology and necessity. People who resort to terrorism either suspends or rejects the laws of war ( jus in bellum ) in the name of an alternative and heightened sense of truth. However, the terrorists’ strong sense of probity and mission is also an opening for re-establishing communication, arbitration and mitigation of cruelty and destruction. This paper represents International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as an “abstract Leviathan”, submission to which is the contemporary norm of pacification. From the perspective of radical terrorism, it is tyrannical. From other perspectives, it is open to criticism and change. Most importantly, it is on the side of rational arbitration rather than arbitrary ordeal. Even radical terrorism, which refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the abstract Leviathan, seeks to communicate its radical messages rather than to seek victory my means of physical annihilation of its opponents.
{"title":"Terror and the Leviathan: Recognition, ordeal and discourse in dispute resolution","authors":"Y. Barilan","doi":"10.1075/PC.23.3.08BAR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/PC.23.3.08BAR","url":null,"abstract":"The article surveys the history of “terror” vis a vis the development of international humanitarian and human rights law. During the French Revolution, the word “terror” was coined to describe a deviation from the laws of war. Justified by a mixture of ideology and necessity. People who resort to terrorism either suspends or rejects the laws of war ( jus in bellum ) in the name of an alternative and heightened sense of truth. However, the terrorists’ strong sense of probity and mission is also an opening for re-establishing communication, arbitration and mitigation of cruelty and destruction. This paper represents International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as an “abstract Leviathan”, submission to which is the contemporary norm of pacification. From the perspective of radical terrorism, it is tyrannical. From other perspectives, it is open to criticism and change. Most importantly, it is on the side of rational arbitration rather than arbitrary ordeal. Even radical terrorism, which refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the abstract Leviathan, seeks to communicate its radical messages rather than to seek victory my means of physical annihilation of its opponents.","PeriodicalId":45741,"journal":{"name":"Pragmatics & Cognition","volume":"17 1","pages":"461-471"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1075/PC.23.3.08BAR","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59061488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper will focus on two controversial cases relating to the [mis]use of the notion of autonomy in situations of life and death. While in one case the patient’s will to die was not respected, in the other there was no attempt to save the life of the individual. I have chosen to put these two specific cases in parallel for the fact that in both instances the presence of some kind of mental impairment is not given at all. Yet, in both situations there is substantial reference to some type of temporary competence -as this is the key element that, allegedly, should function as decisive to assess the moral and legal justification behind the decision to enforce -or not- medical treatment upon the protagonists of these two very sad stories. Following on from the objective of this paper thus, the contraposition of these two cases will provide us with a vivid image of the practical implications of using the notion of autonomy (here presented under the form of a more psychiatric-oriented term: competence) in an inconsistent manner within the Western world (US and EU). Raising many doubts over its appropriateness.
{"title":"Uses and abuses of the body in the postmodern era","authors":"M. Garasic","doi":"10.1075/pc.23.3.13gar","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/pc.23.3.13gar","url":null,"abstract":"This paper will focus on two controversial cases relating to the [mis]use of the notion of autonomy in situations of life and death. While in one case the patient’s will to die was not respected, in the other there was no attempt to save the life of the individual. I have chosen to put these two specific cases in parallel for the fact that in both instances the presence of some kind of mental impairment is not given at all. Yet, in both situations there is substantial reference to some type of temporary competence -as this is the key element that, allegedly, should function as decisive to assess the moral and legal justification behind the decision to enforce -or not- medical treatment upon the protagonists of these two very sad stories. Following on from the objective of this paper thus, the contraposition of these two cases will provide us with a vivid image of the practical implications of using the notion of autonomy (here presented under the form of a more psychiatric-oriented term: competence) in an inconsistent manner within the Western world (US and EU). Raising many doubts over its appropriateness.","PeriodicalId":45741,"journal":{"name":"Pragmatics & Cognition","volume":"23 1","pages":"516-527"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1075/pc.23.3.13gar","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59062329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-01-01DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-21395-8_18
K. Jaszczolt
{"title":"The Syntax-Pragmatics Merger: Belief Reports in the Theory of Default Semantics","authors":"K. Jaszczolt","doi":"10.1007/978-3-319-21395-8_18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21395-8_18","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45741,"journal":{"name":"Pragmatics & Cognition","volume":"22 6","pages":"383-404"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"51008403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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