Pub Date : 2023-05-15DOI: 10.1017/S003441252300046X
Daniel J. McKaughan, Daniel Howard-Snyder
Abstract We assess John Bishop's theory of the nature of Christian faith in God, as most recently expressed in ‘Reasonable Faith and Reasonable Fideism’, although we dip into other writings as well. We explain several concerns we have about it. However, in the end, our reflections lead us to propose a modified theory, one that avoids our concerns while remaining consonant with some of his guiding thoughts about the nature of Christian faith in God. We also briefly examine three normative issues Bishop's views present.
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Pub Date : 2023-05-12DOI: 10.1017/s0034412523000422
Muhammad U. Faruque
The purpose of this article is twofold: first, I will reconstruct Mullā Ṣadrā's complex arguments for the soul's immortality based on its immaterial nature. Second and finally, I will briefly probe and assess various epistemological and metaphysical objections against Ṣadrā's immaterialist conception of the soul. Ṣadrā contends that our bodily death marks an awakening to the reality of our consciousness on the plane of the imaginal realm (the imaginal world is an isthmus between the sensible world and the world of intelligible forms). For Ṣadrā, ‘death’ does not mark an end or discontinuity in human consciousness, rather it signifies an awakening to a new mode of existence in which the soul, having once been the active principle controlling the actions of the physical body, now manifests itself as the passive recipient of the form given to it by its imaginal reality – a reality shaped by the actions it had performed in its earthly, embodied state. Thus, death is seen as the passage of the soul from the sensible to the imaginal world, until the soul unites with the intelligible world (ʿālam al-ʿaql).
{"title":"Life after life: Mullā Ṣadrā on death and immortality","authors":"Muhammad U. Faruque","doi":"10.1017/s0034412523000422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412523000422","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The purpose of this article is twofold: first, I will reconstruct Mullā Ṣadrā's complex arguments for the soul's immortality based on its immaterial nature. Second and finally, I will briefly probe and assess various epistemological and metaphysical objections against Ṣadrā's immaterialist conception of the soul. Ṣadrā contends that our bodily death marks an awakening to the reality of our consciousness on the plane of the imaginal realm (the imaginal world is an isthmus between the sensible world and the world of intelligible forms). For Ṣadrā, ‘death’ does not mark an end or discontinuity in human consciousness, rather it signifies an awakening to a new mode of existence in which the soul, having once been the active principle controlling the actions of the physical body, now manifests itself as the passive recipient of the form given to it by its imaginal reality – a reality shaped by the actions it had performed in its earthly, embodied state. Thus, death is seen as the passage of the soul from the sensible to the imaginal world, until the soul unites with the intelligible world (ʿālam al-ʿaql).","PeriodicalId":45888,"journal":{"name":"RELIGIOUS STUDIES","volume":"129 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78092965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-11DOI: 10.1017/S0034412522000622
A. Agadá, A. D. Attoe
The field of African philosophy of religion, like its parent discipline African philosophy, is making its presence felt globally rather late in the day for reasons familiar to the scholar and student of postcolonial studies. With the West comprehensively dominating knowledge production and dissemination processes, it has positioned, and continues to position, itself as the centre of academic life. Western intellectual dominance has translated plainly into academic hegemony. Western philosophers hardly consider African philosophy a worthy intellectual horizon with which they can engage for the good of global philosophy. The field of African philosophy of religion is hardly referenced in Western scholarship despite Kwasi Wiredu’s (2013) loud invitation to Western philosophers of religion to a philosophical dialogue with African philosophers in his chapter ‘African Religions’, which appeared in Chad Meister and Paul Copan’s (2013) edited volume The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion. Low African philosophy of religion research output combined with global neglect to keep the field in the doldrums for decades. Recently, however, research activities in the field have dramatically increased, thanks in no small measure to the John Templeton Foundation and partner organizations like the Global Philosophy of Religion Project hosted by the University of Birmingham. A series of research grants from the two organizations have enabled a number of African philosophers to organize workshops and publish important articles that convince sceptics that the field of African philosophy of religion has roared back to life and is ready to offer the twenty-first century compelling alternative views of God, the problem of evil, the question of death, the possibility of immortality, and the meaning of life. This current Religious Studies special issue, ‘Shifting Perspectives in African Philosophy of Religion’, continues the trend of the expansion of the horizon of engagement in global (no longer Western) philosophy of religion. The special issue boasts five excellent and potentially field-defining articles by some of the finest African philosophers writing actively today. In ‘Rethinking the Concept Of God and the Problem of Evil from the Perspective of African Thought’ Ada Agada sets out to show that a cultural antinomy revolving around the conception of God in African Traditional Religion (ATR) and traditional African thought exists and will have far-reaching implications for the field of African philosophy of religion as the field emerges fully within the broad African philosophy tradition. He identifies the antinomy in two theses: (1) There exists a Supreme Being that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. (2) There is no transcendent God but only a limited deity that cannot eliminate evil in the world. Agada argues that both theses are grounded
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Pub Date : 2023-05-08DOI: 10.1017/s0034412523000409
Ernest B. Brewster
The Buddhist doctrine of transmigration (saṃsāra) offers a coherent model of a cycle of existence wherein a sentient being continues throughout life, survives death, traverses the afterlife, and is, sooner or later, reborn, thus inaugurating another lifecycle as a new life-form. The Buddhist tenets of no-self (anātman) and impermanence, however, deny the possibility of a self, soul, or any form of spiritual substance that persists throughout the cycle of transmigration. This article examines the argumentation developed by the Indic Buddhist philosopher, Saṅghabhadra (fl. fifth- century ce), as part of his effort to reconcile the doctrines of no-self and karmic continuity. In his *Nyāyānusāraśāstra and the *Samayapradīpikāśāstra, two seminal, yet vastly understudied, doctrinal treatises of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma Buddhism that survive only within the translation corpus of the Sinitic scholar-monk Xuanzang (602?–664 ce), Saṅghabhadra defines the antarābhava, the ‘intermediate state of existence’, as the interstitial space and interim time-period existing between the locus wherein the sequentially reproducing psychic constituents of an individual sentient being, including consciousness, desert the no-longer viable body at the moment of biological death, and the locus wherein these psychic constituents become associated with a new gross physical body in the form of a new viable embryo at the moment of rebirth. By instantiating the antarābhava as an actual interval with real extension in space and time, necessarily traversed by the vast majority of sentient beings after dying in order to reach the next gross physical body, Saṅghabhadra provides, for Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma Buddhism, a rigorous account for how karma is transmitted, via the psychic constituents of a sentient being, beyond biological death into future lives, as well as future afterlives.
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Pub Date : 2023-05-02DOI: 10.1017/s0034412523000355
J. Carey
Panentheism is the position that the world is in some sense ‘in’ God, and God ‘in’ the world, without the world being identical to God. Thus, it tries, like what I call mainstream theism and against pantheism, to protect the transcendence of God, while giving greater emphasis to his immanence in creation than the former. I aim to explicate an approach that I call Orthodox Panentheism. The word ‘orthodox’ is to be read in two ways. First, the picture is derived from the writings of some of the most important figures in Eastern Christian thought, so that it is Orthodox in the ‘big “O” sense’. Second, I hope to show that it is a legitimate Christian picture of the God–world relation which is both distinctive and worthy of being called ‘panentheism’ – an orthodox panentheism in the ‘little “o” sense’.
{"title":"On Orthodox panentheism","authors":"J. Carey","doi":"10.1017/s0034412523000355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412523000355","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Panentheism is the position that the world is in some sense ‘in’ God, and God ‘in’ the world, without the world being identical to God. Thus, it tries, like what I call mainstream theism and against pantheism, to protect the transcendence of God, while giving greater emphasis to his immanence in creation than the former. I aim to explicate an approach that I call Orthodox Panentheism. The word ‘orthodox’ is to be read in two ways. First, the picture is derived from the writings of some of the most important figures in Eastern Christian thought, so that it is Orthodox in the ‘big “O” sense’. Second, I hope to show that it is a legitimate Christian picture of the God–world relation which is both distinctive and worthy of being called ‘panentheism’ – an orthodox panentheism in the ‘little “o” sense’.","PeriodicalId":45888,"journal":{"name":"RELIGIOUS STUDIES","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72879368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-27DOI: 10.1017/s0034412523000379
Natalja Deng
Much of the literature on religious fictionalism has emphasized that religious fictionalists employing a theistic fiction cannot just leave evil out of the fiction, and that on the contrary, they face worries that very closely parallel the worries raised by the problem of evil. This article argues that when religious fictionalism is construed most charitably, these worries do not arise. It explores three fictionalist approaches to evil (Excision, Completeness, and Inconsistency), shows that each can serve religious fictionalist ends, and recommends a pluralist stance towards them.
{"title":"Do religious fictionalists face a problem of evil?","authors":"Natalja Deng","doi":"10.1017/s0034412523000379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412523000379","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Much of the literature on religious fictionalism has emphasized that religious fictionalists employing a theistic fiction cannot just leave evil out of the fiction, and that on the contrary, they face worries that very closely parallel the worries raised by the problem of evil. This article argues that when religious fictionalism is construed most charitably, these worries do not arise. It explores three fictionalist approaches to evil (Excision, Completeness, and Inconsistency), shows that each can serve religious fictionalist ends, and recommends a pluralist stance towards them.","PeriodicalId":45888,"journal":{"name":"RELIGIOUS STUDIES","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84225471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-19DOI: 10.1017/s0034412523000318
Perry Hendricks
In this article, I argue that sceptical theists have too narrow a focus: they consider only God's axiological reasons, ignoring any non-axiological reasons he may have. But this is a mistake: predicting how God will act requires knowing about his reasons in general, and this requires knowing about both God's axiological and non-axiological reasons. In light of this, I construct and defend a kind of sceptical theism – Deontological Sceptical Theism – that encompasses all of God's reasons, and briefly illustrate how it renders irrelevant certain charges of excessive sceptical and how it evaporates equiprobability objections. Furthermore, I put forth a simple argument in favour of Deontological Sceptical Theism, which shows that everyone (at least currently) ought to endorse it.
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Pub Date : 2023-04-19DOI: 10.1017/s0034412523000380
J. J. Joaquin
Religious expressivism is the view that religious sentences, like ‘God is all-loving’ and ‘God offers us the gift of salvation’, are devoid of cognitive meaning. Such sentences are not truth-evaluable: they cannot be judged as true or false. In Religious Language, Michael Scott asked what explains the seeming logical behaviour of religious sentences if they are not truth-evaluable, as religious expressivists claim. In particular, religious expressivists need to explain (i) how a given religious sentence and its negation seem inconsistent and (ii) how religious sentences could figure in logically valid arguments. In this article, I develop a version of Weak Kleene semantics that could address these two ‘logic’ challenges.
{"title":"Two ‘logic’ problems for religious expressivists","authors":"J. J. Joaquin","doi":"10.1017/s0034412523000380","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412523000380","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Religious expressivism is the view that religious sentences, like ‘God is all-loving’ and ‘God offers us the gift of salvation’, are devoid of cognitive meaning. Such sentences are not truth-evaluable: they cannot be judged as true or false. In Religious Language, Michael Scott asked what explains the seeming logical behaviour of religious sentences if they are not truth-evaluable, as religious expressivists claim. In particular, religious expressivists need to explain (i) how a given religious sentence and its negation seem inconsistent and (ii) how religious sentences could figure in logically valid arguments. In this article, I develop a version of Weak Kleene semantics that could address these two ‘logic’ challenges.","PeriodicalId":45888,"journal":{"name":"RELIGIOUS STUDIES","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82380687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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