Pub Date : 2023-06-29DOI: 10.1017/s0034412523000537
F. Bertato
In this article I present some modal-epistemic arguments for the existence of God, based on the possibility of omniscience. For this, I provide modal formal systems that allow obtaining the existence of God as a theorem. Moreover, based on what I assume as reasonable premises, they show that the strong agnostic position is contradictory, since it allows the conclusion both that God exists and that God does not exist.
{"title":"Modal-epistemic arguments for the existence of God based on the possibility of the omniscience and/or refutation of the strong agnosticism","authors":"F. Bertato","doi":"10.1017/s0034412523000537","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412523000537","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this article I present some modal-epistemic arguments for the existence of God, based on the possibility of omniscience. For this, I provide modal formal systems that allow obtaining the existence of God as a theorem. Moreover, based on what I assume as reasonable premises, they show that the strong agnostic position is contradictory, since it allows the conclusion both that God exists and that God does not exist.","PeriodicalId":45888,"journal":{"name":"RELIGIOUS STUDIES","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76985999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-29DOI: 10.1017/s0034412523000513
L. Cordeiro‐Rodrigues
In a recent article in Religious Studies, Ada Agada argues that the problem of evil is relevant not only to those who consider God to hold the Omni-properties but also to those who understand God as a limited deity. He rightly points out that the limited-God literature in the African philosophy of religion has neglected to address the problem of evil by too quickly dismissing it. Agada then argues that the reason why the problem of evil is philosophically relevant for the limited-God view is that He, as the creator, has sufficient powers to address evil and, thereby, moral responsibility regarding the evil in the world. In this reply, I uphold that although Agada is correct to affirm that the problem of evil is relevant for the limited-God view, he is mistaken to contend that the reason is that God is the creator. I contest this view and argue that Agada has not given enough reasons to believe that God has moral responsibility over evil in the world. However, I illuminate how Agada can develop this argument in the future.
{"title":"Engaging and developing Ada Agada's philosophy: moral responsibility, creation, and the problem of evil","authors":"L. Cordeiro‐Rodrigues","doi":"10.1017/s0034412523000513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412523000513","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In a recent article in Religious Studies, Ada Agada argues that the problem of evil is relevant not only to those who consider God to hold the Omni-properties but also to those who understand God as a limited deity. He rightly points out that the limited-God literature in the African philosophy of religion has neglected to address the problem of evil by too quickly dismissing it. Agada then argues that the reason why the problem of evil is philosophically relevant for the limited-God view is that He, as the creator, has sufficient powers to address evil and, thereby, moral responsibility regarding the evil in the world. In this reply, I uphold that although Agada is correct to affirm that the problem of evil is relevant for the limited-God view, he is mistaken to contend that the reason is that God is the creator. I contest this view and argue that Agada has not given enough reasons to believe that God has moral responsibility over evil in the world. However, I illuminate how Agada can develop this argument in the future.","PeriodicalId":45888,"journal":{"name":"RELIGIOUS STUDIES","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83571208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-29DOI: 10.1017/s0034412523000549
Bryan Frances
Isn't there something like an amount and density of horrific suffering whose discovery would make it irrational to think God exists? Use your imagination to think of worlds that are much, much, much worse than you think Earth is when it comes to horrific suffering. Isn't there some conceivable scenario which, if you were in it, would make you say ‘Okay, okay. God doesn't exist, at least in the way we thought God was. We were wrong about that’? Pursuing this question leads to what I call the Problem of Absurd Evil.
{"title":"How much horrific suffering is enough?","authors":"Bryan Frances","doi":"10.1017/s0034412523000549","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412523000549","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Isn't there something like an amount and density of horrific suffering whose discovery would make it irrational to think God exists? Use your imagination to think of worlds that are much, much, much worse than you think Earth is when it comes to horrific suffering. Isn't there some conceivable scenario which, if you were in it, would make you say ‘Okay, okay. God doesn't exist, at least in the way we thought God was. We were wrong about that’? Pursuing this question leads to what I call the Problem of Absurd Evil.","PeriodicalId":45888,"journal":{"name":"RELIGIOUS STUDIES","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85931182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-06DOI: 10.1017/s0034412523000525
Sebastian Gäb
This article explores the concept of non-personal immortality. Non-personal theories of immortality claim that even though there is no personal or individual survival of death, it is still possible to continue to exist in a non-personal state. The most important challenge for non-personal conceptions of immortality is solving the apparent contradiction between on the one hand accepting that individual existence ends with death and on the other hand maintaining that death nevertheless is not equal to total annihilation. I present two theories of non-personal immortality found in Schopenhauer and William James and derive a set of systematic core theses from them. Finally, I discuss whether the notion of non-personal immortality is consistent, and whether a non-personal afterlife could be desirable.
{"title":"Non-personal immortality","authors":"Sebastian Gäb","doi":"10.1017/s0034412523000525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412523000525","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article explores the concept of non-personal immortality. Non-personal theories of immortality claim that even though there is no personal or individual survival of death, it is still possible to continue to exist in a non-personal state. The most important challenge for non-personal conceptions of immortality is solving the apparent contradiction between on the one hand accepting that individual existence ends with death and on the other hand maintaining that death nevertheless is not equal to total annihilation. I present two theories of non-personal immortality found in Schopenhauer and William James and derive a set of systematic core theses from them. Finally, I discuss whether the notion of non-personal immortality is consistent, and whether a non-personal afterlife could be desirable.","PeriodicalId":45888,"journal":{"name":"RELIGIOUS STUDIES","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79032826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-26DOI: 10.1017/s0034412523000410
Karen O’Brien-Kop
This article addresses the theme of ‘death and immortality’ from the perspective of consciousness, and takes as its starting point a root text of Hindu philosophy, the Sāṃkhyakārikā by Īśvarakṛṣṇa (c. fourth century ce). The text posits a dualist ontology in which consciousness is separate and autonomous from a material reality that includes body and mind. The goal is to be ontologically situated in a ‘pure’ consciousness (non-objective), which signifies existential liberation. There are mundane ways to understand this claim, such as referring to cognitive states that produce affective dissociation, or more radical interpretations, such as a post-death state. This article explores the question of what Sāṃkhya's consciousness is like: it is said to be immortal, plural, individuated, and contentless. What is the motivation for and implication of engagement with a system that describes an existential freedom that may only be known in a dualist reality or after death? And how can Sāṃkhya's concepts be brought into conversation with contemporary investigations into mind–body questions? Sāṃkhya rationality counters the argument of eternal oblivion or of consciousness as an illusion confined to the brain. Yet there are resonances with Chalmers's notion of consciousness as fundamental. This article concludes that contemporary Anglo-American philosophy of religion can be enhanced by adding Sāṃkhya thought to its purview.
本文从意识的角度探讨了“死亡与不朽”的主题，并以印度哲学的一个基本文本为出发点，Sāṃkhyakārikā by Īśvarakṛṣṇa(约公元四世纪)。这篇文章假设了一个二元论的本体论，在这个本体论中，意识是独立的，独立于包括身体和精神在内的物质现实的。目标是在本体论上处于“纯粹”意识(非客观)中，这意味着存在的解放。有一些世俗的方法可以理解这一说法，比如指产生情感分离的认知状态，或者更激进的解释，比如死后状态。这篇文章探讨了Sāṃkhya的意识是什么样子的问题:据说它是不朽的、多元的、个性化的、无内容的。参与一个描述存在主义自由的系统的动机和含义是什么，这种自由可能只在二元论的现实中或死后才知道?如何将Sāṃkhya的概念与当代对身心问题的研究结合起来?Sāṃkhya理性反驳了永恒遗忘或意识是局限于大脑的幻觉的观点。然而，查尔默斯关于意识是根本的概念也有共鸣。本文的结论是，当代英美宗教哲学可以通过在其范围内增加Sāṃkhya思想而得到加强。
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Pub Date : 2023-05-26DOI: 10.1017/s0034412523000434
Beverley Clack
According to Carolyne Larrington, legends of the past ‘offer particular kinds of answers – beautiful and mysterious answers. . . – to very large questions through a kind of metaphorical thinking . . . which, in their stripped-down clarity, show us what's really important in an unfamiliar light’. The claim that ‘what is really important [is disclosed] by casting it in an unfamiliar light’ I take into a philosophical engagement with the figure of the ghost. Far from being of dubious interest for the philosopher of religion, the continuing fascination with ghosts and hauntings offers promising ground for the discussion of religion, for the study of ghosts holds out the possibility of engaging with the wonder and terror of the human condition. The figure of something that is dead yet alive is a creative representation of the fact that we who are alive are also mortal, destined to die. The resulting confrontation with death arouses anxiety, but also has the potential to enrich life. The wisdom of the ghost thus enables the possibility of returning philosophy of religion to the great themes of human existence – birth, suffering, loss, and death – which provide rich resources for understanding religion and its relation to the experience of being human.
{"title":"The wisdom of ghosts","authors":"Beverley Clack","doi":"10.1017/s0034412523000434","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412523000434","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 According to Carolyne Larrington, legends of the past ‘offer particular kinds of answers – beautiful and mysterious answers. . . – to very large questions through a kind of metaphorical thinking . . . which, in their stripped-down clarity, show us what's really important in an unfamiliar light’. The claim that ‘what is really important [is disclosed] by casting it in an unfamiliar light’ I take into a philosophical engagement with the figure of the ghost. Far from being of dubious interest for the philosopher of religion, the continuing fascination with ghosts and hauntings offers promising ground for the discussion of religion, for the study of ghosts holds out the possibility of engaging with the wonder and terror of the human condition. The figure of something that is dead yet alive is a creative representation of the fact that we who are alive are also mortal, destined to die. The resulting confrontation with death arouses anxiety, but also has the potential to enrich life. The wisdom of the ghost thus enables the possibility of returning philosophy of religion to the great themes of human existence – birth, suffering, loss, and death – which provide rich resources for understanding religion and its relation to the experience of being human.","PeriodicalId":45888,"journal":{"name":"RELIGIOUS STUDIES","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90296834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-22DOI: 10.1017/s0034412523000495
J. Henry
{"title":"Robyn Horner and Claude Romano (eds), The Experience of Atheism: Phenomenology, Metaphysics and Religion (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2021). Pp. x + 206. £70.00. ISBN 1350167630.","authors":"J. Henry","doi":"10.1017/s0034412523000495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412523000495","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45888,"journal":{"name":"RELIGIOUS STUDIES","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74097744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-22DOI: 10.1017/s0034412523000483
Robert Bass
Michael Almeida has recently tried to show that if S5 correctly represents metaphysical necessity, there can be no non-trivial evidence for or against the existence of the traditional God. Evidence would thus be irrelevant to the reasonability of traditional theistic belief. Almeida's argument has implications beyond its announced target: it amounts to a new argument for sweeping scepticism. Almeida's argument for the irrelevance of evidence to the existence of God would apply to any state of affairs that entails some metaphysical necessity. In S5, every state of affairs entails some metaphysical necessity, so Almeida should conclude that non-trivial evidence for or against any state of affairs is impossible. I argue that the problem is not with S5 but with inadequately motivated assumptions about evidential support. Avoiding those assumptions disables the argument for sweeping scepticism and without foreclosing the possibility of non-trivial evidence for or against the existence of the traditional God.
Michael Almeida最近试图证明，如果S5正确地代表了形而上学的必然性，就不可能有非琐碎的证据支持或反对传统上帝的存在。因此，证据将与传统有神论信仰的合理性无关。阿尔梅达的论点的含义超出了其宣布的目标:它相当于对广泛怀疑主义的新论点。阿尔梅达关于证据与上帝存在无关的论点适用于任何涉及某种形而上学必然性的事物状态。在第五章中，每一种状态都包含某种形而上学的必然性，所以阿尔梅达应该得出结论，支持或反对任何一种状态的非琐碎证据是不可能的。我认为，问题不在于S5，而在于对证据支持的动机不足的假设。避免这些假设会使全面怀疑主义的论点失效，也不会排除支持或反对传统上帝存在的重要证据的可能性。
{"title":"Evil is still evidence: comment on Almeida","authors":"Robert Bass","doi":"10.1017/s0034412523000483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412523000483","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Michael Almeida has recently tried to show that if S5 correctly represents metaphysical necessity, there can be no non-trivial evidence for or against the existence of the traditional God. Evidence would thus be irrelevant to the reasonability of traditional theistic belief. Almeida's argument has implications beyond its announced target: it amounts to a new argument for sweeping scepticism. Almeida's argument for the irrelevance of evidence to the existence of God would apply to any state of affairs that entails some metaphysical necessity. In S5, every state of affairs entails some metaphysical necessity, so Almeida should conclude that non-trivial evidence for or against any state of affairs is impossible. I argue that the problem is not with S5 but with inadequately motivated assumptions about evidential support. Avoiding those assumptions disables the argument for sweeping scepticism and without foreclosing the possibility of non-trivial evidence for or against the existence of the traditional God.","PeriodicalId":45888,"journal":{"name":"RELIGIOUS STUDIES","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79017592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-17DOI: 10.1017/s0034412523000446
T. McNabb
{"title":"Kelly James Clark and Justin Winslett A Spiritual Geography of Early Chinese Thought: Gods, Ancestors, and Afterlife (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2023). Pp. 1–225. £85.00 (Hbk). ISBN 97813502621701.","authors":"T. McNabb","doi":"10.1017/s0034412523000446","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412523000446","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45888,"journal":{"name":"RELIGIOUS STUDIES","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81270104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-16DOI: 10.1017/s0034412523000471
R. Silvestre
In this article, I present a defence of conceptual plausibility, understood as an epistemic way to qualify concepts that situates them between the merely possible and the actual. To show that there is such a thing as conceptual plausibility, I rely on what seems to lie at the heart of many uses of the phrase ‘plausible concept’: explanatory fruitfulness. To make an effective case for the claim that conceptual plausibility is of philosophical interest, I present an argument based on the debate over the rationality of theistic belief and the concept of God. To show that conceptual plausibility is philosophically feasible, I first show that it cannot be reduced to propositional plausibility. Next, I offer a minimally precise characterization of conceptual plausibility; I approach this from a qualitative and comparative perspective as well. Finally, I show how these qualitative and comparative criteria of conceptual plausibility might be applied to the debate over the rationality of theistic belief and the concept of God.
{"title":"Conceptual plausibility and the rationality of theistic belief","authors":"R. Silvestre","doi":"10.1017/s0034412523000471","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412523000471","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this article, I present a defence of conceptual plausibility, understood as an epistemic way to qualify concepts that situates them between the merely possible and the actual. To show that there is such a thing as conceptual plausibility, I rely on what seems to lie at the heart of many uses of the phrase ‘plausible concept’: explanatory fruitfulness. To make an effective case for the claim that conceptual plausibility is of philosophical interest, I present an argument based on the debate over the rationality of theistic belief and the concept of God. To show that conceptual plausibility is philosophically feasible, I first show that it cannot be reduced to propositional plausibility. Next, I offer a minimally precise characterization of conceptual plausibility; I approach this from a qualitative and comparative perspective as well. Finally, I show how these qualitative and comparative criteria of conceptual plausibility might be applied to the debate over the rationality of theistic belief and the concept of God.","PeriodicalId":45888,"journal":{"name":"RELIGIOUS STUDIES","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82070869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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