Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2020.1848189
S. Noll, B. Davis
ABSTRACT This paper explores the ethical dimensions of lionfish removal and provides an argument supporting hunting lionfish for consumption. Lionfish are an invasive species found around the world. Their presence has fueled management strategies that predominantly rely on promoting human predation and consumption. We apply rights-based ethics, utilitarian ethics, and ecocentric environmental ethics to the question of whether hunting and eating lionfish is ethical. After applying these perspectives, we argue that, from a utilitarian perspective, lionfish should be culled. Rights-based ethics, on the other hand, are not applicable in this case, while ecocentric environmental ethics would support lionfish removal.
{"title":"The Invasive Species Diet: The Ethics of Eating Lionfish as a Wildlife Management Strategy","authors":"S. Noll, B. Davis","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2020.1848189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2020.1848189","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper explores the ethical dimensions of lionfish removal and provides an argument supporting hunting lionfish for consumption. Lionfish are an invasive species found around the world. Their presence has fueled management strategies that predominantly rely on promoting human predation and consumption. We apply rights-based ethics, utilitarian ethics, and ecocentric environmental ethics to the question of whether hunting and eating lionfish is ethical. After applying these perspectives, we argue that, from a utilitarian perspective, lionfish should be culled. Rights-based ethics, on the other hand, are not applicable in this case, while ecocentric environmental ethics would support lionfish removal.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"55 1","pages":"320 - 335"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73381904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2020.1848188
Travis N. Rieder, J. Bernstein
ABSTRACT Many of us believe that we can and do have individual obligations to refrain from contributing to massive collective harms – say, from producing luxury greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; however, our individual actions are so small as to be practically meaningless. Can we then, justify the intuition that we ought to refrain? In this paper, we argue that this debate may have been mis-framed. Rather than investigating whether or not we have obligations to refrain from contributing to collective action, perhaps we should ask whether we have reason to do so. However, this framing brings challenges of its own, and so we close by asking what problems are generated if we focus on these questions of ‘contributory ethics’.
{"title":"The Case for ‘Contributory Ethics’: Or How to Think about Individual Morality in a Time of Global Problems","authors":"Travis N. Rieder, J. Bernstein","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2020.1848188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2020.1848188","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Many of us believe that we can and do have individual obligations to refrain from contributing to massive collective harms – say, from producing luxury greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; however, our individual actions are so small as to be practically meaningless. Can we then, justify the intuition that we ought to refrain? In this paper, we argue that this debate may have been mis-framed. Rather than investigating whether or not we have obligations to refrain from contributing to collective action, perhaps we should ask whether we have reason to do so. However, this framing brings challenges of its own, and so we close by asking what problems are generated if we focus on these questions of ‘contributory ethics’.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"226 1","pages":"299 - 319"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78318649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-08DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2021.1940449
Gernot Wagner, Daniel Zizzamia
ABSTRACT Moral hazards are ubiquitous. Green ones typically involve technological fixes: Environmentalists often see ‘technofixes’ as morally fraught because they absolve actors from taking more difficult steps toward systemic solutions. Carbon removal and especially solar geoengineering are only the latest example of such technologies. We here explore green moral hazards throughout American history. We argue that dismissing (solar) geoengineering on moral hazard grounds is often unproductive. Instead, especially those vehemently opposed to the technology should use it as an opportunity to expand the attention paid to the underlying environmental problem in the first place, actively invoking its opposite: ‘inverse moral hazards’.
{"title":"Green Moral Hazards","authors":"Gernot Wagner, Daniel Zizzamia","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2021.1940449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2021.1940449","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Moral hazards are ubiquitous. Green ones typically involve technological fixes: Environmentalists often see ‘technofixes’ as morally fraught because they absolve actors from taking more difficult steps toward systemic solutions. Carbon removal and especially solar geoengineering are only the latest example of such technologies. We here explore green moral hazards throughout American history. We argue that dismissing (solar) geoengineering on moral hazard grounds is often unproductive. Instead, especially those vehemently opposed to the technology should use it as an opportunity to expand the attention paid to the underlying environmental problem in the first place, actively invoking its opposite: ‘inverse moral hazards’.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"18 1","pages":"264 - 280"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74578646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-03DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2020.1848183
Brian Petersen, J. Hultgren
ABSTRACT Past debates surrounding wilderness have not led to constructive dialogue but instead have created a rift between dueling sides. Far from academic, this debate has important ethical, policy, and practical implications. We outline out the major fault lines of the debate between wilderness realists and constructivists and also identify common ground between them. From this starting point, we offer three potential bridges between them and conclude by proposing a preliminary vision of a 21st Century wilderness ethic focused on social-ecological connection, re-commoning, and social justice. Returning to the ‘great wilderness debate’ can lead to a synthesis of the realist and constructivist positions and a renewed wilderness ethic in an era of neoliberalism, hyper-nationalism, and intensified environmental crises.
{"title":"The Case for a 21st Century Wilderness Ethic","authors":"Brian Petersen, J. Hultgren","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2020.1848183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2020.1848183","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Past debates surrounding wilderness have not led to constructive dialogue but instead have created a rift between dueling sides. Far from academic, this debate has important ethical, policy, and practical implications. We outline out the major fault lines of the debate between wilderness realists and constructivists and also identify common ground between them. From this starting point, we offer three potential bridges between them and conclude by proposing a preliminary vision of a 21st Century wilderness ethic focused on social-ecological connection, re-commoning, and social justice. Returning to the ‘great wilderness debate’ can lead to a synthesis of the realist and constructivist positions and a renewed wilderness ethic in an era of neoliberalism, hyper-nationalism, and intensified environmental crises.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"1 1","pages":"222 - 239"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75110028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-03DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2020.1848174
Alexander Lee
ABSTRACT Biocentric (life-centered) and ecocentric (ecosystem-centered) ethics offer a rich discourse on protecting biotic communities – defending conservation with inherent value tied to life. A problem arises from these views if mountains, glaciers, canyons, and other abiotic natural objects (often foci of conservation efforts) matter in and of themselves. Abiotic nature helps demonstrate and delineate the boundaries of environmental ethics grounded in life-based axiology. A series of thought experiments suggest that orienting conservation as a question of obligation offers an additional avenue to explore and defend the protection of abiotic nature; agreements and property rights plausibly ground moral obligations to conserve abiotic nature.
{"title":"The Tragic Death of a Utah Goblin: Conservation and the Problem of Abiotic Nature","authors":"Alexander Lee","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2020.1848174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2020.1848174","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Biocentric (life-centered) and ecocentric (ecosystem-centered) ethics offer a rich discourse on protecting biotic communities – defending conservation with inherent value tied to life. A problem arises from these views if mountains, glaciers, canyons, and other abiotic natural objects (often foci of conservation efforts) matter in and of themselves. Abiotic nature helps demonstrate and delineate the boundaries of environmental ethics grounded in life-based axiology. A series of thought experiments suggest that orienting conservation as a question of obligation offers an additional avenue to explore and defend the protection of abiotic nature; agreements and property rights plausibly ground moral obligations to conserve abiotic nature.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"23 1","pages":"144 - 158"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79611509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-03DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2020.1848175
Michel Bourban, Lisa Broussois
ABSTRACT We challenge effective altruism (EA) on the basis that it should be more inclusive regarding the demands of altruism. EA should consider carefully agents’ intentions and the role those intentions can play in agents’ moral lives. Although we argue that good intentions play an instrumental role and can lead to better results, by adopting a Hutchesonian perspective, we show that intentions should, first and foremost, be considered for their intrinsic value. We examine offsetting and geoengineering, two so-called solutions to climate change supported by EA, to highlight the limitations of a narrow understanding of altruism.
{"title":"The Most Good We Can Do or the Best Person We Can Be?","authors":"Michel Bourban, Lisa Broussois","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2020.1848175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2020.1848175","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We challenge effective altruism (EA) on the basis that it should be more inclusive regarding the demands of altruism. EA should consider carefully agents’ intentions and the role those intentions can play in agents’ moral lives. Although we argue that good intentions play an instrumental role and can lead to better results, by adopting a Hutchesonian perspective, we show that intentions should, first and foremost, be considered for their intrinsic value. We examine offsetting and geoengineering, two so-called solutions to climate change supported by EA, to highlight the limitations of a narrow understanding of altruism.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"27 1","pages":"159 - 179"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89263761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-03DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2020.1848173
Nicolas Delon
ABSTRACT Urban animals can benefit from living in cities, but this also makes them vulnerable as they increasingly depend on the advantages of urban life. This article has two aims. First, I provide a detailed analysis of the concept of captivity and explain why it matters to nonhuman animals – because and insofar as many of them have a (non-substitutable) interest in freedom. Second, I defend a surprising implication of the account – pushing the boundaries of the concept while the boundaries of cities and human activities expand. I argue for the existence of the neglected problem of pervasive captivity, of which urban wildlife is an illustration. Many urban animals are confined, controlled and dependent, therefore often captive of expanding urban areas. While I argue that captivity per se is value-neutral, I draw the ethical and policy implications of harmful pervasive captivity.
{"title":"Pervasive Captivity and Urban Wildlife","authors":"Nicolas Delon","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2020.1848173","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2020.1848173","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Urban animals can benefit from living in cities, but this also makes them vulnerable as they increasingly depend on the advantages of urban life. This article has two aims. First, I provide a detailed analysis of the concept of captivity and explain why it matters to nonhuman animals – because and insofar as many of them have a (non-substitutable) interest in freedom. Second, I defend a surprising implication of the account – pushing the boundaries of the concept while the boundaries of cities and human activities expand. I argue for the existence of the neglected problem of pervasive captivity, of which urban wildlife is an illustration. Many urban animals are confined, controlled and dependent, therefore often captive of expanding urban areas. While I argue that captivity per se is value-neutral, I draw the ethical and policy implications of harmful pervasive captivity.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"165 6 1","pages":"123 - 143"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83323428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-03DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2020.1848182
S. A. Inkpen, C. Tyler DesRoches
ABSTRACT Evidence that humans play a dominant role in most ecosystems forces scientists to confront systems that contain factors transgressing traditional disciplinary boundaries. However, it is an open question whether this state of affairs should encourage interdisciplinary exchange or integration. With two case studies, we show that exchange between ecologists and economists is preferable, for epistemological and policy-oriented reasons, to their acting independently. We call this “exchange gain.” Our case studies show that theoretical exchanges can be less disruptive to current theory than commonly thought. Valuable interdisciplinary exchange does not necessarily require disciplinary breakdown.
{"title":"When Ecology Needs Economics and Economics Needs Ecology: Interdisciplinary Exchange during the Anthropocene","authors":"S. A. Inkpen, C. Tyler DesRoches","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2020.1848182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2020.1848182","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Evidence that humans play a dominant role in most ecosystems forces scientists to confront systems that contain factors transgressing traditional disciplinary boundaries. However, it is an open question whether this state of affairs should encourage interdisciplinary exchange or integration. With two case studies, we show that exchange between ecologists and economists is preferable, for epistemological and policy-oriented reasons, to their acting independently. We call this “exchange gain.” Our case studies show that theoretical exchanges can be less disruptive to current theory than commonly thought. Valuable interdisciplinary exchange does not necessarily require disciplinary breakdown.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"15 1","pages":"203 - 221"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87246112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-03DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2020.1848176
A. Lockley
ABSTRACT Solar Radiation Management (SRM) is a proposed response to Anthropogenic Global Warming (AGW). Other papers consider private SRM provision, e.g. via Voluntary Carbon Offsets (VCO). Limited VCO markets would under-supply SRM, so state provision or mandating is possible. Public funding does not presume state execution; private subcontracting is feasible. Notwithstanding concerns about privatization, we assume state commissioning of SRM – proposing and analyzing plausible governance, by adapting extant proposals. We consider two regulatory functions: legal/corporate; and scientific/technical. We briefly discuss mandatory, emissions-linked SRM funding. State contracting is deemed plausible, e.g. for historic emissions. For future emissions, mandatory polluter-pays SRM may be preferable.
{"title":"State Commissioning of Solar Radiation Management Geoengineering","authors":"A. Lockley","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2020.1848176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2020.1848176","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Solar Radiation Management (SRM) is a proposed response to Anthropogenic Global Warming (AGW). Other papers consider private SRM provision, e.g. via Voluntary Carbon Offsets (VCO). Limited VCO markets would under-supply SRM, so state provision or mandating is possible. Public funding does not presume state execution; private subcontracting is feasible. Notwithstanding concerns about privatization, we assume state commissioning of SRM – proposing and analyzing plausible governance, by adapting extant proposals. We consider two regulatory functions: legal/corporate; and scientific/technical. We briefly discuss mandatory, emissions-linked SRM funding. State contracting is deemed plausible, e.g. for historic emissions. For future emissions, mandatory polluter-pays SRM may be preferable.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"46 2","pages":"180 - 202"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72582315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-07DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2020.1848186
Angela Moriggi, K. Soini, A. Franklin, D. Roep
ABSTRACT Notions of care for humans and more-than-humans appear at the margins of the sustainability transformations debate. This paper explores the merits of an ethics of care approach to sustainability transformations. It argues that more radical, transformative change can be fostered via three mutually reinforcing dimensions: (a) ethically informed practices; (b) relational response-ability; and (c) emotional awareness. This novel theoretical and methodological lens emphasizes the transformative potential of caring practices and as such extends the reach of the sustainability transformations debate.
{"title":"A Care-Based Approach to Transformative Change: Ethically-Informed Practices, Relational Response-Ability & Emotional Awareness","authors":"Angela Moriggi, K. Soini, A. Franklin, D. Roep","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2020.1848186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2020.1848186","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Notions of care for humans and more-than-humans appear at the margins of the sustainability transformations debate. This paper explores the merits of an ethics of care approach to sustainability transformations. It argues that more radical, transformative change can be fostered via three mutually reinforcing dimensions: (a) ethically informed practices; (b) relational response-ability; and (c) emotional awareness. This novel theoretical and methodological lens emphasizes the transformative potential of caring practices and as such extends the reach of the sustainability transformations debate.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"23 1","pages":"281 - 298"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76060205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：