Pub Date : 2020-12-04DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2020.1848193
Kenneth Shockley
ABSTRACT It seems intuitive that human development and environmental protection should go hand in hand. But some have worried there is no framework within environmental ethics that suitably conjoins them. In this paper I suggest we approach this challenge by rethinking a very old idea, external goods. I argue that we can see the basis for the required framework if we recognize the normative significance of our natural environment in the same way Aristotle thought we needed to recognize the normative significance of our social environment. This suggests a promising means of balancing human development and environmental protection.
{"title":"The Environmental Constituents of Flourishing: Rethinking External Goods and the Ecological Systems that Provide Them","authors":"Kenneth Shockley","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2020.1848193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2020.1848193","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT It seems intuitive that human development and environmental protection should go hand in hand. But some have worried there is no framework within environmental ethics that suitably conjoins them. In this paper I suggest we approach this challenge by rethinking a very old idea, external goods. I argue that we can see the basis for the required framework if we recognize the normative significance of our natural environment in the same way Aristotle thought we needed to recognize the normative significance of our social environment. This suggests a promising means of balancing human development and environmental protection.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"12 1","pages":"1 - 20"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81865888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-02DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2020.1848194
Nina Gmeiner, Stefanie Sievers-Glotzbach, Christian U. Becker
ABSTRACT Property regimes are based on fundamental values of the society or group that designs and reproduces them. This paper analyses the ethical underpinnings of Progressive Commons in comparison to the values underlying private property and traditional Commons. Against this backdrop, we discuss the potential of Progressive Commons to address major challenges in context of the twenty-first century economy. Seed Commons serve as an example. Our analysis shows that Progressive Commons respond to contemporary societal and environmental challenges by re-interpreting the classical values underlying traditional private and common property regimes, turning them to sovereignty, re-democratization, and social-ecological sustainability in the global context.
{"title":"New Values for New Challenges: The Emergence of Progressive Commons as a Property Regime for the 21st Century","authors":"Nina Gmeiner, Stefanie Sievers-Glotzbach, Christian U. Becker","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2020.1848194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2020.1848194","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Property regimes are based on fundamental values of the society or group that designs and reproduces them. This paper analyses the ethical underpinnings of Progressive Commons in comparison to the values underlying private property and traditional Commons. Against this backdrop, we discuss the potential of Progressive Commons to address major challenges in context of the twenty-first century economy. Seed Commons serve as an example. Our analysis shows that Progressive Commons respond to contemporary societal and environmental challenges by re-interpreting the classical values underlying traditional private and common property regimes, turning them to sovereignty, re-democratization, and social-ecological sustainability in the global context.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"115 1","pages":"187 - 207"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89564892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-25DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2020.1848187
Ernest Nkansah‐Dwamena, Aireona Bonnie Raschke
ABSTRACT Large-scale land acquisitions (LaSLA), otherwise ‘land grabbing’ in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), raise difficult normative questions the current literature does not sufficiently explore. LaSLA is associated with development opportunities; however, it also threatens the well-being of local people because of displacement and dispossession. To investigate the processes and outcomes for LaSLA to be considered as ‘just and fair,’ we evaluate the impacts of a LaSLA project on local livelihoods in Tanzania. Specifically, we apply John Rawls’ Theory of Justice to the project and compare the results with empirical insights gained from our fieldwork. We find that LaSLA has the potential to improve the living standards of local people, we cannot consider LaSLA as just and fair because it contradicts Rawls’s principles of justice and deteriorates the livelihoods of local people. Our findings suggest that it is critical to scrutinize LaSLA investments, involve local people in decision-making, and build the capacity of host governments to negotiate better LaSLA deals.
{"title":"Justice and Fairness for Mkangawalo People: The Case of the Kilombero Large-scale Land Acquisition (LaSLA) Project in Tanzania","authors":"Ernest Nkansah‐Dwamena, Aireona Bonnie Raschke","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2020.1848187","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2020.1848187","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Large-scale land acquisitions (LaSLA), otherwise ‘land grabbing’ in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), raise difficult normative questions the current literature does not sufficiently explore. LaSLA is associated with development opportunities; however, it also threatens the well-being of local people because of displacement and dispossession. To investigate the processes and outcomes for LaSLA to be considered as ‘just and fair,’ we evaluate the impacts of a LaSLA project on local livelihoods in Tanzania. Specifically, we apply John Rawls’ Theory of Justice to the project and compare the results with empirical insights gained from our fieldwork. We find that LaSLA has the potential to improve the living standards of local people, we cannot consider LaSLA as just and fair because it contradicts Rawls’s principles of justice and deteriorates the livelihoods of local people. Our findings suggest that it is critical to scrutinize LaSLA investments, involve local people in decision-making, and build the capacity of host governments to negotiate better LaSLA deals.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"98 1","pages":"137 - 163"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80985071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-25DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2020.1848197
A. Thresher
ABSTRACT Most current techniques to deal with invasive species are ineffective or have highly damaging side effects. To this end suppression-drives based on clustered regularly inter-spaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR/Cas9) have been touted as a potential silver bullet for the problem, allowing for a highly focused, humane and cost-effective means of removing a target species from an environment. Suppression-drives come with serious risks, however, such that the precautionary principle seems to warrant us not deploying this technology. The focus of this paper is on one such risk – the danger of a suppression-drive escaping containment and wiping out the target species globally. Here, I argue that in most cases this risk is significant enough to warrant not using a gene-drive. In some cases, however, we can bypass the precautionary principle by using an approach that hinges on what I term the ‘Worst-Case Clause’. This clause, in turn, provides us with a litmus test that can be fruitfully used to determine what species are viable targets for suppression-drives in the wild. Using this metric in concert with other considerations, I suggest that only three species are currently possible viable targets – the European rabbit, ship rat and Caribbean Tree Frog.
{"title":"When Extinction Is Warranted: Invasive Species, Suppression-Drives and the Worst-Case Scenario","authors":"A. Thresher","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2020.1848197","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2020.1848197","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Most current techniques to deal with invasive species are ineffective or have highly damaging side effects. To this end suppression-drives based on clustered regularly inter-spaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR/Cas9) have been touted as a potential silver bullet for the problem, allowing for a highly focused, humane and cost-effective means of removing a target species from an environment. Suppression-drives come with serious risks, however, such that the precautionary principle seems to warrant us not deploying this technology. The focus of this paper is on one such risk – the danger of a suppression-drive escaping containment and wiping out the target species globally. Here, I argue that in most cases this risk is significant enough to warrant not using a gene-drive. In some cases, however, we can bypass the precautionary principle by using an approach that hinges on what I term the ‘Worst-Case Clause’. This clause, in turn, provides us with a litmus test that can be fruitfully used to determine what species are viable targets for suppression-drives in the wild. Using this metric in concert with other considerations, I suggest that only three species are currently possible viable targets – the European rabbit, ship rat and Caribbean Tree Frog.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"37 1","pages":"132 - 152"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80589704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-23DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2020.1848196
J. O'day
ABSTRACT Martin B. Peterson argues that the social experiment analysis improperly shifts our focus onto the rhetorical dimension of debates over technology, which is ‘clearly irrelevant’ to the ‘traditional’ question: is this a morally acceptable technology? By invoking Harry Truman and the atom bomb in his counterargument, however, Peterson exemplifies the important role that rhetoric plays in our assessment and acceptance of certain technologies. Peterson’s account of The Bomb is an unfortunate byproduct of American nationalist dogma, but the social experiment analysis is well equipped to neutralize its obfuscating effect. Philosophers should further investigate its utility in light of this analytical strength.
Martin B. Peterson认为，社会实验分析不恰当地将我们的注意力转移到技术辩论的修辞维度上，这与“传统”问题“显然无关”:这是一种道德上可接受的技术吗?然而，通过在他的反驳中引用哈里·杜鲁门和原子弹，彼得森举例说明了修辞在我们评估和接受某些技术时所起的重要作用。彼得森对《炸弹》的描述是美国民族主义教条的不幸副产品，但社会实验分析很好地抵消了其令人困惑的影响。哲学家应该根据这种分析的力量进一步研究它的效用。
{"title":"What Peterson Gets Wrong about Truman and The Bomb","authors":"J. O'day","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2020.1848196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2020.1848196","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Martin B. Peterson argues that the social experiment analysis improperly shifts our focus onto the rhetorical dimension of debates over technology, which is ‘clearly irrelevant’ to the ‘traditional’ question: is this a morally acceptable technology? By invoking Harry Truman and the atom bomb in his counterargument, however, Peterson exemplifies the important role that rhetoric plays in our assessment and acceptance of certain technologies. Peterson’s account of The Bomb is an unfortunate byproduct of American nationalist dogma, but the social experiment analysis is well equipped to neutralize its obfuscating effect. Philosophers should further investigate its utility in light of this analytical strength.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"21 1","pages":"69 - 75"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78662033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-18DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2020.1848190
Mercy Osemudiame Okpoko
ABSTRACT Calls for society to reconnect with nature are commonplace in environmental discourse. The expression ‘Interconnectedness with Nature’ has a place in African eco-philosophy. The departure from this African eco-philosophy may be a potential contributor to present rate of forest depletion in Nigeria. By employing the African eco-philosophy of ‘interconnectedness with nature’, this study considers its capacity to demonstrate the relevance of African socio-ecological ethics for forest conservation. There is need for such values to form the theoretical foundation of environmental policies and actions in Nigeria to achieve the required value change for more commitment to forest resource conservation within Nigeria.
{"title":"‘Interconnectedness with Nature’: The Imperative for an African-centered Eco-philosophy in Forest Resource Conservation in Nigeria","authors":"Mercy Osemudiame Okpoko","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2020.1848190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2020.1848190","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Calls for society to reconnect with nature are commonplace in environmental discourse. The expression ‘Interconnectedness with Nature’ has a place in African eco-philosophy. The departure from this African eco-philosophy may be a potential contributor to present rate of forest depletion in Nigeria. By employing the African eco-philosophy of ‘interconnectedness with nature’, this study considers its capacity to demonstrate the relevance of African socio-ecological ethics for forest conservation. There is need for such values to form the theoretical foundation of environmental policies and actions in Nigeria to achieve the required value change for more commitment to forest resource conservation within Nigeria.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"42 1","pages":"21 - 36"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78213089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-18DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2020.1848192
Michael M. Prinzing
ABSTRACT Awareness and concern about climate change are widespread. But rates of pro-environmental behavior are low. This is partly due to the way in which pro-environmental behavior is framed – as a sacrifice or burden that individuals bear for the planet and future generations. This framing elicits well-known cognitive biases, discouraging what we should be encouraging. We should abandon the self-sacrifice framing, and instead frame pro-environmental behavior as intrinsically desirable. There is a large body of evidence that, around the world, people who are living more environmentally lifestyles are happier than those not doing so. This is the message we should be spreading.
{"title":"Going Green Is Good for You: Why We Need to Change the Way We Think about Pro-environmental Behavior","authors":"Michael M. Prinzing","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2020.1848192","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2020.1848192","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Awareness and concern about climate change are widespread. But rates of pro-environmental behavior are low. This is partly due to the way in which pro-environmental behavior is framed – as a sacrifice or burden that individuals bear for the planet and future generations. This framing elicits well-known cognitive biases, discouraging what we should be encouraging. We should abandon the self-sacrifice framing, and instead frame pro-environmental behavior as intrinsically desirable. There is a large body of evidence that, around the world, people who are living more environmentally lifestyles are happier than those not doing so. This is the message we should be spreading.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"2 1","pages":"1 - 18"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88103367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2020.1848185
Levente Szentkirályi
ABSTRACT We are surrounded by threats of environmental harm whose actual dangers to public health are scientifically unverified. It is widely presumed that under conditions of uncertainty, when it is not possible to foresee the outcomes of our actions, or to calculate the probability they will actually cause harm, we cannot be held culpable for the risks and harms our actions impose on others. It is commonly presumed, that is, that exposing others to what this paper terms ‘uncertain threats’ is permissible, because conventional theories of moral responsibility understand uncertainty as implying that the effects of our actions are out of our control and, therefore, beyond our fault. In contrast, in rejecting arguments from moral luck, this paper denies that authors of uncertain threats of environmental harm are excusably ignorant, and denies that prevailing uncertainty diminishes their moral obligations or attenuates their culpability. For under conditions of uncertainty, culpability turns on the lack of due regard for others as moral equals – a consideration that neither luck nor ignorance excuses. To expose others to unconsented-to uncertain threats of harm without exercising due care to prevent possible injury is to wrongfully gamble with their welfare and their capacity for self-authorship.
{"title":"Luck Has Nothing to Do with It: Prevailing Uncertainty and Responsibilities of Due Care","authors":"Levente Szentkirályi","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2020.1848185","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2020.1848185","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We are surrounded by threats of environmental harm whose actual dangers to public health are scientifically unverified. It is widely presumed that under conditions of uncertainty, when it is not possible to foresee the outcomes of our actions, or to calculate the probability they will actually cause harm, we cannot be held culpable for the risks and harms our actions impose on others. It is commonly presumed, that is, that exposing others to what this paper terms ‘uncertain threats’ is permissible, because conventional theories of moral responsibility understand uncertainty as implying that the effects of our actions are out of our control and, therefore, beyond our fault. In contrast, in rejecting arguments from moral luck, this paper denies that authors of uncertain threats of environmental harm are excusably ignorant, and denies that prevailing uncertainty diminishes their moral obligations or attenuates their culpability. For under conditions of uncertainty, culpability turns on the lack of due regard for others as moral equals – a consideration that neither luck nor ignorance excuses. To expose others to unconsented-to uncertain threats of harm without exercising due care to prevent possible injury is to wrongfully gamble with their welfare and their capacity for self-authorship.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"46 1","pages":"261 - 280"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80836755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2020.1848191
Timothy Aylsworth, Adam Pham
ABSTRACT This paper offers some refinements to a particular objection to act consequentialism, the ‘causal impotence’ objection. According to proponents of the objection, when we find circumstances in which severe, unnecessary harms result entirely from voluntary acts, it seems as if we should be able to indict at least one act among those acts, but act consequentialism appears to lack the resources to offer this indictment. Our aim is to show is that the most promising response on behalf of act consequentialism, the threshold argument, cannot offer a fully general prescription about what to do in cases of collective action.
{"title":"Consequentialism, Collective Action, and Causal Impotence","authors":"Timothy Aylsworth, Adam Pham","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2020.1848191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2020.1848191","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper offers some refinements to a particular objection to act consequentialism, the ‘causal impotence’ objection. According to proponents of the objection, when we find circumstances in which severe, unnecessary harms result entirely from voluntary acts, it seems as if we should be able to indict at least one act among those acts, but act consequentialism appears to lack the resources to offer this indictment. Our aim is to show is that the most promising response on behalf of act consequentialism, the threshold argument, cannot offer a fully general prescription about what to do in cases of collective action.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"4 1","pages":"336 - 349"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76047452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2020.1848184
Yasha Rohwer
ABSTRACT A new movement in conservation biology called ‘compassionate conservation’ questions the traditional hierarchy of moral values in conservation. Compassionate conservationists search for ‘win-win’ solutions that allow species and populations to be saved without killing or causing excessive suffering to sentient creatures. In this paper, I argue that these compassionate conservationists have a moral obligation to support the investigation and development of genetic modification technologies because of their potential to minimize suffering and eliminate killing in conservation. Furthermore, I will end the paper by suggesting that these genetic technologies can help avoid actions that could be damaging to one’s moral character.
{"title":"Gene Drives, Species, and Compassion for Individuals in Conservation Biology","authors":"Yasha Rohwer","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2020.1848184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2020.1848184","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT A new movement in conservation biology called ‘compassionate conservation’ questions the traditional hierarchy of moral values in conservation. Compassionate conservationists search for ‘win-win’ solutions that allow species and populations to be saved without killing or causing excessive suffering to sentient creatures. In this paper, I argue that these compassionate conservationists have a moral obligation to support the investigation and development of genetic modification technologies because of their potential to minimize suffering and eliminate killing in conservation. Furthermore, I will end the paper by suggesting that these genetic technologies can help avoid actions that could be damaging to one’s moral character.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"43 1","pages":"243 - 260"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85482756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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