Pub Date : 2023-10-25DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2023.2272548
Robert Huseby
A common objection to sufficientarianism is that it allows large inequalities above the threshold. A sharpened form of this objection highlights that this indifference also encompasses large inequalities in the distribution of burdens. Consider the burdens that follow from climate change. A theory that does not rule out placing these burdens on the worst off (of the sufficiently well off) will appear implausible to many. This paper assesses ways of addressing this objection and defends a revised conception of sufficientarianism that can demand fair distribution of burdens (and benefits) above the sufficiency threshold, without giving up core sufficientarian theoretical commitments.
{"title":"Sufficiency and the Distribution of Burdens","authors":"Robert Huseby","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2023.2272548","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2023.2272548","url":null,"abstract":"A common objection to sufficientarianism is that it allows large inequalities above the threshold. A sharpened form of this objection highlights that this indifference also encompasses large inequalities in the distribution of burdens. Consider the burdens that follow from climate change. A theory that does not rule out placing these burdens on the worst off (of the sufficiently well off) will appear implausible to many. This paper assesses ways of addressing this objection and defends a revised conception of sufficientarianism that can demand fair distribution of burdens (and benefits) above the sufficiency threshold, without giving up core sufficientarian theoretical commitments.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"65 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135166190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-23DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2023.2269055
Ian Gough
ABSTRACTThis paper outlines a conceptual framework for a sufficiency economy, defining sufficiency as the space between a generalizable notion of human wellbeing and ungeneralisable excess. It assumes an objective and universal concept of human needs to define a ‘floor’ and the concept of planetary boundaries to define a ‘ceiling’. This is set up as an alternative to the dominant preference satisfaction theory of value. It begins with a brief survey of the potential contributions of sufficientarianism and limitarianism to this endeavor before outlining a theory of objective, universal human need. This recognizes the contextual variable nature of need satisfiers and the distinct methodology required to adjudicate necessities. It then turns to the planetary boundaries literature and utilizes a sequence of causal and normative reasoning to derive an operational ceiling and the concept of ungeneralisable luxuries. The final section addresses how the concepts of floors and ceilings might be operationalized via forms of dialogic democracy but noting the absence of any such institutions at the global level. Its policy conclusion is that a safe climate cannot be achieved through supply-side mitigation alone, and that fair demand-side mitigation necessarily requires a clear distinction between necessities and unnecessary luxuries, between which (hopefully) lies a space of sufficiency.KEYWORDS: Sufficiencyvalue theoryhuman needsplentary boundariesfloorsceilingsdemand-side mitigationsufficientarianismlimitarianism AcknowledgmentsThe research for this article was supported by an Emeritus Fellowship awarded by the Leverhulme Trust, titled ‘Valuing what matters: from efficiency to sufficiency’. I am most grateful for their support.Many thanks to Charlotte Rogers for valuable research assistance. I am grateful to many friends and colleagues who commented on earlier drafts including Richard Bärnthaler, Eric Beinhocker, George Boss, Sam Bowles, Oliver Carr, Anna Coote, Len Doyal, David Fell, Ben Fine, Fergus Green, Geoff Hodgson, Frank Nullmeier, John O’Neill, Ingrid Robeyns, Thomas Schramme and Julia Steinberger. There are also two anonymous referees.Apart from the initial conference in Bremen in late 2019 that forms the basis for this special issue, I have also gained much from presenting to other colloquia, notably the interdisciplinary workshop on “New Approaches to Normative Economics”, Oxford University, and (online) the interdisciplinary workshop on ‘What we Owe the Future: Needs, Capabilities, and Intergenerational Justice’, University of Graz, both in June 2022.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Or of Sen’s capabilities – see Gough (Citation2015).2. I am grateful to George Boss for this clarification.3. The large literature includes Caney (Citation2012, Citation2018), Shue (Citation1993, Citation2014), Raworth (Citation2017), and Di Giulio and Fuchs (Citation2014). See also Schramme in this issue.4
{"title":"Sufficiency as a Value Standard: From Preferences to Needs","authors":"Ian Gough","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2023.2269055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2023.2269055","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis paper outlines a conceptual framework for a sufficiency economy, defining sufficiency as the space between a generalizable notion of human wellbeing and ungeneralisable excess. It assumes an objective and universal concept of human needs to define a ‘floor’ and the concept of planetary boundaries to define a ‘ceiling’. This is set up as an alternative to the dominant preference satisfaction theory of value. It begins with a brief survey of the potential contributions of sufficientarianism and limitarianism to this endeavor before outlining a theory of objective, universal human need. This recognizes the contextual variable nature of need satisfiers and the distinct methodology required to adjudicate necessities. It then turns to the planetary boundaries literature and utilizes a sequence of causal and normative reasoning to derive an operational ceiling and the concept of ungeneralisable luxuries. The final section addresses how the concepts of floors and ceilings might be operationalized via forms of dialogic democracy but noting the absence of any such institutions at the global level. Its policy conclusion is that a safe climate cannot be achieved through supply-side mitigation alone, and that fair demand-side mitigation necessarily requires a clear distinction between necessities and unnecessary luxuries, between which (hopefully) lies a space of sufficiency.KEYWORDS: Sufficiencyvalue theoryhuman needsplentary boundariesfloorsceilingsdemand-side mitigationsufficientarianismlimitarianism AcknowledgmentsThe research for this article was supported by an Emeritus Fellowship awarded by the Leverhulme Trust, titled ‘Valuing what matters: from efficiency to sufficiency’. I am most grateful for their support.Many thanks to Charlotte Rogers for valuable research assistance. I am grateful to many friends and colleagues who commented on earlier drafts including Richard Bärnthaler, Eric Beinhocker, George Boss, Sam Bowles, Oliver Carr, Anna Coote, Len Doyal, David Fell, Ben Fine, Fergus Green, Geoff Hodgson, Frank Nullmeier, John O’Neill, Ingrid Robeyns, Thomas Schramme and Julia Steinberger. There are also two anonymous referees.Apart from the initial conference in Bremen in late 2019 that forms the basis for this special issue, I have also gained much from presenting to other colloquia, notably the interdisciplinary workshop on “New Approaches to Normative Economics”, Oxford University, and (online) the interdisciplinary workshop on ‘What we Owe the Future: Needs, Capabilities, and Intergenerational Justice’, University of Graz, both in June 2022.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Or of Sen’s capabilities – see Gough (Citation2015).2. I am grateful to George Boss for this clarification.3. The large literature includes Caney (Citation2012, Citation2018), Shue (Citation1993, Citation2014), Raworth (Citation2017), and Di Giulio and Fuchs (Citation2014). See also Schramme in this issue.4","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"23 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135368461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-16DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2023.2267945
Yasha Rohwer
ABSTRACTThe ʻōhiʻa lehua is an ecologically and culturally important Hawaiian tree. It is currently threatened by two exotic fungal pathogens. One potential way to save the tree may be to genetically modify it. In this paper I consider two different metaphysical perspectives on ʻōhiʻa lehua – western conservation and Indigenous Hawaiian conservation. I will argue that a possible intervention using plant biotechnology appears value-supporting from each perspective. Hence, it is a morally permissible strategy to pursue. Finally, I argue that given the importance of the tree, multiple strategies ought to be pursued.KEYWORDS: Indigenous Hawaiian perspectivewestern conservationplant biotechnologyʻōhiʻa lehuafamily AcknowledgmentsI thank Bernice Bovenkerk, Keje Boersma, Ben Hale, Evelyn Brister, and two anonymous reviewers for detailed feedback and suggestions. I would also like to thank the participants of the International Society for Environmental Ethics 2022 meeting, where these ideas were first presented, for valuable feedback and discussion. A special thanks to everyone who took time out of their busy schedules so that I could interview them in Hawaii, and to the office of the Provost at Oregon Tech for helping fund this research. Lastly, I thank Jason Wong and his family for hosting me in Hawaii.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. By ‘value supporting’ I mean that the potential action will protect and preserve what is considered to be morally valuable concerning the environment within a particular metaphysical framework.2. The tree can also have yellow, salmon, pink, or orange blooms, but red blooms are the most common (Friday & Herbert, Citation2006).3. There are, of course, other environmental values—e.g. environmental autonomy or wildness and naturalness; however, I will focus on these two since biodiversity is clearly the most important value in conservation (e.g. Soulé, Citation1985) and integrity is often cited as being very important (e.g. CBD, Citation2022). See Rohwer (Citation2022) for reasons to think that genetic modification interventions can be value-supporting of environmental autonomy. Also, see Vogel (Citation2015) for reasons why naturalness is a very problematic value in environmental thought.4. See Rohwer and Marris (Citation2021) for arguments as to why, even if it does exist, it is not valuable.5. I am assuming a worst-case scenario in the above discussion concerning genetic integrity such that only a genetic intervention will prevent the genetic bottleneck or extinction. This, of course, may not be the case. But the point is to show that rejecting the transgenic strategy on the grounds that it necessarily compromises genetic integrity is too hasty. We don’t know which strategy will be the most effective. Hence, it is important to show that these kinds of interventions can be value-supporting when it comes to genetic integrity – especially if the worst-case scenario is
{"title":"Using Plant Biotechnology to Save ʻŌhiʻa Lehua: Western and Indigenous Conservation Perspectives","authors":"Yasha Rohwer","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2023.2267945","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2023.2267945","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe ʻōhiʻa lehua is an ecologically and culturally important Hawaiian tree. It is currently threatened by two exotic fungal pathogens. One potential way to save the tree may be to genetically modify it. In this paper I consider two different metaphysical perspectives on ʻōhiʻa lehua – western conservation and Indigenous Hawaiian conservation. I will argue that a possible intervention using plant biotechnology appears value-supporting from each perspective. Hence, it is a morally permissible strategy to pursue. Finally, I argue that given the importance of the tree, multiple strategies ought to be pursued.KEYWORDS: Indigenous Hawaiian perspectivewestern conservationplant biotechnologyʻōhiʻa lehuafamily AcknowledgmentsI thank Bernice Bovenkerk, Keje Boersma, Ben Hale, Evelyn Brister, and two anonymous reviewers for detailed feedback and suggestions. I would also like to thank the participants of the International Society for Environmental Ethics 2022 meeting, where these ideas were first presented, for valuable feedback and discussion. A special thanks to everyone who took time out of their busy schedules so that I could interview them in Hawaii, and to the office of the Provost at Oregon Tech for helping fund this research. Lastly, I thank Jason Wong and his family for hosting me in Hawaii.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. By ‘value supporting’ I mean that the potential action will protect and preserve what is considered to be morally valuable concerning the environment within a particular metaphysical framework.2. The tree can also have yellow, salmon, pink, or orange blooms, but red blooms are the most common (Friday & Herbert, Citation2006).3. There are, of course, other environmental values—e.g. environmental autonomy or wildness and naturalness; however, I will focus on these two since biodiversity is clearly the most important value in conservation (e.g. Soulé, Citation1985) and integrity is often cited as being very important (e.g. CBD, Citation2022). See Rohwer (Citation2022) for reasons to think that genetic modification interventions can be value-supporting of environmental autonomy. Also, see Vogel (Citation2015) for reasons why naturalness is a very problematic value in environmental thought.4. See Rohwer and Marris (Citation2021) for arguments as to why, even if it does exist, it is not valuable.5. I am assuming a worst-case scenario in the above discussion concerning genetic integrity such that only a genetic intervention will prevent the genetic bottleneck or extinction. This, of course, may not be the case. But the point is to show that rejecting the transgenic strategy on the grounds that it necessarily compromises genetic integrity is too hasty. We don’t know which strategy will be the most effective. Hence, it is important to show that these kinds of interventions can be value-supporting when it comes to genetic integrity – especially if the worst-case scenario is","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136113676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-15DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2023.2223805
Dan Baras
Do carbon-offsetting schemes morally offset emissions? The moral equivalence thesis is the claim that the combination of emitting greenhouse gasses and offsetting those emissions is morally equivalent to not emitting at all. This thesis implies that in response to climate change, we need not make any lifestyle changes to reduce our emissions as long as we offset them. An influential argument in favor of this thesis is premised on two claims, one empirical and the other normative: (1) When you emit + offset, the net result is the same as that of not emitting. (2) With emissions, the net result is what matters morally. I argue against both premises. The net result of emitting + offsetting is never equivalent to that of not emitting, and even if it were equivalent, the net result is not the only thing that matters morally. My conclusion is that although we should offset our emissions, avoiding emissions is morally preferable. This conclusion supports a stronger claim: that carbon offsets cannot relieve us of our duty to make significant lifestyle changes so as to reduce emissions and thus lesson our contribution to the harms of climate change.
{"title":"Carbon Offsetting","authors":"Dan Baras","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2023.2223805","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2023.2223805","url":null,"abstract":"Do carbon-offsetting schemes morally offset emissions? The moral equivalence thesis is the claim that the combination of emitting greenhouse gasses and offsetting those emissions is morally equivalent to not emitting at all. This thesis implies that in response to climate change, we need not make any lifestyle changes to reduce our emissions as long as we offset them. An influential argument in favor of this thesis is premised on two claims, one empirical and the other normative: (1) When you emit + offset, the net result is the same as that of not emitting. (2) With emissions, the net result is what matters morally. I argue against both premises. The net result of emitting + offsetting is never equivalent to that of not emitting, and even if it were equivalent, the net result is not the only thing that matters morally. My conclusion is that although we should offset our emissions, avoiding emissions is morally preferable. This conclusion supports a stronger claim: that carbon offsets cannot relieve us of our duty to make significant lifestyle changes so as to reduce emissions and thus lesson our contribution to the harms of climate change.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134891791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2023.2171680
H. Stefánsson, Mac Willners
ABSTRACT Barry and Cullity argue that when morally assessing a person’s climate actions, we should ask how these actions affect other people’s prospects, understood in terms of the actor’s episemic probabilities. In this comment we argue, first, that even though Barry and Cullity are right in that we should use a person’s epistemic probabilities when assessing her climate actions, it is not clear that their conclusion follows. The reason is that important questions remain about what should be the object of these epistemic probabilities. Second, we argue that emitting and offsetting is morally analogous to drawing from one ‘harm’ bag and one ‘benefit’ bag even though one has the option of drawing from neither bag.
{"title":"Why Offsetting is Not Like Shaking a Bag: A Reply to Barry & Cullity","authors":"H. Stefánsson, Mac Willners","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2023.2171680","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2023.2171680","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Barry and Cullity argue that when morally assessing a person’s climate actions, we should ask how these actions affect other people’s prospects, understood in terms of the actor’s episemic probabilities. In this comment we argue, first, that even though Barry and Cullity are right in that we should use a person’s epistemic probabilities when assessing her climate actions, it is not clear that their conclusion follows. The reason is that important questions remain about what should be the object of these epistemic probabilities. Second, we argue that emitting and offsetting is morally analogous to drawing from one ‘harm’ bag and one ‘benefit’ bag even though one has the option of drawing from neither bag.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"9 1","pages":"144 - 148"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78772475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-24DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2022.2137291
D. Fumagalli
ABSTRACT This paper vindicates using the harm principle (HP) to justify restricting consumer’s access to meat products in light of the impact that it has on the development of antibiotic resistance (ABR). In particular, the study claims that, since an individual instance of consumption, or purchase of meat, meaningfully contributes to the development of ABR in farming environments, a state intervention limiting consumer freedom would be legitimate. The causal impact of individuals in greater-scale problems has long been debated and dismissed as not relevant. The study analyzed two possible formulations of the inconsequentialist objection. While the first formulation, which maintains that individuals have no impact, can be rejected independently of the context of application, rejecting the second formulation, which maintains that this impact is insufficient to warrant applying HP, is more difficult. In order to successfully respond to this version of inconsequentialism, the paper vindicates the value of considering ABR and ABR-related harm within a more traditional expected utility arguments.
{"title":"Antibiotic Resistance, Meat Consumption and the Harm Principle","authors":"D. Fumagalli","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2022.2137291","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2022.2137291","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper vindicates using the harm principle (HP) to justify restricting consumer’s access to meat products in light of the impact that it has on the development of antibiotic resistance (ABR). In particular, the study claims that, since an individual instance of consumption, or purchase of meat, meaningfully contributes to the development of ABR in farming environments, a state intervention limiting consumer freedom would be legitimate. The causal impact of individuals in greater-scale problems has long been debated and dismissed as not relevant. The study analyzed two possible formulations of the inconsequentialist objection. While the first formulation, which maintains that individuals have no impact, can be rejected independently of the context of application, rejecting the second formulation, which maintains that this impact is insufficient to warrant applying HP, is more difficult. In order to successfully respond to this version of inconsequentialism, the paper vindicates the value of considering ABR and ABR-related harm within a more traditional expected utility arguments.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"50 1","pages":"53 - 68"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73816854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-24DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2022.2133944
Kevin McGravey, M. Hodgetts
ABSTRACT 2019 saw a wave of youth-led climate strikes that demanded states ‘listen to the science’. Some of these states are committed to protecting free speech through neutrality on climate change. That commitment inhibits informed democratic deliberation by remaining neutral between climate science and denial. In response, using the United States as our example, we argue that the state can and should use its expressive capacity to promote climate literacy and doing so does not violate free speech commitments. Public deliberation must move on from whether climate change exists to the urgent question of how we should respond.
{"title":"Between Neutrality and Action: State Speech and Climate Change","authors":"Kevin McGravey, M. Hodgetts","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2022.2133944","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2022.2133944","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT 2019 saw a wave of youth-led climate strikes that demanded states ‘listen to the science’. Some of these states are committed to protecting free speech through neutrality on climate change. That commitment inhibits informed democratic deliberation by remaining neutral between climate science and denial. In response, using the United States as our example, we argue that the state can and should use its expressive capacity to promote climate literacy and doing so does not violate free speech commitments. Public deliberation must move on from whether climate change exists to the urgent question of how we should respond.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"266 1","pages":"121 - 138"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77817443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-13DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2022.2133945
C. Diehm
ABSTRACT A genetically modified variant of the critically endangered American chestnut (Castanea dentata) has been developed for use in restoring the species. This essay argues against such use, on the grounds that deploying the engineered tree potentially sets troubling industry and conservation precedents, operates on a paradigm of increased intervention rather than increased accommodation of other forms of life, and presents significant justice challenges in relation to Indigenous groups. In light of these problems, it is recommended that conservationists follow the approach to chestnut restoration adopted by the Canadian Chestnut Council, which opposes the conservation application of genetically modified chestnut trees.
{"title":"American Chestnut Restoration: Accommodating Others or Scaling Up?","authors":"C. Diehm","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2022.2133945","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2022.2133945","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT A genetically modified variant of the critically endangered American chestnut (Castanea dentata) has been developed for use in restoring the species. This essay argues against such use, on the grounds that deploying the engineered tree potentially sets troubling industry and conservation precedents, operates on a paradigm of increased intervention rather than increased accommodation of other forms of life, and presents significant justice challenges in relation to Indigenous groups. In light of these problems, it is recommended that conservationists follow the approach to chestnut restoration adopted by the Canadian Chestnut Council, which opposes the conservation application of genetically modified chestnut trees.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"27 1","pages":"69 - 85"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87705124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-02DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2022.2104091
Kritika Maheshwari
ABSTRACT Stefansson (forthcoming) argues that by emitting and offsetting, we fail to fulfil our justice-based duty to avoid harm owed to specific individuals. In this paper, I explore a case where offsetting fails to prevent some but not all risks of harms that our emissions impose on them. By drawing on a distinction between general and specific duties not to (risk) harm, I argue that if by emitting and offsetting, we satisfy some (if not all) of our specific duties we owe others, then this gives us stronger moral reasons to offset than give to charities that do good more effectively.
{"title":"Why I Should Still Offset Rather Than Do More Good","authors":"Kritika Maheshwari","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2022.2104091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2022.2104091","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Stefansson (forthcoming) argues that by emitting and offsetting, we fail to fulfil our justice-based duty to avoid harm owed to specific individuals. In this paper, I explore a case where offsetting fails to prevent some but not all risks of harms that our emissions impose on them. By drawing on a distinction between general and specific duties not to (risk) harm, I argue that if by emitting and offsetting, we satisfy some (if not all) of our specific duties we owe others, then this gives us stronger moral reasons to offset than give to charities that do good more effectively.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"3 1","pages":"249 - 252"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80440158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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