Pub Date : 2020-01-22DOI: 10.1177/1470594X19898866
I. Sher
The Pareto principle is a normative principle about preferences that advocates concordance with unanimous preference. However, people have perspectives not just preferences. Evaluating preferences requires that we understand the reasons that people have for them and the overall perspectives from which they arise. Philippe Mongin has argued that the Pareto principle loses its normative force when different people hold their preferences for different reasons so that we must take reasons into account. This article advocates that we take people’s broader perspectives into account. I argue that when people form their preferences by aggregating a collection of criteria, then taking these criteria directly into account and considering the broader perspectives and principles held by people will naturally lead to violations of the Pareto principle.
{"title":"How perspective-based aggregation undermines the Pareto principle","authors":"I. Sher","doi":"10.1177/1470594X19898866","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X19898866","url":null,"abstract":"The Pareto principle is a normative principle about preferences that advocates concordance with unanimous preference. However, people have perspectives not just preferences. Evaluating preferences requires that we understand the reasons that people have for them and the overall perspectives from which they arise. Philippe Mongin has argued that the Pareto principle loses its normative force when different people hold their preferences for different reasons so that we must take reasons into account. This article advocates that we take people’s broader perspectives into account. I argue that when people form their preferences by aggregating a collection of criteria, then taking these criteria directly into account and considering the broader perspectives and principles held by people will naturally lead to violations of the Pareto principle.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"81 1","pages":"182 - 205"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79447383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-15DOI: 10.1177/1470594X19900050
Lior Glick
In the last few decades, residency in some of the world’s desired destination cities has become a privilege, as housing supply has not kept pace with population growth. This has led to a significant rise in housing prices and consequently to the exclusion of middle- and low-income populations on a large scale. These developments have received only scant attention in political theory despite their prominence in local policymaking and their contribution to processes of redrawing the boundaries of inclusion into local political communities. My focus in this article is on the question ‘is it morally permissible for cities to sort members by economic means, and grant the better-off privileged access to residency?’ I explore this question by examining the main arguments used to support the city’s right to selectively admit would-be members. This allows me to delineate the limitations of the city’s general duty to be accessible to all segments of society and to present particular cases where the city has special obligations to incorporate nonmembers.
{"title":"Cities, selective admission, and economic sorting","authors":"Lior Glick","doi":"10.1177/1470594X19900050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X19900050","url":null,"abstract":"In the last few decades, residency in some of the world’s desired destination cities has become a privilege, as housing supply has not kept pace with population growth. This has led to a significant rise in housing prices and consequently to the exclusion of middle- and low-income populations on a large scale. These developments have received only scant attention in political theory despite their prominence in local policymaking and their contribution to processes of redrawing the boundaries of inclusion into local political communities. My focus in this article is on the question ‘is it morally permissible for cities to sort members by economic means, and grant the better-off privileged access to residency?’ I explore this question by examining the main arguments used to support the city’s right to selectively admit would-be members. This allows me to delineate the limitations of the city’s general duty to be accessible to all segments of society and to present particular cases where the city has special obligations to incorporate nonmembers.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"8 1","pages":"274 - 292"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82013326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-05DOI: 10.1177/1470594X19884705
Japa Pallikkathayil
The way in which consent to sexual interactions is understood in the US is undergoing a transformation. Many universities, sometimes at the behest of lawmakers, are moving to adopt ‘affirmative consent’ policies, which define consent in terms of affirmative behavior that goes beyond mere silence or lack of resistance. Although these policies are a move in the right direction, I argue that their content has not been properly understood. In particular, the circumstances in which nonverbal behavior may communicate consent are more limited than might be apparent. And even though these circumstances can be abstractly identified, it is difficult to give people adequate guidance about when some of them obtain. Moreover, I argue that no matter how the allowance for nonverbal behavior is construed, affirmative consent policies unnecessarily prohibit interactions that people may have reason to engage in. I propose an alternative policy that remedies these problems with the affirmative consent policies that are currently being implemented. And I note that the justification for this alternative policy does not turn on any special features of the university setting. Instead, the account I give suggests grounds for reforming the law as well.
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Pub Date : 2019-11-01DOI: 10.1177/1470594X19889821
A. Simmons
This is the Introduction to the symposium on A. John Simmons, Boundaries of Authority (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). The Symposium contains articles by David Miller, Cara Nine, and Anna Stilz, and a response by the author.
这是a·约翰·西蒙斯研讨会的导言，《权威的边界》(牛津:牛津大学出版社，2016)。研讨会包含了David Miller, Cara Nine和Anna Stilz的文章，以及作者的回应。
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Pub Date : 2019-11-01DOI: 10.1177/1470594X19889419
A. Simmons
‘Rights and Territories: A Reply to Nine, Miller, and Stilz’ defends the Lockean theory of states’ territorial rights (as this theory was presented in Boundaries of Authority) against the critiques of Nine, Miller, and Stilz. In response to Nine’s concern that such a Lockean theory cannot justify the right of legitimate states to exclude aliens, it is argued that a consent-based theory like the Lockean one is flexible enough to justify a wide range of possible incidents of territorial rights – importantly including, though not necessarily including, the sort of right to exclude aliens that is familiar from actual political practice. Miller’s criticisms are more wide-ranging. In response, the article argues that Lockean labor-based property rights are both stronger and more enduring than Miller suggests and that nationalism’s resources for dealing with concerns about rights-supersession and trapped minorities are importantly overstated by Miller. Against Stilz’s Kantian, ‘presentist’ account of states’ authority over persons and territories, it is argued that the rectification of past (historical) wrongs remains morally crucial even in the context of otherwise-just societies and that Stilz’s Kantian/Rawlsian position unconvincingly privileges the rights to autonomy of territorially concentrated groups over those of dissenting individuals or wrongfully dispersed groups.
{"title":"Rights and territories: A reply to Nine, Miller, and Stilz","authors":"A. Simmons","doi":"10.1177/1470594X19889419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X19889419","url":null,"abstract":"‘Rights and Territories: A Reply to Nine, Miller, and Stilz’ defends the Lockean theory of states’ territorial rights (as this theory was presented in Boundaries of Authority) against the critiques of Nine, Miller, and Stilz. In response to Nine’s concern that such a Lockean theory cannot justify the right of legitimate states to exclude aliens, it is argued that a consent-based theory like the Lockean one is flexible enough to justify a wide range of possible incidents of territorial rights – importantly including, though not necessarily including, the sort of right to exclude aliens that is familiar from actual political practice. Miller’s criticisms are more wide-ranging. In response, the article argues that Lockean labor-based property rights are both stronger and more enduring than Miller suggests and that nationalism’s resources for dealing with concerns about rights-supersession and trapped minorities are importantly overstated by Miller. Against Stilz’s Kantian, ‘presentist’ account of states’ authority over persons and territories, it is argued that the rectification of past (historical) wrongs remains morally crucial even in the context of otherwise-just societies and that Stilz’s Kantian/Rawlsian position unconvincingly privileges the rights to autonomy of territorially concentrated groups over those of dissenting individuals or wrongfully dispersed groups.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"385 1","pages":"viii - xxiii"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80755253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-19DOI: 10.1177/1470594X19872505
Kai P. Spiekermann
To find out what is in one’s own best interest, it is helpful to ask one’s epistemic peers. However, identifying one’s epistemic peers is not a trivial task. I consider a stylized political setting, an electoral competition of ‘Masses’ and ‘Elites’. To succeed, the Masses need to know which alternative on offer is truly in their interest. To find out, the Masses can pool their privately held information in a pre-election ballot, provided that they can reliably find out with whom they should pool information. I investigate the process of finding the relevant peer group for information pooling by modelling this group formation process as dynamic network change. The simulations show that the Masses can succeed in finding the right peers, but they also suggest reasons why the Elites may often be more successful. This phenomenon generalizes to the notion of Epistemic Network Injustice. Such injustice arises when a subset of citizens is systematically deprived of connections to helpful epistemic peers, leading to their reduced political influence. Epistemic Network Injustice is a new form of epistemic injustice, related to but distinct from the notion introduced by Miranda Fricker.
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Pub Date : 2019-07-12DOI: 10.1177/1470594X19860235
J. Queralt
Half of the working poor in developing countries are informal entrepreneurs – they make a living by engaging in commercial activities in the shadow economy. A series of government and market failures – for example, corruption, policy uncertainty, and barriers in access to financial services – limit the productivity of informal businesses and condemn their owners to remain poor. This article offers a normative analysis of this problem and makes a twofold contribution. First, it argues that some institutional obstacles that push the entrepreneurial poor toward informality are a violation of a bundle of rights that we can refer as entrepreneurial rights. Second, it claims that these rights ought to be recognized as legal human rights because of their value to realize individual autonomy and to satisfy the basic need to engage in production.
{"title":"Protecting the entrepreneurial poor: A human rights approach","authors":"J. Queralt","doi":"10.1177/1470594X19860235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X19860235","url":null,"abstract":"Half of the working poor in developing countries are informal entrepreneurs – they make a living by engaging in commercial activities in the shadow economy. A series of government and market failures – for example, corruption, policy uncertainty, and barriers in access to financial services – limit the productivity of informal businesses and condemn their owners to remain poor. This article offers a normative analysis of this problem and makes a twofold contribution. First, it argues that some institutional obstacles that push the entrepreneurial poor toward informality are a violation of a bundle of rights that we can refer as entrepreneurial rights. Second, it claims that these rights ought to be recognized as legal human rights because of their value to realize individual autonomy and to satisfy the basic need to engage in production.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"109 1","pages":"336 - 357"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2019-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72896367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-21DOI: 10.1177/1470594X19851162
S. Bajaj
Many philosophers argue that individuals have duties to do their fair shares of the demands of achieving important common ends. But what happens when some individuals fail to do their fair shares? Are the remaining duty bearers required to take up the slack? The most prominent view, Fair Shares, holds that individuals are never required to take up the slack. But this view has counterintuitive implications; in many cases, it would show callous disregard not to take up the slack to help those in dire need. The central alternative, Slack-Taking, holds that considerations of fairness have no bearing in determining whether individuals are required to take up the slack. But this view fails to capture the practical importance of fairness in nonideal circumstances. I defend an alternative view, Weighing, according to which individuals properly weigh the value of fairness against the value of taking up the slack in determining whether they are all-things-considered required to take up the slack. While this view has been suggested before in the literature, I develop it by clarifying its structure and underlying rationale and defending it against important recent objections.
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Pub Date : 2019-05-09DOI: 10.1177/1470594X19848074
A. Cassee
International tax competition undermines states’ capacity for redistributive taxation. It is thus problematic from the point of view of both cosmopolitan and internationalist theories of justice. This article examines the proposal of a fiscal policy constraint that prohibits tax policies if they are strategically motivated and harmful to effective fiscal self-determination internationally. I argue that we should opt for a more robust, preference-independent mechanism to prevent harmful tax competition instead. States should, as a matter of justice, accept global minimum tax rates on mobile tax bases.
{"title":"International tax competition and justice: The case for global minimum tax rates","authors":"A. Cassee","doi":"10.1177/1470594X19848074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X19848074","url":null,"abstract":"International tax competition undermines states’ capacity for redistributive taxation. It is thus problematic from the point of view of both cosmopolitan and internationalist theories of justice. This article examines the proposal of a fiscal policy constraint that prohibits tax policies if they are strategically motivated and harmful to effective fiscal self-determination internationally. I argue that we should opt for a more robust, preference-independent mechanism to prevent harmful tax competition instead. States should, as a matter of justice, accept global minimum tax rates on mobile tax bases.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"38 1","pages":"242 - 263"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2019-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77017790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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