Pub Date : 2019-02-26DOI: 10.1177/1470594X19825494
Natalie Gold
I connect commodification arguments to an empirical literature, present a mechanism by which commodification may occur, and show how this may restrict the range of goods and services that are subject to commodification, therefore having implications for the use of commodification arguments in political theory. Commodification arguments assert that some people’s trading a good or service can debase it for third parties. They consist of a normative premise, a theory of value, and an empirical premise, a mechanism whereby some people’s market exchange affects how goods can be valued by others. Hence, their soundness depends on the existence of a suitable candidate mechanism for the empirical premise. The ‘motivation crowding effect’ has been cited as the empirical base of commodification. I show why the main explanations of motivation crowding – signaling and over-justification – do not provide mechanisms that could underpin the empirical premise. In doing this, I reveal some requirements on any candidate mechanism. I present a third explanation of motivation crowding, based on the crowding out of frames, and show how it fulfills the requirements. With a mechanism in hand, I explore the type of goods and services to which commodification arguments are applicable. The mechanism enables markets to break down ‘shared valuations’, which is a subset of the valuations that proponents of commodification arguments are concerned with. Further, it can only break down relatively fragile shared understandings and therefore, I suggest, it cannot support a commodification argument regarding the sale of sexual services.
{"title":"The limits of commodification arguments: Framing, motivation crowding, and shared valuations","authors":"Natalie Gold","doi":"10.1177/1470594X19825494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X19825494","url":null,"abstract":"I connect commodification arguments to an empirical literature, present a mechanism by which commodification may occur, and show how this may restrict the range of goods and services that are subject to commodification, therefore having implications for the use of commodification arguments in political theory. Commodification arguments assert that some people’s trading a good or service can debase it for third parties. They consist of a normative premise, a theory of value, and an empirical premise, a mechanism whereby some people’s market exchange affects how goods can be valued by others. Hence, their soundness depends on the existence of a suitable candidate mechanism for the empirical premise. The ‘motivation crowding effect’ has been cited as the empirical base of commodification. I show why the main explanations of motivation crowding – signaling and over-justification – do not provide mechanisms that could underpin the empirical premise. In doing this, I reveal some requirements on any candidate mechanism. I present a third explanation of motivation crowding, based on the crowding out of frames, and show how it fulfills the requirements. With a mechanism in hand, I explore the type of goods and services to which commodification arguments are applicable. The mechanism enables markets to break down ‘shared valuations’, which is a subset of the valuations that proponents of commodification arguments are concerned with. Further, it can only break down relatively fragile shared understandings and therefore, I suggest, it cannot support a commodification argument regarding the sale of sexual services.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"76 1","pages":"165 - 192"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2019-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83869640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-19DOI: 10.1177/1470594X19828371
Calvin T. Cochran, Cailin O’Connor
Many societies have norms of equity – that those who make symmetric social contributions deserve symmetric rewards. Despite this, there are widespread patterns of social inequity, especially along gender and racial lines. It is often the case that members of certain social groups receive greater rewards per contribution than others. In this article, we draw on evolutionary game theory to show that the emergence of this sort of convention is far from surprising. In simple cultural evolutionary models, inequity is much more likely to emerge than equity, despite the presence of stable, equitable outcomes that groups might instead learn. As we outline, social groups provide a way to break symmetry between actors in determining both contribution and reward in joint projects.
{"title":"Inequality and inequity in the emergence of conventions","authors":"Calvin T. Cochran, Cailin O’Connor","doi":"10.1177/1470594X19828371","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X19828371","url":null,"abstract":"Many societies have norms of equity – that those who make symmetric social contributions deserve symmetric rewards. Despite this, there are widespread patterns of social inequity, especially along gender and racial lines. It is often the case that members of certain social groups receive greater rewards per contribution than others. In this article, we draw on evolutionary game theory to show that the emergence of this sort of convention is far from surprising. In simple cultural evolutionary models, inequity is much more likely to emerge than equity, despite the presence of stable, equitable outcomes that groups might instead learn. As we outline, social groups provide a way to break symmetry between actors in determining both contribution and reward in joint projects.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"57 1","pages":"264 - 281"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2019-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83567087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-13DOI: 10.1177/1470594X19828021
Jacob Barrett
Most moral and political theories require us to make interpersonal comparisons of welfare. This poses a challenge to the popular view that welfare consists in the satisfaction of preferences or desires, because interpersonal comparisons of preference or desire satisfaction are widely thought to be conceptually problematic, and purported solutions to this problem to lead to a hopeless subjectivism about these comparisons. In this article, I argue that the key to meeting this challenge lies in distinguishing preferences from desires, and preference satisfaction from desire satisfaction theories of welfare. More specifically, I defend three conclusions. First, interpersonal comparisons of preference satisfaction do raise a serious conceptual problem, but this same problem does not arise for interpersonal comparisons of desire satisfaction. Second, none of the existing solutions to the conceptual problem of interpersonal comparisons of preference satisfaction are satisfactory, since none explain how we can make interpersonal comparisons of preference satisfaction objectively. Third, we can at least make a limited range of objective interpersonal comparisons of desire satisfaction, and there are reasons to be optimistic about the possibility of making a wider range of such comparisons, but there is a need for further research on the topic.
{"title":"Interpersonal comparisons with preferences and desires","authors":"Jacob Barrett","doi":"10.1177/1470594X19828021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X19828021","url":null,"abstract":"Most moral and political theories require us to make interpersonal comparisons of welfare. This poses a challenge to the popular view that welfare consists in the satisfaction of preferences or desires, because interpersonal comparisons of preference or desire satisfaction are widely thought to be conceptually problematic, and purported solutions to this problem to lead to a hopeless subjectivism about these comparisons. In this article, I argue that the key to meeting this challenge lies in distinguishing preferences from desires, and preference satisfaction from desire satisfaction theories of welfare. More specifically, I defend three conclusions. First, interpersonal comparisons of preference satisfaction do raise a serious conceptual problem, but this same problem does not arise for interpersonal comparisons of desire satisfaction. Second, none of the existing solutions to the conceptual problem of interpersonal comparisons of preference satisfaction are satisfactory, since none explain how we can make interpersonal comparisons of preference satisfaction objectively. Third, we can at least make a limited range of objective interpersonal comparisons of desire satisfaction, and there are reasons to be optimistic about the possibility of making a wider range of such comparisons, but there is a need for further research on the topic.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"12 1","pages":"219 - 241"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2019-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81315211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-07DOI: 10.1177/1470594X19828023
Ryan Pevnick
Many argue that an important goal of campaign finance reform should be to ensure that competing candidates have roughly equal financial resources with which to contest campaigns. Although there are very important reasons to worry about the role that money has come to play in many democracies, this article argues in three main steps that this particular position lacks compelling justification. First, while advocates of such positions often rely on an analogy with much smaller deliberative settings to defend the view that advocates of competing perspectives should be given equal resources, there are differences between such settings and campaigns that undermine the analogy’s appeal. Second, independent arguments – connected to the importance of ensuring that the wealthy do not dominate public debate and preventing corruption – may speak strongly in favor of a generous system of public funding, but fail to provide reason to ensure that advocates of competing positions have access to equal resources. Third, it is impossible to meaningfully level the playing field without objectionably restricting civil liberties. An implication of these arguments is that common criticisms of voucher-based systems of public funding, which hinge on an implicit commitment to the importance of a level playing field, fail.
{"title":"Should campaign finance reform aim to level the playing field?","authors":"Ryan Pevnick","doi":"10.1177/1470594X19828023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X19828023","url":null,"abstract":"Many argue that an important goal of campaign finance reform should be to ensure that competing candidates have roughly equal financial resources with which to contest campaigns. Although there are very important reasons to worry about the role that money has come to play in many democracies, this article argues in three main steps that this particular position lacks compelling justification. First, while advocates of such positions often rely on an analogy with much smaller deliberative settings to defend the view that advocates of competing perspectives should be given equal resources, there are differences between such settings and campaigns that undermine the analogy’s appeal. Second, independent arguments – connected to the importance of ensuring that the wealthy do not dominate public debate and preventing corruption – may speak strongly in favor of a generous system of public funding, but fail to provide reason to ensure that advocates of competing positions have access to equal resources. Third, it is impossible to meaningfully level the playing field without objectionably restricting civil liberties. An implication of these arguments is that common criticisms of voucher-based systems of public funding, which hinge on an implicit commitment to the importance of a level playing field, fail.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"41 1","pages":"358 - 373"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2019-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88462165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-07DOI: 10.1177/1470594X19828020
K. Lippert‐Rasmussen
In any normal population, health is unequally distributed across different age groups. Are such age-based health inequalities unjust? A divide has recently developed within egalitarian theories of justice between relational egalitarians focusing on the egalitarian nature of social relations and luck egalitarians focusing on the distribution of goods such as welfare or resources. I argue that the most plausible versions of these two theories – ‘whole lives’ luck egalitarianism and time-relative relational egalitarianism – imply conflicting answers to the opening question. Under realistic conditions, the former implies that, from the perspective of luck egalitarian justice, it is better that old people are disadvantaged by bad health than that they are not, whereas the latter theory implies that many age-based health inequalities involve unjust, non-egalitarian social relations and are therefore unjust. Hence, I contend that different egalitarian concerns must be balanced against one another, suggesting that the relational concern has greater weight in this particular case. Along the way, I propose a social model of old age analogous to the social model of disability and suggest that a whole lives version of relational egalitarianism might also be attractive.
{"title":"Is it unjust that elderly people suffer from poorer health than young people? Distributive and relational egalitarianism on age-based health inequalities","authors":"K. Lippert‐Rasmussen","doi":"10.1177/1470594X19828020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X19828020","url":null,"abstract":"In any normal population, health is unequally distributed across different age groups. Are such age-based health inequalities unjust? A divide has recently developed within egalitarian theories of justice between relational egalitarians focusing on the egalitarian nature of social relations and luck egalitarians focusing on the distribution of goods such as welfare or resources. I argue that the most plausible versions of these two theories – ‘whole lives’ luck egalitarianism and time-relative relational egalitarianism – imply conflicting answers to the opening question. Under realistic conditions, the former implies that, from the perspective of luck egalitarian justice, it is better that old people are disadvantaged by bad health than that they are not, whereas the latter theory implies that many age-based health inequalities involve unjust, non-egalitarian social relations and are therefore unjust. Hence, I contend that different egalitarian concerns must be balanced against one another, suggesting that the relational concern has greater weight in this particular case. Along the way, I propose a social model of old age analogous to the social model of disability and suggest that a whole lives version of relational egalitarianism might also be attractive.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"11 1","pages":"145 - 164"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2019-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84950786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-06DOI: 10.1177/1470594X19825495
Rosa Terlazzo
In this article, I develop a tension in the capabilities approach between committing to political liberalism and ensuring full capability for all persons. In particular, I argue that the capabilities approach can maintain a commitment to full capability only by embracing at least one of three kinds of comprehensiveness: Even if it can avoid comprehensiveness along the dimensions of height and depth, it is committed along the dimension of breadth. In short, because the possession of capability can be hampered either by external obstacles that prevent a person from accessing a good or by internal obstacles that prevent a person from being open to it, the capabilities approach faces a dilemma: Either it can ensure that persons are free of internal obstacles to the possession of capability by pushing them to be open to functionings across a relatively comprehensive set of domains of life (that is, require breadth-comprehensiveness); or else it can side with political liberalism by making options externally available across many domains of life without encouraging internal endorsement – but in this case, it runs the risk that persons will foreseeably and avoidably face internal obstacles to genuine possession of some capabilities.
{"title":"How politically liberal should the capabilities approach want to be?","authors":"Rosa Terlazzo","doi":"10.1177/1470594X19825495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X19825495","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I develop a tension in the capabilities approach between committing to political liberalism and ensuring full capability for all persons. In particular, I argue that the capabilities approach can maintain a commitment to full capability only by embracing at least one of three kinds of comprehensiveness: Even if it can avoid comprehensiveness along the dimensions of height and depth, it is committed along the dimension of breadth. In short, because the possession of capability can be hampered either by external obstacles that prevent a person from accessing a good or by internal obstacles that prevent a person from being open to it, the capabilities approach faces a dilemma: Either it can ensure that persons are free of internal obstacles to the possession of capability by pushing them to be open to functionings across a relatively comprehensive set of domains of life (that is, require breadth-comprehensiveness); or else it can side with political liberalism by making options externally available across many domains of life without encouraging internal endorsement – but in this case, it runs the risk that persons will foreseeably and avoidably face internal obstacles to genuine possession of some capabilities.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"119 1","pages":"282 - 304"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2019-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81763388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-01Epub Date: 2018-11-14DOI: 10.1177/1470594X18810439
Thomas Douglas
It is sometimes claimed that those who succeed with the aid of enhancement technologies deserve the rewards associated with their success less, other things being equal, than those who succeed without the aid of such technologies. This claim captures some widely held intuitions, has been implicitly endorsed by participants in social-psychological research and helps to undergird some otherwise puzzling philosophical objections to the use of enhancement technologies. I consider whether it can be provided with a rational basis. I examine three arguments that might be offered in its favour and argue that each either shows only that enhancements undermine desert in special circumstances or succeeds only under assumptions that deprive the appeal to desert of much of its dialectic interest.
{"title":"Enhancement and desert.","authors":"Thomas Douglas","doi":"10.1177/1470594X18810439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X18810439","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>It is sometimes claimed that those who succeed with the aid of enhancement technologies deserve the rewards associated with their success less, other things being equal, than those who succeed without the aid of such technologies. This claim captures some widely held intuitions, has been implicitly endorsed by participants in social-psychological research and helps to undergird some otherwise puzzling philosophical objections to the use of enhancement technologies. I consider whether it can be provided with a rational basis. I examine three arguments that might be offered in its favour and argue that each either shows only that enhancements undermine desert in special circumstances or succeeds only under assumptions that deprive the appeal to desert of much of its dialectic interest.</p>","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"18 1","pages":"3-22"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2019-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1470594X18810439","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37069269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-16DOI: 10.1177/1470594X18809068
Nicolás Maloberti
Standard rationales for the illegality of markets in votes are based on concerns over the undue influence of wealth and the erosion of civic responsibility that would result from the commodification of votes. I present an alternative rationale based on how the mere alienability of votes alters the strategic setting faced by political actors. The inalienability of votes ensure the strict secrecy of voting, that is, the inability of voters to communicate credibly to others the content of their votes. In doing so, it diminishes the credibility of all political actors’ clientelistic promises to reciprocate. By drastically reducing the transaction costs of vote exchanges, the legality of markets in votes would thus exacerbate the detrimental effects of political clientelism on the quality of democratic governments.
{"title":"Markets in votes: Alienability, strict secrecy, and political clientelism","authors":"Nicolás Maloberti","doi":"10.1177/1470594X18809068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X18809068","url":null,"abstract":"Standard rationales for the illegality of markets in votes are based on concerns over the undue influence of wealth and the erosion of civic responsibility that would result from the commodification of votes. I present an alternative rationale based on how the mere alienability of votes alters the strategic setting faced by political actors. The inalienability of votes ensure the strict secrecy of voting, that is, the inability of voters to communicate credibly to others the content of their votes. In doing so, it diminishes the credibility of all political actors’ clientelistic promises to reciprocate. By drastically reducing the transaction costs of vote exchanges, the legality of markets in votes would thus exacerbate the detrimental effects of political clientelism on the quality of democratic governments.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"193 - 215"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2018-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73034340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-01DOI: 10.1177/1470594X18764613
Maxime Lepoutre
According to an influential objection, which Martha Nussbaum has powerfully restated, expressing anger in democratic public discourse is counterproductive from the standpoint of justice. To resist this challenge, this article articulates a crucial yet underappreciated sense in which angry discourse is epistemically productive. Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, which emphasize the distinctive phenomenology of emotion, I argue that conveying anger to one’s listeners is epistemically valuable in two respects: first, it can direct listeners’ attention to elusive morally relevant features of the situation; second, it enables them to register injustices that their existing evaluative categories are not yet suited to capturing. Thus, when employed skillfully, angry speech promotes a greater understanding of existing injustices. This epistemic role is indispensable in highly divided societies, where the injustices endured by some groups are often invisible to, or misunderstood by, other groups. Finally, I defuse the most forceful objections to this defense – that anger is likely to be manipulated, that it is epistemically misleading, and that my defense presupposes unrealistic levels of trust – partly by showing that they overlook the systemic character of democratic discourse.
{"title":"Rage inside the machine","authors":"Maxime Lepoutre","doi":"10.1177/1470594X18764613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X18764613","url":null,"abstract":"According to an influential objection, which Martha Nussbaum has powerfully restated, expressing anger in democratic public discourse is counterproductive from the standpoint of justice. To resist this challenge, this article articulates a crucial yet underappreciated sense in which angry discourse is epistemically productive. Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, which emphasize the distinctive phenomenology of emotion, I argue that conveying anger to one’s listeners is epistemically valuable in two respects: first, it can direct listeners’ attention to elusive morally relevant features of the situation; second, it enables them to register injustices that their existing evaluative categories are not yet suited to capturing. Thus, when employed skillfully, angry speech promotes a greater understanding of existing injustices. This epistemic role is indispensable in highly divided societies, where the injustices endured by some groups are often invisible to, or misunderstood by, other groups. Finally, I defuse the most forceful objections to this defense – that anger is likely to be manipulated, that it is epistemically misleading, and that my defense presupposes unrealistic levels of trust – partly by showing that they overlook the systemic character of democratic discourse.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"114 1","pages":"398 - 426"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2018-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80699616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-15DOI: 10.1177/1470594X18805162
G. Wollner
Just institutions have claims on us. There are two reasons for thinking that such claims are warranted. First, one may believe that we are under a natural duty of justice to support and further just institutions. If one believes that it matters whether institutions are just, one also has a reason, almost as a matter of consistency, to support and further just institutions. Second, one may believe that by enjoying the benefits brought about by cooperation through just institutions, one incurs an obligation to support these institutions. Those who accept and enjoy the benefits brought about by cooperation through a just scheme are under an obligation of fairness to reciprocate. But what happens to these reasons to support and comply with an institution if the scheme of cooperation is less than fully just? There is hardly a real-world institution, policy, or scheme of social cooperation that would qualify as fully just. However, questions about obligations of fairness and duties of justice under conditions of injustice have hitherto suffered relative neglect. I shall outline an overall framework for thinking about these questions by asking what the victims of injustice owe to moderately unjust institutions.
{"title":"On the claims of unjust institutions","authors":"G. Wollner","doi":"10.1177/1470594X18805162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X18805162","url":null,"abstract":"Just institutions have claims on us. There are two reasons for thinking that such claims are warranted. First, one may believe that we are under a natural duty of justice to support and further just institutions. If one believes that it matters whether institutions are just, one also has a reason, almost as a matter of consistency, to support and further just institutions. Second, one may believe that by enjoying the benefits brought about by cooperation through just institutions, one incurs an obligation to support these institutions. Those who accept and enjoy the benefits brought about by cooperation through a just scheme are under an obligation of fairness to reciprocate. But what happens to these reasons to support and comply with an institution if the scheme of cooperation is less than fully just? There is hardly a real-world institution, policy, or scheme of social cooperation that would qualify as fully just. However, questions about obligations of fairness and duties of justice under conditions of injustice have hitherto suffered relative neglect. I shall outline an overall framework for thinking about these questions by asking what the victims of injustice owe to moderately unjust institutions.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"59 1","pages":"46 - 75"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2018-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86221373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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