Hec Forum最新文献

Medical academics are increasingly bringing critical race theory (CRT) or its corollaries to their discourse, to their curricula, and to their analyses of health and medical treatment disparities. The author argues that this is an error. The author considers the history of CRT, its claims, and its current presence in the medical literature. He contends that CRT is inimical to usual academic modes of inquiry and has obscured rather than aided the analysis of social and medical treatment disparities. Remedies for racism suggested by CRT advocates will not work and some of them will make things worse. Academic medicine should avoid the embrace of CRT and should maintain an allegiance to rigorous empirical inquiry and to treating patients not as essentialized ethnic group members but as individual human beings in need of care.

The role of religion in clinical ethics consultations is contested. The religion of the ethics consultant can be an important part of the consultation process and improve the quality of a consultation. Practicing neighbor love leads to empathy, which not only can improve the quality of ethics consultations but also creates a space for religion to be part of, but not imposed on, the consultation. The practice of empathy will build trust, rapport, and an intersubjective connection that improves the quality of the consultation. (The views expressed are the author's and not representative of any institution or employer).

Clinical ethics consultation (CEC) has become all about right technique. When we encounter a case of conflict or confusion, clinical ethicists are expected to deploy a standardized, repeatable, and rationally defensible method for working toward a recommendation and/or consensus. While it has been noted previously that our techniques of CEC often foreclose on its internal goods, there remains an assumption that we must just find the right efficient technique and the problem would be solved. In this paper, I question that assumption, arguing that any standardized, identically repeatable model of CEC will pull us counterproductively away from ethical reflection, and toward the values of modern techne: primarily efficiency, efficacy, and repeatability. This is because standardized techniques of CEC pull the dynamism of being into what Catherine Pickstock calls "identical repetition," a technologized ontology, which is fundamentally at odds with what being is. And, since ethics is a search for the good of being, avoiding the ontological heart of being severely restricts ethics.

While it is not explicitly included in capacity assessment tools, "consistency" has come to feature as a central concern when assessing patients' capacity. In order to determine whether inconsistency indicates incapacity, clinicians must determine the source of the inconsistency with respect to the process or content of a patient's decision-making. In this paper, we outline common types of inconsistency and analyze them against widely accepted elements of capacity. We explore the question of whether inconsistency necessarily entails a deficiency in a patient's capacity. While inconsistency may count as prima facie evidence of incapacity-enough evidence to justify a closer look-when making such determinations, it is important for clinicians to slow down, inquire about the reasons underlying the inconsistency and clearly show which of the elements of capacity the patient fails to satisfy.

When ethics committees are consulted about patients who have or need court-appointed guardians, they lack empirical evidence about several common issues, including the relationship between guardianship and prolonged, potentially medically unnecessary hospitalizations for patients. To provide information about this issue, we conducted quantitative and qualitative analyses using a retrospective cohort from Veterans Healthcare Administration. To examine the relationship between guardianship appointment and hospital length of stay, we first compared 116 persons hospitalized prior to guardianship appointment to a comparison group (n = 348) 3:1 matched for age, diagnosis, date of admission, and comorbidity. We then compared 91 persons hospitalized in the year following guardianship appointment to a second matched comparison group (n = 273). Mean length of stay was 30.75 days (SD = 46.70) amongst those admitted prior to guardianship, which was higher than the comparison group (M = 7.74, SD = 9.71, F = 20.75, p < .001). Length of stay was lower following guardianship appointment (11.65, SD = 12.02, t = 15.16, p < .001); while higher than the comparison group (M = 7.60, SD = 8.46), differences were not associated with guardianship status. In a separate analysis involving 35 individuals who were hospitalized both prior to and following guardianship, length of stay was longer in the year prior (M = 23.00, SD = 37.55) versus after guardianship (M = 10.37, SD = 10.89, F = 4.35, p = .045). In qualitative analyses, four themes associated with lengths of stay exceeding 45 days prior to guardianship appointment were: administrative issues, family conflict, neuropsychiatric comorbidity, and medical complications. Our results suggest that persons who are admitted to hospitals, and subsequently require a guardian, experience extended lengths of stay for multiple complex reasons. Once a guardian has been appointed, however, differences in hospital lengths of stay between patients with and without guardians are reduced.

Introduction: The bioethics literature reflects significant interest in and concern with the use of genetic and genomic information in various settings. Because psychiatric treatment and research raises unique ethical, legal, and social issues, we conducted a scoping review of the biomedical, bioethics, and psychology literature regarding the application of genetic and genomic tools to psychiatric disorders (as listed in the DSM-5) and two associated behaviors or symptoms to provide a more detailed overview of the state of the field.

Objectives: The primary objective was to examine the available bioethics, biomedical, and psychology literature on applying genetic and genomic tools to psychiatric disorders (other than neurodevelopmental disorders) and two behaviors or symptoms sometimes associated with them (aggression or violence and suicidality) to identify the disorders to which these tools have been applied, the contexts in or purposes for which they have been applied, the ethical, legal, or social concerns associated with those uses, and proposed recommendations for mitigating those concerns.

Methods: We used Arksey and O'Malley's scoping review framework: (1) identify the research question; (2) identify relevant studies; (3) select studies; (4) chart the data; and (5) collate, summarize, and report results (2005). We relied on Levac et al. to inform our application of the framework (2010). The PRISMA extension for scoping reviews checklist informed our reporting (2018). We searched three electronic databases MEDLINE (PubMed), Embase, and PsycInfo (EbscoHost) for peer-reviewed journal articles in English to identify relevant literature. One author screened the initial results and additional screening was done in consultation with other authors. A data extraction form using DSM-5 diagnostic categories (excluding neurodevelopmental disorders) was developed and two authors independently each reviewed approximately half of the articles. Inter-rater reliability was ensured by double-coding approximately 10% of the papers. An additional author independently coded 10% of the articles to audit the data.

Results: In 365 coded publications, we identified 15 DSM-5 diagnostic categories in addition to the two pre-selected behaviors or symptoms (aggression or violence and suicidality) to which genetic or genomic tools have been applied. We identified 11 settings in or purposes for which these tools were applied. Twenty-two types of ethical, legal, or social concerns associated with the application of genetic or genomic tools to these disorders or behaviors/symptoms were identified along with 13 practices or policies that could mitigate these concerns.

Conclusion: Genetic and genomic tools have been applied to a wide range of psychiatric disorders. These raise a range of ethical, legal, and social concerns. Additional research is warranted to bet

The bioethics literature has paid little attention to matters of informed reproductive decision-making among women of childbearing age who have chronic kidney disease (CKD), including women who are on dialysis or women who have had a kidney transplant. Women with CKD receive inconsistent and, sometimes, inadequate reproductive counseling, particularly with respect to information about pursuing pregnancy. We identify four factors that might contribute to inadequate and inconsistent reproductive counseling. We argue that women with CKD should receive comprehensive reproductive counseling, including information about the possibility of pursuing pregnancy, and that more rigorous research on pregnancy in women with CKD, including women on dialysis or who have received a kidney transplant, is warranted to improve informed reproductive decision making in this population.

Would primary care services benefit from the aid of a clinical ethics committee (CEC)? The implementation of CECs in primary care in four Norwegian municipalities was supported and their activities followed for 2.5 years. In this study, the CECs' structure and activities are described, with special emphasis on what characterizes the cases they have discussed. In total, the four CECs discussed 54 cases from primary care services, with the four most common topics being patient autonomy, competence and coercion; professionalism; cooperation and disagreement with next of kin; and priority setting, resource use and quality. Nursing homes and home care were the primary care services most often involved. Next of kin were present in 10 case deliberations, whereas patients were never present. The investigation indicates that it might be feasible for new CECs to attain a high level of activity including case deliberations within the time frame. It also confirms that significant, characteristic and complex moral problems arise in primary care services.

In an attempt to respond effectively to the COVID-19 pandemic, policy makers and scientific experts who advise them have aspired to present a unified front. Leveraging the authority of science, they have at times portrayed politically favored COVID interventions, such as lockdowns, as strongly grounded in scientific evidence-even to the point of claiming that enacting such interventions is simply a matter of "following the science." Strictly speaking, all such claims are false, since facts alone never yield moral-political conclusions. More importantly, attempts to present a unified front have led to a number of other actions and statements by scientists and policy makers that erode the authority of science. These include actions and statements that: (1) mislead the public about epidemiological matters such as mortality rates, cause of death determinations, and computerized modeling, or fail to correct mainstream media sources that interpret such concepts in misleading ways; (2) incorporate moral-political opinions into ostensible statements of fact; and (3) misrepresent or misuse scientific expertise. The fundamental thesis of the paper is not primarily that such actions and statements have proliferated during the COVID-19 epidemic (though I think they have), but rather that they are unscientific and that presenting them as science undermines the authority of science. In the moral-political realm, the great power of science and the source of its authority derives from its agnosticism about fundamental moral-political claims. Science, for instance, has no built-in presumption that we should respect life, promote freedom, or practice toleration; nor does it tell us which of these values to prioritize when values conflict. Because of this agnosticism, science is recognized across a broad diversity perspectives as morally and politically impartial, and authoritative within its proper sphere. When it is infused with partisan bias, it loses that authority.

Evaluating the feasibility and first perceived outcomes of a newly developed clinical ethics support instrument called CURA. This instrument is tailored to the needs of nurses that provide palliative care and is intended to foster both moral competences and moral resilience. This study is a descriptive cross-sectional evaluation study. Respondents consisted of nurses and nurse assistants (n = 97) following a continuing education program (course participants) and colleagues of these course participants (n = 124). Two questionnaires with five-point Likert scales were used. The feasibility questionnaire was given to all respondents, the perceived outcomes questionnaire only to the course participants. Data collection took place over a period of six months. Respondents were predominantly positive on most items of the feasibility questionnaire. The steps of CURA are clearly described (84% of course participants agreed or strongly agreed, 94% of colleagues) and easy to apply (78-87%). The perceived outcomes showed that CURA helped respondents to reflect on moral challenges (71% (strongly) agreed), in perspective taking (67%), with being aware of moral challenges (63%) and in dealing with moral distress (54%). Respondents did experience organizational barriers: only half of the respondents (strongly) agreed that they could easily find time for using CURA. CURA is a feasible instrument for nurses and nurse assistants providing palliative care. However, reported difficulties in organizing and making time for reflections with CURA indicate organizational preconditions ought to be met in order to implement CURA in daily practice. Furthermore, these results indicate that CURA helps to build moral competences and fosters moral resilience.