Argumentation最新文献

This study traces the evolutional manifestations of bianzheng in modern Chinese argumentative practices from the twentieth century onwards, focusing on three principal forms. The first form of bianzheng operates as a translational counterpart to Western dialectic, specifically engaging with Aristotelian dialectical mechanisms that prioritize inductive reasoning (epagōgē) and deductive syllogism (sullogismos). The second form of bianzheng deviates from this logical sense and is reconstructed philosophically mainly based on Hegelian dialectic with an integration of the worldviews of change and relation in traditional Chinese thinking. The third form of bianzheng is further retrofitted with traditional Chinese thinking, shifting from philosophical reconstruction to rhetorical reconstruction in Chinese argumentation with a focus on the rejection of essential readings of things and events. And this form of bianzheng is systematically illustrated in Chinese argumentation in the twenty-first century, embracing holism, dynamic contexts and mutual becoming of the two opposites. This paper goes further to compare cultural connotations of Aristotelian dialectic, Hegelian dialectic and the third form of bianzheng based on the method of “comparative cultural hermeneutics”(Ames 2023a: 119). It argues that Aristotelian dialectic and Hegelian dialectic presuppose the One negating the many and the One dominating the many respectively. Yet the third form of bianzheng embraces the notion of “the inseparability of the one and the many” (Ames 2021a: 218), entailing “correlative thinking”. It deals with the production of new meaning, which is realized by aspectual language.

In contemporary literature on argumentation, it is well-established that various genres of fiction can be used to present argumentation. For instance, in political satires, authors argue why a certain political situation is undesirable. Similarly, authors of fables argue—by means of animals as characters—that certain behaviour is desirable or unacceptable. Characteristically, authors of fiction create a fictional world in which their narratives take place. This collides with the sincerity conditions of the speech act complex of argumentation: preliminary conditions that should be satisfied for argumentation to be performed correctly. Firstly, these sincerity conditions require the arguer to believe that their standpoint is acceptable. Second, the arguer should believe that the statements they make to justify their standpoint are acceptable and third, the arguer should believe that these statements constitute an acceptable justification of their standpoint. As such, when argumentation meets fiction, the sincerity conditions do not align: how can authors—as arguers—actually believe that their uttered statements are acceptable, if these statements are oftentimes not true? The aim of this paper is to show both how proponents can accept propositions in fiction while still following argumentation’s sincerity conditions.

Drawing upon the pragma-dialectical treatment of ‘appeal to ignorance’, the neutral counterpart of the fallacious argumentum ad ignorantiam, this article aims to reveal how this kind of argumentative move is used as a mode of concluding maneuvering by the spokespersons in their replies at China’s diplomatic press conferences. As expounded in Wu (2019a, 2019b, 2023), in responding to the journalists’ questions, the spokespersons conduct as a matter of fact simultaneously two critical discussions: one with the critics quoted by the journalists, the other one is with the international general public that may be deemed their primary audience. The first critical discussion is instrumental to the spokespersons in convincing the international general public of their stances in the second critical discussion. As the research results show, in the critical discussion with the critics, the Chinese spokespersons prototypically use three types of appeal to ignorance in the concluding stage, while in the critical discussion with the international general public they use the appeal to ignorance in the empirical counterpart of the argumentation stage with the aim to undermining or even negating the critics’ credibility/reliability before the international general audience.

This study examines the evolution of arguments surrounding Japan’s administrative decision to release the radioactive wastewater that the Tokyo Electronic Power Company (TEPCO) initially pledged to store and lower the radiation levels on its Fukushima Daiichi nuclear site. In so doing, it focuses specifically on how Japan selected the argumentative move to reconcile the technical and public dimensions of the disagreement about the issue of Fukushima water in strategic maneuvering. The study will provide a critical insight into how Tokyo sought to establish a common ground to release the officially-called “Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) treated water” for the reconstruction of Fukushima. In support of dialectical reasonableness drawn from the sphere of scientific arguments in which a premium is placed on techno-efficiency, the treated water became recontextualized in a technical and administrative sense not just to be distinguished from the contaminated water in a rhetorically effective way, but to be more generally and more relevantly accepted in a wider public.

The invention of the term kisceral by Michael Gilbert opens a vast field of human communication that correlates to the intuitive, the religious, the spiritual, the imaginative, and the mystical. However, the ingenuity of the coinage kisceral seems to be inherent with problems, i.e. linguistic fuzziness originating from the Japanese loanword, and conceptual ambiguity of argument from ethos, which are subject to endless reinterpretation by Michael Gilbert himself and others. The source of the problems comes partly from the Japanese loanword ki 気 and partly from the contemporary readings of the Aristotelian mode of arguing from ethos. A case-based close reading of zhengqi ge 正氣歌 (The Song of the Righteous Qi) speaks to the long tradition of Chinese philosophy of qi 氣, from which originates the argument from ethos, and argument from sign that centers on the power of judgment.

A very basic intuition is that argumentation is about giving reasons. This is recognized, for example, when it is stated that the object of study of argumentation theory is argumentative practices that consist, in whole or in part, but, at least, to a significant extent, of asking for, giving, and examining reasons. But this consensus does not translate into theory. In fact, reasons occupy a modest place in argumentation theory. Logical properties can be understood in terms of reasons or in terms of inferences, and in this sense, we can contrast reasons-based theories of argument with inference-based theories of argument. I will first show that the distinction between reasons-based and inference-based theories of argument is robust, and that there is a real difference between them. I will then argue that, as far as argumentation is concerned, a logical approach based on reasons is preferable to one based on inferences.

Part of the business of argumentation theory involves resolving a conceptual dispute over what argumentation and argument are in the first place. This dispute has produced various “concepts of argument.” The goal of this paper is twofold: (1) to develop a complete ontology of argumentative phenomena, capable of accounting for various conceptions of argument—something, as I argue, that is badly wanting in argumentation theory; and, within this ontology, (2) to defend a position that there is but one concept of argument needed to grasp these diverse phenomena and conceptions of argument and argumentation. I move in four steps. First, I briefly sketch the discussion over arguments-as-activities and arguments-as-products. Second, I go back to the classic work of Twardowski on actions and products and adapt it for argumentation theory, producing a complex yet systematically organized conceptual ontology of argument and argumentation. This conceptual housekeeping allows me, third, to critically engage some of the recent, Frege-inspired philosophical literature on the concept of argument, while defending act-based approaches to argument(ation). Fourth, I present a positive proposal of a minimal, contrastivist concept of argument as a set of reasons advanced to support a conclusion C₁ rather than another conclusion C_n.

This paper presents an analogy-based approach to argument evaluation, combining logical analogy, argumentation schemes, and Szymanek’s explanation transmission method to assess the strength of arguments. The proposed framework introduces Strong Argument Schemes (SAS), which represent idealized argument structures incorporating the best possible answers to critical questions called critical premises. The method allows for systematically comparing and evaluating argument strength by mapping actual arguments to these strong schemes. This approach addresses limitations in traditional critical question-based evaluations and provides a unified procedure for assessing defeasible arguments.

Visual argumentation has attracted the attention of argumentation theorists for several decades, with research focus evolving from the legitimacy of the use of visuals in argumentation to exploring how images can function as integral parts of argumentation. Scholars (e.g., Kjeldsen 2015b, 2016) have noted that images perform dual functions in argumentation: as symbols contributing noesis and as phenomena invoking aesthesis. Building on this foundation, the present study focuses on latent images that are overlooked in current argumentation studies. It is argued that latent images are conveyed in an “expressed implicit” manner. These images not only serve as visual flags to capture the audience’s attention and harness the advantages of visual representation to deliver direct sensory stimulation, but also reshape the original structure of visual argumentation and argument schemes. Short video advertisements for financial management courses are discussed as a case study to demonstrate how one specific type of argument by latent images—visual argument from latent authority—achieves an interplay of noesis and aesthesis, thereby transforming the original argumentative structure, establishing various forms of authority, and maneuvering strategically to deliver a direct emotional impact to the audience and shift the burden of proof.