Argumentation最新文献

This paper aims to discuss a well-known concept from argumentation theory, namely the principle of charity. It will show that this principle, especially in its contemporary version as formulated by Donald Davidson, meets with some serious problems. Since we need the principle of charity in any kind of critical discussion, we propose the way of modifying it according to the presupponendum—the rule written in the sixteenth century by Ignatius Loyola. While also corresponding with pragma-dialectical rules, it also provides additional content. This will be termed the dialectical principle of charity, and it offers a few steps to be performed during an argument in order to make sure that the participants understand each other well and are not deceived by any cognitive bias. The meaning of these results could be of great significance for argumentation theory, pragma-dialectics and the practice of public discourse as it enhances the principle of charity and makes it easier to apply in argumentation.

One takes one’s word that p when a source vouches for p and one accepts the word of that source. If the source is reliable in this case, p is acceptable. The reliability of the source is a measure of its plausibility. If a source has the relevant competence, credibility, authority, that word is acceptable. Likewise, the word may be acceptable if accompanied by a cogent argument, but presumption may be misplaced. One may recognize a presumption for a statement when such recognition is not justified, the positive version of the fallacy. One may refuse to recognize a presumption for a statement when there really is a presumption for the statement, the negative version of the fallacy. The essay proceeds to explore various dimensions of when it is justified to take a source’s word for a claim, and when it is justified to reject a claim from a source. The discussion ranges over considerations of sexism and race, cultural differences, and the relationship of presumptions to fallacies. Also considered is the role of trust in taking someone’s word and the factors involved in trusting someone.

Conditional constructions (if–then) enable us to express our thoughts about possible states of the world, and they form an important ingredient for our reasoning and argumentative capabilities. Different types and argumentative uses have been distinguished in the literature, but their applicability to actual language use is rarely evaluated. This paper focuses on the reliability of applying classifications of connections between antecedents and consequents of conditionals to discourse, and three issues are identified. First, different accounts produce incompatible results when applied to language data. Second, a discrepancy between theory and data was observed in previous studies, which sometimes discard existing classifications for being detached from actual language use. Finally, language users construct various cognitive relations between clauses of conditionals without being able to rely on overt linguistic features, which poses problems for the annotation of conditionals in argumentation and discourse. This paper addresses these issues by means of comparing theoretical types and actual uses of conditionals, by inspecting the dispersion of types in natural-language corpora, and by conducting an experiment in which the inter-rater reliability of classifications was assessed. The results show that the reliability of classifications of conditionals when applied to language data is low. With respect to the aforementioned issues, different classifications produced incompatible results, a discrepancy between theory and data was indeed observed, and low reliability scores indicated a largely interpretative nature of types of conditionals. Given these results, suggestions for the enhancement of reliability in corpus studies of conditionals and beyond are provided to enhance future classification design.

Critical questions have been understood in the framework of argument schemes from their conception. This understanding has influenced the process of evaluating arguments and the development of classifications. This paper argues that relating these two notions is detrimental to research on argument schemes and critical questions, and that it is possible to have critical questions without relying on argument schemes. Two objections are raised against the classical understanding of critical questions based on theoretical and analytical grounds. The theoretical objection presents the assumptions that are embedded in the idea of argument schemes delivering questions to evaluate arguments. The analytical objection, on the other hand, exposes the shortcomings of the theory when critical questions are used to evaluate real-life argumentation. After presenting these criticisms, a new theory of critical questions is sketched. This theory takes into account the dynamics of dialectical discussions to describe the function of critical questions and their implications for evaluating arguments.

Argumentation as the public exchange of reasons is widely thought to enhance deliberative interactions that generate and justify reasonable public policies. Adopting an argumentation-theoretic perspective, we survey the norms that should govern public argumentation and address some of the complexities that scholarly treatments have identified. Our focus is on norms associated with the ideals of correctness and participation as sources of a politically legitimate deliberative outcome. In principle, both ideals are mutually coherent. If the information needed for a correct deliberative outcome is distributed among agents, then maximising participation increases information diversity. But both ideals can also be in tension. If participants lack competence or are prone to biases, a correct deliberative outcome requires limiting participation. The central question for public argumentation, therefore, is how to strike a balance between both ideals. Rather than advocating a preferred normative framework, our main purpose is to illustrate the complexity of this theme.

This paper’s thesis is that the fallacies should not be taught to undergraduates. Besides some bad influences, this is not only because doing so steals time more valuably spent elsewhere, but also because the field is now so complex (overlapping concepts, theories and disciplines), that we lack knowledgeable instructors and sophisticated students. The study of theories involving fallacies, however, remains viable.

This argument explores transcultural commonalities among civic arguments from divination in global antiquity. In the ancient world, proponents engaged in kisceral arguments deriving from divinatory signs: arguments ex divinatione regarding prospective civic action. Under ideal circumstances, their aim was to help insure that the collective action of human political organizations was aligned with the natural synchrony of the cosmos. Thus, civic arguments from divination were employed to anticipate the future’s course based on the signs the system produced holistically. In ancient Mesopotamia, China, and Rome, divination was employed as a tool for aligning the order of human society to that of a conception of metaphysical or cosmic order. By comparing these argumentative examples and rationales, we see a broader context for the way in which humans made arguments toward political futurity outside more conventional syllogistic formulations concerning causation. Rather, the argumentative strategies of many ancient cultures embraced an understanding of the future as the logical outcome of a holistic dynamism in kairotic time.

It has been said that there is no scholarly consensus as to why Aristotle’s logics of proof and refutation would have borne the title Analytics. But if we consulted Tarski’s (Introduction to logic and the methodology of deductive sciences, Oxford University Press, New York, 1941) graduate-level primer, we would have the perfect title for them: Introduction to logic and to the methodology of deductive sciences. There are two strings to Aristotle’s bow. The methodological string is the founding work on the epistemology of science, and the logical string sets down conditions on the proofs that bring this knowledge about. The logic of proof presents a difficulty whose solution exceeds its theoretical reach. The logic of refutation takes the problem on board, and advances a solution whose execution is framed by fallacy-avoidance at the beginning and fallacy-adoption at the end. But with a difference: the avoidance-fallacies are of Aristotle’s own conception, whereas the adoption-fallacies, so judged in the modern tradition, aren’t fallacies at all for Aristotle. The avoidance-fallacies are begging the question and ignoratio elenchi, and the adoption-fallacies, fallacies in name only, are the ad hominem and ad ignorantiam, an inductive turning in the first instance, and an abductive finish in the second.

We propose a revised definition of “argument scheme” that focuses on describing argumentative performances and normative assessments that occur within an argumentative context, the social context in which the scheme arises. Our premise-and-conclusion structure identifies the typical instantiation of an argument in the argumentative context, and our critical framework describes a set of normative assessments available to participants in the context, what we call practically normative assessments. We distinguish this practical normativity from the rationally or universally normative assessment that might be imposed from outside the argumentative context. Thus, the practical norms represented in an argument scheme may still be subject to rational critique, and the scheme avoids the is/ought fallacy. We ground our theoretical discussion and observations in an empirical study of US district court opinions resolving legal questions about copyright fair use and the lawyers’ briefs that led to them, instantiating our definition of argument scheme in the “argument for classification by precedent.” Our definition addresses some criticisms the argument-scheme construct has received. For example, using our data, we show that a minimally well formed instance of this type of argument does not shift any conventional burden from the proponent of the argument to its skeptics. We also argue that these argument schemes need not be seen as dialogical.

This essay begins with a brief description of my approach to the study of argumentation and fallacies which is empirical, historical-textual, dialectical, and meta-argumentational. It then focuses on the fallacy of composition and elaborates a number of conceptual definitions and distinctions: argument of composition; fallacy of composition; arguments and fallacies of division; arguments that confuse the distributive and collective meaning of terms; arguments from a property belonging to members of a group to its belonging to the entire group; several nuanced schemes for arguments of composition; and several principles for the evaluation of such arguments. I then call attention to the fact that some scholars have claimed that the basic argument for global warming commits the fallacy of composition, and undertake a critical analysis of this claim. I show that the global-warming argument is not a fallacy of composition, but is rather a deductively valid argument of composition from the temperature of the parts to the temperature of the whole earth; moreover, I criticize the meta-argumentation of these scholars by showing that the global-warming argument is not similar to the one for global pollution, which is indeed fallacious; finally, I argue that these scholars confuse the global-warming argument with the argument claiming that all effects of global warming are harmful, which is indeed incorrect as a hasty generalization.