In recent work, Scott Soames (2010, 2013, 2015, 2019) and Peter Hanks (2011, 2013, 2015) have developed a theory of propositions on which these are constituted by complexes of intellectual acts. In this article, I adapt this type of theory to provide an account of perceptual content. After introducing terminology in section 1, I detail the approach proffered by Soames and Hanks in section 2, focusing on Hanks’s version. In section 3, I introduce a problem that these theories face, namely, how to account for the unity among the relevant intellectual acts. Section 4 provides an answer to this problem of unity, while section 5 explicates the relation to Soames and Hanks. In section 6, I extend the model to a theory of the unity of experiential consciousness. Finally, in section 7, I apply the preceding considerations to debates about the nature of perceptual representation. The upshot will be that experiential unity is not simply a phenomenal feature of consciousness, but central to an account of the role perceptual representation plays in perceptual cognition. As we perceive something, we rouse ourselves, so to speak, as though from a sleep with respect to the object. We grasp [it], comprehend it, we grasp ourselves with respect to it, [and] reflect upon ourselves. — J. N. Tetens (1913, 284) A concept should thus be understood as consciousness of an act, and more precisely of an act of combining and grasping together. — Béatrice Longuenesse (1998, 46) David de Bruijn is a lecturer in philosophy at Auburn University. He completed his PhD at the University of Pittsburgh. His primary research interests are the philosophy of perception and modern philosophy, specifically rationalist and Kantian themes in contemporary perceptual epistemology. 206962, 222, 4, D ow nladed from https:/inelibrary.w il.com /doi/101/sjp.12458 by A uurn U niersity L ibries, W ley O nline L irary on [04//2023]. ee he T rm s nd C onitions (https:linelibrary.w il.com /erm s-andnditions) on W ley O nline L irary or rles of use; O A aricles re goerned by he apicable C retive C om m ns L icnse 541 PERCEPTUAL CONTENT AND THE UNITY OF PERCEPTION In recent years there has been an increased interest in Kant’s theory of perception, and specifically Kant’s view of the nature of “intuitions” (Anschauungen): immediate confrontations with objects. Questions of interest include Kant’s distinctive thoughts on the relation between perceptual awareness and selfawareness: the question of whether or not intuitions have representational content in the contemporary sense of the term, and if so, whether this content should be considered to be conceptual or nonconceptual. However, one difficulty in approaching these issues from a contemporary point of view is that Kant appears to start from a very different mental metaphysics than is the contemporary standard. Specifically, Kant starts from a metaphysics of mind on which there is a critical place in cognition for certain mental acts associated with th
在最近的工作中，Scott Soames(2010年、2013年、2015年、2019年)和Peter Hanks(2011年、2013年、2015年)发展了一种命题理论，这些命题由智力行为的复合体构成。在这篇文章中，我采用了这种类型的理论来提供一种感性内容的解释。在第1节介绍了术语之后，我在第2节详细介绍了Soames和Hanks提供的方法，重点介绍了Hanks的版本。在第三节中，我介绍了这些理论面临的一个问题，即如何解释相关智力行为之间的统一性。第4节给出了这个统一问题的答案，而第5节则阐述了与索姆斯和汉克斯的关系。在第6节中，我将这个模型扩展到经验意识的统一性理论。最后，在第7节中，我将前面的考虑应用到关于感知表征本质的辩论中。其结果将是，经验统一性不仅仅是意识的一种现象性特征，而且是解释知觉表征在知觉认知中所起作用的核心。当我们感知到某样东西时，可以说，我们唤醒了自己，就像从对客体的睡眠中醒来一样。我们把握它，理解它，我们根据它把握自己，反思自己。- J. N. Tetens(1913, 284)因此，概念应该被理解为一种行为的意识，更准确地说，应该被理解为一种结合和把握在一起的行为的意识。David de Bruijn是奥本大学的哲学讲师。他在匹兹堡大学完成了博士学位。他的主要研究兴趣是感知哲学和现代哲学，特别是当代感性认识论中的理性主义和康德主题。206962,222,4, D从https:/ inlibrary加载。http://www.wil.com /doi/101/sjp。[j].北京大学学报(自然科学版);[04//2023]。请参阅trm和C条件(https: linlibrary)。www.wil.com /网址(及条件):www.wil.com的网址或使用规则;摘要:近年来，人们对康德的知觉理论，特别是康德关于“直觉”本质的观点(即与客体的直接对抗)越来越感兴趣。我们感兴趣的问题包括康德对感性意识和自我意识之间关系的独特思考:直觉是否具有当代意义上的表征性意旨的问题，如果有，这种意旨应该被认为是概念性的还是非概念性的。然而，从当代的观点来看这些问题的一个困难是，康德似乎是从一个与当代标准非常不同的精神形而上学开始的。具体来说，康德是从心灵形而上学出发的，在这个形而上学上，与心灵官能相关的某些心理行为在认知中占有重要地位。这种模式是现代早期的标准模式，但与当代从态度或命题关系方面理解心理状态的模式形成鲜明对比。因此，如何将康德思想中的一个位置映射到21世纪心灵或感知哲学的位置并不完全清楚。在这篇文章中，我将把康德关于知觉的思考与最近对“积极的”精神形而上学的重要重新评价联系起来。在最近的工作中，Scott Soames(2010、2013、2015、2019)和Peter Hanks(2011、2013、2015)认为，我们应该拒绝命题态度的客体概念，并在早期现代模式中发展了一种广泛的观点，即主体通过心理行为(如预测和参考对象的行为)构成命题。正如我将要论证的那样，关注《纯粹理性批判》(康德1998)早期参考文献的当代发展，使用标准的A/B符号。康德进一步引用:R = (' Reflexionen ';康德1882康德handschriftlicher Nachlaß AA (' Akademieausgabe ') 14 - 19;Prol。=《未来形而上学导论》(2001)。“纯粹的”和“经验的”直觉是有区别的，只有后者具有感性的特征。我只会关注经验直觉。3关于非概念主义的阅读，见Hanna (2005, 2008, 2011);阿莱(2009);击发弹(2013);McLear (2014, 2015, 2016a, 2016b);Schulting and Onof(2015)。关于概念主义的阅读，见Ginsborg (2006, 2008);文策尔(2005);格里菲思(2012);Van Mazijk (2014a, 2014b);奥运会(2014、2017);麦克道尔(2009);Engstrom (2006);康诺利(2014)。严格地说，我将关注的工作是语义学，因为它关注命题的本质。然而，我将把重点放在心理行为上，根据这些说法，涉及到命题表征。 关于感知内容和心理行为之间的联系，参见苏珊娜·谢伦伯格(Susanna Schellenberg)最近的研究，其中写道:“感知意识是由心理活动构成的……这种观点实际上是表征主义的一种版本”(谢伦伯格2019,530)。对于谢伦伯格来说，知觉表征是由“基本”或“简单”歧视能力的概念前练习构成的。相比之下，就目前而言，相关能力将具有更多的智力特征。206962,222,4, D从https:/ inlibrary加载。http://www.wil.com /doi/101/sjp。[j].北京大学学报(自然科学版);[04//2023]。请参阅trm和C条件(https: linlibrary)。www.wil.com /网址(及条件):www.wil.com的网址或使用规则;A类物品受适用的C / C / C / L许可证规管
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{"title":"Why Are There Two Versions of Meno’s Paradox?","authors":"Douglas A. Shepardson","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12453","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12453","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45349634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Kant on Inclination and Reason","authors":"Justin B. Shaddock","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12452","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12452","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45773797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Online Misinformation and “Phantom Patterns”: Epistemic Exploitation in the Era of Big Data","authors":"Megan Fritts, Frank Cabrera","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12451","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44956638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral Status and Intelligent Robots","authors":"John‐Stewart Gordon, David J. Gunkel","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12450","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47932257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Editor's Introduction: Mary Beth Mader as Co‐Editor","authors":"Remy Debes","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12445","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12445","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44900209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The State of the Question","authors":"Remy Debes","doi":"10.1111/sjp.12446","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12446","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46350,"journal":{"name":"SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49244920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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