Prior research shows that individuals benefit from abstract construals when performing broader high-level assurance tasks. We extend this research by studying the effects of different construal mindsets on skepticism and performance in a low-level assurance task setting. Using a sample of 195 online participants, we find that individuals benefit from concrete (versus abstract) mindsets when performing low-level assurance tasks because concrete construals better allow them to focus on detailed evidence that may contradict client assertions. Specifically, we show that assurance providers who utilize a concrete (abstract) construal mindset when performing a low-level task display better (worse) skeptical judgments and actions. Taken together with findings from past research, our results support the notion that assurance providers should utilize the construal mindset that best matches the characteristics of the task at hand. Exploratory analysis suggests that client retention incentives may moderate the relationship between skeptical judgment and skeptical action in our context. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.
{"title":"Seeing the Trees: How a Concrete versus Abstract Mindset Improves Performance on Low-Level Assurance Tasks","authors":"David N. Herda, John R. Lauck","doi":"10.2308/bria-2024-008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/bria-2024-008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Prior research shows that individuals benefit from abstract construals when performing broader high-level assurance tasks. We extend this research by studying the effects of different construal mindsets on skepticism and performance in a low-level assurance task setting. Using a sample of 195 online participants, we find that individuals benefit from concrete (versus abstract) mindsets when performing low-level assurance tasks because concrete construals better allow them to focus on detailed evidence that may contradict client assertions. Specifically, we show that assurance providers who utilize a concrete (abstract) construal mindset when performing a low-level task display better (worse) skeptical judgments and actions. Taken together with findings from past research, our results support the notion that assurance providers should utilize the construal mindset that best matches the characteristics of the task at hand. Exploratory analysis suggests that client retention incentives may moderate the relationship between skeptical judgment and skeptical action in our context.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141841431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anna M. Cianci, Stephen Kuselias, D. J. Lowe, G. Tsakumis
The dynamics of the auditor-client interaction can provide cues and information that may affect audit quality beyond the collection of evidence. However, more research is needed to understand how certain cues from these interactions might factor into auditor decisions. Using the Elaboration Likelihood Model as a theoretical framework, we provide insight into how auditors use client management team likeability in their audit judgments. Our results suggest that audit committee strength influences auditor elaboration, thereby shifting how auditors use likeability as an information cue. We find that, when there is a weak (strong) audit committee, auditors use less (more) elaboration, which causes their inventory write-down judgments to be more (less) influenced by unlikeable client management teams. Moderated mediation analyses support the Elaboration Likelihood Model, providing a starting point for future research to examine other auditing judgments that could be affected by this theory. Data Availability: Data are available at http://www.osf.io/ under doi number 10.17605/OSF.IO/8VZKQ.
{"title":"The Impact of Audit Committee Strength on the Influence of Management Team Likeability","authors":"Anna M. Cianci, Stephen Kuselias, D. J. Lowe, G. Tsakumis","doi":"10.2308/bria-2023-004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/bria-2023-004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The dynamics of the auditor-client interaction can provide cues and information that may affect audit quality beyond the collection of evidence. However, more research is needed to understand how certain cues from these interactions might factor into auditor decisions. Using the Elaboration Likelihood Model as a theoretical framework, we provide insight into how auditors use client management team likeability in their audit judgments. Our results suggest that audit committee strength influences auditor elaboration, thereby shifting how auditors use likeability as an information cue. We find that, when there is a weak (strong) audit committee, auditors use less (more) elaboration, which causes their inventory write-down judgments to be more (less) influenced by unlikeable client management teams. Moderated mediation analyses support the Elaboration Likelihood Model, providing a starting point for future research to examine other auditing judgments that could be affected by this theory.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available at http://www.osf.io/ under doi number 10.17605/OSF.IO/8VZKQ.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141692892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The increased prevalence of remote work is causing auditors to work more often in isolation. To address this, firms are using virtual audit rooms in an attempt to mimic the traditional social environment of auditing. Social Facilitation Theory predicts that auditors’ adherence to team guidance is increasing to the extent of felt presence of others. I examine how physical and virtual presence of the audit team, compared to working alone, facilitates the incorporation of team guidance encouraging skepticism. I predict that auditors engage in this behavior most frequently in the physical presence of their team, somewhat less frequently in the virtual presence of their team, and least frequently when working alone. For skeptical actions, results do not support these expectations. However, for skeptical judgments, participants view audit evidence more skeptically when in the virtual presence of peers compared to alone. Low statistical power may limit the generalizability of the results. Data Availability: Data are available from the author upon request.
{"title":"Preliminary Evidence on the Impact of the Felt Presence of Peers on Auditor Skeptical Judgment and Action in a Remote Work Setting","authors":"Steven Dannemiller","doi":"10.2308/bria-2023-048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/bria-2023-048","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The increased prevalence of remote work is causing auditors to work more often in isolation. To address this, firms are using virtual audit rooms in an attempt to mimic the traditional social environment of auditing. Social Facilitation Theory predicts that auditors’ adherence to team guidance is increasing to the extent of felt presence of others. I examine how physical and virtual presence of the audit team, compared to working alone, facilitates the incorporation of team guidance encouraging skepticism. I predict that auditors engage in this behavior most frequently in the physical presence of their team, somewhat less frequently in the virtual presence of their team, and least frequently when working alone. For skeptical actions, results do not support these expectations. However, for skeptical judgments, participants view audit evidence more skeptically when in the virtual presence of peers compared to alone. Low statistical power may limit the generalizability of the results.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from the author upon request.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141412007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We report the results of a series of experiments showing that individual investors rely on low-quality investment advice from social media platforms, especially when the advice is negative. Our results also suggest reasons for investors’ reliance. Some investors believe that they should rely on the advice, suggesting that reliance on low-quality advice is sometimes due to a lack of knowledge about the advice’s predictive value. However, low-quality advice influences investment judgments even among investors who believe they should not and did not rely on the advice. This unintentional reliance on low-quality advice stems from a tendency to automatically accept information when it is initially provided. Prompting investors to consider the credibility of their information sources before they view low-quality advice reduces the advice’s influence. Our findings suggest that regulators interested in reducing investors’ reliance on low-quality advice should augment knowledge-oriented education with process-oriented interventions. Data Availability: Contact the authors. JEL Classifications: D83; D91; G41; M41.
{"title":"Why Do Investors Rely on Low-Quality Investment Advice? Experimental Evidence from Social Media Platforms","authors":"Kathryn Kadous, Molly Mercer, Yuepin (Daniel) Zhou","doi":"10.2308/bria-2023-015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/bria-2023-015","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We report the results of a series of experiments showing that individual investors rely on low-quality investment advice from social media platforms, especially when the advice is negative. Our results also suggest reasons for investors’ reliance. Some investors believe that they should rely on the advice, suggesting that reliance on low-quality advice is sometimes due to a lack of knowledge about the advice’s predictive value. However, low-quality advice influences investment judgments even among investors who believe they should not and did not rely on the advice. This unintentional reliance on low-quality advice stems from a tendency to automatically accept information when it is initially provided. Prompting investors to consider the credibility of their information sources before they view low-quality advice reduces the advice’s influence. Our findings suggest that regulators interested in reducing investors’ reliance on low-quality advice should augment knowledge-oriented education with process-oriented interventions.\u0000 Data Availability: Contact the authors.\u0000 JEL Classifications: D83; D91; G41; M41.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141130842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Leslie Berger, Lan Guo, Kelsey Matthews, Christopher Wong
One significant challenge of motivating team performance is that the contribution of individual team members is difficult to observe. In this setting, managers often seek private information about team members’ relative contributions to help allocate team bonuses. However, the presence of self-interested biases in such communication, especially strategic bias, could reduce its informational value. We study the effects of two features of team members’ communication about their relative contributions—whether it is mandatory or voluntary and whether an explanation is required—on the severity of employees’ self-interested biases in their communication. As predicted, experimental results show that when explanations are not required, low-ability team members incorporate more strategic bias into their relative contribution communication when it is voluntary, compared to mandatory. We also observe that among low-ability team members, the greater strategic bias observed when the relative contribution communication is voluntary, compared to mandatory, diminishes when an explanation is required. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.
{"title":"Strategic Bias in Team Members’ Communication about Relative Contributions: The Effects of Voluntary Communication and Explanation","authors":"Leslie Berger, Lan Guo, Kelsey Matthews, Christopher Wong","doi":"10.2308/bria-2022-056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/bria-2022-056","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 One significant challenge of motivating team performance is that the contribution of individual team members is difficult to observe. In this setting, managers often seek private information about team members’ relative contributions to help allocate team bonuses. However, the presence of self-interested biases in such communication, especially strategic bias, could reduce its informational value. We study the effects of two features of team members’ communication about their relative contributions—whether it is mandatory or voluntary and whether an explanation is required—on the severity of employees’ self-interested biases in their communication. As predicted, experimental results show that when explanations are not required, low-ability team members incorporate more strategic bias into their relative contribution communication when it is voluntary, compared to mandatory. We also observe that among low-ability team members, the greater strategic bias observed when the relative contribution communication is voluntary, compared to mandatory, diminishes when an explanation is required.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140283268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tax specialists are often part of interprofessional teams that conduct financial statement audits, yet little is documented about their role and collaboration with auditors during these engagements or their contributions to audit quality. Our interviews with 33 highly experienced audit and tax professionals reveal variation in tax specialists’ roles during audits. Further, we find that auditors and tax specialists perceive a greater need for interdependence of expertise, particularly across different types of tax experts, due to increased tax specialization and global tax complexity. However, our interviewees acknowledge that power dynamics and differing attitudes toward shared goals and partnership affect the collaboration process. Interviewees also report instances where ineffective collaboration impacted audit quality. Collectively, we document how auditor and tax specialists’ collaboration (or lack of) influences both audit production and quality, providing insight for practice, regulators, and research regarding tax specialists’ audit involvement and extending the interprofessional collaboration literature to accounting. JEL Classifications: L84; M40; M42.
{"title":"Auditors’ and Tax Specialists’ Interprofessional Collaboration during Audit Engagements: Implications for Audit Production and Audit Quality","authors":"C. Hux, Lindsay M. Andiola, Tracy J. Noga","doi":"10.2308/bria-2023-018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/bria-2023-018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Tax specialists are often part of interprofessional teams that conduct financial statement audits, yet little is documented about their role and collaboration with auditors during these engagements or their contributions to audit quality. Our interviews with 33 highly experienced audit and tax professionals reveal variation in tax specialists’ roles during audits. Further, we find that auditors and tax specialists perceive a greater need for interdependence of expertise, particularly across different types of tax experts, due to increased tax specialization and global tax complexity. However, our interviewees acknowledge that power dynamics and differing attitudes toward shared goals and partnership affect the collaboration process. Interviewees also report instances where ineffective collaboration impacted audit quality. Collectively, we document how auditor and tax specialists’ collaboration (or lack of) influences both audit production and quality, providing insight for practice, regulators, and research regarding tax specialists’ audit involvement and extending the interprofessional collaboration literature to accounting.\u0000 JEL Classifications: L84; M40; M42.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139827441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tax specialists are often part of interprofessional teams that conduct financial statement audits, yet little is documented about their role and collaboration with auditors during these engagements or their contributions to audit quality. Our interviews with 33 highly experienced audit and tax professionals reveal variation in tax specialists’ roles during audits. Further, we find that auditors and tax specialists perceive a greater need for interdependence of expertise, particularly across different types of tax experts, due to increased tax specialization and global tax complexity. However, our interviewees acknowledge that power dynamics and differing attitudes toward shared goals and partnership affect the collaboration process. Interviewees also report instances where ineffective collaboration impacted audit quality. Collectively, we document how auditor and tax specialists’ collaboration (or lack of) influences both audit production and quality, providing insight for practice, regulators, and research regarding tax specialists’ audit involvement and extending the interprofessional collaboration literature to accounting. JEL Classifications: L84; M40; M42.
{"title":"Auditors’ and Tax Specialists’ Interprofessional Collaboration during Audit Engagements: Implications for Audit Production and Audit Quality","authors":"C. Hux, Lindsay M. Andiola, Tracy J. Noga","doi":"10.2308/bria-2023-018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/bria-2023-018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Tax specialists are often part of interprofessional teams that conduct financial statement audits, yet little is documented about their role and collaboration with auditors during these engagements or their contributions to audit quality. Our interviews with 33 highly experienced audit and tax professionals reveal variation in tax specialists’ roles during audits. Further, we find that auditors and tax specialists perceive a greater need for interdependence of expertise, particularly across different types of tax experts, due to increased tax specialization and global tax complexity. However, our interviewees acknowledge that power dynamics and differing attitudes toward shared goals and partnership affect the collaboration process. Interviewees also report instances where ineffective collaboration impacted audit quality. Collectively, we document how auditor and tax specialists’ collaboration (or lack of) influences both audit production and quality, providing insight for practice, regulators, and research regarding tax specialists’ audit involvement and extending the interprofessional collaboration literature to accounting.\u0000 JEL Classifications: L84; M40; M42.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139887049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Firms frequently provide relative performance information (RPI) in different environmental contexts. In this experimental study, we investigate how RPI (absent versus present) affects rule-breaking under different levels of group identity (lower versus higher). We refer to performance-improving rule-breaking that increases not only one’s own performance but also overall firm performance. We predict and find that RPI triggers a stronger increase in rule-breaking in cases of higher group identity than in cases of lower group identity. We argue that in the case of lower group identity, individuals mainly follow their own moral standards independently of RPI provision. In contrast, we reason that individuals with higher group identity generally want to impress their fellow group members when RPI is absent by following the rules, but when RPI is present by achieving a high rank through rule-breaking. Our results inform managers about the importance of considering RPI in conjunction with group identity. Data Availability: Data are available from Sandra Winkelmann. JEL Classifications: M40; M41.
{"title":"Relative Performance Information and Rule-Breaking: The Moderating Effect of Group Identity","authors":"Corinna Ewelt-Knauer, Thorsten Knauer, Sandra Winkelmann","doi":"10.2308/bria-2022-049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/bria-2022-049","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Firms frequently provide relative performance information (RPI) in different environmental contexts. In this experimental study, we investigate how RPI (absent versus present) affects rule-breaking under different levels of group identity (lower versus higher). We refer to performance-improving rule-breaking that increases not only one’s own performance but also overall firm performance. We predict and find that RPI triggers a stronger increase in rule-breaking in cases of higher group identity than in cases of lower group identity. We argue that in the case of lower group identity, individuals mainly follow their own moral standards independently of RPI provision. In contrast, we reason that individuals with higher group identity generally want to impress their fellow group members when RPI is absent by following the rules, but when RPI is present by achieving a high rank through rule-breaking. Our results inform managers about the importance of considering RPI in conjunction with group identity.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from Sandra Winkelmann.\u0000 JEL Classifications: M40; M41.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139395592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mackenzie M. Festa, Megan M. Jones, Patrick D. Witz
ABSTRACT This study contributes to the literature examining the benefits and costs associated with auditor quantitative materiality disclosures. We conduct an experiment to examine a conditional risk associated with such disclosures: that investors with heightened concerns about earnings management, a qualitative concern, will anchor too strongly to the quantitative threshold and lose trust in the audit. The experiment manipulates (1) whether investor concerns about earnings management are low or high and (2) whether auditors provide a quantitative materiality disclosure. We find that quantitative materiality disclosures mislead investors when they have high concerns about earnings management. Specifically, investors lose trust in the auditor’s ability to identify errors that are quantitatively small, but important from a qualitative perspective. A second experiment further suggests that auditors’ provision of detailed, rather than nominal, qualitative materiality disclosures can mitigate this conditional risk. Our study contributes to practice and literature on financial disclosure, materiality, and investor behavior. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.
{"title":"Auditor Materiality Disclosures and Investor Trust: How to Address Conditional Risks of Disclosure Mandates","authors":"Mackenzie M. Festa, Megan M. Jones, Patrick D. Witz","doi":"10.2308/bria-2023-010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/bria-2023-010","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This study contributes to the literature examining the benefits and costs associated with auditor quantitative materiality disclosures. We conduct an experiment to examine a conditional risk associated with such disclosures: that investors with heightened concerns about earnings management, a qualitative concern, will anchor too strongly to the quantitative threshold and lose trust in the audit. The experiment manipulates (1) whether investor concerns about earnings management are low or high and (2) whether auditors provide a quantitative materiality disclosure. We find that quantitative materiality disclosures mislead investors when they have high concerns about earnings management. Specifically, investors lose trust in the auditor’s ability to identify errors that are quantitatively small, but important from a qualitative perspective. A second experiment further suggests that auditors’ provision of detailed, rather than nominal, qualitative materiality disclosures can mitigate this conditional risk. Our study contributes to practice and literature on financial disclosure, materiality, and investor behavior. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136129423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. Kip Holderness, Kari Joseph Olsen, Todd A. Thornock
ABSTRACT Managers often encourage employee effort by incentivizing employees to achieve performance targets. This paper examines the effect of employee effort on counterproductive work behaviors when those employees ultimately fail to meet specified performance targets. We conduct an experiment in which participants receive a bonus for meeting a challenging performance target in a real-effort task. We find that for individuals who fail to meet the performance target, greater effort is correlated with both an increased propensity toward noncompliant behavior and an increase in misreporting. Our results identify potential drawbacks of incentivizing employee effort when that effort may not translate into greater performance outcomes. Data Availability: Data available upon request. JEL Classifications: M40; M41.
{"title":"I’m Working Hard, but It’s Hardly Working: The Consequences of Motivating Employee Effort That Fails to Achieve Performance Targets","authors":"D. Kip Holderness, Kari Joseph Olsen, Todd A. Thornock","doi":"10.2308/bria-2022-035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/bria-2022-035","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Managers often encourage employee effort by incentivizing employees to achieve performance targets. This paper examines the effect of employee effort on counterproductive work behaviors when those employees ultimately fail to meet specified performance targets. We conduct an experiment in which participants receive a bonus for meeting a challenging performance target in a real-effort task. We find that for individuals who fail to meet the performance target, greater effort is correlated with both an increased propensity toward noncompliant behavior and an increase in misreporting. Our results identify potential drawbacks of incentivizing employee effort when that effort may not translate into greater performance outcomes. Data Availability: Data available upon request. JEL Classifications: M40; M41.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135663735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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