A. Rose, Jacob M. Rose, K. Rotaru, Kerri-Ann Sanderson, J. Thibodeau
Two experiments examine the effects of visualizing uncertainty on attention, cognitive arousal, and incorporation of uncertainty information into judgments. The first experiment employs psychophysiological measurements to understand how different presentations of uncertainty information influence decision-making processes. Results indicate that participants attend more to uncertainty information when uncertainty is incorporated directly into a visualization. Pupillometry and eye tracking analyses indicate that participants exhibit greater attention to uncertainty information, fixate more on the bounds of uncertainty, and spend more time examining uncertainty information when uncertainty is visualized, compared to when uncertainty is depicted textually (i.e., not visually). In addition, the decisions of participants who view visualizations directly depicting uncertainty better integrate the level of uncertainty in the underlying data. The second experiment reveals that experienced auditors are more likely to appropriately use uncertainty information when it is visualized.
{"title":"Effects of Uncertainty Visualization on Attention, Arousal and Judgment","authors":"A. Rose, Jacob M. Rose, K. Rotaru, Kerri-Ann Sanderson, J. Thibodeau","doi":"10.2308/bria-2021-011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/bria-2021-011","url":null,"abstract":"Two experiments examine the effects of visualizing uncertainty on attention, cognitive arousal, and incorporation of uncertainty information into judgments. The first experiment employs psychophysiological measurements to understand how different presentations of uncertainty information influence decision-making processes. Results indicate that participants attend more to uncertainty information when uncertainty is incorporated directly into a visualization. Pupillometry and eye tracking analyses indicate that participants exhibit greater attention to uncertainty information, fixate more on the bounds of uncertainty, and spend more time examining uncertainty information when uncertainty is visualized, compared to when uncertainty is depicted textually (i.e., not visually). In addition, the decisions of participants who view visualizations directly depicting uncertainty better integrate the level of uncertainty in the underlying data. The second experiment reveals that experienced auditors are more likely to appropriately use uncertainty information when it is visualized.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47644556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Prior research has found evidence that country factors and management styles influence earnings management decisions in various geographic locations. Extending this research, we utilize an experimental setting to isolate the effect of geographic distance on the willingness to manage earnings in a near/distant location. In an initial experiment, we find less acceptable earnings management methods generate greater concerns about the method (ethicality and riskiness) leading to less willingness to manage earnings. Yet, greater geographic distance between the decisionmaker and reporting location attenuates these concerns, resulting in increased willingness to use a less acceptable method. In contrast, individuals are willing to use a more acceptable method to manage earnings regardless of geographic distance. These findings are consistent with construal level theory (CLT) and are corroborated in a second experiment where we find that greater geographic distance reduces managers’ focus on the means of earnings management, thereby reducing concerns about the method.
{"title":"The Effect of Geographic Distance on Earnings Management Decisions","authors":"M. Hayes, Michael J. Mowchan","doi":"10.2308/bria-2021-003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/bria-2021-003","url":null,"abstract":"Prior research has found evidence that country factors and management styles influence earnings management decisions in various geographic locations. Extending this research, we utilize an experimental setting to isolate the effect of geographic distance on the willingness to manage earnings in a near/distant location. In an initial experiment, we find less acceptable earnings management methods generate greater concerns about the method (ethicality and riskiness) leading to less willingness to manage earnings. Yet, greater geographic distance between the decisionmaker and reporting location attenuates these concerns, resulting in increased willingness to use a less acceptable method. In contrast, individuals are willing to use a more acceptable method to manage earnings regardless of geographic distance. These findings are consistent with construal level theory (CLT) and are corroborated in a second experiment where we find that greater geographic distance reduces managers’ focus on the means of earnings management, thereby reducing concerns about the method.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48292063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines the effects of using the internal audit function as a management training ground (MTG) and fraud magnitude on internal fraud reporting decisions. Two experiments examine (1) internal auditors’ reporting behaviors, and (2) other employees’ willingness to report directly to internal audit. In the first experiment, experienced internal auditors indicate that the use of internal audit as a MTG may negatively impact fraud reporting likelihood by internal auditors to the Chief Audit Executive (CAE). Further, using the internal audit function as a MTG inhibits the sense of urgency internal auditors feel to report large fraudulent acts. The second experiment compares management accountants’ preferences for reporting to an anonymous third-party hotline versus reporting directly to internal audit. The results indicate a preference for the hotline that increases with a MTG. This preference is fully mediated by the perceived trustworthiness of internal audit, which is negatively impacted by a MTG.
{"title":"Fraud Reporting within an Organization and the Use of the Internal Audit Function as a Training Ground for Management","authors":"Alisa G. Brink, C. Eller, Karen Y. Green","doi":"10.2308/bria-2020-015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/bria-2020-015","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the effects of using the internal audit function as a management training ground (MTG) and fraud magnitude on internal fraud reporting decisions. Two experiments examine (1) internal auditors’ reporting behaviors, and (2) other employees’ willingness to report directly to internal audit. In the first experiment, experienced internal auditors indicate that the use of internal audit as a MTG may negatively impact fraud reporting likelihood by internal auditors to the Chief Audit Executive (CAE). Further, using the internal audit function as a MTG inhibits the sense of urgency internal auditors feel to report large fraudulent acts. The second experiment compares management accountants’ preferences for reporting to an anonymous third-party hotline versus reporting directly to internal audit. The results indicate a preference for the hotline that increases with a MTG. This preference is fully mediated by the perceived trustworthiness of internal audit, which is negatively impacted by a MTG.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46617729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I examine how the subjectivity of task criteria influences auditors' ordering and performance of audit tasks under time pressure. Tasks with more objective criteria provide little flexibility in how well they can be completed (i.e., they are either performed correctly or incorrectly). On the other hand, tasks with more subjective criteria have a wider range of performance levels that satisfy the "letter" of the criteria, but not necessarily the "spirit." I predict and find that auditors tend to work on a task with more objective criteria before a task with more subjective criteria. As time pressure increases, auditors ordering their tasks this way reduce performance on the subjective task, but not the objective task. By decreasing performance on tasks with more subjective criteria, auditors can address all the criteria for both tasks if only in letter, rather than in spirit.
{"title":"How Do Auditors Order Their Tasks, and How Does Task Ordering Affect Performance Under Time Pressure?","authors":"Robert P. Mocadlo","doi":"10.2308/bria-19-039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/bria-19-039","url":null,"abstract":"I examine how the subjectivity of task criteria influences auditors' ordering and performance of audit tasks under time pressure. Tasks with more objective criteria provide little flexibility in how well they can be completed (i.e., they are either performed correctly or incorrectly). On the other hand, tasks with more subjective criteria have a wider range of performance levels that satisfy the \"letter\" of the criteria, but not necessarily the \"spirit.\" I predict and find that auditors tend to work on a task with more objective criteria before a task with more subjective criteria. As time pressure increases, auditors ordering their tasks this way reduce performance on the subjective task, but not the objective task. By decreasing performance on tasks with more subjective criteria, auditors can address all the criteria for both tasks if only in letter, rather than in spirit.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41730493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Prior research finds that trait skepticism influences auditors’ judgments but that situational variables may interact with trait skepticism. We examine whether ego depletion, an exhaustion of individuals’ self-control resources which limits one’s ability to vigilantly process information and apply critical thinking, moderates the relationship between trait skepticism and auditor judgment. We contend that when not depleted auditors’ trait skepticism will influence judgment; conversely, when depleted, auditors’ trait skepticism will not influence auditors’ judgments due to a lack of necessary cognitive resources to vigilantly process information. Depleted auditors are expected to adopt a less cognitively demanding strategy and simply make more skeptical judgments, as they expect this is the more acceptable, safer judgment when accountable. Results from an experiment involving a risk assessment task support our expectations: when not depleted, auditors’ judgments are in-line with their trait skepticism but, when depleted, auditors make more skeptical judgments regardless of their trait skepticism.
{"title":"The Impact of Trait Skepticism and Ego Depletion on Auditor Judgment","authors":"Amy M. Donnelly, S. Kaplan, Jeremy M. Vinson","doi":"10.2308/BRIA-2020-011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/BRIA-2020-011","url":null,"abstract":"Prior research finds that trait skepticism influences auditors’ judgments but that situational variables may interact with trait skepticism. We examine whether ego depletion, an exhaustion of individuals’ self-control resources which limits one’s ability to vigilantly process information and apply critical thinking, moderates the relationship between trait skepticism and auditor judgment. We contend that when not depleted auditors’ trait skepticism will influence judgment; conversely, when depleted, auditors’ trait skepticism will not influence auditors’ judgments due to a lack of necessary cognitive resources to vigilantly process information. Depleted auditors are expected to adopt a less cognitively demanding strategy and simply make more skeptical judgments, as they expect this is the more acceptable, safer judgment when accountable. Results from an experiment involving a risk assessment task support our expectations: when not depleted, auditors’ judgments are in-line with their trait skepticism but, when depleted, auditors make more skeptical judgments regardless of their trait skepticism.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48355554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Donna D. Bobek, Laura N. Feustel, Scott D. Vandervelde
The audit of the financial statement income tax accounts is ultimately the responsibility of the audit engagement team; however, tax professionals are often involved because of their knowledge of the tax functional area. Auditors are expected to exercise professional skepticism and independence when performing audits, while tax professionals are expected to be advocates for their tax clients. This study investigates whether the auditor and/or tax professionals’ typical role influences how they evaluate evidence on an audit engagement, especially when provided evidence by individuals with whom they are closely affiliated. The results of an experiment with experienced auditors and tax professionals, suggest that despite differing in their trait skepticism and client advocacy attitudes, tax professionals and auditors make similar judgments when in the role of an audit engagement team member. We also find evidence both auditors and tax professionals are more persuaded by individuals with whom they have a closer affiliation.
{"title":"Do Tax Professionals Act Like Auditors when Evaluating Tax-Related Audit Evidence?","authors":"Donna D. Bobek, Laura N. Feustel, Scott D. Vandervelde","doi":"10.2308/BRIA-2020-013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/BRIA-2020-013","url":null,"abstract":"The audit of the financial statement income tax accounts is ultimately the responsibility of the audit engagement team; however, tax professionals are often involved because of their knowledge of the tax functional area. Auditors are expected to exercise professional skepticism and independence when performing audits, while tax professionals are expected to be advocates for their tax clients. This study investigates whether the auditor and/or tax professionals’ typical role influences how they evaluate evidence on an audit engagement, especially when provided evidence by individuals with whom they are closely affiliated. The results of an experiment with experienced auditors and tax professionals, suggest that despite differing in their trait skepticism and client advocacy attitudes, tax professionals and auditors make similar judgments when in the role of an audit engagement team member. We also find evidence both auditors and tax professionals are more persuaded by individuals with whom they have a closer affiliation.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46853801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When a company internally suspects material fraud, it faces difficult choices. It can choose to investigate internally or engage an external specialist. Additionally, it can choose to disclose the investigation or take the risk that the investigation is leaked to the public. I analyze whether the choice to engage an external specialist, rather than investigate internally, changes investors’ willingness to invest in the company. I argue that, when engaging external specialists, disclosure choices matter. Conceptualizing the engagement of external specialists as an external credibility signal, I hypothesize that, when engaging external specialists, self-disclosure increases investors’ willingness to invest compared to when the press reveals the investigation. Results from a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment with 128 non-professional investors support my hypothesis. This suggests that aligning a signal of credible investigation efforts with forthcoming disclosure could be beneficial. Hence, companies conducting genuine investigations could benefit from resisting temptation of non-disclosure.
{"title":"Private Investigations and Self-Disclosure of Suspected Fraud: Experimental Evidence on Forensic Accounting Services","authors":"C. Friedrich","doi":"10.2308/BRIA-2020-045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/BRIA-2020-045","url":null,"abstract":"When a company internally suspects material fraud, it faces difficult choices. It can choose to investigate internally or engage an external specialist. Additionally, it can choose to disclose the investigation or take the risk that the investigation is leaked to the public. I analyze whether the choice to engage an external specialist, rather than investigate internally, changes investors’ willingness to invest in the company. I argue that, when engaging external specialists, disclosure choices matter. Conceptualizing the engagement of external specialists as an external credibility signal, I hypothesize that, when engaging external specialists, self-disclosure increases investors’ willingness to invest compared to when the press reveals the investigation. Results from a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment with 128 non-professional investors support my hypothesis. This suggests that aligning a signal of credible investigation efforts with forthcoming disclosure could be beneficial. Hence, companies conducting genuine investigations could benefit from resisting temptation of non-disclosure.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43389509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study whether investor mood affects non-professional investors' judgments of the reliability of fair value estimates. In two experiments, we find that investor mood, which is a factor that is unrelated to the assessment of reliability across the fair value hierarchy, is associated with differences in the extent to which Level 1 fair values are perceived to be more reliable than Level 3 fair values. As mood becomes more positive, investors perceive greater differences in the extent to which Level 1 fair values are more reliable than Level 3 fair values. Importantly, we find that including brief definitions in the headings under which fair values are reported reduces the influence of mood over perceptions of reliability, and likely improves the effectiveness of fair value disclosures.
{"title":"Non-Professional Investors' Judgments of the Reliability of Fair Value Estimates - The impact of Investor Mood","authors":"Wei Chen, Noel Harding, Wen He","doi":"10.2308/BRIA-19-035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/BRIA-19-035","url":null,"abstract":"We study whether investor mood affects non-professional investors' judgments of the reliability of fair value estimates. In two experiments, we find that investor mood, which is a factor that is unrelated to the assessment of reliability across the fair value hierarchy, is associated with differences in the extent to which Level 1 fair values are perceived to be more reliable than Level 3 fair values. As mood becomes more positive, investors perceive greater differences in the extent to which Level 1 fair values are more reliable than Level 3 fair values. Importantly, we find that including brief definitions in the headings under which fair values are reported reduces the influence of mood over perceptions of reliability, and likely improves the effectiveness of fair value disclosures.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41695502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Slapničar, Mina Ličen, F. Hartmann, Anka Slana Ozimič, G. Repovš
Research shows that management accountants’ role to support business unit managers’ decision-making may cause them to succumb to managers’ pressures to misreport. Using electroencephalographic (EEG) evidence, Eskenazi, Hartmann and Rietdijk (2016) demonstrate the role of automatic emotional mimicry, which drives misreporting when managers’ personal interest is at stake, but not when BU interest is at stake. In this study, we aim to replicate this finding using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which enables us to separate affective from cognitive empathy. Thirty accounting professionals completed an emotion observation task during which empathy-related brain activity was recorded. We then explored accountants’ inclination to misreport using empathy-invoking accounting scenarios. We find that the inclination to misreport correlates with activation of cognitive empathy regions, but only for scenarios in which accountants misreport to serve business unit’s interests, rather than managers’ personal interests. We find no evidence for a role of affective empathy.
{"title":"Management Accountants’ Empathy and Their Violation of Fiduciary Duties: a Replication and Extension Study Using fMRI","authors":"S. Slapničar, Mina Ličen, F. Hartmann, Anka Slana Ozimič, G. Repovš","doi":"10.2308/BRIA-2020-021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/BRIA-2020-021","url":null,"abstract":"Research shows that management accountants’ role to support business unit managers’ decision-making may cause them to succumb to managers’ pressures to misreport. Using electroencephalographic (EEG) evidence, Eskenazi, Hartmann and Rietdijk (2016) demonstrate the role of automatic emotional mimicry, which drives misreporting when managers’ personal interest is at stake, but not when BU interest is at stake. In this study, we aim to replicate this finding using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which enables us to separate affective from cognitive empathy. Thirty accounting professionals completed an emotion observation task during which empathy-related brain activity was recorded. We then explored accountants’ inclination to misreport using empathy-invoking accounting scenarios. We find that the inclination to misreport correlates with activation of cognitive empathy regions, but only for scenarios in which accountants misreport to serve business unit’s interests, rather than managers’ personal interests. We find no evidence for a role of affective empathy.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48676886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study aims to enhance our understanding of the practice of risk management, and specifically how corporate boards fulfill their responsibilities regarding risk oversight. We draw on a theoretical perspective centered on (dis)comfort and 25 interviews with corporate board members and risk management consultants in Canada to present a view of risk management as a set of activities characterized by tension between actions that engender the feeling of discomfort, and a quest for comfort and reassurance. Our findings provide insights that show how, alongside the functionalist underpinnings, comfort-seeking represents a pervasive imperative that profoundly shapes risk management in action.
{"title":"MAKING SENSE OF RISK MANAGEMENT AS A (DIS)COMFORT-INDUCING PRACTICE","authors":"Y. Gendron, Anna Samsonova-Taddei, H. Guénin","doi":"10.2308/bria-18-016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/bria-18-016","url":null,"abstract":"This study aims to enhance our understanding of the practice of risk management, and specifically how corporate boards fulfill their responsibilities regarding risk oversight. We draw on a theoretical perspective centered on (dis)comfort and 25 interviews with corporate board members and risk management consultants in Canada to present a view of risk management as a set of activities characterized by tension between actions that engender the feeling of discomfort, and a quest for comfort and reassurance. Our findings provide insights that show how, alongside the functionalist underpinnings, comfort-seeking represents a pervasive imperative that profoundly shapes risk management in action.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2020-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45098566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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