I examine how the subjectivity of task criteria influences auditors' ordering and performance of audit tasks under time pressure. Tasks with more objective criteria provide little flexibility in how well they can be completed (i.e., they are either performed correctly or incorrectly). On the other hand, tasks with more subjective criteria have a wider range of performance levels that satisfy the "letter" of the criteria, but not necessarily the "spirit." I predict and find that auditors tend to work on a task with more objective criteria before a task with more subjective criteria. As time pressure increases, auditors ordering their tasks this way reduce performance on the subjective task, but not the objective task. By decreasing performance on tasks with more subjective criteria, auditors can address all the criteria for both tasks if only in letter, rather than in spirit.
{"title":"How Do Auditors Order Their Tasks, and How Does Task Ordering Affect Performance Under Time Pressure?","authors":"Robert P. Mocadlo","doi":"10.2308/bria-19-039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/bria-19-039","url":null,"abstract":"I examine how the subjectivity of task criteria influences auditors' ordering and performance of audit tasks under time pressure. Tasks with more objective criteria provide little flexibility in how well they can be completed (i.e., they are either performed correctly or incorrectly). On the other hand, tasks with more subjective criteria have a wider range of performance levels that satisfy the \"letter\" of the criteria, but not necessarily the \"spirit.\" I predict and find that auditors tend to work on a task with more objective criteria before a task with more subjective criteria. As time pressure increases, auditors ordering their tasks this way reduce performance on the subjective task, but not the objective task. By decreasing performance on tasks with more subjective criteria, auditors can address all the criteria for both tasks if only in letter, rather than in spirit.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41730493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Prior research finds that trait skepticism influences auditors’ judgments but that situational variables may interact with trait skepticism. We examine whether ego depletion, an exhaustion of individuals’ self-control resources which limits one’s ability to vigilantly process information and apply critical thinking, moderates the relationship between trait skepticism and auditor judgment. We contend that when not depleted auditors’ trait skepticism will influence judgment; conversely, when depleted, auditors’ trait skepticism will not influence auditors’ judgments due to a lack of necessary cognitive resources to vigilantly process information. Depleted auditors are expected to adopt a less cognitively demanding strategy and simply make more skeptical judgments, as they expect this is the more acceptable, safer judgment when accountable. Results from an experiment involving a risk assessment task support our expectations: when not depleted, auditors’ judgments are in-line with their trait skepticism but, when depleted, auditors make more skeptical judgments regardless of their trait skepticism.
{"title":"The Impact of Trait Skepticism and Ego Depletion on Auditor Judgment","authors":"Amy M. Donnelly, S. Kaplan, Jeremy M. Vinson","doi":"10.2308/BRIA-2020-011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/BRIA-2020-011","url":null,"abstract":"Prior research finds that trait skepticism influences auditors’ judgments but that situational variables may interact with trait skepticism. We examine whether ego depletion, an exhaustion of individuals’ self-control resources which limits one’s ability to vigilantly process information and apply critical thinking, moderates the relationship between trait skepticism and auditor judgment. We contend that when not depleted auditors’ trait skepticism will influence judgment; conversely, when depleted, auditors’ trait skepticism will not influence auditors’ judgments due to a lack of necessary cognitive resources to vigilantly process information. Depleted auditors are expected to adopt a less cognitively demanding strategy and simply make more skeptical judgments, as they expect this is the more acceptable, safer judgment when accountable. Results from an experiment involving a risk assessment task support our expectations: when not depleted, auditors’ judgments are in-line with their trait skepticism but, when depleted, auditors make more skeptical judgments regardless of their trait skepticism.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48355554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Donna D. Bobek, Laura N. Feustel, Scott D. Vandervelde
The audit of the financial statement income tax accounts is ultimately the responsibility of the audit engagement team; however, tax professionals are often involved because of their knowledge of the tax functional area. Auditors are expected to exercise professional skepticism and independence when performing audits, while tax professionals are expected to be advocates for their tax clients. This study investigates whether the auditor and/or tax professionals’ typical role influences how they evaluate evidence on an audit engagement, especially when provided evidence by individuals with whom they are closely affiliated. The results of an experiment with experienced auditors and tax professionals, suggest that despite differing in their trait skepticism and client advocacy attitudes, tax professionals and auditors make similar judgments when in the role of an audit engagement team member. We also find evidence both auditors and tax professionals are more persuaded by individuals with whom they have a closer affiliation.
{"title":"Do Tax Professionals Act Like Auditors when Evaluating Tax-Related Audit Evidence?","authors":"Donna D. Bobek, Laura N. Feustel, Scott D. Vandervelde","doi":"10.2308/BRIA-2020-013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/BRIA-2020-013","url":null,"abstract":"The audit of the financial statement income tax accounts is ultimately the responsibility of the audit engagement team; however, tax professionals are often involved because of their knowledge of the tax functional area. Auditors are expected to exercise professional skepticism and independence when performing audits, while tax professionals are expected to be advocates for their tax clients. This study investigates whether the auditor and/or tax professionals’ typical role influences how they evaluate evidence on an audit engagement, especially when provided evidence by individuals with whom they are closely affiliated. The results of an experiment with experienced auditors and tax professionals, suggest that despite differing in their trait skepticism and client advocacy attitudes, tax professionals and auditors make similar judgments when in the role of an audit engagement team member. We also find evidence both auditors and tax professionals are more persuaded by individuals with whom they have a closer affiliation.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46853801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When a company internally suspects material fraud, it faces difficult choices. It can choose to investigate internally or engage an external specialist. Additionally, it can choose to disclose the investigation or take the risk that the investigation is leaked to the public. I analyze whether the choice to engage an external specialist, rather than investigate internally, changes investors’ willingness to invest in the company. I argue that, when engaging external specialists, disclosure choices matter. Conceptualizing the engagement of external specialists as an external credibility signal, I hypothesize that, when engaging external specialists, self-disclosure increases investors’ willingness to invest compared to when the press reveals the investigation. Results from a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment with 128 non-professional investors support my hypothesis. This suggests that aligning a signal of credible investigation efforts with forthcoming disclosure could be beneficial. Hence, companies conducting genuine investigations could benefit from resisting temptation of non-disclosure.
{"title":"Private Investigations and Self-Disclosure of Suspected Fraud: Experimental Evidence on Forensic Accounting Services","authors":"C. Friedrich","doi":"10.2308/BRIA-2020-045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/BRIA-2020-045","url":null,"abstract":"When a company internally suspects material fraud, it faces difficult choices. It can choose to investigate internally or engage an external specialist. Additionally, it can choose to disclose the investigation or take the risk that the investigation is leaked to the public. I analyze whether the choice to engage an external specialist, rather than investigate internally, changes investors’ willingness to invest in the company. I argue that, when engaging external specialists, disclosure choices matter. Conceptualizing the engagement of external specialists as an external credibility signal, I hypothesize that, when engaging external specialists, self-disclosure increases investors’ willingness to invest compared to when the press reveals the investigation. Results from a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment with 128 non-professional investors support my hypothesis. This suggests that aligning a signal of credible investigation efforts with forthcoming disclosure could be beneficial. Hence, companies conducting genuine investigations could benefit from resisting temptation of non-disclosure.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43389509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study whether investor mood affects non-professional investors' judgments of the reliability of fair value estimates. In two experiments, we find that investor mood, which is a factor that is unrelated to the assessment of reliability across the fair value hierarchy, is associated with differences in the extent to which Level 1 fair values are perceived to be more reliable than Level 3 fair values. As mood becomes more positive, investors perceive greater differences in the extent to which Level 1 fair values are more reliable than Level 3 fair values. Importantly, we find that including brief definitions in the headings under which fair values are reported reduces the influence of mood over perceptions of reliability, and likely improves the effectiveness of fair value disclosures.
{"title":"Non-Professional Investors' Judgments of the Reliability of Fair Value Estimates - The impact of Investor Mood","authors":"Wei Chen, Noel Harding, Wen He","doi":"10.2308/BRIA-19-035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/BRIA-19-035","url":null,"abstract":"We study whether investor mood affects non-professional investors' judgments of the reliability of fair value estimates. In two experiments, we find that investor mood, which is a factor that is unrelated to the assessment of reliability across the fair value hierarchy, is associated with differences in the extent to which Level 1 fair values are perceived to be more reliable than Level 3 fair values. As mood becomes more positive, investors perceive greater differences in the extent to which Level 1 fair values are more reliable than Level 3 fair values. Importantly, we find that including brief definitions in the headings under which fair values are reported reduces the influence of mood over perceptions of reliability, and likely improves the effectiveness of fair value disclosures.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41695502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Slapničar, Mina Ličen, F. Hartmann, Anka Slana Ozimič, G. Repovš
Research shows that management accountants’ role to support business unit managers’ decision-making may cause them to succumb to managers’ pressures to misreport. Using electroencephalographic (EEG) evidence, Eskenazi, Hartmann and Rietdijk (2016) demonstrate the role of automatic emotional mimicry, which drives misreporting when managers’ personal interest is at stake, but not when BU interest is at stake. In this study, we aim to replicate this finding using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which enables us to separate affective from cognitive empathy. Thirty accounting professionals completed an emotion observation task during which empathy-related brain activity was recorded. We then explored accountants’ inclination to misreport using empathy-invoking accounting scenarios. We find that the inclination to misreport correlates with activation of cognitive empathy regions, but only for scenarios in which accountants misreport to serve business unit’s interests, rather than managers’ personal interests. We find no evidence for a role of affective empathy.
{"title":"Management Accountants’ Empathy and Their Violation of Fiduciary Duties: a Replication and Extension Study Using fMRI","authors":"S. Slapničar, Mina Ličen, F. Hartmann, Anka Slana Ozimič, G. Repovš","doi":"10.2308/BRIA-2020-021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/BRIA-2020-021","url":null,"abstract":"Research shows that management accountants’ role to support business unit managers’ decision-making may cause them to succumb to managers’ pressures to misreport. Using electroencephalographic (EEG) evidence, Eskenazi, Hartmann and Rietdijk (2016) demonstrate the role of automatic emotional mimicry, which drives misreporting when managers’ personal interest is at stake, but not when BU interest is at stake. In this study, we aim to replicate this finding using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which enables us to separate affective from cognitive empathy. Thirty accounting professionals completed an emotion observation task during which empathy-related brain activity was recorded. We then explored accountants’ inclination to misreport using empathy-invoking accounting scenarios. We find that the inclination to misreport correlates with activation of cognitive empathy regions, but only for scenarios in which accountants misreport to serve business unit’s interests, rather than managers’ personal interests. We find no evidence for a role of affective empathy.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48676886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study aims to enhance our understanding of the practice of risk management, and specifically how corporate boards fulfill their responsibilities regarding risk oversight. We draw on a theoretical perspective centered on (dis)comfort and 25 interviews with corporate board members and risk management consultants in Canada to present a view of risk management as a set of activities characterized by tension between actions that engender the feeling of discomfort, and a quest for comfort and reassurance. Our findings provide insights that show how, alongside the functionalist underpinnings, comfort-seeking represents a pervasive imperative that profoundly shapes risk management in action.
{"title":"MAKING SENSE OF RISK MANAGEMENT AS A (DIS)COMFORT-INDUCING PRACTICE","authors":"Y. Gendron, Anna Samsonova-Taddei, H. Guénin","doi":"10.2308/bria-18-016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/bria-18-016","url":null,"abstract":"This study aims to enhance our understanding of the practice of risk management, and specifically how corporate boards fulfill their responsibilities regarding risk oversight. We draw on a theoretical perspective centered on (dis)comfort and 25 interviews with corporate board members and risk management consultants in Canada to present a view of risk management as a set of activities characterized by tension between actions that engender the feeling of discomfort, and a quest for comfort and reassurance. Our findings provide insights that show how, alongside the functionalist underpinnings, comfort-seeking represents a pervasive imperative that profoundly shapes risk management in action.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2020-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45098566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J. Boritz, Natalia V. Kochetova, Linda A. Robinson, Christopher Wong
With the greater spotlight on the quality of auditing in the context of increasing complexity of accounting, auditors are more frequently seeking the assistance of specialists from such fields as tax, information technology, valuation, and forensic accounting. This interview-based study of 40 practitioners from Big 4 2 firms - 18 auditors (partners, managers, seniors) and 22 specialists (tax, IT, valuation, and forensic) - examines auditors’ and specialists’ views about the current state of specialist use, sources of conflict, auditors’ overconfidence in their ability to perform specialist work, firm policies, and future expectations about utilization of specialist services.
{"title":"Auditors’ and Specialists’ Views about the Use of Specialists during an Audit*","authors":"J. Boritz, Natalia V. Kochetova, Linda A. Robinson, Christopher Wong","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2379424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2379424","url":null,"abstract":"With the greater spotlight on the quality of auditing in the context of increasing complexity of accounting, auditors are more frequently seeking the assistance of specialists from such fields as tax, information technology, valuation, and forensic accounting. This interview-based study of 40 practitioners from Big 4 2 firms - 18 auditors (partners, managers, seniors) and 22 specialists (tax, IT, valuation, and forensic) - examines auditors’ and specialists’ views about the current state of specialist use, sources of conflict, auditors’ overconfidence in their ability to perform specialist work, firm policies, and future expectations about utilization of specialist services.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45699328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Kaplan, Danny Lanier, K. Pope, Janet A. Samuels
Whistleblowing reports, if properly investigated, facilitate the early detection of fraud. Although critical, investigation-related decisions represent a relatively underexplored component of the whistleblowing process. Investigators are responsible for initially deciding whether to follow-up on reports alleging fraud. We report the results of an experimental study examining the follow-up intentions of highly experienced healthcare investigators. Participants, in the role of an insurance investigator, are asked to review a whistleblowing report alleging billing fraud occurring at a medical provider. Thus, participants are serving as external investigators. In a between-participant design, we manipulate the report type and whether the caller previously confronted the wrongdoer. We find that compared to an anonymous report, a non-anonymous report is perceived as more credible and follow-up intentions stronger. We also find that perceived credibility fully mediates the relationship between report type and follow-up intentions. Previous confrontation is not significantly associated with either perceived credibility or follow-up intentions. Data Availability: Data are available upon request.
{"title":"External Investigators' Follow-Up Intentions When Whistleblowers Report Healthcare Fraud: The Effects of Report Anonymity and Previous Confrontation","authors":"S. Kaplan, Danny Lanier, K. Pope, Janet A. Samuels","doi":"10.2308/bria-19-042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/bria-19-042","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Whistleblowing reports, if properly investigated, facilitate the early detection of fraud. Although critical, investigation-related decisions represent a relatively underexplored component of the whistleblowing process. Investigators are responsible for initially deciding whether to follow-up on reports alleging fraud. We report the results of an experimental study examining the follow-up intentions of highly experienced healthcare investigators. Participants, in the role of an insurance investigator, are asked to review a whistleblowing report alleging billing fraud occurring at a medical provider. Thus, participants are serving as external investigators. In a between-participant design, we manipulate the report type and whether the caller previously confronted the wrongdoer. We find that compared to an anonymous report, a non-anonymous report is perceived as more credible and follow-up intentions stronger. We also find that perceived credibility fully mediates the relationship between report type and follow-up intentions. Previous confrontation is not significantly associated with either perceived credibility or follow-up intentions.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available upon request.","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46366217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sanaz Aghazadeh, Andrew M. Collins, Chad M. Stefaniak
Accounting estimates are highly subjective and multiple estimation alternatives often exist for a single account. When addressing audit-related adjustments with clients, auditors must decide whethe...
{"title":"The Effects of Client Status and the Auditor's Presentation of Multiple Estimation Alternatives on Client Financial Reporting Aggressiveness","authors":"Sanaz Aghazadeh, Andrew M. Collins, Chad M. Stefaniak","doi":"10.2308/bria-19-025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/bria-19-025","url":null,"abstract":"Accounting estimates are highly subjective and multiple estimation alternatives often exist for a single account. When addressing audit-related adjustments with clients, auditors must decide whethe...","PeriodicalId":46356,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral Research in Accounting","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42912952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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