{"title":"Learning from the Field","authors":"S. Young","doi":"10.2308/jmar-10754","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-10754","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43835629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Top management team (TMT) members have been shown to influence tax avoidance; however, prior literature has not identified whether the intrapersonal diversity of TMT functional backgrounds leads to higher levels of tax avoidance. To study this relationship, we utilize TMT intrapersonal functional diversity, which captures the average heterogeneity of the TMT members' work experience. The skills associated with intrapersonal functional diversity may allow managers to better understand and communicate with various parties related to firm tax policies, thereby facilitating tax avoidance. Overall, we find that TMTs with higher levels of intrapersonal functional diversity achieve lower cash effective tax rates and that these TMTs do not rely on tax strategies that pose high risk.
{"title":"Top Management Team Intrapersonal Functional Diversity and Tax Avoidance","authors":"James M. Plečnik, Shannon Wang","doi":"10.2308/jmar-19-058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-19-058","url":null,"abstract":"Top management team (TMT) members have been shown to influence tax avoidance; however, prior literature has not identified whether the intrapersonal diversity of TMT functional backgrounds leads to higher levels of tax avoidance. To study this relationship, we utilize TMT intrapersonal functional diversity, which captures the average heterogeneity of the TMT members' work experience. The skills associated with intrapersonal functional diversity may allow managers to better understand and communicate with various parties related to firm tax policies, thereby facilitating tax avoidance. Overall, we find that TMTs with higher levels of intrapersonal functional diversity achieve lower cash effective tax rates and that these TMTs do not rely on tax strategies that pose high risk.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47562920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
M. Beasley, N. Goldman, Christina M Lewellen, M. McAllister
Risk oversight by the board of directors is a key component of a firm's enterprise risk management framework, and recently, boards have paid more attention to their firm's tax-planning activities. In this study, we use a hand-collected sample of proxy statement disclosures about the board's role in risk oversight and provide evidence that risk oversight is negatively associated with both tax uncertainty and overall tax burdens. We find that risk oversight is most strongly associated with positions that yield permanent tax benefits and also with less risky tax-planning activities. Overall, the evidence suggests that board risk oversight is associated with more effective tax-planning practices.
{"title":"Board Risk Oversight and Corporate Tax-Planning Practices","authors":"M. Beasley, N. Goldman, Christina M Lewellen, M. McAllister","doi":"10.2308/jmar-19-056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-19-056","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Risk oversight by the board of directors is a key component of a firm's enterprise risk management framework, and recently, boards have paid more attention to their firm's tax-planning activities. In this study, we use a hand-collected sample of proxy statement disclosures about the board's role in risk oversight and provide evidence that risk oversight is negatively associated with both tax uncertainty and overall tax burdens. We find that risk oversight is most strongly associated with positions that yield permanent tax benefits and also with less risky tax-planning activities. Overall, the evidence suggests that board risk oversight is associated with more effective tax-planning practices.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47929756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Employees could respond to impacting a valued, but uncompensated, organizational objective by behaving more or less opportunistically, depending on whether stewardship or justice theory is at play. Stewardship theory implies employees will be less opportunistic due to feeling more psychological ownership over the firm, whereas justice theory implies more opportunism due to feeling unfairly treated. In an experiment with Mechanical Turk participants, we predict and find lower Machiavellians are less opportunistic (on a subsequent budgeting task) when impacting an uncompensated objective, due to elevated psychological ownership. Also as predicted, higher Machiavellians feel less fairly treated when impacting the objective; however, they do not behave more opportunistically. Instead, they are highly opportunistic both when impacting and not impacting the objective. Collectively, our findings suggest that less complete contracts create stewardship benefits for lower Machiavellian employees that translate to less opportunistic behavior, but create a heightened sense of injustice for higher Machiavellians.
{"title":"Incomplete Contracts and Employee Opportunism: How Machiavellianism Moderates the Effects of Impacting an Uncompensated Objective","authors":"Tim Brown, T. Majors, Thomas W. Vance","doi":"10.2308/jmar-18-023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-18-023","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Employees could respond to impacting a valued, but uncompensated, organizational objective by behaving more or less opportunistically, depending on whether stewardship or justice theory is at play. Stewardship theory implies employees will be less opportunistic due to feeling more psychological ownership over the firm, whereas justice theory implies more opportunism due to feeling unfairly treated. In an experiment with Mechanical Turk participants, we predict and find lower Machiavellians are less opportunistic (on a subsequent budgeting task) when impacting an uncompensated objective, due to elevated psychological ownership. Also as predicted, higher Machiavellians feel less fairly treated when impacting the objective; however, they do not behave more opportunistically. Instead, they are highly opportunistic both when impacting and not impacting the objective. Collectively, our findings suggest that less complete contracts create stewardship benefits for lower Machiavellian employees that translate to less opportunistic behavior, but create a heightened sense of injustice for higher Machiavellians.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46490004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine how suppliers' product market competition influences the relation between customer concentration and cost structure. Analyzing cost data from a sample of manufacturing firms, we find that suppliers exhibit more rigid cost structure when both product market competition and customer concentration are high. In further analysis, we find that the effect of competition on the relationship between customer concentration and cost structure is isolated to the COGS and COGM. Our results suggest that suppliers trade off the downside risk of having fixed costs that cannot be reassigned with the potential upside benefit of meeting major customer demands.
{"title":"Suppliers' Product Market Competition, Customer Concentration, and Cost Structure","authors":"Hsihui Chang, C. Hall, Michael T. Paz","doi":"10.2308/jmar-17-070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-17-070","url":null,"abstract":"We examine how suppliers' product market competition influences the relation between customer concentration and cost structure. Analyzing cost data from a sample of manufacturing firms, we find that suppliers exhibit more rigid cost structure when both product market competition and customer concentration are high. In further analysis, we find that the effect of competition on the relationship between customer concentration and cost structure is isolated to the COGS and COGM. Our results suggest that suppliers trade off the downside risk of having fixed costs that cannot be reassigned with the potential upside benefit of meeting major customer demands.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49330440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine whether skilled nursing facilities' (SNFs') cost structures vary based on their Medicaid payment systems: fixed-price (FXP) or cost-plus (C+). FXP systems—which tie payments to patient conditions, rather than costs—increase SNFs' operating risk by decreasing the association between revenues and costs. Results suggest that cost elasticities are greater in SNFs that operate primarily under FXP, with weaker results in non-profit SNFs compared with for-profit SNFs. We conclude that SNFs' cost structures are managed in part based on the operating risk resulting from their payment systems. We also find that, under FXP, managers of for-profit SNFs introduce more variable costs into their cost structures by deploying more contract labor. Finally, we show that greater use of contract labor by for-profit SNFs in FXP settings is concentrated below the registered nurse skill level. For non-profit SNFs, we find no differences in contract labor across payment types. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources indicated in the text.
{"title":"The Effects of Healthcare Payment Systems on Skilled Nursing Facilities' Cost Structure and Human Resource Strategies","authors":"Elizabeth Plummer, William F. Wempe","doi":"10.2308/jmar-19-044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-19-044","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We examine whether skilled nursing facilities' (SNFs') cost structures vary based on their Medicaid payment systems: fixed-price (FXP) or cost-plus (C+). FXP systems—which tie payments to patient conditions, rather than costs—increase SNFs' operating risk by decreasing the association between revenues and costs. Results suggest that cost elasticities are greater in SNFs that operate primarily under FXP, with weaker results in non-profit SNFs compared with for-profit SNFs. We conclude that SNFs' cost structures are managed in part based on the operating risk resulting from their payment systems. We also find that, under FXP, managers of for-profit SNFs introduce more variable costs into their cost structures by deploying more contract labor. Finally, we show that greater use of contract labor by for-profit SNFs in FXP settings is concentrated below the registered nurse skill level. For non-profit SNFs, we find no differences in contract labor across payment types.\u0000 Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources indicated in the text.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44947431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this study, I examine whether supervisors respond to their own preferences in subjective performance evaluation under a forced distribution system (FDS). Using a proprietary, archival dataset in a car dealership, I find that subjective evaluations are higher when longer supervisor-subordinate relationships exist, whereas subjective evaluations are lower when greater supervisor-subordinate age differences exist. The empirical evidence also indicates that subjective evaluations predict promotions and future performance of the employees, implying that the use of subjectivity allows supervisors to incorporate the forward-looking information of employee performance despite its potential biases. This study contributes to the literature by focusing on the performance appraisal based on the FDS and documenting the impact of supervisor incentives on subjective performance evaluation. Data Availability: Data used in this study cannot be made public due to a confidentiality agreement.
{"title":"Subjective Performance Evaluation and Forward-Looking Implications: The Role of Supervisor Incentives","authors":"J. Hao","doi":"10.2308/jmar-19-023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-19-023","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this study, I examine whether supervisors respond to their own preferences in subjective performance evaluation under a forced distribution system (FDS). Using a proprietary, archival dataset in a car dealership, I find that subjective evaluations are higher when longer supervisor-subordinate relationships exist, whereas subjective evaluations are lower when greater supervisor-subordinate age differences exist. The empirical evidence also indicates that subjective evaluations predict promotions and future performance of the employees, implying that the use of subjectivity allows supervisors to incorporate the forward-looking information of employee performance despite its potential biases. This study contributes to the literature by focusing on the performance appraisal based on the FDS and documenting the impact of supervisor incentives on subjective performance evaluation.\u0000 Data Availability: Data used in this study cannot be made public due to a confidentiality agreement.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42720594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Our study examines superiors' allocation decisions for otherwise homogeneous agents facing disparate performance risk (i.e., unequal likelihoods a given amount of effort will translate to an anticipated level of performance). We predict and find that superiors sympathize, through their bonus allocation decisions, with those agents confronted with greater performance risk. However, this behavior changes when superiors are responsible for allocating initial resources between the agents and have task-irrelevant reputational information concerning the agents, such that superiors favor the advantaged agent and give less sympathy to the disadvantaged agent. We provide additional evidence that such favoritism toward the advantaged agent leads to disparity in agents' fairness and satisfaction perceptions. Our results have implications for organizations, given the pervasiveness of discretion in allocation decisions and concerns for fairness, job satisfaction, and their effects on performance.
{"title":"Superiors' Discretionary Allocations when Agents Face Disparate Performance Risk","authors":"Michael Majerczyk, Tyler F. Thomas","doi":"10.2308/jmar-19-040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-19-040","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Our study examines superiors' allocation decisions for otherwise homogeneous agents facing disparate performance risk (i.e., unequal likelihoods a given amount of effort will translate to an anticipated level of performance). We predict and find that superiors sympathize, through their bonus allocation decisions, with those agents confronted with greater performance risk. However, this behavior changes when superiors are responsible for allocating initial resources between the agents and have task-irrelevant reputational information concerning the agents, such that superiors favor the advantaged agent and give less sympathy to the disadvantaged agent. We provide additional evidence that such favoritism toward the advantaged agent leads to disparity in agents' fairness and satisfaction perceptions. Our results have implications for organizations, given the pervasiveness of discretion in allocation decisions and concerns for fairness, job satisfaction, and their effects on performance.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49082516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the effect of employment contract horizon on managers' discretion in financial reporting. During the contract horizon, the board learns about a new CEO's ability from realized firm performance and uses this information to determine whether to renew or terminate the CEO's contract. Economic theory suggests that the informational value of firm performance to the board's learning declines over time as the board's estimate of the CEO's ability becomes more precise; this motivates a CEO to overstate earnings more aggressively during the earlier stage of the contract horizon. Consistently, we find more (less) aggressive earnings overstatement during the earlier (later) stage of the first contract horizon. This finding is stronger for CEOs who have greater concerns over contract termination and CEOs who have greater flexibility to manipulate earnings. Our evidence suggests that the CEO employment contract horizon has a significant impact on managerial discretion in financial reporting. JEL Classification: G34; J41; M40; M41.
{"title":"CEO Employment Contract Horizon and Financial Reporting Discretion","authors":"G. Gong, Juan Wang, Hyun Jung Lee","doi":"10.2308/jmar-16-123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-16-123","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We examine the effect of employment contract horizon on managers' discretion in financial reporting. During the contract horizon, the board learns about a new CEO's ability from realized firm performance and uses this information to determine whether to renew or terminate the CEO's contract. Economic theory suggests that the informational value of firm performance to the board's learning declines over time as the board's estimate of the CEO's ability becomes more precise; this motivates a CEO to overstate earnings more aggressively during the earlier stage of the contract horizon. Consistently, we find more (less) aggressive earnings overstatement during the earlier (later) stage of the first contract horizon. This finding is stronger for CEOs who have greater concerns over contract termination and CEOs who have greater flexibility to manipulate earnings. Our evidence suggests that the CEO employment contract horizon has a significant impact on managerial discretion in financial reporting.\u0000 JEL Classification: G34; J41; M40; M41.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46405479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this study, we investigate how team members' social value orientation (SVO) affects their contributions to a team project when different types of information about other team members' effort is known. Specifically, we examine the team contributions made by proselfs and prosocials after they learn either the input provided or output achieved by other team members. Proselfs subsequently contributed less following input information compared to output information because they can use input information opportunistically to justify their own lower contributions. Conversely, prosocials contributed more after receiving input information compared to output information because they perceive input information as being more psychologically meaningful. Finally, proself teams with output information perform similarly to prosocial teams with either type of information. These findings provide insight into how information about team member contributions and SVO affect individuals' subsequent team contributions, and how output information can help mitigate proselfs' free-riding tendencies and improve team performance.
{"title":"How Incomplete Information of Team Member Contributions Affects Subsequent Contributions: The Moderating Role of Social Value Orientation","authors":"Tyler F. Thomas, Todd A. Thornock","doi":"10.2308/jmar-19-026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-19-026","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, we investigate how team members' social value orientation (SVO) affects their contributions to a team project when different types of information about other team members' effort is known. Specifically, we examine the team contributions made by proselfs and prosocials after they learn either the input provided or output achieved by other team members. Proselfs subsequently contributed less following input information compared to output information because they can use input information opportunistically to justify their own lower contributions. Conversely, prosocials contributed more after receiving input information compared to output information because they perceive input information as being more psychologically meaningful. Finally, proself teams with output information perform similarly to prosocial teams with either type of information. These findings provide insight into how information about team member contributions and SVO affect individuals' subsequent team contributions, and how output information can help mitigate proselfs' free-riding tendencies and improve team performance.","PeriodicalId":46474,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Accounting Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42738449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：