Pub Date : 2021-12-16DOI: 10.1080/1350178X.2021.2010282
Sheila Dow
ABSTRACT Kevin Hoover explores retroduction as a means of theorizing in macro-economics, rather than exclusive reliance on deductivism or inductivism. Retroduction is discussed as involving conceptualization with respect to empirical evidence as a means of identifying causal mechanisms as the basis for theory in the form of mathematical models. It is put forward as a preferred alternative to more fundamental reform of macro-economics, whose justification Hoover dismisses as being ‘ideological’. Yet ideology refers to a position on metaphysics such as Hoover himself sets out in terms of open systems, which would significantly extend the scope for retroduction.
{"title":"A deeper struggle for the soul of economics","authors":"Sheila Dow","doi":"10.1080/1350178X.2021.2010282","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2021.2010282","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 Kevin Hoover explores retroduction as a means of theorizing in macro-economics, rather than exclusive reliance on deductivism or inductivism. Retroduction is discussed as involving conceptualization with respect to empirical evidence as a means of identifying causal mechanisms as the basis for theory in the form of mathematical models. It is put forward as a preferred alternative to more fundamental reform of macro-economics, whose justification Hoover dismisses as being ‘ideological’. Yet ideology refers to a position on metaphysics such as Hoover himself sets out in terms of open systems, which would significantly extend the scope for retroduction.","PeriodicalId":46507,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Methodology","volume":"18 1","pages":"90 - 93"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73985888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-01DOI: 10.1080/1350178X.2021.2010281
K. Hoover
ABSTRACT Critics argued that the 2007–09 financial crisis was failure of macroeconomics, locating its source in the dynamic, stochastic general-equilibrium model and calling for fundamental re-orientation of the field. Critics exaggerated the role of DSGE models in actual policymaking, and DSGE modelers addressed some criticisms within the DSGE framework. But DSGE modelers oversold their success and even claimed that their approach is the sine qua non of competent macroeconomics. The DSGE modelers and their critics renew an old debate over the relative priority of a priori theory and empirical data, classically exemplified in the Measurement without Theory Debate of the 1940s between the Cowles Commission and the National Bureau of Economic Research. The earlier debate is reviewed for its implications for the recent controversy. In adopting the Cowles-Commission position, some DSGE modelers would essentially straight-jacket macroeconomics and undermine economic science and the pursuit of knowledge in an open-minded, yet critical framework.
{"title":"The struggle for the soul of macroeconomics","authors":"K. Hoover","doi":"10.1080/1350178X.2021.2010281","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2021.2010281","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Critics argued that the 2007–09 financial crisis was failure of macroeconomics, locating its source in the dynamic, stochastic general-equilibrium model and calling for fundamental re-orientation of the field. Critics exaggerated the role of DSGE models in actual policymaking, and DSGE modelers addressed some criticisms within the DSGE framework. But DSGE modelers oversold their success and even claimed that their approach is the sine qua non of competent macroeconomics. The DSGE modelers and their critics renew an old debate over the relative priority of a priori theory and empirical data, classically exemplified in the Measurement without Theory Debate of the 1940s between the Cowles Commission and the National Bureau of Economic Research. The earlier debate is reviewed for its implications for the recent controversy. In adopting the Cowles-Commission position, some DSGE modelers would essentially straight-jacket macroeconomics and undermine economic science and the pursuit of knowledge in an open-minded, yet critical framework.","PeriodicalId":46507,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Methodology","volume":"18 1","pages":"80 - 89"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82370792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-25DOI: 10.1080/1350178X.2021.2006998
Aki Lehtinen
ABSTRACT A review of Donald Katzner's book on economic modelling is provided. In addition to characterising the book, I give critical comments on the distinction between primary and secondary assumptions.
{"title":"A review on Katzner’s Models, mathematics and methodology in economic explanation, Cambridge University Press 2018","authors":"Aki Lehtinen","doi":"10.1080/1350178X.2021.2006998","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2021.2006998","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT A review of Donald Katzner's book on economic modelling is provided. In addition to characterising the book, I give critical comments on the distinction between primary and secondary assumptions.","PeriodicalId":46507,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Methodology","volume":"182 1","pages":"105 - 109"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89004909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-24DOI: 10.1080/1350178x.2021.1993308
Geoffrey Brennan, H. Kliemt
Starting from a behavioural-economics critique of standard rational choice theory Sugden seeks to restate the case for classical liberalism. That case has three strands: a refutation of libertarian paternalism; a restatement of standard welfare theorems of economics in terms of opportunity sets; and underlining the role that ‘exchange’ plays in supporting civil liberal society. We explore questions about Sugden’s arguments in connection to all three strands and to relevant pieces of Adam Smith and James Buchanan to which Sugden appeals. Without substantive assumptions Sugden either adopts a view from nowhere or has to implicitly rely on non-negotiable interpersonal respect norms. ARTICLE HISTORY Received 21 July 2021 Accepted 11 October 2021
{"title":"Sugden’s community of advantage","authors":"Geoffrey Brennan, H. Kliemt","doi":"10.1080/1350178x.2021.1993308","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1350178x.2021.1993308","url":null,"abstract":"Starting from a behavioural-economics critique of standard rational choice theory Sugden seeks to restate the case for classical liberalism. That case has three strands: a refutation of libertarian paternalism; a restatement of standard welfare theorems of economics in terms of opportunity sets; and underlining the role that ‘exchange’ plays in supporting civil liberal society. We explore questions about Sugden’s arguments in connection to all three strands and to relevant pieces of Adam Smith and James Buchanan to which Sugden appeals. Without substantive assumptions Sugden either adopts a view from nowhere or has to implicitly rely on non-negotiable interpersonal respect norms. ARTICLE HISTORY Received 21 July 2021 Accepted 11 October 2021","PeriodicalId":46507,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Methodology","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90541400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-11DOI: 10.1080/1350178X.2021.1993307
T. Sargent
ABSTRACT This paper recollects meetings with Robert E. Lucas, Jr. over many years. It describes how, through personal interactions and studying his work, Lucas taught me to think about economics.
{"title":"Learning from Lucas","authors":"T. Sargent","doi":"10.1080/1350178X.2021.1993307","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2021.1993307","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper recollects meetings with Robert E. Lucas, Jr. over many years. It describes how, through personal interactions and studying his work, Lucas taught me to think about economics.","PeriodicalId":46507,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Methodology","volume":"13 1","pages":"17 - 29"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74306235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-08DOI: 10.1080/1350178X.2021.1993306
Peter Galbács
ABSTRACT This introductory paper offers a look into the intellectual and technical progress that led Robert E. Lucas to his seminal paper entitled Expectations and the neutrality of money. It is argued that the neutrality paper applies the capital-theoretic approach of Lucas’s firm microeconomics of the mid-1960s to the representative agent’s labour supply decision. While emphasizing this similarity, the study gives an overview of the steps through which Lucas changed the basic decision problem of adjusting to price changes from a static Marshallian setting into his neo-Walrasian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework. Extensive references to Lucas’s unpublished materials underpin the claims.
本文介绍了罗伯特·e·卢卡斯(Robert E. Lucas)的开创性论文《期望与货币中立性》(Expectations and neutral of money),正是在这些知识和技术进步的推动下,卢卡斯才写出了这篇论文。本文将20世纪60年代中期卢卡斯企业微观经济学的资本理论方法应用于代表性代理人的劳动力供给决策。在强调这种相似性的同时,该研究概述了卢卡斯将调整价格变化的基本决策问题从静态马歇尔设定转变为新瓦尔拉斯动态随机一般均衡框架的步骤。大量引用卢卡斯未发表的材料支持了这一说法。
{"title":"Lucas’s way to his monetary theory of large-scale fluctuations","authors":"Peter Galbács","doi":"10.1080/1350178X.2021.1993306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2021.1993306","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This introductory paper offers a look into the intellectual and technical progress that led Robert E. Lucas to his seminal paper entitled Expectations and the neutrality of money. It is argued that the neutrality paper applies the capital-theoretic approach of Lucas’s firm microeconomics of the mid-1960s to the representative agent’s labour supply decision. While emphasizing this similarity, the study gives an overview of the steps through which Lucas changed the basic decision problem of adjusting to price changes from a static Marshallian setting into his neo-Walrasian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework. Extensive references to Lucas’s unpublished materials underpin the claims.","PeriodicalId":46507,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Methodology","volume":"29 1","pages":"4 - 16"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73958543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-11DOI: 10.1080/1350178X.2021.1985755
Heather Browning, W. Veit
Blaug, M. (1980). The methodology of economics, or, how economists explain. Cambridge University Press. Caldwell, B. (1982). Beyond positivism: Economic methodology in the twentieth century. Allen & Unwin. Cartwright, N. (1999). The dappled world: A study of the boundaries of science. Cambridge University Press. Chao, H.-K. (2003). Milton Friedman and the emergence of the permanent income hypothesis. History of Political Economy, 35(1), 77–104. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-35-1-77 Chao, H.-K. (2007). A structure of the consumption function. Journal of Economic Methodology, 14(2), 227–248. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13501780701394102 De Vroey, M. (2016). A history of macroeconomics from Keynes to Lucas and beyond. Cambridge University Press. Friedman, M. (1956). The quantity theory of money: A restatement. In M. Friedman (Ed.), Studies in the quantity theory of money (pp. 3–21). University of Chicago Press. Friedman, M. (1959). The demand for money: Some theoretical and empirical results. Journal of Political Economy, 67(4), 327–351. https://doi.org/10.1086/258194 Hoover, K. D. (2010). Idealizing reduction: The microfoundations of macroeconomics. Erkenntnis, 73(3), 329–347. https:// doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9235-1 Hoover, K. D. (2015). Reductionism in economics: Intentionality and eschatological justification in the microfoundations of macroeconomics. Philosophy of Science, 82(4), 689–711. https://doi.org/10.1086/682917 Jhun, J. (2021). The case of the consumption function: Structural realism in macroeconomics. In T. D. Lyons & P. Vickers (Eds.), Contemporary scientific realism: The challenge from the history of science (pp. 257–283). Oxford University Press. Lucas, R. E., Jr. (2013a). Collected papers on monetary theory. Harvard University Press. Lucas, R. E., Jr. (2013b/1984). Money in a theory of finance. In M. Gillman (Ed.), Collected papers on monetary theory (pp. 161–192). Harvard University Press. Lucas, R. E., Jr. (2013c/1994). Review of Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A monetary history of the United States, 1867–1960. In M. Gillman (Ed.), Collected papers on monetary theory (pp. 361–374). Harvard University Press. Lucas, R. E., Jr. (2013d/1996). Nobel lecture: Monetary neutrality. In M. Gillman (Ed.), Collected papers on monetary theory (pp. 375–399). Harvard University Press. Lucas, R. E., Jr. (2013e/2004). Keynote address to the 2003 HOPE Conference: My Keynesian education. In M. Gillman (Ed.), Collected papers on monetary theory (pp. 503–516). Harvard University Press. Lucas, R. E., & Rapping, L. A. (1969). Real wages, employment, and inflation. Journal of Political Economy, 77(5), 721–754. https://doi.org/10.1086/259559 Lucas, R. E., Jr., & Stokey, N. L. (2013/1987). Money and interest in a cash-in-advance economy. In M. Gillman (Ed.), Collected papers on monetary theory (pp. 214–242). Harvard University Press. Sargent, T. J. (2015). Robert E. Lucas Jr.’s collected papers on monetary theory. Journal of Economic Literature,
布劳格,M.(1980)。经济学的方法论,或经济学家如何解释。剑桥大学出版社。考德威尔,B.(1982)。超越实证主义:二十世纪的经济方法论。Allen & Unwin。卡特赖特,N.(1999)。斑点世界:对科学边界的研究。剑桥大学出版社。曹国伟,H.-K。(2003)。米尔顿·弗里德曼和永久收入假说的出现。政治经济史,35(1),77-104。https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-35-1-77 Chao, h - k。(2007)。一种消费函数的结构。《经济研究》,14(2),227-248。https:// doi.org/10.1080/13501780701394102 De Vroey, M.(2016)。宏观经济学的历史,从凯恩斯到卢卡斯和超越。剑桥大学出版社。弗里德曼,M.(1956)。货币数量理论:重述。弗里德曼主编,《货币数量理论研究》(第3-21页)。芝加哥大学出版社。弗里德曼,M.(1959)。货币需求:一些理论和实证结果。政治经济研究,2009(4),327-351。https://doi.org/10.1086/258194 Hoover, K. D.(2010)。理想化的还原:宏观经济学的微观基础。中国生物医学工程学报,33(3),329-347。https:// doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9235-1 Hoover, k.d.(2015)。经济学中的还原论:宏观经济学微观基础中的意向性和末世论正当性。科学哲学,2008(4),689-711。https://doi.org/10.1086/682917 Jhun, J.(2021)。消费函数的案例:宏观经济学中的结构现实主义。在t.d. Lyons & P. Vickers(编),当代科学现实主义:来自科学史的挑战(第257-283页)。牛津大学出版社。Lucas, r.e., Jr. (2013a)。收集有关货币理论的论文。哈佛大学出版社。李文杰,李文杰(2013 / 11)。金融理论中的货币。吉尔曼主编,《货币理论论文集》(第161-192页)。哈佛大学出版社。李建军,李建军(2013 /1994)。米尔顿·弗里德曼和安娜·j·施瓦茨:《美国货币史,1867-1960》。吉尔曼主编,《货币理论论文集》(第361-374页)。哈佛大学出版社。[3]李建军,李建军,李建军。诺贝尔奖演讲:货币中性。吉尔曼主编,《货币理论论文集》(第375-399页)。哈佛大学出版社。李建平,李建平(2013 /2004)。2003年希望会议的主题演讲:我的凯恩斯主义教育。在M.吉尔曼(编),《货币理论文集》(第503-516页)。哈佛大学出版社。Lucas, r.e., & Rapping, l.a.(1969)。实际工资,就业和通货膨胀。政治经济研究,2009(5):721-754。https://doi.org/10.1086/259559 Lucas, R. E., Jr.和Stokey, N. L.(2013/1987)。预付现金经济中的金钱和利息。吉尔曼主编,《货币理论论文集》(第214-242页)。哈佛大学出版社。萨金特,t.j.(2015)。小罗伯特·e·卢卡斯关于货币理论的论文集。经济研究,2013(1),44 - 44。https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.53.1.43
{"title":"Does utilitarianism need a rethink? Review of Louis Narens and Brian Skyrms' The Pursuit of Happiness","authors":"Heather Browning, W. Veit","doi":"10.1080/1350178X.2021.1985755","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2021.1985755","url":null,"abstract":"Blaug, M. (1980). The methodology of economics, or, how economists explain. Cambridge University Press. Caldwell, B. (1982). Beyond positivism: Economic methodology in the twentieth century. Allen & Unwin. Cartwright, N. (1999). The dappled world: A study of the boundaries of science. Cambridge University Press. Chao, H.-K. (2003). Milton Friedman and the emergence of the permanent income hypothesis. History of Political Economy, 35(1), 77–104. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-35-1-77 Chao, H.-K. (2007). A structure of the consumption function. Journal of Economic Methodology, 14(2), 227–248. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13501780701394102 De Vroey, M. (2016). A history of macroeconomics from Keynes to Lucas and beyond. Cambridge University Press. Friedman, M. (1956). The quantity theory of money: A restatement. In M. Friedman (Ed.), Studies in the quantity theory of money (pp. 3–21). University of Chicago Press. Friedman, M. (1959). The demand for money: Some theoretical and empirical results. Journal of Political Economy, 67(4), 327–351. https://doi.org/10.1086/258194 Hoover, K. D. (2010). Idealizing reduction: The microfoundations of macroeconomics. Erkenntnis, 73(3), 329–347. https:// doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9235-1 Hoover, K. D. (2015). Reductionism in economics: Intentionality and eschatological justification in the microfoundations of macroeconomics. Philosophy of Science, 82(4), 689–711. https://doi.org/10.1086/682917 Jhun, J. (2021). The case of the consumption function: Structural realism in macroeconomics. In T. D. Lyons & P. Vickers (Eds.), Contemporary scientific realism: The challenge from the history of science (pp. 257–283). Oxford University Press. Lucas, R. E., Jr. (2013a). Collected papers on monetary theory. Harvard University Press. Lucas, R. E., Jr. (2013b/1984). Money in a theory of finance. In M. Gillman (Ed.), Collected papers on monetary theory (pp. 161–192). Harvard University Press. Lucas, R. E., Jr. (2013c/1994). Review of Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A monetary history of the United States, 1867–1960. In M. Gillman (Ed.), Collected papers on monetary theory (pp. 361–374). Harvard University Press. Lucas, R. E., Jr. (2013d/1996). Nobel lecture: Monetary neutrality. In M. Gillman (Ed.), Collected papers on monetary theory (pp. 375–399). Harvard University Press. Lucas, R. E., Jr. (2013e/2004). Keynote address to the 2003 HOPE Conference: My Keynesian education. In M. Gillman (Ed.), Collected papers on monetary theory (pp. 503–516). Harvard University Press. Lucas, R. E., & Rapping, L. A. (1969). Real wages, employment, and inflation. Journal of Political Economy, 77(5), 721–754. https://doi.org/10.1086/259559 Lucas, R. E., Jr., & Stokey, N. L. (2013/1987). Money and interest in a cash-in-advance economy. In M. Gillman (Ed.), Collected papers on monetary theory (pp. 214–242). Harvard University Press. Sargent, T. J. (2015). Robert E. Lucas Jr.’s collected papers on monetary theory. Journal of Economic Literature, ","PeriodicalId":46507,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Methodology","volume":"23 1","pages":"256 - 261"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82998899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/1350178X.2021.1989476
C. Sunstein
ABSTRACT In philosophy, economics, and law, the idea of voluntary agreements plays a central role. But contractarianism in political philosophy stands (or falls) on altogether different grounds from enthusiasm for contractual ordering in economics and law. Protection of voluntary agreements, and of personal agency, might well be justified on deontological grounds; it should also be supported by welfarists. But when participants in voluntary agreements lack information or suffer from behavioral biases (including adaptive preferences), there is reason to help them, potentially through nudges, mandates, and bans.
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Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/1350178x.2021.1998755
J. Vromen, N. Emrah Aydinonat
The publication of Robert Sugden’s The Community of Advantage in 2018 might very well turn out to be a landmark event in welfare economics. In the book, Sugden presents a highly original view on what the main lessons of behavioral economics should be for welfare analyses; a view that radically deviates from the libertarian paternalism underlying the Nudge literature and other views that have been put forward in behavioral welfare economics. All the prevailing versions of behavioral welfare economics somehow want to retain the normative authority of individuals’ preferences (or of a proper subset of individuals’ preferences; preferences that are not clearly flawed by cognitive errors and mistakes). As Sugden cogently argues, the evidence gathered in behavioral economics fails to sustain this deference to preferences. With his own opportunity criterion, Sugden proposes a break with this long-lived tradition in welfare economics. The radicality of Sugden’s view goes beyond this as he argues that the addressee of welfare analysis should not be a fictitious benevolent social planner, but rather citizens, as potential parties to mutually beneficial agreements. We are happy to present this Review Symposium issue on The Community of Advantage in which prominent scholars, all with different outlooks and predilections, comment on the book, prompting Sugden to clarify and sharpen his own views. We want to thank Douglas Bernheim, Geoffrey Brennan, Malte Dold, Hartmut Kliemt, Mozaffar Quizilbash, Mario Rizzo, Cass Sunstein, Johanna Thoma and Robert Sugden for their fine work. Many thanks also to our reviewers for their contribution. Our greatest gratitude goes to Constanze Binder, the guest editor of this Review Symposium. Without her relentless efforts, this issue would not have seen the light. What is more, Constanze’s meticulous comments on earlier drafts of the articles published in this issue surely helped in improving their focus and clarity. Sadly, personal circumstances prevented her from finishing her own contribution in time. We hope that she will publish her own contribution soon and shed her own light on The Community of Advantage.
罗伯特·苏登(Robert Sugden)在2018年出版的《优势共同体》(The Community of Advantage)很可能成为福利经济学的一个里程碑事件。在书中,苏登提出了一个非常原创的观点,即行为经济学的主要教训应该用于福利分析;这种观点从根本上背离了《助推》(Nudge)文学和行为福利经济学中提出的其他观点所隐含的自由意志主义家长式作风。所有流行的行为福利经济学版本都想保留个人偏好(或个人偏好的适当子集)的规范性权威;没有明显的认知错误和错误的偏好)。正如萨格登令人信服地指出的那样,行为经济学中收集到的证据无法支持这种对偏好的服从。根据他自己的机会标准,萨格登提出要打破福利经济学中这种长期存在的传统。萨格登观点的激进之处在于,他认为福利分析的对象不应该是一个虚构的仁慈的社会规划者,而应该是公民,作为互惠协议的潜在各方。我们很高兴在《优势共同体》的评论研讨会上发表这期文章,在这期文章中,有着不同观点和偏好的著名学者对这本书进行了评论,这促使苏登澄清并阐明了他自己的观点。我们要感谢道格拉斯·伯恩海姆、杰弗里·布伦南、马尔特·多尔德、哈特穆特·克里姆特、莫扎法·奎兹尔巴什、马里奥·里佐、卡斯·桑斯坦、约翰娜·托马和罗伯特·萨格登的出色工作。也非常感谢我们的审稿人的贡献。我们非常感谢本次评论研讨会的客座编辑Constanze Binder。没有她不懈的努力,这个问题就不会曝光。更重要的是,Constanze对本期发表的文章的早期草稿进行了细致的评论,这无疑有助于提高文章的重点和清晰度。不幸的是,个人情况使她未能及时完成自己的贡献。我们希望她能尽快发表自己的贡献,为优势社区提供自己的见解。
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Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/1350178X.2021.1988132
M. Dold, M. Rizzo
ABSTRACT What should be the ‘informational base’ of welfare economics if one takes the insights from behavioral economics seriously? Sugden proposes individuals’ sets of opportunities. This paper discusses his opportunity criterion and argues that it largely neglects intricate problems of context-dependence and personal agency. We contrast Sugden’s approach with Buchanan’s understanding of choice, which highlights the importance of agentic capabilities to navigate choice sets, particularly in situations where individuals face subtle interdependences between preference formation processes and their situational or social environment. This paper advocates that the informational base of welfare economics may need to go beyond opportunities if it is to command general assent among individuals who have an interest in being sovereign ‘authors of their own lives’. We argue that economists who take individuals interests seriously should not only consider the size of opportunity sets but also individuals’ sense of personal agency when comparing alternative social states.
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