Pub Date : 2024-05-28DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00742-4
Pasi Valtonen
It is generally thought that the reclamation of slurs is restricted to the in-group. Bianca Cepollaro and Dan Lopez de Sa challenge this assumption by presenting cases in which slurs are successfully reclaimed by members of out-groups. I agree with the idea that the out-groups often participate in reclamation. In this paper, I present a view which accommodates the fact that sometimes out-groups successfully reclaim slurs. At the same time, the view preserves the central role of the in-group in reclamation.
人们普遍认为,污言秽语的使用仅限于本群体。比安卡-塞波拉罗(Bianca Cepollaro)和丹-洛佩兹-德-萨(Dan Lopez de Sa)通过介绍外群体成员成功开垦污言秽语的案例,对这一假设提出了质疑。我同意这种观点,即外群体往往参与了 "回收"。在本文中,我提出了一种观点,这种观点考虑到了外群体有时会成功地收回污言秽语这一事实。同时,该观点保留了本群体在开垦中的核心作用。
{"title":"Reclamation and Authorization: Cepollaro and Lopez de Sa on in-group Restriction","authors":"Pasi Valtonen","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00742-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00742-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It is generally thought that the reclamation of slurs is restricted to the in-group. Bianca Cepollaro and Dan Lopez de Sa challenge this assumption by presenting cases in which slurs are successfully reclaimed by members of out-groups. I agree with the idea that the out-groups often participate in reclamation. In this paper, I present a view which accommodates the fact that sometimes out-groups successfully reclaim slurs. At the same time, the view preserves the central role of the in-group in reclamation.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141167564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-24DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00745-1
Torin Alter
{"title":"Replies to Howell, Jackson, Kind, and Montero","authors":"Torin Alter","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00745-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00745-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141099250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-22DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00746-0
Keunchang Oh
{"title":"Institutional Racism and Social Norms: On the Debate Between Rawls and Mills","authors":"Keunchang Oh","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00746-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00746-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141111510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-18DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00743-3
Andrea Luisa Bucchile Faggion
According to rule-consequentialism’s moral criterion, a given action is morally right if and only if it complies with an ideal code of rules, regardless of the consequences of that action. Rules are to be assessed by their consequences, not actions. This being so, one of the many accusations that have been made against rule-consequentialism is that it can turn suboptimal decisions into morally right decisions and optimal decisions into morally wrong decisions. After all, in certain circumstances, a rule that has the best consequences overall can require an action that does less good or forbid an action that does more good. This is the core of the original rule-worship objection. However, recently, different versions of rule-consequentialism have been developed in order to address that challenge. This paper focuses on three of them, those offered by Brad Hooker, Susan Wolf, and David Copp. My claim is that their arguments, however ingenious, are unsuccessful, because they are innocuous if the charge is reformulated as it should be.
{"title":"The Charge of Rule Worship Against Rule-Consequentialism Restated","authors":"Andrea Luisa Bucchile Faggion","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00743-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00743-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to rule-consequentialism’s moral criterion, a given action is morally right if and only if it complies with an ideal code of rules, regardless of the consequences of that action. Rules are to be assessed by their consequences, not actions. This being so, one of the many accusations that have been made against rule-consequentialism is that it can turn suboptimal decisions into morally right decisions and optimal decisions into morally wrong decisions. After all, in certain circumstances, a rule that has the best consequences overall can require an action that does less good or forbid an action that does more good. This is the core of the original rule-worship objection. However, recently, different versions of rule-consequentialism have been developed in order to address that challenge. This paper focuses on three of them, those offered by Brad Hooker, Susan Wolf, and David Copp. My claim is that their arguments, however ingenious, are unsuccessful, because they are innocuous if the charge is reformulated as it should be.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141062812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-15DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00741-5
Erik Carlson, Karl Ekendahl, Jens Johansson
{"title":"Fischer on the Time of Death’s Badness","authors":"Erik Carlson, Karl Ekendahl, Jens Johansson","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00741-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00741-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140975841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-15DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00737-1
Chad Mason Stevenson
{"title":"Lucky Idiots and Incompetent Villains: Luck and Responsibility in Meaningful Lives","authors":"Chad Mason Stevenson","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00737-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00737-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140975603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-08DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00734-4
Peter Gärdenfors
This article takes a cognitive approach to natural concepts. The aim is to introduce criteria that are evaluated with respect to how they support the cognitive economy of humans when using concepts in reasoning and communicating with them. I first present the theory of conceptual spaces as a tool for expressing the criteria. Then I introduce the central idea that natural concepts correspond to convex regions of a conceptual space. I argue that this criterion has far-reaching consequences as regards natural concepts. Partly following earlier work, I present some other criteria that further delimit the class of natural concepts. One of these is coherence, which does not seem to have been discussed previously. Finally, I show that convexity and other criteria make it possible to ensure that people mean the same thing when they communicate using concepts. Apart from its philosophical interest, the analysis presented in the article will be relevant for tasks of conceptual engineering in artificial systems that work with concepts.
{"title":"Natural Concepts and the Economics of Cognition and Communication","authors":"Peter Gärdenfors","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00734-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00734-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article takes a cognitive approach to natural concepts. The aim is to introduce criteria that are evaluated with respect to how they support the cognitive economy of humans when using concepts in reasoning and communicating with them. I first present the theory of conceptual spaces as a tool for expressing the criteria. Then I introduce the central idea that natural concepts correspond to <i>convex</i> regions of a conceptual space. I argue that this criterion has far-reaching consequences as regards natural concepts. Partly following earlier work, I present some other criteria that further delimit the class of natural concepts. One of these is coherence, which does not seem to have been discussed previously. Finally, I show that convexity and other criteria make it possible to ensure that people mean the same thing when they communicate using concepts. Apart from its philosophical interest, the analysis presented in the article will be relevant for tasks of conceptual engineering in artificial systems that work with concepts.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140929776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-03DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00735-3
Cade Franken
Jeppe von Platz has recently argued that welfare-state capitalism can be justified by a theory of democratic equality, challenging John Rawls’s critique of capitalism. Von Platz develops his argument by introducing a social democratic interpretation of democratic equality as an alternative to Rawls’s justice as fairness. Unlike justice as fairness, in which there is only one possible principle of reciprocity (the difference principle), social democracy includes four possible principles in an eligible set that could be chosen as a principle of reciprocity. However, I argue that von Platz’s conception of reciprocity still fails to justify welfare-state capitalism. Of the four principles of reciprocity in social democracy’s eligible set, one of them, the principle of utility, does not express a notion of reciprocity and thus does not belong. The other three – the principle of equality, the difference principle, and the principle of equity – are not compatible with welfare-state capitalism. Thus, since capitalism cannot satisfy a principle of reciprocity in the (revised) eligible set, it is incompatible with the social democratic interpretation of democratic equality.
Jeppe von Platz 最近提出,福利国家资本主义可以用民主平等理论来证明其合理性,从而挑战了约翰-罗尔斯对资本主义的批判。冯-普拉茨通过引入社会民主主义对民主平等的诠释来发展他的论点,以此替代罗尔斯的正义即公平。作为公平的正义只有一种可能的互惠原则(差异原则),而社会民主则不同,它在一个合格的集合中包含了四种可能的原则,可以选择作为互惠原则。然而,我认为冯-普拉茨的互惠概念仍然不能证明福利国家资本主义的合理性。在社会民主主义的合格集合中的四项互惠原则中,有一项--效用原则--没有表达互惠的概念,因此不属于社会民主主义。其他三个原则--平等原则、差异原则和公平原则--与福利国家资本主义不相容。因此,由于资本主义无法满足(修订后的)符合条件的互惠原则,它与社会民主对民主平等的解释不相容。
{"title":"Can Democratic Equality Justify Capitalism?","authors":"Cade Franken","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00735-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00735-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Jeppe von Platz has recently argued that welfare-state capitalism can be justified by a theory of democratic equality, challenging John Rawls’s critique of capitalism. Von Platz develops his argument by introducing a social democratic interpretation of democratic equality as an alternative to Rawls’s justice as fairness. Unlike justice as fairness, in which there is only one possible principle of reciprocity (the difference principle), social democracy includes four possible principles in an eligible set that could be chosen as a principle of reciprocity. However, I argue that von Platz’s conception of reciprocity still fails to justify welfare-state capitalism. Of the four principles of reciprocity in social democracy’s eligible set, one of them, the principle of utility, does not express a notion of reciprocity and thus does not belong. The other three – the principle of equality, the difference principle, and the principle of equity – are not compatible with welfare-state capitalism. Thus, since capitalism cannot satisfy a principle of reciprocity in the (revised) eligible set, it is incompatible with the social democratic interpretation of democratic equality.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140885212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-03DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00733-5
Regina Sibylle Surber
This article argues that the reduction of the morality of killing in war to the morality of killing in self-defense by ‘reductive-individualist’ revisionist just war theories is inconsistent, because when those theories apply the moral notion of self-defense to the morality of killing in war, they do not preserve the two conceptions of the “individual” inherent in this notion. The article demonstrates this inconsistency in two steps: First, it disentangles the two conceptions of the individual inherent to the notion of self-defense, namely (1) that the individual is an “entity” potentially bearing a right to self-defense (unlike, e.g., groups) and (2) that the individual is a “particular,” where “particular” signifies that every human is different from every other human. The conception of the individual as a “particular” is tied to the idea that a justification grounded in a rule of self-defense is necessarily “concrete,” in the sense of referring to individually given and specific perceptions or cases, as opposed to “abstract,” in the sense of being detached from specific perceptions or cases. The article then demonstrates that reductive individualism reflects the first notion of the individual, but not the second. Due to the “loss” of the individual as a “particular”, the reductive-individualist reduction of the morality of killing in war to the morality of killing in self-defense is inconsistent, and hence its justification of killing in war grounded in self-defense is not concrete. Since such a justification must be concrete, reductive individualism cannot offer a justification for belligerent killing.
{"title":"The Inconsistent Reduction: An Internal Methodological Critique of Revisionist Just War Theory","authors":"Regina Sibylle Surber","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00733-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00733-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article argues that the reduction of the morality of killing in war to the morality of killing in self-defense by ‘reductive-individualist’ revisionist just war theories is inconsistent, because when those theories apply the moral notion of self-defense to the morality of killing in war, they do not preserve the two conceptions of the “individual” inherent in this notion. The article demonstrates this inconsistency in two steps: First, it disentangles the two conceptions of the individual inherent to the notion of self-defense, namely (1) that the individual is an “entity” potentially bearing a right to self-defense (unlike, e.g., groups) and (2) that the individual is a “particular,” where “particular” signifies that every human is different from every other human. The conception of the individual as a “particular” is tied to the idea that a justification grounded in a rule of self-defense is necessarily “concrete,” in the sense of referring to individually given and specific perceptions or cases, as opposed to “abstract,” in the sense of being detached from specific perceptions or cases. The article then demonstrates that reductive individualism reflects the first notion of the individual, but not the second. Due to the “loss” of the individual as a “particular”, the reductive-individualist reduction of the morality of killing in war to the morality of killing in self-defense is inconsistent, and hence its justification of killing in war grounded in self-defense is not concrete. Since such a justification must be concrete, reductive individualism cannot offer a justification for belligerent killing.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140884933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}