Information Economics and Policy最新文献

Although the recent years have witnessed a stark increase in the availability of high-speed Internet, adoption rates remain low. One potential explanation is that for most users high-speed Internet does not increase their utility. Using a mixed logit discrete choice model, this paper analyzes whether high-speed and basic Internet are substitutes. I find that they are not. Users who do not need higher speeds, choose basic speeds regardless of high-speed availability. Therefore, high-speed Internet is not an infrastructure of general interest. Consequently, policy-makers cannot increase usage of high-speed Internet by solely fostering its rollout.

This paper investigates how regulations that limit advertising airtime may affect advertising quality and social welfare. I show, first, conditions under which an advertising cap may reduce or improve the average quality of advertising broadcast on a free-to-air TV platform. Second, an advertising cap may reduce TV platform’s and firms’ profits, while the net effect on viewers’ welfare is ambiguous because the ad quality may decrease as a result of a regulatory cap offsetting the direct gain from watching fewer ads. The results suggest that a regulator that is trying to increase social welfare via regulation of the volume of advertising on TV should take the effect of advertising quality into consideration. Implementing an advertising cap without regard to ad quality may result in lower social welfare than leaving advertising airtime unregulated.

We study zero-rating, a practice whereby an Internet service provider (ISP) that limits data consumption exempts certain content from that limit. This practice is particularly controversial when an ISP zero-rates its own vertically integrated content, because the data limit and ensuing overage charges impose an additional cost on rival content. We find that zero-rating and vertical integration are complementary in improving social welfare, though potentially at the expense of lower profit to an unaffiliated content provider. Moreover, allowing content providers to pay for zero-rating via a sponsored data plan raises welfare by inducing the ISP to zero-rate more content.

We study how an opt-in regime of privacy regulation, which limits the scope for online price discrimination, affects product quality and consumer surplus. When consumers decide to share personal data, they benefit from the complementarity between information and quality, but they pay personalized prices instead of a uniform price. We find that, if the complementarity is strong enough, then product quality is higher with than without the opt-in regime. Privacy regulation may have conflicting effects on consumers with different attitudes towards privacy, and an increase in quality is necessary to improve total consumer surplus. Interestingly, these results hold both under monopoly and imperfect product market competition. We thus recommend that privacy protection measures be grounded in the study of the relation between personal information and product quality.

We consider the implementability and welfare effects of a partial announcement policy using a beauty contest model in which agents’ actions are strategic complements and their decisions on public information acquisition are endogenous. We obtain the following results: (i) if a social planner sells public information at a constant price, then multiple equilibria emerge and the partial announcement equilibrium becomes unstable; (ii) there exist pricing rules that ensure a unique and stable equilibrium partial publicity level, which indicates that a partial announcement policy can be implemented; and (iii) as the precision of public information increases, the optimal price rises due to higher optimal publicity level. To realize the higher optimal publicity level in equilibrium, the social planner must reset the pricing rules to lower the price of public information for each publicity level.

We examine the impact of household access to the internet on job finding rates in Germany during a period (2006–2009) in which the share of households with a broadband connection increased by 31 percentage points, and job-seekers increased their use of the internet as a search tool. During this period, household access to broadband internet was almost completely dependent on the availability of a particular technology (DSL). We therefore exploit the variation in DSL availability across municipalities as an instrument for household access to the internet. OLS estimates which control for differences in individual and local area characteristics suggest a job finding advantage of about six percentage points. The IV estimates are substantially larger, but much less precisely estimated. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that, conditional on observables, residential computer access with internet was as good as randomly assigned with respect to the job finding rate. The hypothesis that residential internet access helped job-seekers find work because of its effect on the job search process is supported by the finding that residential internet access greatly increased the use of the internet as a search method. We find some evidence that household access to the internet reduced the use of traditional job search methods, but this effect is outweighed by the increase in internet-based search methods.

In recent decades, international connectivity has improved significantly with the worldwide deployment of some 400 fiber submarine cables (SMCs), transmitting more than 99% of international telecommunications. If sub-Saharan African (SSA) has long remained excluded from this interconnection process, the maritime infrastructure network has recently densified and spurred an African connectivity catch-up. This paper estimates the impact of SMC deployment on the digital divide in a sample of 45 SSA countries covering the period of 1990–2014. Difference in differences (DID) estimations are conducted and highlight the particular contribution of SEACOM and EASSy cables, laid in 2009–2010, to Internet penetration in Eastern and Southern Africa. According to DID estimates, the rollout of these SMCs has yielded a 3–5 percentage point increase in Internet penetration rates in this region compared to the rest of SSA. This is a remarkable advancement, since this variation corresponds approximately to the level of Internet penetration in the subcontinent prior to their arrival.

The rise of big data in the global economy has led to concerns about antitrust and consumer protection, but policy makers often treat the two areas separately. The separate treatment is justified in classical markets because antitrust tends to focus on firm-to-firm interactions, while consumer protection deals with firm-to-consumer interfaces. The two areas may also be subject to different laws, and any crossovers between the two have tended to be small. However, big data blurs the distinction between the two, causing them to intertwine, complement or even conflict with each other. This paper uses examples to illustrate why that is the case and identifies areas that would benefit from more economic research.

Big tech mergers are frequently occurring events. What are the competitive effects of these mergers? With the help of a simple model we identify the acquisition of potential competitors as a pressing issue for merger control in digital industries. We also sketch a few recent theories of harm of horizontal and conglomerate mergers that are potentially relevant in digital industries. Finally, we draw some policy recommendations on how to deal with mergers in such industries.

We model how a technology that perfectly predicts one of two stochastic demand shocks alters the character and sustainability of collusion. Our results show that mechanisms that reduce firms’ uncertainty about the true level of demand have ambiguous welfare implications for consumers and firms alike. An exogenous improvement in firms’ ability to predict demand may make collusion possible where it was previously unsustainable or more profitable where it previously existed. However, an increase in transparency also may make collusion impracticable where it had been possible. The intuition for this ambiguity is that greater clarity about the true state of demand raises the payoffs both to colluding and to cheating. Our findings on the ambiguous welfare implications of reduced uncertainty contribute to the emerging literature on how algorithms, artificial intelligence (AI), and “big data” in market intelligence applications may affect competition.