Information Economics and Policy最新文献

Based on the technology choice model proposed by Bustos (2011) and the infrastructure spillover model developed by Dugga (1999), this paper aims to explore the multifaceted effects of network infrastructure construction on both radical and incremental enterprise innovation, while considering the micro perspective of enterprise and industry heterogeneity. The findings of this study uncover the following significant insights: (1) The implementation of network infrastructure construction exerts a substantial positive impact on both radical and incremental innovation within enterprises, affirming its crucial role in fostering innovation capabilities; (2) In the context of firm heterogeneity, the impact of network infrastructure construction on fostering radical and incremental innovation is particularly pronounced among medium-sized and large-scale enterprises, as well as state-owned enterprises; (3) Network infrastructure construction stimulates radical innovation primarily among local enterprises, whereas export-oriented enterprises tend to benefit more from incremental innovation; (4) When considering industry heterogeneity, the analysis demonstrates that network infrastructure construction fosters radical innovation in industries characterized by high concentration, intense competition, and advanced technology. On the other hand, in industries with low concentration and limited competition, network infrastructure construction tends to facilitate incremental innovation within enterprises. (5) Moreover, the study finds that the impact of network infrastructure construction on enterprise innovation is mediated by talent structure and financing constraints. These factors serve as crucial conduits through which network infrastructure construction facilitates both radical and incremental innovation. Furthermore, the paper acknowledges that the digital transformation of enterprises partially regulates these channels. Overall, this research offers valuable insights for enterprises in developing countries aiming to strengthen various forms of innovation in the digital era.

Pay-for-delay (reverse payments) settlements and patent expansion practices (PEP), such as preemptive patenting, product hopping and evergreening, have been criticized for their potential anticompetitive effects. This paper shows that reverse payments and PEP are strategic substitutes and, when the information over the patents’ strength is asymmetric and patents’ strength is endogenous, a ban on reverse payments may reduce consumer surplus. This effect is stronger the more generic competition reduces industry profits. When the cost of using PEP is sufficiently high, a ban on reverse payments is optimal, otherwise it is optimal to allow reverse payments at the minimal level consistent with the originator not engaging in PEP. Results are qualitatively robust to allowing PEP to increase patent quality and consumer surplus.

Internet piracy has been repeatedly shown to displace the authorised consumption of digital content. However, fewer studies tried to identify a viable solution and even less tried to convert the ‘pirates’ into paying consumers. We conducted a three-wave panel survey among comic book readers, asking about their consumption from various sources. After each wave, a random subsample was provided with prizes in the form of digital comic books from a legal provider. We analyse the effects of prizes on further consumption behaviour. The first prizing scheme incentivised setting up an account, installing a reader app and familiarising oneself with the catalogue of the dominant digital seller of comics. The second scheme aimed at hooking consumers on particular comic book series. However, we only find small evidence of a change in the consumption patterns or the willingness to pay for digital formats. We suggest that for the case of comic books, the prices of lower-valued digital copies might deter purchase. Furthermore, we discuss the use of similar research design for other creative content.

This paper examines how an incumbent firm's data investment decisions can impact market structure and competition. In markets with sufficiently low entry costs, using exclusive data for personalized pricing (PP) does not raise any barrier to entry. However, in markets with intermediate entry costs, the risk of competition and consumer harm is significant. Policy intervention is needed to foster competition. The effectiveness of an information-sharing policy depends on whether the incumbent anticipates it. Mandatory information sharing can only promote entry in markets with intermediate to high entry costs if the incumbent does not foresee its imposition. If the incumbent foresees this policy, it will strategically reduce its data acquisition to deter entry, by serving fewer consumers in the early period. This will cause significant harm to consumers and overall welfare. In markets with sufficiently low intermediate entry costs, information-sharing obligations can effectively foster competition and benefit consumers, regardless of the incumbent's anticipation. A ban on price personalization practices could be a better policy option to promote competition, especially in markets with high entry costs or where mandatory information sharing is not effective due to the incumbent strategic behavior.

The paper investigates welfare effects of targeted advertising in a duopoly. To this end, a game-theoretical model is proposed in which firms can make costly investments in their targeting technology. It can be shown that ex ante identical firms use different technologies in every pure-strategy equilibrium of the technology game. If firms target the same group of consumers, the low-technology firm could increase overall welfare by using a better technology. However, this leads to lower industry profits due to tougher competition among firms.

We utilize stated preference data from discrete choice exercises administered to 15,000 households and individuals in Mexico and estimate logit and conditional logit models to identify determinants of fixed and mobile broadband demand. We find that the service attribute most consistently important for broadband demand, apart from price, was service reliability and find that urban customers are willing to pay more for reliable fixed broadband service, but rural customers are willing to pay more for reliable mobile broadband service. We find evidence that rural customers are more price sensitive compared to urban customers for mobile broadband but not for fixed broadband. We find evidence that fixed and mobile broadband services are complements and that speaking an indigenous language results in a higher likelihood of subscription for both fixed and mobile broadband as does greater daily internet usage. We do not find evidence that equipment subsidies are associated with greater likelihood of subscription.

Digital platform markets perform a myriad of daily transactions, providing internet-mediated exchange possibilities: between consumers, for peer-to-peer exchanges; between businesses, for digital value chains; and between businesses and consumers, in digital marketplaces. It is essential for competition that new entrants are able to join platform markets. However, these markets are often characterised by proprietary innovations, especially in data analytics applied to existing user data. The algorithmic analysis of user data and information might increase incumbency advantages, creating lock-in effects among users and making them more reluctant to join an entrant platform. The individual costs of these lock-in effects may differ between the sides of a platform, e.g., between sellers and buyers, and across users within each side, e.g., between sellers with different costs and/or propensities to join an entrant platform. Moreover, these costs will interact with cross-group network effects, another well-studied source of incumbency advantage. This paper develops a model exploring how different levels of lock-in effects may favour an incumbent platform. The conditions for platforms’ coexistence, to avoid market tipping, require lock-in effects to be "stronger" than cross-group effects. However, this condition also provides a market advantage to the incumbent platform compared to the entrant's. Therefore, policies aimed at reducing lock-in effects, such as mandating data portability, may counterintuitively impair entry conditions as the incumbent sets its prices more aggressively with lower lock-in effects.

The economics literature views R&D as an important conduit for growth because it generates new ideas that can be translated into technological innovations. Some of this R&D occurs in universities, making academic freedom an important part of this process. This literature ignores the potential role that academic research in the social sciences plays toward achieving non-commercial societal outcomes. We bridge this gap by proposing that academia generates social R&D. We posit that greater degrees of academic freedom allow for social R&D to flourish and be transformed into policies that improve societal conditions. We test our hypothesis by studying the relationship between academic freedom and inequality using panel data of 132 countries over the 1967–2018 period. We measure academic freedom using an index developed by the V-Dem Institute. Our econometric analysis suggests that an increase in the index is associated with a decrease in inequality. We employ instrumental variable and interactive fixed effects techniques to try to lend support to the causal relationship between academic freedom and inequality. We argue that this negative relationship can be explained by academia, predominantly the social sciences, exerting pressure on governments to enact policies that redistribute wealth. We find evidence in support of this mechanism using data from other sources.

This paper analyzes how customers’ heterogeneous search and switching habits affect the prices paid for telecommunication services in a context in which operators use price discrimination strategies to retain their customers and attract those of their rivals. Drawing on a representative sample of Spanish households (N=3,113), we show that engaged consumers pay 9.4% less than completely unengaged consumers for their telecommunication services, after controlling for the characteristics of the bundle of services contracted. We also find that highly engaged consumers (i.e. those that have called their operator to obtain a better deal and who have switched to a different operator at least once) pay 13.6% less for their services than unengaged consumers, that consumers who have switched operator at least once pay 8.4% less, and that consumers who call their operator to request better conditions for their contracts pay 5.8% less. Finally, we show that the excess price paid by unengaged consumers increases as they contract more sophisticated services, such as premium television content and additional mobile lines.

In this article we study the impact of taxation in the performance of the telecommunications sector. To do so, we develop a model that considers the taxes and fees imposed directly or indirectly along the telecommunications value chain. Overall, we find strong evidence of a negative impact on investment from an increase in regulatory fees, profit taxes, and excise taxes. In addition, telecommunication service prices are affected by the fiscal regime, both directly -through taxation over services- and indirectly, through obligations imposed on operators that can ultimately have an impact on service prices. We also find some evidence of the effect of custom duties for equipment and smartphones on the decrease of investment on broadband network deployment and service adoption, respectively. On this basis, we simulate a fiscal-reform scenario, consisting in removing sector-specific contributions to eliminate inter-sectoral asymmetries, with results suggesting significant gains in investment, coverage, and adoption. Considering these findings, and the potential socioeconomic gains from increasing broadband adoption, we believe that governments pursuing the development of digital agendas should consider potential fiscal reforms to accelerate the development of the digital economy. That being said, considering the potential loses in tax collection, a careful trade-off analysis should be performed before determining the nature and the scope of the fiscal reforms to be introduced.