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Towards a Typology of Narrative Frustration 走向叙事挫折的类型学
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-16 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-023-09942-1
Daniel Altshuler, Christina S. Kim
Abstract Through imaginative engagement readers of fiction become, to an extraordinary extent, the narrator’s ‘children’: they often submit themselves to the narrator’s authority without reserve. But precisely because of that, readers are deeply at a loss when their trust is betrayed. This underscores a core function of fiction, namely to evoke emotional response in the reader. In this paper, we hypothesize how a reader’s imaginative engagement can be subjected to narrative frustration due to processing or moral complexity. The types of narrative frustration we consider differ in terms of their sources, and their emotional and behavioral impacts on the reader. Here, we break down these frustrations into their component parts, in an effort to better characterize the different classes of frustrations. We propose that frustrations arise from different combinations of local uncertainty, moral clash and global uncertainty. These sources of frustration in turn explain the reader’s emotional response and their consequent reading behavior as they imaginatively engage with fiction.
通过想象力的参与,小说的读者在很大程度上成为了叙述者的“孩子”:他们经常毫无保留地服从叙述者的权威。但正因为如此,当读者的信任被背叛时,他们会深感茫然。这强调了小说的核心功能,即唤起读者的情感反应。在本文中,我们假设读者的想象参与如何由于处理或道德复杂性而受到叙事挫折。我们所考虑的叙事挫折类型在其来源以及对读者的情感和行为影响方面有所不同。在这里,我们将这些挫折分解成它们的组成部分,以便更好地描述不同类型的挫折。我们认为,挫折感来自当地不确定性、道德冲突和全球不确定性的不同组合。这些挫折的来源反过来解释了读者的情感反应,以及他们在想象中参与小说时随之而来的阅读行为。
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引用次数: 0
What We Do and Don’t Know About Joint Attention 我们所知道和不知道的共同注意力
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-11 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-023-09961-y
Henrike Moll
Abstract Joint attention is an early-emerging and uniquely human capacity that lies at the foundation of many other capacities of humans, such as language and the understanding of other minds. In this article, I summarize what developmentalists and philosophers have come to find out about joint attention, and I end by stating that two problems or questions of joint attention require additional research: 1) the relation between joint attention and the skills for dyadic sharing or affect exchange in young infants, and 2) the evolution of joint attention.
共同注意是一种早期出现的独特的人类能力,它是人类许多其他能力的基础,如语言和理解他人的思想。在这篇文章中,我总结了发展学家和哲学家们关于共同注意的发现,最后我指出了共同注意的两个问题或问题需要进一步的研究:1)共同注意与幼儿二元分享或情感交换技能之间的关系,以及2)共同注意的进化。
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引用次数: 0
Untimely Reviews 不合时宜的评论
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-07 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-023-09960-z
Fabio Paglieri
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引用次数: 0
Assertion, Lying and the Norm of Truth 断言、谎言与真理准则
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-06 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-023-09956-9
Roger Teichmann
Abstract In chapter four of Truth and Truthfulness Bernard Williams presents an account of assertion that relies heavily on the ‘psychological’ notions of belief and intention. In chapter five his definition of lying similarly relies on such notions. For Williams, insofar as there are norms governing assertion as such or norms broken by lying as such, these norms relate to saying what you think to be true, as distinct from saying what is true. I argue that this ‘psychologized’ account of assertion (and lying) is for various reasons mistaken. A consequence of Williams’s approach is that ‘Shall I tell the truth here?’ is presented as a much more open question for an agent than it possibly can be. Only by adverting to the language-game presupposed by that question’s having any sense at all can we arrive at a fair picture of when and how the answer ‘No’ might be reasonable.
在《真理与真实性》的第四章中,伯纳德·威廉姆斯提出了一种对断言的描述,这种断言严重依赖于信念和意图的“心理学”概念。在第五章中,他对说谎的定义同样依赖于这些概念。对威廉姆斯来说,只要有规范来控制断言或被谎言打破的规范,这些规范与说出你认为是真的有关,而不是说出真实的东西。我认为,由于各种原因,这种对断言(和谎言)的“心理化”解释是错误的。威廉姆斯这种做法的一个后果是,“我能在这里说实话吗?”对于代理人来说,这是一个更开放的问题。只有通过这个问题具有任何意义的语言游戏预设,我们才能得出一个公平的图景,即“不”的答案何时以及如何可能是合理的。
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引用次数: 0
Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments 亚当·斯密的道德情操论
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-09-30 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-023-09959-6
Elias L. Khalil
Abstract This review identifies at least six different kinds of fellow-feeling in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. The six kinds are (i) the mirroring of emotions; (ii) altruism; (iii) judgment of pitch of emotions/actions; (iv) judgment of merit of emotions/actions; (v) friendship-and-love; and (vi) aspiration that leads to admiration. Smith does not list them side-by-side. This side-by-side listing promises to help thinkers to see how to assemble them to construct a coherent and systematic framework on how to amalgamate three moments of behavior: the emotional, the rational, and the moral.
摘要本文从亚当·斯密的《道德情操论》中归纳出至少六种不同的同胞情感。这六种类型是:(1)情绪的镜像;(2)利他主义;(iii)判断情绪/动作的音高;(iv)判断情绪/行动的价值;(v)友谊和爱;(六)引起钦佩的渴望。史密斯并没有把它们并排列出。这个并列的清单有望帮助思想家了解如何将它们组合起来,以构建一个连贯和系统的框架,来整合行为的三个时刻:情感、理性和道德。
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引用次数: 0
There are Many Senses to an Emotion – Loss of Power, Diminishment and the Internalised Other 一种情绪有很多感觉——失去力量、贬低和内化他人
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-09-15 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-023-09955-w
Daniel Peixoto Murata
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引用次数: 0
Correction To: Introduction: Metalinguistic Disagreement and Semantic Externalism 修正:引言:元语言歧义与语义外在主义
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-023-09952-z
Pedro Abreu, Giulia Terzian
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引用次数: 0
On Experiential Loneliness. 论体验孤独。
IF 1.4 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-06-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-023-09936-z
Philipp Schmidt

Presumably, everyone has, at some point in their lives, felt lonely. Loneliness is, in that particular sense, omnipresent. What it feels like to be lonely can, however, vary significantly. Loneliness is far from being a homogeneous phenomenon. Different kinds of loneliness need to be distinguished, considering its causes, contexts, a person's capacities to cope with it, and many other factors. This paper introduces the notion of a specific kind of loneliness: experiential loneliness. Experiential loneliness, it will be argued, consists in particular ways of experiencing the world, oneself, and others. Although feelings of being lonely in one way or another can emanate from one's experience of the world being structured in a particular manner, such kinds of loneliness need not-at least, not always and the whole time-lead to emotional feelings that are concerned with one's loneliness or the lack of meaningful social relationship. Loneliness can give rise to quite different emotional feelings that sometimes even cover up their provenience from underlying experiential loneliness. The notion of experiential loneliness, it is suggested, helps to tie back certain styles of thinking, desires, feelings, and behaviors to contexts of loneliness. Moreover, it will be argued that the notion can also elucidate the development of feelings of being lonely in contexts in which others are not only around but also available. To develop and enrich the notion of experiential loneliness as well as to exemplify its usefulness, a closer look will be taken at the case of borderline personality disorder, a condition in which sufferers are often plagued by loneliness.

据推测,每个人在生命中的某个时刻都感到孤独。从这个特殊的意义上说,孤独无处不在。然而,孤独的感觉可能会有很大的不同。孤独远不是一种同质现象。需要区分不同类型的孤独,考虑其原因、背景、一个人应对孤独的能力以及许多其他因素。本文介绍了一种特定类型的孤独的概念:体验孤独。有人认为,体验性孤独包括体验世界、自己和他人的特殊方式。尽管以这样或那样的方式感到孤独可能源于一个人对世界以某种特定方式构建的体验,但这种孤独至少不需要,也不总是和一直导致与一个人的孤独或缺乏有意义的社会关系有关的情绪。孤独会产生截然不同的情绪,有时甚至会掩盖他们对潜在体验孤独的预感。有人认为,体验孤独的概念有助于将某些思维、欲望、感觉和行为风格与孤独的背景联系起来。此外,有人认为,这一概念还可以阐明在他人不仅在身边而且在身边的情况下孤独感的发展。为了发展和丰富体验孤独的概念,并证明其有用性,我们将更仔细地研究边缘型人格障碍的情况,这种情况下患者经常受到孤独的困扰。
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引用次数: 0
Loneliness as Cause. 孤独是原因。
IF 1.4 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-06-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-023-09933-2
Elena Popa

While loneliness has been linked to various mental and physical health problems, the sense in which loneliness is a cause of these conditions has so far attracted little philosophical attention. This paper aims to fill this gap by analyzing research on health effects of loneliness and therapeutic interventions through current approaches to causality. To deal with the problem of causality between psychological, social, and biological variables, the paper endorses a biopsychosocial model of health and disease. I will investigate how three main approaches to causality used in psychiatry and public health apply to loneliness: interventionism, mechanisms, and dispositional theories. Interventionism can specify whether loneliness causes specific effects, or whether a treatment works, incorporating results from randomized controlled trials. Mechanisms help explain how loneliness brings about negative health effects, spelling out psychological processes involved in lonely social cognition. Dispositional approaches help stress particular features of loneliness connected to negative social interactions, such as defensiveness. I will conclude by showing that previous research alongside emerging approaches to health effects of loneliness lend themselves to analysis in terms of the causal models under discussion.

虽然孤独感与各种心理和身体健康问题有关,但迄今为止,孤独感是这些问题的原因这一概念几乎没有引起哲学上的关注。本文旨在通过分析孤独对健康影响的研究以及通过目前的因果关系方法进行治疗干预来填补这一空白。为了解决心理、社会和生物变量之间的因果关系问题,本文赞同健康和疾病的生物心理社会模型。我将研究精神病学和公共卫生中使用的三种主要因果关系方法如何适用于孤独:干预主义、机制和倾向理论。干预可以结合随机对照试验的结果,具体说明孤独是否会引起特定的影响,或者治疗是否有效。机制有助于解释孤独如何带来负面健康影响,阐明孤独社会认知中涉及的心理过程。倾向性方法有助于强调与消极社会互动有关的孤独的特定特征,如防御。最后,我将表明,以前的研究以及新出现的孤独对健康影响的方法有助于根据正在讨论的因果模型进行分析。
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引用次数: 3
Is AI the Future of Mental Healthcare? 人工智能是精神健康的未来吗?
IF 1.4 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-05-31 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-023-09932-3
Francesca Minerva, Alberto Giubilini
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引用次数: 5
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TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY
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