Pub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10422-z
Stephen R. Milford, David Shaw
Abstract Pro-life and pro-choice advocates battle for rational dominance in abortion debates. Yet, public polling (and general legal opinion) demonstrates the public’s preference for the middle ground: that abortions are acceptable in certain circumstances and during early pregnancy. Implicit in this, are two contradictory intuitions: (1) that we were all early fetuses, and (2) abortion kills no one. To hold these positions together, Harman and Räsänen have argued for the Actual Future Principle (AFP) which distinguishes between fetuses that will develop into persons and those that will never develop into persons. However intellectually ingenious their solutions are, they fail to account for a third intuition: that the death of a wanted fetus – e.g. through termination or miscarriage – is of moral significance. Not only is this practically important, but it is also supported by public opinion. The authors of this paper argue that relational ontology can modify the AFP to better account for all three intuitions. Furthermore, it further emphasizes the pivotal role of the pregnant person who relates to their own fetus in either personal or impersonal ways. Addressing the fundamental challenges of relational ontology, the authors defend the position that human personal identity is ultimately relational.
{"title":"Schrödinger’s Fetus and Relational Ontology: Reconciling Three Contradictory Intuitions in Abortion Debates","authors":"Stephen R. Milford, David Shaw","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10422-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10422-z","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Pro-life and pro-choice advocates battle for rational dominance in abortion debates. Yet, public polling (and general legal opinion) demonstrates the public’s preference for the middle ground: that abortions are acceptable in certain circumstances and during early pregnancy. Implicit in this, are two contradictory intuitions: (1) that we were all early fetuses, and (2) abortion kills no one. To hold these positions together, Harman and Räsänen have argued for the Actual Future Principle (AFP) which distinguishes between fetuses that will develop into persons and those that will never develop into persons. However intellectually ingenious their solutions are, they fail to account for a third intuition: that the death of a wanted fetus – e.g. through termination or miscarriage – is of moral significance. Not only is this practically important, but it is also supported by public opinion. The authors of this paper argue that relational ontology can modify the AFP to better account for all three intuitions. Furthermore, it further emphasizes the pivotal role of the pregnant person who relates to their own fetus in either personal or impersonal ways. Addressing the fundamental challenges of relational ontology, the authors defend the position that human personal identity is ultimately relational.","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135993040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-16DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10414-z
Amalia Amaya
Abstract This paper develops a virtue-account of legal reasoning which significantly differs from standard, principle-based, theories. A virtue approach to legal reasoning highlights the relevance of the particulars to sound legal decision-making, brings to light the perceptual and affective dimensions of legal judgment, and vindicates the relevance of description and specification to good legal reasoning. After examining the central features of the theory, the paper proposes a taxonomy of the main character traits that legal decision-makers need to possess to successfully engage in legal reasoning. The paper concludes by discussing an array of strategies in legal education, institutional design, and legal culture that can be put in place to work virtue in legal decision-making.
{"title":"Reasoning in Character: Virtue, Legal Argumentation, and Judicial Ethics","authors":"Amalia Amaya","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10414-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10414-z","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper develops a virtue-account of legal reasoning which significantly differs from standard, principle-based, theories. A virtue approach to legal reasoning highlights the relevance of the particulars to sound legal decision-making, brings to light the perceptual and affective dimensions of legal judgment, and vindicates the relevance of description and specification to good legal reasoning. After examining the central features of the theory, the paper proposes a taxonomy of the main character traits that legal decision-makers need to possess to successfully engage in legal reasoning. The paper concludes by discussing an array of strategies in legal education, institutional design, and legal culture that can be put in place to work virtue in legal decision-making.","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136113777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-11DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10418-9
Matthew John Minehan
{"title":"Correction to: “Stay Away from the Park”: A Case for Police-Issued Personal Safety Advice for Women","authors":"Matthew John Minehan","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10418-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10418-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136209450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-07DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10419-8
Luís Cordeiro-Rodrigues, Cornelius Ewuoso
Abstract Thaddeus Metz’s groundbreaking book A Relational Moral Theory provides a sophisticated moral theory hailing from the Global South. In this book, one of the theses he defends is that biotechnological enhancement is generally morally impermissible. This article, written for a book symposium on A Relational Moral Theory , primarily demonstrates how Metz’s criticisms presented in his book fail to convince. Furthermore, we explore some possible objections from Metzian deontology against enhancement and also show that these do not imply that enhancement is intrinsically wrong. Finally, we showed how Metzian ethics offers good reasons to support rather than oppose enhancement.
{"title":"Metz on Enhancement: A Relational Critique","authors":"Luís Cordeiro-Rodrigues, Cornelius Ewuoso","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10419-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10419-8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Thaddeus Metz’s groundbreaking book A Relational Moral Theory provides a sophisticated moral theory hailing from the Global South. In this book, one of the theses he defends is that biotechnological enhancement is generally morally impermissible. This article, written for a book symposium on A Relational Moral Theory , primarily demonstrates how Metz’s criticisms presented in his book fail to convince. Furthermore, we explore some possible objections from Metzian deontology against enhancement and also show that these do not imply that enhancement is intrinsically wrong. Finally, we showed how Metzian ethics offers good reasons to support rather than oppose enhancement.","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135254319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-04DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10417-w
Andreas Bengtson, Andreas Albertsen
Abstract In 1970, Stewart advocated disenfranchising everyone reaching retirement age or age 70, whichever was earlier. The question of whether senior citizens should be disenfranchised has recently come to the fore due to votes on issues such as Brexit and climate change. Indeed, there is a growing literature which argues that we should increase the voting power of non-senior citizens relative to senior citizens, for reasons having to do with intergenerational justice. Thus, it seems that there are reasons of justice to disenfranchise senior citizens, or at least to grant them a lower voting weight than non-senior citizens. In this paper, we investigate whether there are democratic reasons to do so. To answer this question, we turn to the boundary problem in democratic theory, i.e., the question of who should be included in democratic decision-making. Two prominent solutions, and a more recent one, are particularly relevant: the all-affected principle, the all-subjected principle, and the relational egalitarian principle. When it comes to the all-affected principle and the all-subjected principle, we argue that there is reason to grant most senior citizens a lower voting weight than most non-senior citizens in most decisions. Whether that is the case on the relational egalitarian principle depends on how people relate to each other in society. Indeed, it is sometimes in accordance with the relational egalitarian view to grant senior citizens a greater voting weight than non-senior citizens.
{"title":"The Voting Rights of Senior Citizens: Should all Votes Count the Same?","authors":"Andreas Bengtson, Andreas Albertsen","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10417-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10417-w","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In 1970, Stewart advocated disenfranchising everyone reaching retirement age or age 70, whichever was earlier. The question of whether senior citizens should be disenfranchised has recently come to the fore due to votes on issues such as Brexit and climate change. Indeed, there is a growing literature which argues that we should increase the voting power of non-senior citizens relative to senior citizens, for reasons having to do with intergenerational justice. Thus, it seems that there are reasons of justice to disenfranchise senior citizens, or at least to grant them a lower voting weight than non-senior citizens. In this paper, we investigate whether there are democratic reasons to do so. To answer this question, we turn to the boundary problem in democratic theory, i.e., the question of who should be included in democratic decision-making. Two prominent solutions, and a more recent one, are particularly relevant: the all-affected principle, the all-subjected principle, and the relational egalitarian principle. When it comes to the all-affected principle and the all-subjected principle, we argue that there is reason to grant most senior citizens a lower voting weight than most non-senior citizens in most decisions. Whether that is the case on the relational egalitarian principle depends on how people relate to each other in society. Indeed, it is sometimes in accordance with the relational egalitarian view to grant senior citizens a greater voting weight than non-senior citizens.","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135591594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-01DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10406-z
Tristan David Katz
{"title":"Catia Faria: Animal Ethics in the Wild","authors":"Tristan David Katz","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10406-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10406-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43243437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-01DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10416-x
Corrado Fumagalli, Enes Kulenović
{"title":"Editorial ‘The Theory and Practice of Counterspeech’","authors":"Corrado Fumagalli, Enes Kulenović","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10416-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10416-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135433405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-31DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10413-0
M. J. Minehan
{"title":"“Stay away from the Park”: A Case for Police-Issued Personal Safety Advice for Women","authors":"M. J. Minehan","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10413-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10413-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42598754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-22DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10412-1
Samuel Director
{"title":"Framing Effects Do Not Undermine Consent","authors":"Samuel Director","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10412-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10412-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48262800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-16DOI: 10.1007/s10677-023-10411-2
David Peña-Rangel
{"title":"Economic Inequality and the Permissibility of Leveling Down","authors":"David Peña-Rangel","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10411-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10411-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49047441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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