Pub Date : 2023-03-28DOI: 10.1017/s1744137423000073
Karolina Safarzynska, Marta Sylwestrzak
Sharing resources between members of different tribes and collectives is common and well-documented. Surprisingly, little is known about factors that are conducive to building social relationships between groups. We design a common-pool resource experiment, where after harvesting, groups can send some of their harvest to augment the resource of the outgroup. We compare donations made by individuals collectively and independently of other group members, under the conditions of equal and unequal resources. We find that individuals acting as decision-makers, but not groups, donate harvests frequently even though it is payoff-reducing. We conduct an additional treatment, where each donation is matched (doubled) by an equivalent transfer of resources, making sharing between groups payoff-improving. Under matching donations, sharing between groups flourishes, but fails to prevent resource decline in most groups. Finally, our experiment reveals that members of low-endowment groups overharvest resources in expectation of donations from affluent groups, which leads to the tragedy of the commons.
{"title":"Impact of bridging social capital on the tragedy of the commons: experimental evidence","authors":"Karolina Safarzynska, Marta Sylwestrzak","doi":"10.1017/s1744137423000073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744137423000073","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Sharing resources between members of different tribes and collectives is common and well-documented. Surprisingly, little is known about factors that are conducive to building social relationships between groups. We design a common-pool resource experiment, where after harvesting, groups can send some of their harvest to augment the resource of the outgroup. We compare donations made by individuals collectively and independently of other group members, under the conditions of equal and unequal resources. We find that individuals acting as decision-makers, but not groups, donate harvests frequently even though it is payoff-reducing. We conduct an additional treatment, where each donation is matched (doubled) by an equivalent transfer of resources, making sharing between groups payoff-improving. Under matching donations, sharing between groups flourishes, but fails to prevent resource decline in most groups. Finally, our experiment reveals that members of low-endowment groups overharvest resources in expectation of donations from affluent groups, which leads to the tragedy of the commons.","PeriodicalId":47221,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44031492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-20DOI: 10.1017/s1744137423000036
A. Mazé
In this article, we reconceptualize, using an extended discrete and dynamic Ostrom's classification, the specific intellectual property (IP) regimes that support geographical indications (GIs) as ‘knowledge commons’, e.g. a set of shared collective knowledge resources constituting a complex ecosystem created and shared by a group of people that has remained subject to social dilemma. Geographical names are usually considered part of the public domain. However, under certain circumstances, geographical names have also been appropriated through trademark registration. Our analysis suggests that IP laws that support GIs first emerged in Europe and spread worldwide as a response to the threat of undue usurpation or private confiscation through trademark registration. We thus emphasize the nature of the tradeoffs faced when shifting GIs from the public domain to shared common property regimes, as defined by the EU legislation pertaining to GIs. In the context of trade globalization, we also compare the pros and cons of regulating GIs ex-ante rather than engaging in ex-post trademark litigation in the courts.
{"title":"Geographical indications as global knowledge commons: Ostrom's law on common intellectual property and collective action","authors":"A. Mazé","doi":"10.1017/s1744137423000036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744137423000036","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this article, we reconceptualize, using an extended discrete and dynamic Ostrom's classification, the specific intellectual property (IP) regimes that support geographical indications (GIs) as ‘knowledge commons’, e.g. a set of shared collective knowledge resources constituting a complex ecosystem created and shared by a group of people that has remained subject to social dilemma. Geographical names are usually considered part of the public domain. However, under certain circumstances, geographical names have also been appropriated through trademark registration. Our analysis suggests that IP laws that support GIs first emerged in Europe and spread worldwide as a response to the threat of undue usurpation or private confiscation through trademark registration. We thus emphasize the nature of the tradeoffs faced when shifting GIs from the public domain to shared common property regimes, as defined by the EU legislation pertaining to GIs. In the context of trade globalization, we also compare the pros and cons of regulating GIs ex-ante rather than engaging in ex-post trademark litigation in the courts.","PeriodicalId":47221,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45107717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-20DOI: 10.1017/s1744137423000061
Levent Kutlu, Xiuping Mao
We examine the effect of corruption control on efficiency and its implications for efficiency spillovers by a stochastic frontier model. Our dataset covers 102 countries from 1996 to 2014. We find a positive relationship between corruption control and efficiency. If neighboring countries have difficulty in handling corruption, the country would be negatively affected by its neighbors' corruption through efficiency spillovers. We then compare the efficiency differences across countries for three time periods: 1996–2002, 2002–2008, and 2008–2014. On average, technical efficiencies slightly increased in the second period compared to the first period. In the third period, the efficiencies declined, particularly in China.
{"title":"The effect of corruption control on efficiency spillovers","authors":"Levent Kutlu, Xiuping Mao","doi":"10.1017/s1744137423000061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744137423000061","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We examine the effect of corruption control on efficiency and its implications for efficiency spillovers by a stochastic frontier model. Our dataset covers 102 countries from 1996 to 2014. We find a positive relationship between corruption control and efficiency. If neighboring countries have difficulty in handling corruption, the country would be negatively affected by its neighbors' corruption through efficiency spillovers. We then compare the efficiency differences across countries for three time periods: 1996–2002, 2002–2008, and 2008–2014. On average, technical efficiencies slightly increased in the second period compared to the first period. In the third period, the efficiencies declined, particularly in China.","PeriodicalId":47221,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45480116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-17DOI: 10.1017/s174413742300005x
Natalia Diniz-Maganini, A. Rasheed, Mahmut Yasar
We examine whether the differences in the legal origins of countries (Common Law versus Civil Law) can explain the variations in the price efficiencies of the stock markets of different countries. Based on multifractal detrended fluctuation analysis of the daily stock indices of 34 countries over 21 years, we find that the stock price indices in Common Law origin countries show greater price efficiency than the stock price indices in Civil Law countries. These results provide additional evidence that the legal origins of countries affect their economic activities and outcomes.
{"title":"Legal systems and stock market efficiency: an empirical analysis of stock indices around the world","authors":"Natalia Diniz-Maganini, A. Rasheed, Mahmut Yasar","doi":"10.1017/s174413742300005x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s174413742300005x","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We examine whether the differences in the legal origins of countries (Common Law versus Civil Law) can explain the variations in the price efficiencies of the stock markets of different countries. Based on multifractal detrended fluctuation analysis of the daily stock indices of 34 countries over 21 years, we find that the stock price indices in Common Law origin countries show greater price efficiency than the stock price indices in Civil Law countries. These results provide additional evidence that the legal origins of countries affect their economic activities and outcomes.","PeriodicalId":47221,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46481391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-09DOI: 10.1017/s1744137423000048
Makio Yamada
Building on the Hodgson–Mokyr debate in this journal (Volume 18, Issue 1, 2022), this article discusses how modern economic growth occurred in pre-Industrial Revolution Britain, with a particular focus on coalition politics and the marginalization of conservative political groups – vetoers to change. Such political marginalization was unusual before the 19th century, when monarchs had substantial political power and land-based conservative groups were their main political allies. This article finds the source of the English exceptionalism in the unique system of non-imperial personal union that Britain then had with the Dutch Republic and Hanover. Under this system, foreigner monarchs chose their local ally in Britain based on the security needs of their home states. It created a significant disadvantage to the Tories, the incumbent conservative groups, while providing a window of opportunity for the Whigs, the opposition group supported by new commercial interests, to form a coalition with the Crown. The long absence of the Tories from power resulted in the incorporation of their constituencies into the Whig-led regime, making the traditional economic interests the regime's ‘junior partners’, instead of formidable political competitors to the new commercial interests, which was the case before and elsewhere at that time.
{"title":"Foreigner kings as local kingmakers: how the ‘unusual’ marginalization of conservative political groups occurred in pre-Industrial Revolution Britain","authors":"Makio Yamada","doi":"10.1017/s1744137423000048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744137423000048","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Building on the Hodgson–Mokyr debate in this journal (Volume 18, Issue 1, 2022), this article discusses how modern economic growth occurred in pre-Industrial Revolution Britain, with a particular focus on coalition politics and the marginalization of conservative political groups – vetoers to change. Such political marginalization was unusual before the 19th century, when monarchs had substantial political power and land-based conservative groups were their main political allies. This article finds the source of the English exceptionalism in the unique system of non-imperial personal union that Britain then had with the Dutch Republic and Hanover. Under this system, foreigner monarchs chose their local ally in Britain based on the security needs of their home states. It created a significant disadvantage to the Tories, the incumbent conservative groups, while providing a window of opportunity for the Whigs, the opposition group supported by new commercial interests, to form a coalition with the Crown. The long absence of the Tories from power resulted in the incorporation of their constituencies into the Whig-led regime, making the traditional economic interests the regime's ‘junior partners’, instead of formidable political competitors to the new commercial interests, which was the case before and elsewhere at that time.","PeriodicalId":47221,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41356877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-23DOI: 10.1017/S1744137423000012
Leander Heldring, James A. Robinson
Abstract We argue that the effectiveness of Rwandan governments, both at implementing the 1994 genocide and inducing the current growth miracle, illustrates that the state has high capacity. Yet this capacity is not captured by conventional Weberian concepts, with their focus on taxation and formal bureaucracy. Rather, the capacity of Rwanda's state relies on its ability to leverage dense social networks which connect it to society. The origins of these networks lie in the construction of the historical state which expanded by merging with local lineages and kinship groups. Using data on the historical expansion of the Rwandan state as a proxy for the strength of state–society social networks we show they are uncorrelated with measures of Weberian state capacity. In a fieldwork exercise, we show that rule compliance today is positively correlated with our proxy, but uncorrelated with Weberian state capacity.
{"title":"Problematizing state capacity: the Rwandan case","authors":"Leander Heldring, James A. Robinson","doi":"10.1017/S1744137423000012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137423000012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We argue that the effectiveness of Rwandan governments, both at implementing the 1994 genocide and inducing the current growth miracle, illustrates that the state has high capacity. Yet this capacity is not captured by conventional Weberian concepts, with their focus on taxation and formal bureaucracy. Rather, the capacity of Rwanda's state relies on its ability to leverage dense social networks which connect it to society. The origins of these networks lie in the construction of the historical state which expanded by merging with local lineages and kinship groups. Using data on the historical expansion of the Rwandan state as a proxy for the strength of state–society social networks we show they are uncorrelated with measures of Weberian state capacity. In a fieldwork exercise, we show that rule compliance today is positively correlated with our proxy, but uncorrelated with Weberian state capacity.","PeriodicalId":47221,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional Economics","volume":"19 1","pages":"401 - 425"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41611499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-22DOI: 10.1017/S1744137422000546
Matilde Jeppesen, Ane Karoline Bak, Anne Mette Kjær
Abstract This paper contributes to the debate on domestic revenue mobilization and state-building in the Global South by exploring the concept of fiscal states and the common assumption that such states are present in sub-Saharan Africa. We systematically review the diverse understandings of the fiscal state across relevant literatures to revisit its conceptualization. On that basis, we define the fiscal state as a state whose public revenue base is dominated by tax revenue and loans, and where the relationship between taxation and external and domestic borrowing is balanced and thereby sustainable and characterized by interdependence. We distinguish the fiscal state conceptually from the tax, debt, and rentier states and present a typology of these ideal state types, discussing illustrative empirical examples of different states in sub-Saharan Africa. These illustrate that not all sub-Saharan states can be categorized as fiscal states. This is important because when African states are regarded as fiscal states, assumptions are made about their economic structures; yet, to the extent that these are absent, fiscal policy reforms are unlikely to carry long-term positive effects.
{"title":"Conceptualizing the fiscal state: implications for sub-Saharan Africa","authors":"Matilde Jeppesen, Ane Karoline Bak, Anne Mette Kjær","doi":"10.1017/S1744137422000546","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137422000546","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper contributes to the debate on domestic revenue mobilization and state-building in the Global South by exploring the concept of fiscal states and the common assumption that such states are present in sub-Saharan Africa. We systematically review the diverse understandings of the fiscal state across relevant literatures to revisit its conceptualization. On that basis, we define the fiscal state as a state whose public revenue base is dominated by tax revenue and loans, and where the relationship between taxation and external and domestic borrowing is balanced and thereby sustainable and characterized by interdependence. We distinguish the fiscal state conceptually from the tax, debt, and rentier states and present a typology of these ideal state types, discussing illustrative empirical examples of different states in sub-Saharan Africa. These illustrate that not all sub-Saharan states can be categorized as fiscal states. This is important because when African states are regarded as fiscal states, assumptions are made about their economic structures; yet, to the extent that these are absent, fiscal policy reforms are unlikely to carry long-term positive effects.","PeriodicalId":47221,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional Economics","volume":"19 1","pages":"348 - 363"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45179204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-16DOI: 10.1017/s1744137422000431
W. Thurman
‘The Primacy of Property’ is a deep discussion of property as an evolved institution and should stimulate useful discussion of how property rights and transaction costs economists should ply their trade.
{"title":"Where lies the bundle of sticks? A comment on Bart Wilson's ‘The Primacy of Property’","authors":"W. Thurman","doi":"10.1017/s1744137422000431","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744137422000431","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 ‘The Primacy of Property’ is a deep discussion of property as an evolved institution and should stimulate useful discussion of how property rights and transaction costs economists should ply their trade.","PeriodicalId":47221,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49097615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-11DOI: 10.1017/s1744137422000522
K. Gërxhani, S. Cichocki
This paper reviews work that tests (1) how formal and informal institutions, and especially their interaction, affect participation in the shadow economy in transition countries; and (2) how participating in these shadow economies affects individuals' well-being. The key findings are that a clash of individuals' perceptions of formal institutions with their informal institutions increases involvement in the shadow economy. Conversely, a trustworthy relationship with the government and other individuals makes people more inclined to comply. The importance of their social and institutional context also appears in how individuals' involvement in the shadow economy relates to their well-being. These findings complement insights from the rich literature on tax morale, on the exchange between public institutions and citizens and between culture and institutions more generally. The findings also contribute to the institutional economic literature by empirically showing that: (1) focusing on formal institutions alone, that is strengthening the rule of law, is a necessary but insufficient response to the shadow economy; (2) taking informal institutions, such as individuals' trust and tax morale, into account is of equal importance; and (3) most importantly, formal and informal institutions go hand in hand, and their interaction should be an essential part of the new institutional perspective.
{"title":"Formal and informal institutions: understanding the shadow economy in transition countries","authors":"K. Gërxhani, S. Cichocki","doi":"10.1017/s1744137422000522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744137422000522","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper reviews work that tests (1) how formal and informal institutions, and especially their interaction, affect participation in the shadow economy in transition countries; and (2) how participating in these shadow economies affects individuals' well-being. The key findings are that a clash of individuals' perceptions of formal institutions with their informal institutions increases involvement in the shadow economy. Conversely, a trustworthy relationship with the government and other individuals makes people more inclined to comply. The importance of their social and institutional context also appears in how individuals' involvement in the shadow economy relates to their well-being. These findings complement insights from the rich literature on tax morale, on the exchange between public institutions and citizens and between culture and institutions more generally. The findings also contribute to the institutional economic literature by empirically showing that: (1) focusing on formal institutions alone, that is strengthening the rule of law, is a necessary but insufficient response to the shadow economy; (2) taking informal institutions, such as individuals' trust and tax morale, into account is of equal importance; and (3) most importantly, formal and informal institutions go hand in hand, and their interaction should be an essential part of the new institutional perspective.","PeriodicalId":47221,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46636987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-09DOI: 10.1017/s1744137422000248
Demet Yalcin Mousseau
The objective of this study is to show how contract-intensive economic institutions can promote diversity and inclusion of social and political groups in economic and business opportunities provided by governments. Building on the interdisciplinary political economy and governance literatures, two types of economic institutions are identified: rent-seeking and contract-intensive. It is argued that rent-seeking economic activities can reinforce in-group norms, gift-giving practices, and governments' discrimination of groups. However, when contract-intensive activities increase in an economy, they can enhance diversity and inclusion of groups in the marketplace creating opportunity structures outside the state and as businesses press governments toward greater impartiality. Analyses of 165 countries from 1961 to 2011 show that a one standard deviation increase in contract-intensive economic activity is associated with a substantial 18 percent increase in the equality of access to state business opportunities for both social and political groups in the long run.
{"title":"The impact of economic institutions on government policy: does contract-intensive economy promote impartial governance?","authors":"Demet Yalcin Mousseau","doi":"10.1017/s1744137422000248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744137422000248","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The objective of this study is to show how contract-intensive economic institutions can promote diversity and inclusion of social and political groups in economic and business opportunities provided by governments. Building on the interdisciplinary political economy and governance literatures, two types of economic institutions are identified: rent-seeking and contract-intensive. It is argued that rent-seeking economic activities can reinforce in-group norms, gift-giving practices, and governments' discrimination of groups. However, when contract-intensive activities increase in an economy, they can enhance diversity and inclusion of groups in the marketplace creating opportunity structures outside the state and as businesses press governments toward greater impartiality. Analyses of 165 countries from 1961 to 2011 show that a one standard deviation increase in contract-intensive economic activity is associated with a substantial 18 percent increase in the equality of access to state business opportunities for both social and political groups in the long run.","PeriodicalId":47221,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48768220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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