Pub Date : 2022-09-13DOI: 10.1177/0095327x221115068
D. Travis, P. Shields
This Symposium on the role of social science in security policy responds to Michael Desch’s 2019 book Cult of the Irrelevant: The Waning Influence of Social Science on National Security. Four articles consider Desch’s position that the social sciences are becoming increasingly irrelevant in security policy. Yagil Levy and Peter Feaver challenge Desch’s perspective. Alan Okros and Rebecca Jensen largely concur with Desch’s perspective. Rebecca Schiff asserts that Desch’s analysis fell short by overlooking the divisive role of university activism and political narratives in his discourse.
{"title":"Introduction to the Symposium on National Security and Social Science","authors":"D. Travis, P. Shields","doi":"10.1177/0095327x221115068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327x221115068","url":null,"abstract":"This Symposium on the role of social science in security policy responds to Michael Desch’s 2019 book Cult of the Irrelevant: The Waning Influence of Social Science on National Security. Four articles consider Desch’s position that the social sciences are becoming increasingly irrelevant in security policy. Yagil Levy and Peter Feaver challenge Desch’s perspective. Alan Okros and Rebecca Jensen largely concur with Desch’s perspective. Rebecca Schiff asserts that Desch’s analysis fell short by overlooking the divisive role of university activism and political narratives in his discourse.","PeriodicalId":47332,"journal":{"name":"Armed Forces & Society","volume":"52 1","pages":"3 - 6"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73074298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-10DOI: 10.1177/0095327X221116138
S. Rietjens
What role did North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the coalition (International Security Assistance Force—ISAF) it led play in the failure of the West in Afghanistan? This essay argues that the ISAF intelligence community’s inability to come to grips with the complex operational environment in Afghanistan contributed to the problem. Using three concepts from the complexity literature, requisite variety, learning, and enactment, I analyze critical flaws in NATO’s approach. ISAF’s weak cross-cultural competence, its inconsistent relationships with international civilian organizations, and its absence of double- and triple-loop learning are identified as key drivers of NATO’s weak intelligence performance.
{"title":"NATO’s Struggle for Intelligence in Afghanistan","authors":"S. Rietjens","doi":"10.1177/0095327X221116138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X221116138","url":null,"abstract":"What role did North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the coalition (International Security Assistance Force—ISAF) it led play in the failure of the West in Afghanistan? This essay argues that the ISAF intelligence community’s inability to come to grips with the complex operational environment in Afghanistan contributed to the problem. Using three concepts from the complexity literature, requisite variety, learning, and enactment, I analyze critical flaws in NATO’s approach. ISAF’s weak cross-cultural competence, its inconsistent relationships with international civilian organizations, and its absence of double- and triple-loop learning are identified as key drivers of NATO’s weak intelligence performance.","PeriodicalId":47332,"journal":{"name":"Armed Forces & Society","volume":"134 1","pages":"1001 - 1012"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75744375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-10DOI: 10.1177/0095327X221116129
W. Atkins
Numerous reflections exist regarding who should be held accountable and what lessons should be learned from the military withdrawal and political collapse of Afghanistan. This essay argues that the failures in Afghanistan are second- and third-order effects of a failure of strategic thinking on behalf of civilian and military leadership alike. I argue that this failure of strategic thinking is caused, in part, by the overreliance on concepts of civil–military relations espoused by Samuel Huntington. These concepts have been inculcated by a professional military education system that has subsequently developed a generation of officers with an atrophied appreciation for the political aspects of war, and an inability to link operational prowess to the achievement of strategic objectives. This dilemma is aggravated by a similar overreliance on systematic thinking, which further obscures the linkages between the military and political aspects of strategy.
{"title":"Who Lost Afghanistan? Samuel Huntington and the Decline of Strategic Thinking","authors":"W. Atkins","doi":"10.1177/0095327X221116129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X221116129","url":null,"abstract":"Numerous reflections exist regarding who should be held accountable and what lessons should be learned from the military withdrawal and political collapse of Afghanistan. This essay argues that the failures in Afghanistan are second- and third-order effects of a failure of strategic thinking on behalf of civilian and military leadership alike. I argue that this failure of strategic thinking is caused, in part, by the overreliance on concepts of civil–military relations espoused by Samuel Huntington. These concepts have been inculcated by a professional military education system that has subsequently developed a generation of officers with an atrophied appreciation for the political aspects of war, and an inability to link operational prowess to the achievement of strategic objectives. This dilemma is aggravated by a similar overreliance on systematic thinking, which further obscures the linkages between the military and political aspects of strategy.","PeriodicalId":47332,"journal":{"name":"Armed Forces & Society","volume":"7 1","pages":"965 - 981"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79205368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-10DOI: 10.1177/0095327X221116876
Risa A. Brooks
This article explores shortcomings in military effectiveness in the war in Afghanistan. It focuses on three sets of problems: the failure to resolve internal contradictions in the training effort, the failure to integrate political considerations with military activity, and poor strategic and operational/tactical integration.
{"title":"The Best They Could Do? Assessing U.S. Military Effectiveness in the Afghanistan War","authors":"Risa A. Brooks","doi":"10.1177/0095327X221116876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X221116876","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores shortcomings in military effectiveness in the war in Afghanistan. It focuses on three sets of problems: the failure to resolve internal contradictions in the training effort, the failure to integrate political considerations with military activity, and poor strategic and operational/tactical integration.","PeriodicalId":47332,"journal":{"name":"Armed Forces & Society","volume":"56 1","pages":"913 - 922"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77630256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-13DOI: 10.1177/0095327X221100780
S. Allen., Sam R. Bell, C. Machain
Can the presence of international organizations reduce civilian deaths caused by aerial bombing? This commentary examines this question in the specific context of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. We evaluate this based on interviews conducted with members of international organizations that were present in Afghanistan during the conflict, existing intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and government reports, and with quantitative data on civilian casualties between 2008 and 2013. We conclude that there is tentative evidence from Afghanistan that international organizations can in fact reduce the severity of civilian killings that result from the use of air power. However, there is much need for greater data sharing to more fully answer this important question.
{"title":"Air Power, International Organizations, and Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan","authors":"S. Allen., Sam R. Bell, C. Machain","doi":"10.1177/0095327X221100780","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X221100780","url":null,"abstract":"Can the presence of international organizations reduce civilian deaths caused by aerial bombing? This commentary examines this question in the specific context of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. We evaluate this based on interviews conducted with members of international organizations that were present in Afghanistan during the conflict, existing intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and government reports, and with quantitative data on civilian casualties between 2008 and 2013. We conclude that there is tentative evidence from Afghanistan that international organizations can in fact reduce the severity of civilian killings that result from the use of air power. However, there is much need for greater data sharing to more fully answer this important question.","PeriodicalId":47332,"journal":{"name":"Armed Forces & Society","volume":"12 1","pages":"1048 - 1060"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80150964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-10DOI: 10.1177/0095327X221100769
Kairi Kasearu, Eleri Lillemäe, E. Ben‐Ari
The military covenant is a set of morally binding expectations marking the exchange between military, society, and the state. Its base is the military’s duality: like other large public institutions delivering services and its uniqueness in holding the monopoly over the use of legitimate organized state violence. The covenant is a form of relational (not transactional) contract based on trust between, and a long-term orientation of, partners; it both orders and displays these relations thereby offering both prescriptions for action and discursive means to legitimate them. The covenant can be used as an analytical (not normative) concept for theoretical development in three areas: social change and society-military ties, processual aspects of agreements between individuals and groups and the armed forces, and links between society-military ties and the social contract and social cohesion. We use the case of Estonia to illustrate the theoretical potential of the military covenant.
{"title":"The Military Covenant, Contractual Relations, and Social Cohesion in Democracies: Estonia as an Exploratory Case Study","authors":"Kairi Kasearu, Eleri Lillemäe, E. Ben‐Ari","doi":"10.1177/0095327X221100769","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X221100769","url":null,"abstract":"The military covenant is a set of morally binding expectations marking the exchange between military, society, and the state. Its base is the military’s duality: like other large public institutions delivering services and its uniqueness in holding the monopoly over the use of legitimate organized state violence. The covenant is a form of relational (not transactional) contract based on trust between, and a long-term orientation of, partners; it both orders and displays these relations thereby offering both prescriptions for action and discursive means to legitimate them. The covenant can be used as an analytical (not normative) concept for theoretical development in three areas: social change and society-military ties, processual aspects of agreements between individuals and groups and the armed forces, and links between society-military ties and the social contract and social cohesion. We use the case of Estonia to illustrate the theoretical potential of the military covenant.","PeriodicalId":47332,"journal":{"name":"Armed Forces & Society","volume":"63 1","pages":"729 - 751"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74061771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-10DOI: 10.1177/0095327x221103295
Connie A. Buscha
The evolution of the status of American women as warriors between Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990-1991 and the War in Afghanistan, beginning in 2001 [and simultaneously the Iraq War in 2003] is explored. This era of American civil-military history included rescinding the ‘Risk Rule’ of 1988, the formal ban on women serving in ground combat units. This generation of women’s legitimate military service as warriors began. The Afghanistan War period also exposed, however, the physical and emotional risks military women often face from their own colleagues on a global scale in the form of sexual violence. As a society, we purposefully must eliminate such risks inherent in the contemporary All-Volunteer Force (AVF) and clean up the resulting messes before we even consider taking the risk of conscription and mass mobilization of American women in our next war.
{"title":"Overturning the “Risk Rule” of 1988, Opting for New Risks: U.S. Women Servicemembers and the War in Afghanistan","authors":"Connie A. Buscha","doi":"10.1177/0095327x221103295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327x221103295","url":null,"abstract":"The evolution of the status of American women as warriors between Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990-1991 and the War in Afghanistan, beginning in 2001 [and simultaneously the Iraq War in 2003] is explored. This era of American civil-military history included rescinding the ‘Risk Rule’ of 1988, the formal ban on women serving in ground combat units. This generation of women’s legitimate military service as warriors began. The Afghanistan War period also exposed, however, the physical and emotional risks military women often face from their own colleagues on a global scale in the form of sexual violence. As a society, we purposefully must eliminate such risks inherent in the contemporary All-Volunteer Force (AVF) and clean up the resulting messes before we even consider taking the risk of conscription and mass mobilization of American women in our next war.","PeriodicalId":47332,"journal":{"name":"Armed Forces & Society","volume":"10 1","pages":"1035 - 1047"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79000097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-07DOI: 10.1177/0095327X221101340
Ori Swed
The two decades of war in Afghanistan left a mark on the American armed forces and redefined the American ways of war-making. One of this war’s legacies is the reimagining of the role of private military and security contractors in contemporary warfare. Due to the massive involvement of the private sector in the American war machine, this industry transformed from a marginal participant into a central partner. The privatization of military and security functions became a norm, an integral part of security architecture and military operation. In this study, I provide a brief review of this development and its implications.
{"title":"The Afghanistan War’s Legacy: The Reimagining of the Outsourcing of War and Security","authors":"Ori Swed","doi":"10.1177/0095327X221101340","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X221101340","url":null,"abstract":"The two decades of war in Afghanistan left a mark on the American armed forces and redefined the American ways of war-making. One of this war’s legacies is the reimagining of the role of private military and security contractors in contemporary warfare. Due to the massive involvement of the private sector in the American war machine, this industry transformed from a marginal participant into a central partner. The privatization of military and security functions became a norm, an integral part of security architecture and military operation. In this study, I provide a brief review of this development and its implications.","PeriodicalId":47332,"journal":{"name":"Armed Forces & Society","volume":"45 1","pages":"1027 - 1034"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90607061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-07DOI: 10.1177/0095327X221101364
J. Honig, Ilmari Käihkö
The Western defeat in Afghanistan was due to an inadequate process of strategic reflection informed, first, by an overestimation of the attractiveness of the Western political agenda to Afghans and, second, by overconfidence in the effectiveness of its military approach. As a corollary, popular support for the Taliban was underestimated. The insurgents possessed a degree of what we term strategic cohesion—a sociopolitical and military embeddedness within society—that produced a far stronger strategic effectiveness than we could replicate in our Afghan allies. Furthermore, a military-professional mindset underestimated the degree to which political considerations permeated the battlefield. The political effect of military actions was insufficiently integrated into strategic practice. Specifically, the linchpin officer in staff planning and field operations in Western armies struggled to act as what we term strategic colonels. In both respects, the war continues to offer important lessons for Western involvement in future conflict, including with Russia and China.
{"title":"An Exemplary Defeat: The West in Afghanistan, 2001–2021","authors":"J. Honig, Ilmari Käihkö","doi":"10.1177/0095327X221101364","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X221101364","url":null,"abstract":"The Western defeat in Afghanistan was due to an inadequate process of strategic reflection informed, first, by an overestimation of the attractiveness of the Western political agenda to Afghans and, second, by overconfidence in the effectiveness of its military approach. As a corollary, popular support for the Taliban was underestimated. The insurgents possessed a degree of what we term strategic cohesion—a sociopolitical and military embeddedness within society—that produced a far stronger strategic effectiveness than we could replicate in our Afghan allies. Furthermore, a military-professional mindset underestimated the degree to which political considerations permeated the battlefield. The political effect of military actions was insufficiently integrated into strategic practice. Specifically, the linchpin officer in staff planning and field operations in Western armies struggled to act as what we term strategic colonels. In both respects, the war continues to offer important lessons for Western involvement in future conflict, including with Russia and China.","PeriodicalId":47332,"journal":{"name":"Armed Forces & Society","volume":"18 1","pages":"989 - 1000"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89743028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-07DOI: 10.1177/0095327X221100584
D. Travis
Why did Afghanistan falter as a U.S. partner? America’s war in Afghanistan was lost for many reasons, but the U.S. military contributed to its downfall in two ways. First, U.S. combat units, trained to fight conventional battles, conducted counterterrorism operations (aka “search and destroy” missions) against guerilla forces that resulted in hardening the resolve of the enemy while causing widespread and senseless civilian casualties. Second, the Afghan military could not exist without U.S. logistical and material support. Because the Afghan Army was trained and equipped to fight a conventional-type war, they were incapable of operating independent of U.S. support, and could not survive on their own against guerrilla forces in a protracted civil war. Therefore, the Afghan security forces were not properly trained and equipped, demonstrating that the U.S. military repeated mistakes of the Vietnam War. It is argued that the United States must temper its conventional warfare mindset and re-direct resources toward improved ways to conduct limited wars against irregular adversaries. The constabulary forces concept described by Morris Janowitz is a feasible way to improve the chances that U.S. forces will succeed in such limited wars.
{"title":"Why the U.S. Military Lost Afghanistan","authors":"D. Travis","doi":"10.1177/0095327X221100584","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X221100584","url":null,"abstract":"Why did Afghanistan falter as a U.S. partner? America’s war in Afghanistan was lost for many reasons, but the U.S. military contributed to its downfall in two ways. First, U.S. combat units, trained to fight conventional battles, conducted counterterrorism operations (aka “search and destroy” missions) against guerilla forces that resulted in hardening the resolve of the enemy while causing widespread and senseless civilian casualties. Second, the Afghan military could not exist without U.S. logistical and material support. Because the Afghan Army was trained and equipped to fight a conventional-type war, they were incapable of operating independent of U.S. support, and could not survive on their own against guerrilla forces in a protracted civil war. Therefore, the Afghan security forces were not properly trained and equipped, demonstrating that the U.S. military repeated mistakes of the Vietnam War. It is argued that the United States must temper its conventional warfare mindset and re-direct resources toward improved ways to conduct limited wars against irregular adversaries. The constabulary forces concept described by Morris Janowitz is a feasible way to improve the chances that U.S. forces will succeed in such limited wars.","PeriodicalId":47332,"journal":{"name":"Armed Forces & Society","volume":"18 1","pages":"939 - 952"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72901439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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