Law and Social Inquiry-Journal of the American Bar Foundation最新文献

As law deepens its engagement with visual data, legal scholars have expressed concern that courts all too often uphold photographic evidence as objective representations of truth, rather than as necessarily partial portrayals of reality. To combat this naïve realism in legal institutions, some are incorporating insights from media studies in calling for a jurisprudence of the visual. Drawing on an ongoing lawsuit over the disclosure of detainee abuse photographs taken in Iraq and Afghanistan after September 11, I suggest this project expand its scope to examine litigants' interpretations of images in courtrooms, as well as concerns beyond photographic objectivity that arise in disclosure disputes, including images' unique privacy implications and national security risks. Though the stakes in this case are atypical, these specific concerns are to varying degrees more germane. Having all been raised before, they are likely to be heard again, if only by a single judge or jury.

In light of the contemporary long-term care crisis, Sandra Levitsky's book Caring for Our Own examines why there has been no movement to secure state support for caregivers. Speaking to sociolegal and social movement audiences, Levitsky reveals how lack of collective identity, the power of family-based ideologies, and the separation of support organizations from political ones help to repress mobilization. In this essay I refract Levitsky's findings through the lens of organizational theory and medical sociology. I argue that the social problem of long-term care is caught in an institutional gap since it does not readily fall under the purview of either medicine or family. I also discuss the implications of lay caregivers' provision of sophisticated medical care for theories of professional jurisdictions and gatekeeping.

The notion that families should care for their own seems straightforward in its meaning. I suggest that it may not be. Building on the argument advanced in Sandra Levitsky's Caring for Our Own, and especially its focus on the discursive shaping of rights consciousness, I draw attention to three discourses that may be responsible for how the caregivers quoted in the book understand family responsibility. One is an American discourse about the limits of government; one is a therapeutic discourse that is enacted in the support groups from which the book's respondents mainly come; and one is a nativist discourse that pits the American-born against newcomers. I argue that these discourses inflect the meaning of family responsibility in distinctive ways.

This article draws on the insights offered by Francesca Polletta, Calvin Morrill, and Elizabeth Chiarello in their comments on my book, Caring for Our Own: Why There Is No Political Demand for New American Social Welfare Rights (2014) to further specify the conditions that unleash the emancipatory potential of law. I argue that much of law's emancipatory power lies in its capacity to “construct anew”—to demonstrate new solutions to social problems by connecting the familiar with the strange. Drawing on the case of child care, I find that laws do not automatically provide the cultural resources to construct new claims for state intervention, but that existing laws—and the symbols, narratives, and norms that we associate with them—serve as grist for the political imagination and can be transposed to new contexts or institutions. In the absence of cultural resources in one institution (such as work), advocates can use legal discourse to strategically shift responsibility for a social problem to a new institution (such as education), opening up possibilities for new models, organizational actors, constituencies, and frames.

Character plays a crucial role in US law. This article explores flaws in how moral character requirements determine who can work in licensed occupations, who can practice law, and who can immigrate to the United States or become a citizen. Section I summarizes psychological research on character, which raises questions about a central legal premise that individuals have a settled disposition capable of accurately predicting their behavior independent of situational influences. Section II examines the role of moral character as an employment credential. Almost a third of the workforce is covered by licensing laws that typically require proof of good character and often unjustly penalize the seventy million Americans with criminal records. Section III examines the idiosyncratic and inconsistent application of moral character requirements for lawyers. Section IV focuses on similar flaws in immigration contexts. Section V identifies reform strategies to improve the fairness of character-related decisions in the law.

Solitary confinement has been a perennial tool of control in US prisons, despite its status as a repeatedly delegitimized practice. Although there have been significant changes in punishment over time, solitary confinement has remained, mostly at the margins and always as a response to past failures, part of an unending search for greater control over prisoners. This history raises the question of how a discredited penal technology can nevertheless persist. We locate the source of this persistence in prison administrators' unflagging belief in solitary confinement as a last-resort tool of control. To maintain this highly criticized practice, prison administrators strategically revise, but never abandon, discredited practices in response to antecedent legitimacy struggles. Using solitary confinement as a case study, we demonstrate how penal technologies that violate current sensibilities can survive, despite changing macro-level social factors that otherwise explain penal change and practice, provided those technologies serve prison officials' internal goals.