Review of Industrial Organization最新文献

This paper explains that when there is great uncertainty about which elements of knowledge must be combined to make an invention, the likelihood of invention increases markedly-by many orders of magnitude-when there are numerous diverse research organizations, rather than just a few. The paper examines the possibility that competition (antitrust) policy toward mergers would be improved if enforcement efforts placed more emphasis on protecting the diversity that is provided by numerous research rivals in a market.

This study estimates the competitive effects of horizontal mergers in the French long-distance bus industry. We examine the two mergers that followed the 2015 Deregulation Act (the Macron Law); we use an exclusive and exhaustive dataset that covers eight consecutive quarters. We analyze the merger effects by comparing bus links that were affected by mergers with those that were unaffected; we use difference-in-differences estimations. We find that the two mergers are associated with price increases of about 13.5% immediately that then moderate to 5.3%; and with the frequency decreases from - 21.5 to - 25.7%; we observe no effects on load factors. These findings show evidence of short-run anticompetitive effects, while the mergers under study were not scrutinized by the French competition agency, as they were below the notification thresholds.

Especially in many online markets, consumers can readily observe prices, but may need to inspect products further to assess their suitability. We study the effects of product differentiation and search costs on competition and market outcomes in a tractable model of price-directed consumer search. We find that: (i) firms' equilibrium pricing always induces efficient search behavior; (ii) for relatively large product differentiation, welfare distortions still occur because some consumers (may) forgo consumption; and (iii) lower search costs lead to stochastically higher prices, which increases firms' expected profits and decreases their frequency of sales. Consumer surplus often falls when search costs decrease.

We consider the problem of patent licensing in a Cournot duopoly in which the innovator (patentee) is one of the firms and it is capacity constrained. We show that when the patentee can produce a relatively small (relatively large) quantity, it prefers licensing by means of a fixed fee (unit royalty). When the patentee can set two-part tariffs in the form of combinations of fixed fees and unit royalties, it charges a positive fixed fee if and only if it is limited to producing a relatively small quantity. We also show that with combinations of fixed fees and royalties, the royalty rate is lower than is true for the standard case.

This paper estimates the effect of a sugar-factory privatization policy on sugar beet acreages in Turkey. It finds that sugar beet acreages decreased by more than 15% due to the 2018 privatization of several sugar factories. Farmers decreased their contracted acreages in the middle of 2018, after the privatization announcement but before the actual transfer of the institutions. Production continued to decrease in the following years for the farms that were in the "catchment area" of the privatized factory group. However, for the farms that were in the area of the factories in which privatization was subsequently canceled, the negative effect of the announcement vanished. The results show that privatization policies can significantly affect markets even before the transfer of the institutions to the private sector.