Review of Industrial Organization最新文献

I study the relationship between competition and price dispersion by evaluating the competitive role of “ultra-low-cost carriers” (ULCCs) in the U.S. airline industry. These carriers have significantly lower unit costs than do traditional “low-cost carriers” (LCCs), and the ULCCs focus almost exclusively on leisure travelers, and offer unbundled products with low base fares and fees for many ancillary services. Public statements in carriers’ earnings calls from 2012 to 2019 indicate that “legacy carriers” responded to ULCC expansion by increasing fare segmentation and further reducing fares at the bottom of the fare distribution. Using data from 2012Q1 to 2019Q4, I show that ULCC presence significantly widens fare dispersion, whereas competition from legacy carriers and LCCs does not meaningfully affect fare dispersion in most cases. More generally, my results show that failing to account for firm-level heterogeneity could lead to inappropriate conclusions about the relationship between competition and price dispersion.

This paper analyzes whether repealing net neutrality (NN) improves or decreases the capacity of a regulator to make internet service providers (ISPs) extend broadband coverage through universal service obligations (USOs). We model a two-sided market where a monopolistic ISP links content providers (CPs) to end users with a broadband network of a given bandwidth. A regulator determines whether to subject the ISP to NN or to allow it to supply paid priority (P) services to CPs. She can also impose a broadband USO to the ISP: She can mandate the broadband market coverage. We show that the greater is the network bandwidth, the more likely is the repeal of NN to increase ISP profits and social welfare. Regulation can still be necessary, however, as there are bandwidth ranges for which the ISP would benefit from a repeal of NN while such a repeal is detrimental to society.

Assume that there is an outside innovator who owns a cost-reducing innovation and the market structure of the industry in question is that of successive monopoly. It is found that, an innovation that is aimed at an upstream firm will tend to be accompanied by a fixed fee license, while an innovation that is aimed at a downstream firm will tend to be accompanied by a per-unit royalty license. But the former is reversed if the market structure of the final goods becomes duopolistic: The optimal licensing contract could never be that of fixed fee when licensing occurs at the upmost production stage. Moreover, the industry profit, consumer surplus and social welfare are all maximized when the licensing occurs at the upmost production stage.

Abstract

In a sequential model of vertical product differentiation in which consumers are loss-averse, I analyse how firms compete to sell the reference product when they set prices. I find that there are two subgame perfect equilibria: one where the reference point for all consumers is the higher-quality product; and the other where the reference point is the lower-quality product. However, applying the risk-dominance criterion, I obtain that the sole risk-dominant equilibrium is for the higher-quality firm to sell the reference product. Since the hedonic price of the higher-quality product is the highest, consumers do not suffer any psychological disutility in the risk-dominant equilibrium.

This article investigates the mechanisms that underlie the biases in price elasticities of demand in applying static demand models under dynamic demand, which have been pointed out by previous empirical studies. It studies three sources of biases: disregard of state variables (affecting short-run elasticity); inconsistent utility parameter estimates; and changing expectations of consumers (affecting long-run elasticity). Disregard of state variables, such as durable product holdings, which is not negligible but not paid much attention to in the literature, leads to an overestimate of short-run own elasticities. Inconsistent utility parameter estimates arises due to the failure to account for consumers’ future expectations and unobserved state variables. Changing expectations of consumers are not explicitly specified in the static model, and this also leads to biased results when applying static models. Regarding the magnitude of the biases, the first and the third sources of biases might induce large biases in price elasticities, especially when the focus is on the large conditional choice probability products. Possible remedies for the use of static demand models are also discussed.

Supplier market power—such as the ability of branded goods suppliers to dictate terms to retailers—is an important feature of many markets. We show that supplier power can counteract the effects of downstream mergers on consumer prices where there are two-part contracts. This is because greater market power allows suppliers to set contracts that internalise partially the impact of the merger on downstream prices. Post-merger, the supplier reduces the per-unit price at which it supplies the merged downstream firms, with the aim of maintaining total industry profitability—and then recoups the profits via a larger fixed fee. We modify the standard upward pricing pressure (UPP) formula to account for the supplier’s response to a horizontal merger in the downstream market, while preserving much of the simplicity of the standard approach.

This study empirically investigates the revenue return to differential seat pricing in the Korean movie theater market and how it is affected by competition. In March 2016, one of three major multiplex chains in the market divided the seats in most of its screening auditoria into prime (high-quality), standard (medium-quality), and economy (low-quality) zones, and started charging different prices for each seating zone. For the analysis, we construct a unique dataset that contains ticket prices and the number of tickets that are sold at the show level. We find that differential seat pricing increases revenue on average by 10.6%, but does not affect the number of tickets sold. Based on the results, we suggest that in a situation in which a large number of seats remain unsold, the pricing scheme involves encouraging the sale of the prime zone seats by increasing their price only slightly. By measuring the degree of competition as the number of showings of the same movie that are played by neighboring theaters at a similar time, we also find that competition has a small negative effect on the revenue gain from differential seat pricing. This finding may be explained by switching costs that are due to moviegoers’ being away from preferred theater locations and showtimes.

Abstract

This study investigates the dynamic effects of patent pools in the optical disc (DVD) industry, while considering the inter-generational competition between standards. We examine their patent-pool effects on innovation in terms of patenting performance for the 2nd-generation (SG) standard (BD/HDDVD) as well as for the 1st-generation (FG) standard (DVD), with the use of firm-level panel data. Our major findings are as follows: First, the formation of the FG pools led to significantly more SG innovations by the pool licensors relative to the licensees. Second, the FG pools also led to more FG innovations by the pool licensees relative to the nonparticipants with comparable innovation capabilities, which suggests the procompetitive effects of the pools. Third, the licensors had significant innovations for the FG, starting in the pre-standard period. Thus, the patent pool appears to have positive dynamic effects, which thereby complemented the standards for the DVD pools.

In the past year, Division economists have contributed to the Division’s many investigations and enforcement actions. This review highlights several of the Division’s enforcement efforts that have confronted issues of labor market competition, as well as a merger challenge that focused on the Division’s theory of harm that would occur before the merger was consummated.