Pub Date : 2023-07-28DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09911-3
Juan Luis Jiménez, Manuel Ojeda-Cabral, José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro
Abstract Competition authorities need a better understanding of the determinants of cartel self-reporting in order to increase cartel members’ incentives to apply for the benefit from leniency programs and thus improve the effectiveness of anti-cartel policy. Using information on 683 firm groups that participated in 132 cartels that were penalized by the European Commission between 1996 and 2020, we estimate which type of cartel member is most likely to be the first or subsequent leniency applicant. Our results emphasize the role of firm groups as a driver to self-report: The higher is the proportion of firms that are part of the same group (relative to the size of the cartel), the greater is the likelihood of applying for leniency. Fines also incentivize cartelists—with the exceptions of ringleaders—to self-report. While ringleaders or instigators tend to avoid being first confessors, they appear to be more likely to self-report than are others only after someone else has revealed the cartel. Finally, cartels that do bid-rigging are less likely to be uncovered by a leniency application.
{"title":"Who Blows the Whistle on Cartels? Finding the Leniency Applicant at the European Commission","authors":"Juan Luis Jiménez, Manuel Ojeda-Cabral, José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro","doi":"10.1007/s11151-023-09911-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09911-3","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Competition authorities need a better understanding of the determinants of cartel self-reporting in order to increase cartel members’ incentives to apply for the benefit from leniency programs and thus improve the effectiveness of anti-cartel policy. Using information on 683 firm groups that participated in 132 cartels that were penalized by the European Commission between 1996 and 2020, we estimate which type of cartel member is most likely to be the first or subsequent leniency applicant. Our results emphasize the role of firm groups as a driver to self-report: The higher is the proportion of firms that are part of the same group (relative to the size of the cartel), the greater is the likelihood of applying for leniency. Fines also incentivize cartelists—with the exceptions of ringleaders—to self-report. While ringleaders or instigators tend to avoid being first confessors, they appear to be more likely to self-report than are others only after someone else has revealed the cartel. Finally, cartels that do bid-rigging are less likely to be uncovered by a leniency application.","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134965468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-27DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09909-x
L. van Stekelenburg, Peter T. Dijkstra, E. V. van Steenbergen, J. Mastop, N. Ellemers
{"title":"Integrating Norms, Knowledge, and Social Ties into the Deterrence Model of Cartels: A Survey Study of Business Executives","authors":"L. van Stekelenburg, Peter T. Dijkstra, E. V. van Steenbergen, J. Mastop, N. Ellemers","doi":"10.1007/s11151-023-09909-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09909-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":"63 1","pages":"275 - 315"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42100587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-13DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09906-0
Markus Thomas Münter
{"title":"Endogenous Entry and Growth of Firms with Heterogeneous Firms","authors":"Markus Thomas Münter","doi":"10.1007/s11151-023-09906-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09906-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":"63 1","pages":"21 - 39"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47229699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-02DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09904-2
S. Akhundjanov, Ben O. Smith, Max St. Brown
{"title":"Path Dependence as a Path to Consumer Surplus and Loyalty","authors":"S. Akhundjanov, Ben O. Smith, Max St. Brown","doi":"10.1007/s11151-023-09904-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09904-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":"63 1","pages":"1 - 20"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44585457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-16DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09901-5
Yuhui. Liu, D. Chisholm, G. Norman
{"title":"Product-Line Decisions and Rapid Turnover in Movie Markets","authors":"Yuhui. Liu, D. Chisholm, G. Norman","doi":"10.1007/s11151-023-09901-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09901-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":"62 1","pages":"341 - 365"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48645164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-13DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09902-4
Leonard F.S. Wang, D. Buccella
{"title":"The Timing of Technology Adoption in Network Industries","authors":"Leonard F.S. Wang, D. Buccella","doi":"10.1007/s11151-023-09902-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09902-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":"62 1","pages":"367 - 392"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49188715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-08DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09900-6
Huubinh B. Le, Jules O. Yimga
{"title":"Slot Divestitures and Price Competition at Reagan National and LaGuardia","authors":"Huubinh B. Le, Jules O. Yimga","doi":"10.1007/s11151-023-09900-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09900-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":"62 1","pages":"321 - 340"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42209016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：