Pub Date : 2023-09-01DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09915-z
Jeong Yeol Kim, Charles N. Noussair
{"title":"Leniency Policies and Cartel Success: An Experiment","authors":"Jeong Yeol Kim, Charles N. Noussair","doi":"10.1007/s11151-023-09915-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09915-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135149897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-01DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09917-x
Hong-Ren Din, Chia-Hung Sun
{"title":"A Technology Licensing Model with Endogenous Timing","authors":"Hong-Ren Din, Chia-Hung Sun","doi":"10.1007/s11151-023-09917-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09917-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46839099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is Amnesty Plus More Successful in Fighting Multimarket Cartels? An Exploratory Analysis","authors":"Karine Brisset, Francois Cochard, Eve-Angeline Lambert","doi":"10.1007/s11151-023-09919-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09919-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135298001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-01DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09920-2
Catarina Marvão, Giancarlo Spagnolo
Abstract We revisit the pros and cons of introducing cartel criminalization in the EU. We document the recent EU “leniency inflation”, whereby leniency has been increasingly awarded to many (or all) cartel members, which softens the “courthouse race” effect. Coupled with the insufficient protection of leniency applicants from damages (2014 Damages Directive), it may have led to a decrease in leniency applications and cartel convictions. Given the current level of fines, criminalization may have to be introduced. We then explore US criminal sanctions (1990–2015) to highlight potential areas of concern for EU policymakers, of which recidivism appears to be a significant one.
{"title":"Leniency Inflation, Cartel Damages, and Criminalization","authors":"Catarina Marvão, Giancarlo Spagnolo","doi":"10.1007/s11151-023-09920-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09920-2","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We revisit the pros and cons of introducing cartel criminalization in the EU. We document the recent EU “leniency inflation”, whereby leniency has been increasingly awarded to many (or all) cartel members, which softens the “courthouse race” effect. Coupled with the insufficient protection of leniency applicants from damages (2014 Damages Directive), it may have led to a decrease in leniency applications and cartel convictions. Given the current level of fines, criminalization may have to be introduced. We then explore US criminal sanctions (1990–2015) to highlight potential areas of concern for EU policymakers, of which recidivism appears to be a significant one.","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135890162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-29DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09913-1
J. Hinloopen, S. Onderstal, A. Soetevent
{"title":"Corporate Leniency Programs for Antitrust: Past, Present, and Future","authors":"J. Hinloopen, S. Onderstal, A. Soetevent","doi":"10.1007/s11151-023-09913-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09913-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42643237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-28DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09914-0
Garrett T. Senney, Jonathan R. Lhost
{"title":"Balancing Attraction and Risk Revelation: The Optimal Reservation Price in Peer-to-Peer Loan Auctions","authors":"Garrett T. Senney, Jonathan R. Lhost","doi":"10.1007/s11151-023-09914-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09914-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42310112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-18DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09912-2
Garrett T. Senney, Jonathan R. Lhost
{"title":"Big Bids and Bidder Behavior in Uniform Price Auctions: Evidence from Peer-to-Peer Loan Markets","authors":"Garrett T. Senney, Jonathan R. Lhost","doi":"10.1007/s11151-023-09912-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09912-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42742139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-18DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09910-4
Peter T. Dijkstra, Jacob Seifert
{"title":"Cartel Leniency and Settlements: A Joint Perspective","authors":"Peter T. Dijkstra, Jacob Seifert","doi":"10.1007/s11151-023-09910-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09910-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48337962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-01DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09907-z
C. Vergari, L. Filippini
{"title":"Innovation Diffusion and Strategic Outside Option in a Bargaining Game","authors":"C. Vergari, L. Filippini","doi":"10.1007/s11151-023-09907-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09907-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42976185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-28DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09911-3
Juan Luis Jiménez, Manuel Ojeda-Cabral, José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro
Abstract Competition authorities need a better understanding of the determinants of cartel self-reporting in order to increase cartel members’ incentives to apply for the benefit from leniency programs and thus improve the effectiveness of anti-cartel policy. Using information on 683 firm groups that participated in 132 cartels that were penalized by the European Commission between 1996 and 2020, we estimate which type of cartel member is most likely to be the first or subsequent leniency applicant. Our results emphasize the role of firm groups as a driver to self-report: The higher is the proportion of firms that are part of the same group (relative to the size of the cartel), the greater is the likelihood of applying for leniency. Fines also incentivize cartelists—with the exceptions of ringleaders—to self-report. While ringleaders or instigators tend to avoid being first confessors, they appear to be more likely to self-report than are others only after someone else has revealed the cartel. Finally, cartels that do bid-rigging are less likely to be uncovered by a leniency application.
{"title":"Who Blows the Whistle on Cartels? Finding the Leniency Applicant at the European Commission","authors":"Juan Luis Jiménez, Manuel Ojeda-Cabral, José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro","doi":"10.1007/s11151-023-09911-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09911-3","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Competition authorities need a better understanding of the determinants of cartel self-reporting in order to increase cartel members’ incentives to apply for the benefit from leniency programs and thus improve the effectiveness of anti-cartel policy. Using information on 683 firm groups that participated in 132 cartels that were penalized by the European Commission between 1996 and 2020, we estimate which type of cartel member is most likely to be the first or subsequent leniency applicant. Our results emphasize the role of firm groups as a driver to self-report: The higher is the proportion of firms that are part of the same group (relative to the size of the cartel), the greater is the likelihood of applying for leniency. Fines also incentivize cartelists—with the exceptions of ringleaders—to self-report. While ringleaders or instigators tend to avoid being first confessors, they appear to be more likely to self-report than are others only after someone else has revealed the cartel. Finally, cartels that do bid-rigging are less likely to be uncovered by a leniency application.","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134965468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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