Pub Date : 2009-09-01DOI: 10.4324/9781315091617-23
Carlos F. Alves, C. Barbot
The low-cost carriers' (LCCs) pricing system is characterised by a single class of booking that starts with a minimum fare and then monotonically increases its value over time. This is a form of price discrimination although markets are not physically or temporally separate. Using game theory techniques, this paper shows that this Lo-Hi (low first and later high) strategy is optimal under certain ranges of fare. The paper also finds that the existence of different probabilities of consuming the good and of different willingness to pay makes it possible to separate markets in time and to profitably price discriminate. ? 2009 LSE and the University of Bath
{"title":"Price Discrimination Strategies of Low-cost Carriers","authors":"Carlos F. Alves, C. Barbot","doi":"10.4324/9781315091617-23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315091617-23","url":null,"abstract":"The low-cost carriers' (LCCs) pricing system is characterised by a single class of booking that starts with a minimum fare and then monotonically increases its value over time. This is a form of price discrimination although markets are not physically or temporally separate. Using game theory techniques, this paper shows that this Lo-Hi (low first and later high) strategy is optimal under certain ranges of fare. The paper also finds that the existence of different probabilities of consuming the good and of different willingness to pay makes it possible to separate markets in time and to profitably price discriminate. ? 2009 LSE and the University of Bath","PeriodicalId":47475,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transport Economics and Policy","volume":"43 1","pages":"345-363"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2009-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70628736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The objective of this paper is to inform the debate on how efficiency targets for Network Rail (formerly Railtrack) should be set during the 2002/03 Interim Review and beyond. Given the problems experienced during the 2000 Periodic Review, which focused on external benchmarks, we propose an internal benchmarking approach, drawing on data for seven geographical Zones within Railtrack (over the period 1995/96 to 2001/02). Our approach mirrors the yardstick competition method used in other UK regulated industries. Three efficiency measurement techniques are applied to this data (DEA; COLS; SFA). Our results suggest that Railtrack (as a whole) delivered substantial improvements in productivity in the early years after privatisation, although these savings were largely offset by the post-Hatfield cost increases. However, looking forward, Zonal efficiency differences suggest that the company could make significant savings in future years by applying (its own) best practice consistently across the network.
{"title":"ASSESSING THE EFFICIENT COST OF SUSTAINING BRITAIN'S RAIL NETWORK: PERSPECTIVES BASED ON ZONAL COMPARISONS","authors":"J. Kennedy, Andrew S. J. Smith","doi":"10.17863/CAM.5033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.5033","url":null,"abstract":"The objective of this paper is to inform the debate on how efficiency targets for Network Rail (formerly Railtrack) should be set during the 2002/03 Interim Review and beyond. Given the problems experienced during the 2000 Periodic Review, which focused on external benchmarks, we propose an internal benchmarking approach, drawing on data for seven geographical Zones within Railtrack (over the period 1995/96 to 2001/02). Our approach mirrors the yardstick competition method used in other UK regulated industries. Three efficiency measurement techniques are applied to this data (DEA; COLS; SFA). Our results suggest that Railtrack (as a whole) delivered substantial improvements in productivity in the early years after privatisation, although these savings were largely offset by the post-Hatfield cost increases. However, looking forward, Zonal efficiency differences suggest that the company could make significant savings in future years by applying (its own) best practice consistently across the network.","PeriodicalId":47475,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transport Economics and Policy","volume":"38 1","pages":"157-190"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2004-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67573102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-05-01DOI: 10.4324/9781315256252-20
M. Tanishita, S. Kashima, William Hayes
This article presents an analysis of the impact of car-related taxes in Japan from the viewpoint of their impact on transportation policy goals, revenue generation and controlling transportation demand. They account for about 10 percent of all taxes raised and include taxes on buying cars, regular ownership and usage taxes, and fuel taxes. The authors developed a model of car usage by household to determine how taxes affect car ownership and use and how and if tax subsidies affect transit ridership. Similar research has been one in the EU and the U.S. One key element in Japan is the high share of rail transit, as much as 45 percent of commuter trips in Tokyo and nationwide averaging more than 30 percent of commuter trips. The model studied fuel consumption as a factor of car ownership, use and travel speed. Given current trends, fuel consumption is expected to rise 41 percent by 2010. The study sought to understand which car-related taxes would best reduce this growth in fuel consumption. It found that a fuel tax is more efficient than acquisition or ownership taxes, subsidies for mass transit work, incentives for manufacturers to improve fuel efficiency might work, but taxes are limited in how much they can reduce fuel use.
{"title":"IMPACT ANALYSIS OF CAR-RELATED TAXES ON FUEL CONSUMPTION IN JAPAN","authors":"M. Tanishita, S. Kashima, William Hayes","doi":"10.4324/9781315256252-20","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315256252-20","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents an analysis of the impact of car-related taxes in Japan from the viewpoint of their impact on transportation policy goals, revenue generation and controlling transportation demand. They account for about 10 percent of all taxes raised and include taxes on buying cars, regular ownership and usage taxes, and fuel taxes. The authors developed a model of car usage by household to determine how taxes affect car ownership and use and how and if tax subsidies affect transit ridership. Similar research has been one in the EU and the U.S. One key element in Japan is the high share of rail transit, as much as 45 percent of commuter trips in Tokyo and nationwide averaging more than 30 percent of commuter trips. The model studied fuel consumption as a factor of car ownership, use and travel speed. Given current trends, fuel consumption is expected to rise 41 percent by 2010. The study sought to understand which car-related taxes would best reduce this growth in fuel consumption. It found that a fuel tax is more efficient than acquisition or ownership taxes, subsidies for mass transit work, incentives for manufacturers to improve fuel efficiency might work, but taxes are limited in how much they can reduce fuel use.","PeriodicalId":47475,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transport Economics and Policy","volume":"37 1","pages":"133-155"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2003-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70642804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1996-09-01DOI: 10.4324/9781315091617-18
M. Dresner, J.-S. Lin, R. Windle
The entry of a low cost carrier onto a route leads to lower prices and higher passenger counts, both on other routes at the same airport and on competing routes at neighboring airports. These effects indicate that consumer gains from the entry of low cost carriers are higher than previously estimated. A case study and an econometric analysis are used to estimate these effects.
{"title":"THE IMPACT OF LOW COST CARRIERS ON AIRPORT AND ROUTE COMPETITION","authors":"M. Dresner, J.-S. Lin, R. Windle","doi":"10.4324/9781315091617-18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315091617-18","url":null,"abstract":"The entry of a low cost carrier onto a route leads to lower prices and higher passenger counts, both on other routes at the same airport and on competing routes at neighboring airports. These effects indicate that consumer gains from the entry of low cost carriers are higher than previously estimated. A case study and an econometric analysis are used to estimate these effects.","PeriodicalId":47475,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transport Economics and Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"309-328"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"1996-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70628730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1993-05-01DOI: 10.4324/9780203985359-34
J. Dodgson, Y. Katsoulacos, C. Newton
This paper is concerned with the identification of the predatory behaviour in the bus industry. An economic model of competition is used to determine competitive equilibria in markets where predation is alleged. The model can show whether a competitive entry opportunity exists in the market where entry has occurred. This modelling approach is compared with a more conventional "rule-of-reason" approach used by the Office of Fair Trading and by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission to investigate predation in the town of Inverness, Scotland. (A)
本文研究的是公共汽车行业掠夺性行为的识别问题。竞争的经济模型被用来确定市场中存在掠夺行为的竞争均衡。该模型可以显示在已经进入的市场中是否存在竞争性进入机会。这种建模方法与英国公平贸易局(Office of Fair Trading)和英国垄断与合并委员会(Monopolies and Mergers Commission)在调查苏格兰因弗内斯镇(Inverness)的掠夺性行为时采用的更为传统的“理性法则”(rule-of-reason)方法进行了比较。（一）
{"title":"An application of the economic modelling approach to the investigation of predation","authors":"J. Dodgson, Y. Katsoulacos, C. Newton","doi":"10.4324/9780203985359-34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203985359-34","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is concerned with the identification of the predatory behaviour in the bus industry. An economic model of competition is used to determine competitive equilibria in markets where predation is alleged. The model can show whether a competitive entry opportunity exists in the market where entry has occurred. This modelling approach is compared with a more conventional \"rule-of-reason\" approach used by the Office of Fair Trading and by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission to investigate predation in the town of Inverness, Scotland. (A)","PeriodicalId":47475,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transport Economics and Policy","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"1993-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70605721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1993-01-01DOI: 10.4324/9780203985359-24
T. Oum, A. Zhang, Yiming Zhang
Since deregulation in 1978 the US airline industry has undergone major structural changes. A series of mergers and hub-and-spoke network development have increased market concentration at major airports as well as at industry level. The industry is still being consolidated. Analysts express concern regarding the increasing market power of a few airlines, especially in route markets connected to major hub airports. There is clear evidence that major US airlines attempt to solidify their market power by intensif ying hub and-spoke networks, offering commission overrides to travel agents (a system that rewards agents for directing a high proportion of their business to an airline), using skilful dynamic pricing and seat allocation techniques (scientific yield management) and frequent-flyer bonus programmes for rewarding brand-loyal customers. A large number of routes are served by three or fewer airlines, indicating that a small numbers oligopoly is the dominant market structure in the industry, particularly on the routes directly connected to major hubs. Furthermore, recent evidence shows that dominant airlines at hub airports have sustained higher average fares for the local traffic than their competitors (see Borenstein,1989, 1990; and Berry, 1992). This suggests the importance of understanding competitive interaction among airlines in order to explain their pricing behaviour and price differentials between airlines serving the same route markets.
{"title":"INTER-FIRM RIVALRY AND FIRM-SPECIFIC PRICE ELASTICITIES IN DEREGULATED AIRLINE MARKETS.","authors":"T. Oum, A. Zhang, Yiming Zhang","doi":"10.4324/9780203985359-24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203985359-24","url":null,"abstract":"Since deregulation in 1978 the US airline industry has undergone major structural changes. A series of mergers and hub-and-spoke network development have increased market concentration at major airports as well as at industry level. The industry is still being consolidated. Analysts express concern regarding the increasing market power of a few airlines, especially in route markets connected to major hub airports. There is clear evidence that major US airlines attempt to solidify their market power by intensif ying hub and-spoke networks, offering commission overrides to travel agents (a system that rewards agents for directing a high proportion of their business to an airline), using skilful dynamic pricing and seat allocation techniques (scientific yield management) and frequent-flyer bonus programmes for rewarding brand-loyal customers. A large number of routes are served by three or fewer airlines, indicating that a small numbers oligopoly is the dominant market structure in the industry, particularly on the routes directly connected to major hubs. Furthermore, recent evidence shows that dominant airlines at hub airports have sustained higher average fares for the local traffic than their competitors (see Borenstein,1989, 1990; and Berry, 1992). This suggests the importance of understanding competitive interaction among airlines in order to explain their pricing behaviour and price differentials between airlines serving the same route markets.","PeriodicalId":47475,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transport Economics and Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"1993-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70605665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1990-09-01DOI: 10.4324/9780203979532-18
M. Beesley
Collusion, predation and merger in buses should each be viewed as attempts by firms to restore and improve profits following deregulation in 1985. Their analysis by competition authorities should define the entry conditions which deregulation in 1985 exposed, and the changes since, including some raised barriers. Effective pro-competitive action depends on modifying these conditions. The analysis of predation and merger in buses performed by the Office of Fair Trading and the Monopolies and Mergers Commissions are assessed in this light. Some evidence linking the registration since 1985 of agreements in restraint of trade, denoting collusion, with greater than average entry, and other parameters, is presented. (Author/TRRL)
{"title":"COLLUSION, PREDATION AND MERGER IN THE UK BUS INDUSTRY","authors":"M. Beesley","doi":"10.4324/9780203979532-18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203979532-18","url":null,"abstract":"Collusion, predation and merger in buses should each be viewed as attempts by firms to restore and improve profits following deregulation in 1985. Their analysis by competition authorities should define the entry conditions which deregulation in 1985 exposed, and the changes since, including some raised barriers. Effective pro-competitive action depends on modifying these conditions. The analysis of predation and merger in buses performed by the Office of Fair Trading and the Monopolies and Mergers Commissions are assessed in this light. Some evidence linking the registration since 1985 of agreements in restraint of trade, denoting collusion, with greater than average entry, and other parameters, is presented. (Author/TRRL)","PeriodicalId":47475,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transport Economics and Policy","volume":"24 1","pages":"191-207"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"1990-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70601716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1987-01-01DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-18584-9_10
E. Berglas, D. Fresko, D. Pinés
{"title":"RIGHT OF WAY AND CONGESTION TOLL","authors":"E. Berglas, D. Fresko, D. Pinés","doi":"10.1007/978-1-349-18584-9_10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18584-9_10","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47475,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transport Economics and Policy","volume":"18 1","pages":"343-374"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"1987-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50918964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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