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Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC's New Role as Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog 冲突矿产立法:美国证券交易委员会作为外交和人道主义监督机构的新角色
IF 0.8 3区 社会学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2012-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2182025
Karen E. Woody
Buried in the voluminous Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is an oft-overlooked provision requiring corporate disclosure of the use of “conflict minerals” in products manufactured by issuing corporations. This article scrutinizes the legislative history and lobbying efforts behind the conflict minerals provision to establish that, unlike the majority of the bill, its goals are moral and political, rather than financial. Analyzing the history of disclosure requirements, the article suggests that the presence of conflict minerals in a company’s product is not inherently material information, and that the Dodd-Frank provision statutorily renders non-material information material. The provision, thus, forces the SEC to expand beyond its congressional mandate of protecting investors and ensuring capital formation by requiring issuers engage in additional non-financial disclosures in order to meet the provision’s humanitarian and diplomatic aims. Further, the article posits that the conflict minerals provision is a wholly ineffective means to accomplish its stated humanitarian goals, and likely will cause more harm than good in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In conclusion, this article proposes that a more efficient regulatory model for conflict minerals is the Clean Diamond Trade Act and the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.
在《多德-弗兰克华尔街改革与消费者保护法》(Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act)中,隐藏着一条经常被忽视的条款,要求企业披露发行公司生产的产品中使用的“冲突矿产”。本文详细分析了冲突矿产条款背后的立法历史和游说努力,以确定,与大多数法案不同,它的目标是道德和政治,而不是经济。通过分析披露要求的历史,本文认为公司产品中存在冲突矿产本身并不是重要信息,多德-弗兰克法案在法律上使非重要信息成为重要信息。因此,该条款迫使SEC在其保护投资者和确保资本形成的国会授权之外进行扩展,要求发行人参与额外的非财务披露,以满足该条款的人道主义和外交目的。此外,文章认为,冲突矿产条款是实现其既定人道主义目标的一种完全无效的手段,可能会在刚果民主共和国造成弊大于利。综上所述,本文建议对冲突矿物更有效的监管模式是《清洁钻石贸易法案》和金伯利进程证书制度。
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引用次数: 25
Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition: Virtue’s Home in Originalism 原旨主义与亚里士多德传统:美德在原旨主义中的归宿
IF 0.8 3区 社会学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2011-08-19 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1912681
Lee J. Strang
A concept fundamental to philosophy – virtue – is, with a few notable exceptions, absent from scholarship on constitutional interpretation generally, and originalism in particular. Furthermore, common perceptions of both virtue ethics and originalism have prevented exploration of how incorporating virtue ethics’ insights may make originalism a better theory of constitutional interpretation. This Article fills that void by explaining the many ways in which concepts from virtue ethics are compatible with an originalist theory of constitutional interpretation. More importantly, I show that originalism is more normatively attractive and descriptively accurate when it takes on board virtue ethics’ insights. Originalism must articulate virtue’s role in constitutional interpretation for a number of reasons. First, incorporating the concept of virtue into originalism will give it greater explanatory power. For example, adding the concept of virtue to the mix helps originalism embrace ideals such as judicial craftsmanship. Second, incorporating the concept of virtue into originalism makes originalism more normatively attractive. Originalism has transformed over the past thirty years. Most importantly, originalism has come to acknowledge judicial discretion in constitutional adjudication. An originalism that incorporates the lessons of virtue ethics is able to preserve originalism as a viable theory of constitutional interpretation while, at the same time, continuing to acknowledge judicial discretion. An originalism that incorporates virtue ethics’ insights will give the Constitution’s original meaning its due. Simultaneously, it also gives other factors – such as the practical workability of legal doctrine – their due, all in their proper proportion.
除了一些值得注意的例外,哲学的一个基本概念——美德——在宪法解释的学术研究中普遍缺失,尤其是原旨主义。此外,对美德伦理和原旨主义的共同看法阻碍了探索如何将美德伦理的见解纳入宪法解释的原旨主义理论。本文通过解释美德伦理概念与宪法解释的原旨主义理论相容的许多方式来填补这一空白。更重要的是,我表明,当原旨主义采纳了美德伦理学的见解时,它在规范上更具吸引力,在描述上更准确。出于一些原因,原旨主义必须阐明美德在宪法解释中的作用。首先,将美德概念纳入原旨主义将使其具有更大的解释力。例如,将美德的概念加入其中,有助于原旨主义拥抱司法工艺等理想。第二,将美德概念纳入原旨主义使原旨主义更具规范性吸引力。原旨主义在过去三十年里发生了变化。最重要的是,原旨主义已经开始承认宪法裁决中的司法自由裁量权。原旨主义结合了美德伦理的教训,能够保留原旨主义作为宪法解释的可行理论,同时继续承认司法自由裁量权。一种融合了美德伦理洞见的原旨主义将赋予宪法应有的原意。同时,它也使其他因素- -例如法律原则的实际可行性- -以适当的比例得到应有的重视。
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引用次数: 4
Rights, Capabilities and the Good Society 权利、能力与美好社会
IF 0.8 3区 社会学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2011-05-25 DOI: 10.4324/9781315251240-5
R. West
In Part I this essay explores and then criticizes the two major arguments behind the conventional wisdom that rights undermine efforts to secure a state role in ensuring the material preconditions for a good society, and therefore, the material preconditions for the development of those human capabilities essential to a fully human life. I conclude in this part that this understanding of rights is mistaken. In Part II, I urge that the pragmatic argument put forward by rights critics and some welfare advocates for forgoing rights-talk and rights-rhetoric also fails: there are very real costs, both in theory and in law, in deciding to forgo putting the case for the state's obligation to provide minimal material goods in terms of rights. In Part III, I briefly describe two core rights that a refashioned liberal state, understood as a vehicle for protecting not just the liberty but also the capabilities of citizens, should recognize: first, a right to be protected against private violence, and second, a right of caregivers to give care to dependents without incurring the risk of severe impoverishment or subordination – a right, to use the provocative phrase coined by the philosopher Eva Kittay, to doulia. Both rights, I think, are directly entailed by the state's obligation to provide the minimal preconditions for the development of those fundamental human capabilities that are themselves essential to a fully human life. Both rights however, could be and should be conceived in the most traditionally liberal terms. The first such right – the right to protection against private violence – although now disfavored in United States rights discourse, seems fully authorized by both the liberal tradition and the American Constitution itself. The second right for which I will argue – the right to provide care to dependents has no similar basis of support in either liberal theory or American constitutionalism. It is not incompatible with either, however, and is at least arguably required by the deepest commitments of both. The right to protection and the right to care are rights that can be framed in liberal terms, and both rights would go a long way toward securing for individual citizens the minimal preconditions of a good society.
在第一部分中,本文探讨并批评了传统智慧背后的两个主要论点,即权利破坏了确保国家在确保良好社会的物质先决条件方面所做的努力,因此,这些人类能力发展的物质先决条件对于完整的人类生活至关重要。我在这一部分的结论是,这种对权利的理解是错误的。在第二部分中,我强调,权利批评家和一些福利倡导者提出的实用主义论点,即放弃权利言论和权利言论,也失败了:在理论上和法律上,决定放弃国家在权利方面提供最低限度物质商品的义务,都是非常现实的成本。在第三部分,我简要地描述了两个核心权利,一个重塑的自由主义国家,被理解为不仅保护公民的自由,而且保护公民的能力,应该承认:第一,保护免受私人暴力的权利,第二,照顾者照顾被抚养者的权利,而不会招致严重贫困或从属的风险——用哲学家伊娃·基泰创造的挑衅性短语来说,这是一种权利。我认为,这两项权利都直接与国家的义务有关,即为人类基本能力的发展提供最低限度的先决条件,而这些基本能力本身对于完整的人类生活至关重要。然而,这两种权利都可以而且应该用最传统的自由主义术语来理解。第一项权利——免受私人暴力侵害的权利——虽然现在在美国的权利论述中不受欢迎,但似乎得到了自由主义传统和美国宪法本身的充分授权。我要论证的第二项权利——为家属提供照顾的权利,在自由主义理论或美国宪政中都没有类似的支持基础。然而,它与两者都不是不相容的,而且至少可以说是两者最深刻的承诺所要求的。受保护的权利和受照顾的权利是可以用自由主义的术语来定义的权利,这两项权利都将大大有助于为公民个人确保一个良好社会的最低先决条件。
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引用次数: 6
The Honor of Private Law 私法的荣誉
IF 0.8 3区 社会学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2011-03-22 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1792467
Nathan B. Oman
While combativeness is central to how our culture both experiences and conceptualizes litigation, we generally notice it only as a regrettable cost. This Article offers a less squeamish vision, one that sees in the struggle of people suing one another a morally valuable activity: The vindication of insulted honor. This claim is offered as a normative defense of a civil recourse approach to private law. According to civil recourse theorists, tort and contract law should be seen as empowering plaintiffs to act against defendants, rather than as economically optimal incentives or as a means of enforcing duties of corrective justice. The justification of civil recourse must answer three questions. First, under what circumstances – if any – is one justified in acting or retaliating against a wrongdoer? Second, under what circumstances does the state have reasons for providing a mechanism for such action? Finally, how are the answers to these questions related to the current structure of our private law? This Article offers the vindication of wronged honor as an answer to these three questions. First, I establish the historical connection between honor and litigation by looking at the quintessential honor practice, dueling. Then I argue that the vindication of honor is normatively attractive. I do this by divorcing the idea of honor from unsavory associations with violence and aristocracy, showing how it can be made congruent with certain core modern concerns. In particular, when insulted parties act against wrongdoers, they reestablish the position of respect and equality that the insult upset. I then show how having the state provide plaintiffs with a means of vindicating their honor avoids making the political community complicit in the humiliation of its citizens and provides those citizens with a means of exercising their agency in ways that provide a foundation for self-respect. Finally, I show those areas of private law where honor operates most powerfully as a justification for providing recourse through the courts while acknowledging that it operates less powerfully as a reason in other areas.
虽然好斗是我们的文化如何体验和概念化诉讼的核心,但我们通常只将其视为一种令人遗憾的成本。这篇文章提供了一个不那么拘拘有礼的视角,在人们相互起诉的斗争中,我们看到了一种有道德价值的活动:为被侮辱的荣誉辩护。这一主张是作为对私法民事追索权方式的规范性辩护。根据民事追索权理论家的观点,侵权法和合同法应被视为赋予原告对被告采取行动的权力,而不是作为经济上最优的激励措施或作为执行纠正性司法义务的手段。民事追索权的正当性必须回答三个问题。首先,在什么情况下——如果有的话——一个人采取行动或报复作恶者是正当的?第二,在什么情况下,国家有理由为这种行为提供机制?最后,这些问题的答案与我们现行的私法结构有什么关系?这篇文章为这三个问题提供了辩护的机会。首先,我通过观察最典型的荣誉实践——决斗,来建立荣誉与诉讼之间的历史联系。然后我认为,维护荣誉在规范上是有吸引力的。为了做到这一点,我将荣誉的概念与暴力和贵族的令人讨厌的联系分离开来,展示了它如何与某些核心的现代关注保持一致。特别是,当被侮辱的一方对作恶者采取行动时,他们重新建立了被侮辱所破坏的尊重和平等的地位。然后,我展示了国家如何为原告提供一种维护其荣誉的手段,从而避免使政治团体成为羞辱其公民的同谋,并为这些公民提供一种行使其权力的手段,这种方式为自尊提供了基础。最后,我展示了私法中荣誉作为通过法院提供追索权的理由发挥最有力作用的领域,同时承认它在其他领域作为理由的作用较小。
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引用次数: 2
Giving Arbitration Some Credit: The Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses Under the Credit Repair Organizations Act 给予仲裁一定的信任:信用修复组织法下仲裁条款的可执行性
IF 0.8 3区 社会学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2011-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1753756
Genevieve Hanft
This Student Note addresses the unresolved question of the enforceability of arbitration agreements under the Credit Repair Organizations Act. While the Third and Eleventh Circuits have enforced such agreements, finding that the CROA does not preclude arbitration, the Ninth Circuit has refused to enforce these arbitration clauses, finding that the CROA entitles plaintiffs to a judicial forum. This conflict arises against a backdrop of debate over mandatory arbitration agreements between consumers and businesses. Scholars and legislators alike have argued that such agreements are unjust. A refusal to enforce such agreements, however, would fly in the face of the Supreme Court’s clear mandate to lower courts to enforce arbitration agreements. This Note examines the current circuit split over the enforceability of arbitration agreements under the Credit Repair Organizations Act in the context of both consumer protection law and relevant arbitration jurisprudence. Part I discusses the development of consumer protection law and the enactment of the Credit Repair Organizations Act, and examines the statute in detail. Part II describes the history and procedure of arbitration and examines the development of the Supreme Court’s policy regarding arbitration. Part III then analyzes the circuit split over the enforceability of arbitration agreements under the Credit Repair Organizations Act and the arguments for and against enforcing mandatory consumer arbitration clauses. Part IV advocates for the enforcement of such arbitration agreements, presenting several reasons why consumers will not be harmed by the enforcement of such agreements. Finally, Part IV proposes a simple solution to the problem: the elimination of credit repair organizations.
本学生笔记解决了《信用修复组织法》下仲裁协议的可执行性这一尚未解决的问题。虽然第三和第十一巡回法院已经执行了这些协议,认为CROA并不排除仲裁,但第九巡回法院拒绝执行这些仲裁条款,认为CROA赋予原告诉诸司法论坛的权利。这一冲突是在消费者和企业之间关于强制性仲裁协议的辩论的背景下产生的。学者和立法者都认为这样的协议是不公平的。然而,拒绝执行此类协议将违背最高法院对下级法院执行仲裁协议的明确授权。本文从消费者保护法和相关仲裁判例两方面考察了目前在《信用修复组织法》下仲裁协议可执行性的巡回法院分歧。第一部分论述了消费者保护法的发展和《信用修复组织法》的制定,并对该法规进行了详细的考察。第二部分描述了仲裁的历史和程序,并考察了最高法院关于仲裁政策的发展。第三部分接着分析了《信用修复组织法》下关于仲裁协议可执行性的巡回分歧,以及支持和反对执行强制性消费者仲裁条款的争论。第四部分主张执行此类仲裁协议,提出了消费者不会因执行此类协议而受到损害的几个原因。最后,第四部分提出了一个简单的解决方案:消除信用修复机构。
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引用次数: 2
The Internet is a Semicommons 互联网是半公共的
IF 0.8 3区 社会学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2010-06-01 DOI: 10.31228/osf.io/znhdx
James Grimmelmann
The Internet is a semicommons. Private property in servers and network links coexists with a shared communications platform. This distinctive combination both explains the Internet's enormous success and illustrates some of its recurring problems.Building on Henry Smith's theory of the semicommons in the medieval open-field system, this essay explains how the dynamic interplay between private and common uses on the Internet enables it to facilitate worldwide sharing and collaboration without collapsing under the strain of misuse. It shows that key technical features of the Internet, such as its layering of protocols and the Web's division into distinct "sites," respond to the characteristic threats of strategic behavior in a semicommons. An extended case study of the Usenet distributed messaging system shows that not all semicommons on the Internet succeed; the continued success of the Internet depends on our ability to create strong online communities that can manage and defend the infrastructure on which they rely. Private and common both have essential roles to play in that task, a lesson recognized in David Post's and Jonathan Zittrain's recent books on the Internet.
互联网是一个半公共领域。服务器和网络链路中的私有属性与共享通信平台共存。这种独特的结合既解释了互联网的巨大成功,也说明了它的一些反复出现的问题。本文以亨利·史密斯关于中世纪开放领域系统的半公地理论为基础,解释了互联网上私人和公共用途之间的动态相互作用如何使其能够促进全球共享和协作,而不会在滥用的压力下崩溃。它表明,互联网的关键技术特征,如协议的分层和网络划分为不同的“站点”,对半公共战略行为的特征威胁作出反应。对Usenet分布式消息传递系统的扩展案例研究表明,并不是所有的互联网上的半公共资源都成功了;互联网的持续成功取决于我们创建强大的在线社区的能力,这些社区能够管理和保护他们所依赖的基础设施。私人和公共在这项任务中都扮演着重要的角色,这一点在大卫·波斯特(David Post)和乔纳森·齐特林(Jonathan Zittrain)最近的互联网书籍中得到了认可。
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引用次数: 11
Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney/Client Relationship 对手团队?公司律师/客户关系的新模式
IF 0.8 3区 社会学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2009-12-02 DOI: 10.1093/CLP/62.1.478
D. Wilkins
At the heart of the traditional understanding of the lawyer's role stands a simple but powerful assumption: That the attorney/client relationship is essentially one of agency. In this paper, I argue that notwithstanding its pedigree and intuitive appeal, this traditional assumption is no longer an appropriate template for the relationship between large companies and their primary outside law firms. My claim is both descriptive and normative. Using a variety of data including the results of an on-going study of the legal purchasing decisions of large US companies, I argue that a series of recent trends - the "convergence" of law firm relationships by companies, "consolidation" among firms, increasing integration and information exchange both within and across organizational boundaries, and a surprising amount of turnover among in-house lawyers - are leading companies and firms to enter into relationships that look more like the kind of strategic alliances or partnerships that companies often have with their other important suppliers than the principal-agent relationship envisioned by the traditional model. Borrowing a phrase that has been used to describe the long-term strategic partnerships between Japanese automakers and their suppliers, I call these new relationships "legal keiretsus".Rather than emphasizing the typical principal-agent "logic of power" where stronger actors attempt to gain by coercing their exchange partners into an asymmetric distribution of value, these new legal keiretsus rely on a "logic of embeddedness" that seeks to encourage reciprocity and mutual trust to produce joint gains that will be fairly distributed between the parties. This new logic, however, arguably threatens the ability of outside counsel to function as public-regarding gatekeepers. Although these concerns are legitimate, I will argue that the logic of embeddedness is no more corrosive of public regarding values than the logic of power that now typifies the relationship between companies and their outside firms. Indeed, this logic has the potential to be significantly less corrosive - particularly if we move away from an ethical and regulatory structures based on a principal-agent model that serves only to entrench the ability of powerful corporate-principals to impose their will on increasingly vulnerable lawyer-agents. I conclude by identifying questions for future research, particularly in light of the current economic crisis, recent initiatives such as the American Corporate Counsel Association's Value Challenge, and the growing tendency among corporate clients to focus on the "department" or "team" level when making legal purchasing decisions.
对律师角色的传统理解的核心是一个简单而有力的假设:律师/客户关系本质上是一种代理关系。在本文中,我认为,尽管它的血统和直观的吸引力,这个传统的假设不再是一个合适的模板大公司和他们的主要外部律师事务所之间的关系。我的主张既是描述性的,也是规范性的。利用各种数据,包括对美国大公司法律采购决策的持续研究结果,我认为一系列最近的趋势——公司之间律师事务所关系的“趋同”,公司之间的“整合”,组织内部和跨组织边界的整合和信息交换的增加,内部律师之间惊人的流动率——正在领导公司和事务所建立一种关系,这种关系看起来更像是公司与其他重要供应商之间的那种战略联盟或伙伴关系,而不是传统模式所设想的委托代理关系。借用一个用来描述日本汽车制造商与其供应商之间长期战略合作伙伴关系的短语,我将这些新的关系称为“法律上的合作关系”。在典型的委托-代理“权力逻辑”中,实力较强的行为体试图通过强迫交换伙伴进行不对称的价值分配来获利,而这些新的法律主体依赖于“嵌入逻辑”,寻求鼓励互惠和相互信任,以产生在各方之间公平分配的共同收益。然而,这种新的逻辑可能会威胁到外部法律顾问作为公众看门人的能力。尽管这些担忧是合理的,但我认为,嵌入性的逻辑对公众价值观的侵蚀并不比现在代表公司与其外部公司之间关系的权力逻辑更严重。事实上,这种逻辑有可能大大降低其腐蚀性——特别是如果我们抛弃基于委托代理模式的道德和监管结构,这种模式只会巩固强大的公司委托人将其意志强加于日益脆弱的律师代理的能力。最后,我确定了未来研究的问题,特别是考虑到当前的经济危机,最近的倡议,如美国企业法律顾问协会的价值挑战,以及企业客户在做出法律采购决策时越来越倾向于关注“部门”或“团队”层面。
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引用次数: 30
When cows fly: expanding cognizable injury-in-fact and interest group litigation. 当牛飞:扩大可认知的事实损害与利益集团诉讼。
IF 0.8 3区 社会学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2009-12-01
Robert Terenzi

This Note takes an in-depth look at standing and, specifically, the extent to which increased risk of exposure to toxins caused by a government agency's regulations constitutes a judicially cognizable injury-in-fact. Despite over a century of case law on the topic, standing doctrine remains in flux and ill defined, largely due to the constantly changing ideological makeup of the U.S. Supreme Court. The lower courts are divided on the question of whether increased risk of future harm constitutes an injury-in-fact. Using Baur v. Veneman as a case study, this Note argues for the expansion of the definition of injury-in-fact to include potential future injuries that result from a specific government policy.

本说明将深入探讨因政府机构的法规而导致的毒素暴露风险增加在多大程度上构成司法上可认定的伤害——事实上。尽管关于这一主题的判例法已有一个多世纪的历史,但由于美国最高法院的意识形态构成不断变化,现有的原则仍在不断变化,定义不清。在未来伤害风险的增加是否构成事实伤害的问题上,下级法院存在分歧。本说明以鲍尔诉维尼曼案为例,主张扩大“事实伤害”的定义,使之包括因特定政府政策而可能造成的未来伤害。
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引用次数: 0
It's been a privilege: advising patients of the Tarasoff duty and its legal consequences for the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege. 这是一种特权:告诉病人塔拉索夫的职责及其对联邦精神治疗师-病人特权的法律后果。
IF 0.8 3区 社会学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2009-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1470849
Elisha Klinka
State laws modeled on Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California require psychotherapists to warn potential victims or law enforcement when treating dangerous patients who make serious threats of harm to another person. In practice, many psychotherapists advise their patients who make such threats about their duty under these Tarasoff-model laws. Although they are not required to make these advisories by law, psychotherapists generally assume that they also have a concomitant ethical duty to advise their patients that such threats will not be kept confidential, as their communications normally would be. This Note looks at how these advisories affect the status of privilege for subsequent threatening statements relayed to a psychotherapist. It explores the opposing views in the federal circuit courts regarding whether such an advisory precludes the existence of privilege for subsequent statements, or whether the advisory operates as a waiver to the privilege. This Note argues that threats communicated to a psychotherapist after an advisory about a psychotherapist's Tarasoff duty cannot be considered privileged if the patient intended for the threat to be passed on to a third party. Psychotherapists must now be aware of the possible legal consequences regarding the patients' diminished expectation of confidentiality and lack of privilege following such advisories. In order to act in their patients' best interest, psychotherapists should educate themselves about the scope of a Tarasoff duty in their applicable states and should consider alternative intervention techniques that could reduce dangerous patients' risk of harm. Psychotherapists should continue to follow professional ethical guidelines about advising patients of the limits of confidentiality, but implement techniques that evidence the patients' true intent about confidentiality, in order to bolster the patients' possible privilege claims later on and minimize harm to the treatment relationship.
以塔拉索夫诉加州大学董事案(Tarasoff v. Regents of California)为蓝本的州法律要求,心理治疗师在治疗对他人构成严重伤害威胁的危险患者时,必须警告潜在的受害者或执法部门。在实践中,许多心理治疗师建议他们的病人在这些塔拉索夫示范法下做出这样的威胁。虽然法律上没有要求心理治疗师提供这些建议,但他们通常认为,他们也有相应的道德责任,即告诉病人,这些威胁不会像他们通常的交流那样保密。本注着眼于这些建议如何影响随后传递给心理治疗师的威胁性陈述的特权状态。本文探讨了联邦巡回法院关于此类咨询是否排除了后续陈述特权的存在,或者咨询是否作为对特权的放弃而运作的反对意见。本说明认为,如果患者有意将威胁传递给第三方,则在咨询心理治疗师的Tarasoff职责后向心理治疗师传达的威胁不能被视为特权。心理治疗师现在必须意识到,在这样的建议之后,病人对保密和缺乏特权的期望降低可能带来的法律后果。为了给病人带来最大的利益,心理治疗师应该教育自己在他们适用的州Tarasoff职责的范围,并且应该考虑替代的干预技术,可以减少危险的病人受到伤害的风险。心理治疗师应该继续遵循职业道德准则,建议患者保密的限度,但要采用技术来证明患者保密的真实意图,以便支持患者以后可能的特权要求,并尽量减少对治疗关系的伤害。
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引用次数: 10
It's been a privilege: advising patients of the Tarasoff duty and its legal consequences for the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege. 这是一种特权:告诉病人塔拉索夫的职责及其对联邦精神治疗师-病人特权的法律后果。
IF 0.8 3区 社会学 Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2009-11-01
Elisha Klinka

State laws modeled on Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California require psychotherapists to warn potential victims or law enforcement when treating dangerous patients who make serious threats of harm to another person. In practice, many psychotherapists advise their patients who make such threats about their duty under these Tarasoff-model laws. Although they are not required to make these advisories by law, psychotherapists generally assume that they also have a concomitant ethical duty to advise their patients that such threats will not be kept confidential, as their communications normally would be. This Note looks at how these advisories affect the status of privilege for subsequent threatening statements relayed to a psychotherapist. It explores the opposing views in the federal circuit courts regarding whether such an advisory precludes the existence of privilege for subsequent statements, or whether the advisory operates as a waiver to the privilege. This Note argues that threats communicated to a psychotherapist after an advisory about a psychotherapist's Tarasoff duty cannot be considered privileged if the patient intended for the threat to be passed on to a third party. Psychotherapists must now be aware of the possible legal consequences regarding the patients' diminished expectation of confidentiality and lack of privilege following such advisories. In order to act in their patients' best interest, psychotherapists should educate themselves about the scope of a Tarasoff duty in their applicable states and should consider alternative intervention techniques that could reduce dangerous patients' risk of harm. Psychotherapists should continue to follow professional ethical guidelines about advising patients of the limits of confidentiality, but implement techniques that evidence the patients' true intent about confidentiality, in order to bolster the patients' possible privilege claims later on and minimize harm to the treatment relationship.

以塔拉索夫诉加州大学董事案(Tarasoff v. Regents of California)为蓝本的州法律要求,心理治疗师在治疗对他人构成严重伤害威胁的危险患者时,必须警告潜在的受害者或执法部门。在实践中,许多心理治疗师建议他们的病人在这些塔拉索夫示范法下做出这样的威胁。虽然法律上没有要求心理治疗师提供这些建议,但他们通常认为,他们也有相应的道德责任,即告诉病人,这些威胁不会像他们通常的交流那样保密。本注着眼于这些建议如何影响随后传递给心理治疗师的威胁性陈述的特权状态。本文探讨了联邦巡回法院关于此类咨询是否排除了后续陈述特权的存在,或者咨询是否作为对特权的放弃而运作的反对意见。本说明认为,如果患者有意将威胁传递给第三方,则在咨询心理治疗师的Tarasoff职责后向心理治疗师传达的威胁不能被视为特权。心理治疗师现在必须意识到,在这样的建议之后,病人对保密和缺乏特权的期望降低可能带来的法律后果。为了给病人带来最大的利益,心理治疗师应该教育自己在他们适用的州Tarasoff职责的范围,并且应该考虑替代的干预技术,可以减少危险的病人受到伤害的风险。心理治疗师应该继续遵循职业道德准则,建议患者保密的限度,但要采用技术来证明患者保密的真实意图,以便支持患者以后可能的特权要求,并尽量减少对治疗关系的伤害。
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Fordham Law Review
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