In this Essay, we examine a case in which the organizational and logistical demands of a novel form of organ exchange (the nonsimultaneous, extended, altruistic donor (NEAD) chain) do not map cleanly onto standard cultural schemas for either market or gift exchange, resulting in sociological ambiguity and legal uncertainty. In some ways, a NEAD chain resembles a form of generalized exchange, an ancient and widespread instance of the norm of reciprocity that can be thought of simply as the obligation to “pay it forward” rather than the obligation to reciprocate directly with the original giver. At the same time, a NEAD chain resembles a string of promises and commitments to deliver something in exchange for some valuable consideration--that is, a series of contracts. Neither of these salient "social imaginaries" of exchange--gift giving or formal contract--perfectly meets the practical demands of the NEAD system. As a result, neither contract nor generalized exchange drives the practice of NEAD chains. Rather, the majority of actual exchanges still resemble a simpler form of exchange: direct, simultaneous exchange between parties with no time delay or opportunity to back out. If NEAD chains are to reach their full promise for large-scale, nonsimultaneous organ transfer, legal uncertainties and sociological ambiguities must be finessed, both in the practices of the coordinating agencies and in the minds of NEAD-chain participants. This might happen either through the further elaboration of gift-like language and practices, or through a creative use of the cultural form and motivational vocabulary, but not necessarily the legal and institutional machinery, of contract.
Concerns about the alleged harmful effects of gene patents--including hindered research and innovation and impeded patient access to high-quality genetic diagnostic tests--have resulted in overreactions from the public and throughout the legal profession. These overreactions are exemplified by Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, a 2010 case in the Southern District of New York that held that isolated DNA is unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The problem with these responses is that they fail to adequately consider the role that gene patents and patents on similar biomolecules play in facilitating investment in the costly and risky developmental processes required to transform the underlying inventions into marketable products. Accordingly, a more precisely refined solution is advisable. This Note proposes a narrowly tailored set of solutions to address the concerns about gene patents without destroying the incentives for companies to create and commercialize inventions derived from these and similar patents.
Professional cycling has suffered from a number of doping scandals. The sport's governing bodies have responded by implementing an aggressive new antidoping program known as the biological passport. Cycling's biological passport marks a departure from traditional antidoping efforts, which have focused on directly detecting prohibited substances in a cyclist's system. Instead, the biological passport tracks biological variables in a cyclist's blood and urine over time, monitoring for fluctuations that are thought to indirectly reveal the effects of doping. Although this method of indirect detection is promising, it also raises serious legal and scientific concerns. Since its introduction, the cycling community has debated the reliability of indirect biological-passport evidence and the clarity, consistency, and transparency of its use in proving doping violations. Such uncertainty undermines the legitimacy of finding cyclists guilty of doping based on this indirect evidence alone. Antidoping authorities should address these important concerns before continuing to pursue doping sanctions against cyclists solely on the basis of their biological passports.