Pub Date : 2023-04-24DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01450-w
Urmee Khan, M. Stinchcombe
{"title":"Intergenerational equity and sustainability: a large population approach","authors":"Urmee Khan, M. Stinchcombe","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01450-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01450-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49635696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-17DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01457-3
Miho Hong, Semin Kim
{"title":"Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains","authors":"Miho Hong, Semin Kim","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01457-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01457-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"61 1","pages":"385 - 411"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41355550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-05DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01453-7
Niclas Boehmer, Markus Brill, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin
Abstract Given a set of agents with approval preferences over each other, we study the task of finding k matchings fairly representing everyone’s preferences. To formalize fairness, we apply the concept of proportional representation as studied in approval-based multiwinner elections. To this end, we model the problem as a multiwinner election where the set of candidates consists of matchings of the agents, and agents’ preferences over each other are lifted to preferences over matchings. Due to the exponential number of candidates in such elections, standard algorithms for classical sequential voting rules (such as those proposed by Thiele and Phragmén) are rendered inefficient. We show that the computational tractability of these rules can be regained by exploiting the structure of the approval preferences. Moreover, we establish algorithmic results and axiomatic guarantees that go beyond those obtainable in the classical approval-based multiwinner setting: Assuming that approvals are symmetric, we show that Proportional Approval Voting (PAV), a well-established but computationally intractable voting rule, becomes polynomial-time computable, and that its sequential variant, which does not provide any proportionality guarantees in general, fulfills a rather strong guarantee known as extended justified representation. Some of our algorithmic results extend to other types of compactly representable elections with an exponential candidate space.
{"title":"Proportional representation in matching markets: selecting multiple matchings under dichotomous preferences","authors":"Niclas Boehmer, Markus Brill, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01453-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01453-7","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Given a set of agents with approval preferences over each other, we study the task of finding k matchings fairly representing everyone’s preferences. To formalize fairness, we apply the concept of proportional representation as studied in approval-based multiwinner elections. To this end, we model the problem as a multiwinner election where the set of candidates consists of matchings of the agents, and agents’ preferences over each other are lifted to preferences over matchings. Due to the exponential number of candidates in such elections, standard algorithms for classical sequential voting rules (such as those proposed by Thiele and Phragmén) are rendered inefficient. We show that the computational tractability of these rules can be regained by exploiting the structure of the approval preferences. Moreover, we establish algorithmic results and axiomatic guarantees that go beyond those obtainable in the classical approval-based multiwinner setting: Assuming that approvals are symmetric, we show that Proportional Approval Voting (PAV), a well-established but computationally intractable voting rule, becomes polynomial-time computable, and that its sequential variant, which does not provide any proportionality guarantees in general, fulfills a rather strong guarantee known as extended justified representation. Some of our algorithmic results extend to other types of compactly representable elections with an exponential candidate space.","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136001702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-31DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01455-5
Antonio J. Morales, Javier Rodero-Cosano
{"title":"Forward induction and market entry with an endogenous outside option","authors":"Antonio J. Morales, Javier Rodero-Cosano","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01455-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01455-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"61 1","pages":"365 - 383"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45918794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-27DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01481-3
C. Leedham-Green, K. Markström, Søren Riis
{"title":"The largest Condorcet domain on 8 alternatives","authors":"C. Leedham-Green, K. Markström, Søren Riis","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01481-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01481-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45582375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-25DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01454-6
Michael Kurschilgen
How does moral awareness affect people's fairness judgments? Using a simple model of identity utility, I predict that if individuals differ in their personal fairness ideals (equality versus efficiency), reflecting over what one thinks is right should not only make people's choices less selfish but also more polarized. On the other hand, people's desire for conforming with the behavior of their peers could help mitigate polarization. I test these conjectures in a laboratory experiment, in which participants can pursue different fairness ideals. I exogenously vary (i) whether participants are prompted to state their moral opinions behind the veil of ignorance, and (ii) whether they are informed about the behavior of their peers. I find that moral introspection makes choices more polarized, reflecting even more divergent moral opinions. The increase in polarization coincides largely with a widening of revealed gender differences as introspection makes men's choices more efficiency-oriented and women's more egalitarian. Disclosing the descriptive norm of the situation is not capable of mitigating the polarization.
{"title":"Moral awareness polarizes people's fairness judgments.","authors":"Michael Kurschilgen","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01454-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01454-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>How does moral awareness affect people's fairness judgments? Using a simple model of identity utility, I predict that if individuals differ in their personal fairness ideals (equality versus efficiency), reflecting over what one thinks is right should not only make people's choices less selfish but also more polarized. On the other hand, people's desire for conforming with the behavior of their peers could help mitigate polarization. I test these conjectures in a laboratory experiment, in which participants can pursue different fairness ideals. I exogenously vary (i) whether participants are prompted to state their moral opinions behind the veil of ignorance, and (ii) whether they are informed about the behavior of their peers. I find that moral introspection makes choices more polarized, reflecting even more divergent moral opinions. The increase in polarization coincides largely with a widening of revealed gender differences as introspection makes men's choices more efficiency-oriented and women's more egalitarian. Disclosing the descriptive norm of the situation is not capable of mitigating the polarization.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":" ","pages":"1-26"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10039363/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9716454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-18DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01452-8
Gustaf Arrhenius, H. Stefánsson
{"title":"Population ethics under risk","authors":"Gustaf Arrhenius, H. Stefánsson","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01452-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01452-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49282678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-16DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01451-9
Kevin Kuruc, Jonathan R. McFadden
{"title":"Monetizing the externalities of animal agriculture: insights from an inclusive welfare function","authors":"Kevin Kuruc, Jonathan R. McFadden","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01451-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01451-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46001861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-06DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01448-w
Amílcar Mata Díaz, Ramón Pino Pérez, Jahn Franklin Leal
{"title":"Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions","authors":"Amílcar Mata Díaz, Ramón Pino Pérez, Jahn Franklin Leal","doi":"10.1007/s00355-022-01448-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01448-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"61 1","pages":"277 - 309"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41407382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-27DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01449-3
Pathikrit Basu
{"title":"Mechanism design with model specification","authors":"Pathikrit Basu","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01449-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01449-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-14"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42604138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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