Industrial Relations最新文献

Does collective bargaining lift wages for contingent workers? Well-worn theory suggests that temps at a covered employer earn less than otherwise similar “perms,” but still fare better than they would in a nonunion workplace. Our analysis of a national sample of matched employee–employer data first disposes of the universality of this conventional wisdom. Then, it allows us to test an alternative, contingent theory of the mitigating impact of collective bargaining on the temp wage gap predicated on received research in labor relations and institutional labor economics. We find that just how temps fare relative to perms hinges on the labor relations orientation of the employment relationship. Whereas unions clearly deliver for temps under adversarial conditions, they do not appear to do so where they adopt a more cooperative stance toward their employer counterparts.

This paper shows that labor demand plays an important role in the labor market reactions to a pension reform in Germany. Employers with a high share of older worker inflow compared with their younger worker inflow, employers in sectors with few investments in research and development, and employers in sectors with a high share of collective bargaining agreements allow their employees to stay employed longer after the reform. These employers offer their older employees partial retirement instead of forcing them into unemployment before early retirement because the older employees incur low substitution costs and high dismissal costs.

This paper examines whether workers are rewarded for inconsistent performance by salary premia. Some earlier research suggests that performance inconsistency leads to salary premia, while other research finds premia for consistent performance. Using detailed salary and performance data for top-level footballers in Italy’s Serie A, we find that inconsistency is penalized for some important dimensions of basic performance measures associated with key skills of players, specifically clearances, aerial duels won, and shots on target.

This paper explores how cultural work contributes to differences in coordinated and liberal industrial relations systems. Quantitative text analyses show profound and systematic differences between coordinated Denmark and liberal Britain in depictions of labour, skills, coordination and the role of government in large corpora of fictional works between 1700 and 1920. The analysis expands our notions about how ideas contribute to the employment relationship and to the defense against liberalization in the post-industrial economy.

Gender equality at work has become in recent years a priority for governments. In France, collective bargaining is the main lever to achieve progress on gender equality issues. In a two-tier bargaining framework, industries and firms are required by law to negotiate on the reduction of gender inequalities. Using firm-level survey data on labor relations issues combined with administrative data, this paper seeks to better understand the dynamics of collective bargaining on gender equality at the firm level by questioning the role played by the gender mix. We find that gender diversity favors gender equality bargaining at the firm level. Underrepresentation and overrepresentation of women reduce the probability of firms negotiating an agreement on gender equality. The introduction of sanctions in the recent period has prompted low-feminized firms to negotiate more on gender equality but had little impact on highly feminized firms.

The decision of the UK to leave the European Union created uncertainty for European citizens resident in the UK for the period 2016–2019. This paper studies the effects of this uncertainty on their mental health. Using data from a large household panel and a difference-in-differences framework, we find no evidence for a decline in mental health or life satisfaction for various definitions of EU citizens relative to multiple control groups. These findings are robust to the specific mental health measure. We corroborate this finding by looking at various channels plausibly linking Brexit and European citizens’ mental health.

This article analyzes how engagement in legitimation politics in Australia and New Zealand has enabled unions to influence the industrial relations policy process. It demonstrates how enhanced moral legitimacy with the wider public positively impacts unions’ pragmatic legitimacy with governing political parties. Drawing on Grant’s insider–outsider typology, we show how enhanced legitimacy can increase unions’ power resources as insider groups with center-left and, to a lesser extent, center-right governing parties, which can enable greater influence over industrial relations policy.

Evidence suggests that non-standard jobs are associated with wage penalties. Yet, these jobs possess a range of undesirable characteristics that should generate compensating wage differentials. This evidence relies on derived wage variables, prone to measurement error likely to be correlated with employment contract. Stated-rate hourly wage questions are not subjected to the same measurement issues. Using zero-hour contracts in the UK, we show that there is no conditional average ZHC wage penalty once stated-rate hourly wage measures are used. We discuss implications for policy.

This paper documents the evolution of sector-level collective agreements in Italy and investigates wage differentials associated with the diffusion of non-representative agreements, often signed by unknown organizations—that is, the so-called pirate agreements. Using employer–employee data from Social Security Archives, we find that non-representative agreements are associated with significant wage penalties (up to −8 percent) compared with regular collective agreements. Wage penalties are heterogeneous across firm size and industry affiliation. It is also shown that half of the wage differential is due to selection effects. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence of firms’ coping strategies, showing that pirate agreements exhibit comparatively higher employment levels.

The length of time from the implementation of an occupational licensing statute (i.e., licensing duration) may matter in influencing labor-market outcomes as entry requirements evolve. In addition, states enact grandfather clauses that allow existing workers to continue employment following these regulations, while ratcheting up requirements to increase entry costs for new entrants. We analyze the labor-market influence of the duration of occupational licensing statutes for fifteen state universally licensed occupations over a 75-year period. We find a positive nonlinear wage effect for licensing duration. Further, we find that occupational licensing raises the wages of grandfathered workers by almost 5 percent. The licensed occupations, however, exhibit heterogeneity in outcomes. Duration of occupational licensing influences wage determination when measured over longer time periods.