Serbia emerged as a small independent nation-state in the economic periphery of nineteenth-century Europe. This article leverages uniquely abundant town-level data to examine spatial inequality in prices and wages within this late-developing economy. I first build a new dataset on prices of traded and household goods, and wages of skilled and unskilled workers for a panel of 42 urban settlements in Serbia in the period from 1863 to 1910. I apply the welfare ratio approach to calculate real wages of day labourers and masons. Second, I find strong spatial convergence in grain prices and costs of living, but divergence in wages, both nominal and real. Lastly, I investigate the determinants of price convergence and wage divergence with panel-data models. The results suggest that falling transport costs decreased price gaps between locations, whereas rising population differences increased inter-urban wage gaps.
{"title":"Spatial inequality in prices and wages within a late-developing economy: Serbia, 1863–1910","authors":"Stefan Nikolić","doi":"10.1111/ehr.13348","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ehr.13348","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Serbia emerged as a small independent nation-state in the economic periphery of nineteenth-century Europe. This article leverages uniquely abundant town-level data to examine spatial inequality in prices and wages within this late-developing economy. I first build a new dataset on prices of traded and household goods, and wages of skilled and unskilled workers for a panel of 42 urban settlements in Serbia in the period from 1863 to 1910. I apply the welfare ratio approach to calculate real wages of day labourers and masons. Second, I find strong spatial convergence in grain prices and costs of living, but divergence in wages, both nominal and real. Lastly, I investigate the determinants of price convergence and wage divergence with panel-data models. The results suggest that falling transport costs decreased price gaps between locations, whereas rising population differences increased inter-urban wage gaps.</p>","PeriodicalId":47868,"journal":{"name":"Economic History Review","volume":"78 1","pages":"207-234"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ehr.13348","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140682854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Meredith M. Paker, Judy Z. Stephenson, Patrick Wallis
Records of long-eighteenth-century English wage rates exhibit almost absolute nominal rigidity over many decades, alongside significant dispersion between the wages paid by different organizations for the same type of work in the same location. These features of preindustrial wages have been obscured by data aggregation and the construction of real wage series, which introduce variation. In this paper, we argue that the standard explanations for wage rigidity in economic history are insufficient. We show econometric evidence for monopsony power in one major organization and argue that the main historical wage series are also affected by employer power. Eighteenth-century England had an imperfectly competitive labour market with large frictions. This gave large organizations the power to set wage policies. We discuss the implications for the eighteenth-century British economy and research into long-run wages more generally.
{"title":"Nominal wage patterns, monopsony, and labour market power in early modern England","authors":"Meredith M. Paker, Judy Z. Stephenson, Patrick Wallis","doi":"10.1111/ehr.13346","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ehr.13346","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Records of long-eighteenth-century English wage rates exhibit almost absolute nominal rigidity over many decades, alongside significant dispersion between the wages paid by different organizations for the same type of work in the same location. These features of preindustrial wages have been obscured by data aggregation and the construction of real wage series, which introduce variation. In this paper, we argue that the standard explanations for wage rigidity in economic history are insufficient. We show econometric evidence for monopsony power in one major organization and argue that the main historical wage series are also affected by employer power. Eighteenth-century England had an imperfectly competitive labour market with large frictions. This gave large organizations the power to set wage policies. We discuss the implications for the eighteenth-century British economy and research into long-run wages more generally.</p>","PeriodicalId":47868,"journal":{"name":"Economic History Review","volume":"78 1","pages":"179-206"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ehr.13346","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140705889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the Amsterdam phase of the 1772–3 financial crisis using the British experience in the same episode as comparative context. We conclude that, notwithstanding some direct exposures by Amsterdam institutions to the principals of the London crisis, the main linkage between the two outbreaks was the requirement for cash margin on loans backed by British East India Company shares. No significant contagion via the bills of exchange network spread from London to Amsterdam in the period separating the two outbreaks, but some feeding back of distress to London is noticeable after the Dutch outbreak. The crisis was rooted in credit expansion, a deterioration in asset risk profiles, and speculation in West Indian mortgage securities and British equity markets. Speculators were enabled by information inefficiencies in the specialized and layered Amsterdam markets, and by the absence of a gatekeeper who could have regulated the provision of credit to them. To contain the outbreak, the Dutch drew on the cohesion of an informal club of insiders who led business and civic affairs. Though the credit markets resumed normal operations relatively quickly, the incurred losses were transformative for their long term prospects by devastating some of their most important firms.
{"title":"Anglo–Dutch financial connections and contrasts in the late eighteenth century: The Amsterdam phase of the 1772–3 credit crisis","authors":"Stein Berre, Paul Kosmetatos","doi":"10.1111/ehr.13345","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ehr.13345","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the Amsterdam phase of the 1772–3 financial crisis using the British experience in the same episode as comparative context. We conclude that, notwithstanding some direct exposures by Amsterdam institutions to the principals of the London crisis, the main linkage between the two outbreaks was the requirement for cash margin on loans backed by British East India Company shares. No significant contagion via the bills of exchange network spread from London to Amsterdam in the period separating the two outbreaks, but some feeding back of distress to London is noticeable after the Dutch outbreak. The crisis was rooted in credit expansion, a deterioration in asset risk profiles, and speculation in West Indian mortgage securities and British equity markets. Speculators were enabled by information inefficiencies in the specialized and layered Amsterdam markets, and by the absence of a gatekeeper who could have regulated the provision of credit to them. To contain the outbreak, the Dutch drew on the cohesion of an informal club of insiders who led business and civic affairs. Though the credit markets resumed normal operations relatively quickly, the incurred losses were transformative for their long term prospects by devastating some of their most important firms.</p>","PeriodicalId":47868,"journal":{"name":"Economic History Review","volume":"78 1","pages":"152-178"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ehr.13345","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140746954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The rampant growth rate of output and productivity in manufacturing borne out by Swedish Historical National Accounts (HNA) has nurtured the notion that the Swedish rise to prosperity was propelled by the confluence of disproportionately high levels of sophistication and very low levels of output per worker. The thrust of the argument is that this unique configuration allowed Sweden to leapfrog into modernization. The time has come to put this arresting claim under scrutiny, which is the foremost aim of this paper. This claim, we argue, is founded on a questionable empirical foundation. The most frequently used series of outputs from manufacturing at large and from groups of industries are those of the Swedish HNA. For several reasons, these series are inappropriate to use in studies assessing the rate of output and productivity increases before 1950. We have established new series of output and labour input for manufacturing at large between 1869 and 1950 that are suitable for investigations of productivity growth rates. The resulting series significantly raises the level of output per worker in the early part of the period and hence lowers the estimated growth rates of productivity for the era as a whole.
{"title":"Modifying the success story of Sweden: Revised output and labour productivity figures for manufacturing, 1869–1950","authors":"Jesper Hamark, Svante Prado","doi":"10.1111/ehr.13332","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ehr.13332","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The rampant growth rate of output and productivity in manufacturing borne out by Swedish Historical National Accounts (HNA) has nurtured the notion that the Swedish rise to prosperity was propelled by the confluence of disproportionately high levels of sophistication and very low levels of output per worker. The thrust of the argument is that this unique configuration allowed Sweden to leapfrog into modernization. The time has come to put this arresting claim under scrutiny, which is the foremost aim of this paper. This claim, we argue, is founded on a questionable empirical foundation. The most frequently used series of outputs from manufacturing at large and from groups of industries are those of the Swedish HNA. For several reasons, these series are inappropriate to use in studies assessing the rate of output and productivity increases before 1950. We have established new series of output and labour input for manufacturing at large between 1869 and 1950 that are suitable for investigations of productivity growth rates. The resulting series significantly raises the level of output per worker in the early part of the period and hence lowers the estimated growth rates of productivity for the era as a whole.</p>","PeriodicalId":47868,"journal":{"name":"Economic History Review","volume":"78 1","pages":"113-151"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ehr.13332","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140370957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While real male wages can be used to measure input costs, they do not provide accurate measures of the standard of living. This paper uses detailed accounts of nineteenth-century European families collected by Le Play and his colleagues to demonstrate the importance of non-market production for household consumption. If we measure income from all sources, including non-market production, the British advantage in material consumption was only about half of the British advantage in male wages. While British male wages were high, British wives worked less and British families were more dependent on the income of the male head than continental families.
虽然男性的实际工资可以用来衡量投入成本,但并不能准确衡量生活水平。本文利用 Le Play 及其同事收集的 19 世纪欧洲家庭的详细记录,证明了非市场生产对家庭消费的重要性。如果我们衡量包括非市场生产在内的所有来源的收入,英国在物质消费方面的优势仅为英国男性工资优势的一半左右。虽然英国男性工资高,但英国妻子工作较少,与欧洲大陆家庭相比,英国家庭更依赖于男户主的收入。
{"title":"How not to measure the standard of living: Male wages, non-market production and household income in nineteenth-century Europe","authors":"Joyce Burnette","doi":"10.1111/ehr.13339","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ehr.13339","url":null,"abstract":"<p>While real male wages can be used to measure input costs, they do not provide accurate measures of the standard of living. This paper uses detailed accounts of nineteenth-century European families collected by Le Play and his colleagues to demonstrate the importance of non-market production for household consumption. If we measure income from all sources, including non-market production, the British advantage in material consumption was only about half of the British advantage in male wages. While British male wages were high, British wives worked less and British families were more dependent on the income of the male head than continental families.</p>","PeriodicalId":47868,"journal":{"name":"Economic History Review","volume":"78 1","pages":"87-112"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140216476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper uses longitudinal establishment-level data to trace the rise of the factory during Sweden's industrialization between 1864 and 1890. We document a sharp shift from the small artisan shop to the mechanized factory, which can largely be ascribed to differences in survival. Whilst non-mechanized establishments could compete with the factory during early industrialization, a distinct survival advantage of the factory appeared at later stages of industrialization. The evolving advantage of the factory can mainly be attributed to its larger scale, labour productivity, and technology use. By the end of the nineteenth century, these factors became increasingly important determinants of firm survival.
{"title":"Firm survival and the rise of the factory","authors":"Thor Berger, Vinzent Ostermeyer","doi":"10.1111/ehr.13328","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ehr.13328","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper uses longitudinal establishment-level data to trace the rise of the factory during Sweden's industrialization between 1864 and 1890. We document a sharp shift from the small artisan shop to the mechanized factory, which can largely be ascribed to differences in survival. Whilst non-mechanized establishments could compete with the factory during early industrialization, a distinct survival advantage of the factory appeared at later stages of industrialization. The evolving advantage of the factory can mainly be attributed to its larger scale, labour productivity, and technology use. By the end of the nineteenth century, these factors became increasingly important determinants of firm survival.</p>","PeriodicalId":47868,"journal":{"name":"Economic History Review","volume":"78 1","pages":"62-86"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ehr.13328","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140233805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Forced wage labour (FWL) in colonial-era Portuguese Africa came to encompass a majority of working age men and persisted until the early 1960s. On the basis of reconstructed financial records from the Sena Sugar Estates in today's Mozambique, we estimate the long-run profitability of the firm. With this we associate rates of extraction from native labour, defined as the difference between actual levels of remuneration and those under counterfactual freer market conditions. We estimate that coercion suppressed workers’ remuneration by about two-fifths, representing a significant cost saving to the firm. However, a production function analysis indicates that coercion also negatively affected productivity. Using these results, we calculate that the firm's profitability might have remained broadly robust without FWL. This suggests other factors, including fiscal imperatives and technological factors, likely contributed to the persistence of labour coercion in Mozambique.
{"title":"Firm profitability and forced wage labour in Portuguese Africa: Evidence from the Sena Sugar Estates, 1920–74","authors":"Sam Jones, Peter Gibbon","doi":"10.1111/ehr.13343","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ehr.13343","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Forced wage labour (FWL) in colonial-era Portuguese Africa came to encompass a majority of working age men and persisted until the early 1960s. On the basis of reconstructed financial records from the Sena Sugar Estates in today's Mozambique, we estimate the long-run profitability of the firm. With this we associate rates of extraction from native labour, defined as the difference between actual levels of remuneration and those under counterfactual freer market conditions. We estimate that coercion suppressed workers’ remuneration by about two-fifths, representing a significant cost saving to the firm. However, a production function analysis indicates that coercion also negatively affected productivity. Using these results, we calculate that the firm's profitability might have remained broadly robust without FWL. This suggests other factors, including fiscal imperatives and technological factors, likely contributed to the persistence of labour coercion in Mozambique.</p>","PeriodicalId":47868,"journal":{"name":"Economic History Review","volume":"78 1","pages":"30-61"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ehr.13343","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140238948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dan Bogart, Latika Chaudhary, Alfonso Herranz-Loncán
Railways were an important driver of global economic growth in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Whilst their role is well documented in industrial economies, we know less about their macro-economic impact in developing countries. In this paper, we first estimate the aggregate growth impact of Indian railways, one of the largest networks in the world in the early twentieth century. Then, we compare their impact in India to four emerging Latin American economies (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay) and the Cape colony. Using growth accounting techniques common to the cross-country estimates, we argue that the aggregate growth impact of Indian railways was significant, increasing Indian gross domestic product (GDP) per capita by 13.5 per cent by 1912. We also find that the growth impact of Indian railways was similar to Brazil and Mexico, but smaller than Argentina and the Cape. Compared with the latter, India had a smaller size of railway freight revenues in the economy and lower wages to fares leading to lower passenger time savings. Railways were the most important infrastructure driver of economic growth in India during the first era of globalization from 1860 to 1912, but they contributed less than in richer and more dynamic developing economies.
{"title":"The growth contribution of colonial Indian railways in comparative perspective","authors":"Dan Bogart, Latika Chaudhary, Alfonso Herranz-Loncán","doi":"10.1111/ehr.13341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ehr.13341","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Railways were an important driver of global economic growth in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Whilst their role is well documented in industrial economies, we know less about their macro-economic impact in developing countries. In this paper, we first estimate the aggregate growth impact of Indian railways, one of the largest networks in the world in the early twentieth century. Then, we compare their impact in India to four emerging Latin American economies (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay) and the Cape colony. Using growth accounting techniques common to the cross-country estimates, we argue that the aggregate growth impact of Indian railways was significant, increasing Indian gross domestic product (GDP) per capita by 13.5 per cent by 1912. We also find that the growth impact of Indian railways was similar to Brazil and Mexico, but smaller than Argentina and the Cape. Compared with the latter, India had a smaller size of railway freight revenues in the economy and lower wages to fares leading to lower passenger time savings. Railways were the most important infrastructure driver of economic growth in India during the first era of globalization from 1860 to 1912, but they contributed less than in richer and more dynamic developing economies.</p>","PeriodicalId":47868,"journal":{"name":"Economic History Review","volume":"77 4","pages":"1509-1534"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ehr.13341","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142435013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Philip T. Fliers, Abe de Jong, Bert S. van Stiphout-Kramer
We examine the Netherlands around the Second World War, where the occupying Nazi regime overhauled the country's corporate tax regime and introduced a profit tax of 55 per cent. We estimate that the new tax regime cost investors at least 300 million guilders, an amount equivalent to 5 per cent of Dutch GDP in 1940. We demonstrate that the tax introduction changed the financing of Dutch businesses. In particular, we find strong evidence that debt financing increased because it provides a tax shelter. The changes in taxation also led to an after-tax reduction in the cost of debt, which had large real effects on firm investment. After the end of the war, firms with more leverage had higher capital expenditures.
{"title":"Corporate taxes, leverage, and investment: Evidence from Nazi-occupied Netherlands","authors":"Philip T. Fliers, Abe de Jong, Bert S. van Stiphout-Kramer","doi":"10.1111/ehr.13331","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ehr.13331","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the Netherlands around the Second World War, where the occupying Nazi regime overhauled the country's corporate tax regime and introduced a profit tax of 55 per cent. We estimate that the new tax regime cost investors at least 300 million guilders, an amount equivalent to 5 per cent of Dutch GDP in 1940. We demonstrate that the tax introduction changed the financing of Dutch businesses. In particular, we find strong evidence that debt financing increased because it provides a tax shelter. The changes in taxation also led to an after-tax reduction in the cost of debt, which had large real effects on firm investment. After the end of the war, firms with more leverage had higher capital expenditures.</p>","PeriodicalId":47868,"journal":{"name":"Economic History Review","volume":"77 4","pages":"1477-1508"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ehr.13331","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140077606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper employs quantitative and qualitative methods to examine the link between banking competition, branching and financial distress during the interwar period in Europe, focusing on Italy as a case study. Regression analysis and a systematic review of printed sources show that banks experiencing distress had opened scores of branches and operated in areas with harsher competition. Poor managerial choices led banks to have higher operational costs, pushing them to more remunerative but riskier activities. The 1920s saw a profound transformation of the Italian banking system, with extensive branch expansion and cut-throat competition for deposits. This paper argues that these changes in the structure of the banking system rendered it more fragile when the international crisis hit. Available evidence on other European countries suggests that Italy was not an isolated case. The study contributes to the literature on banking crises during the Great Depression and the effects of banking competition on financial stability.
{"title":"Competition, over-branching and bank failures during the Great Depression: New evidence from Italy","authors":"Marco Molteni","doi":"10.1111/ehr.13340","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ehr.13340","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper employs quantitative and qualitative methods to examine the link between banking competition, branching and financial distress during the interwar period in Europe, focusing on Italy as a case study. Regression analysis and a systematic review of printed sources show that banks experiencing distress had opened scores of branches and operated in areas with harsher competition. Poor managerial choices led banks to have higher operational costs, pushing them to more remunerative but riskier activities. The 1920s saw a profound transformation of the Italian banking system, with extensive branch expansion and cut-throat competition for deposits. This paper argues that these changes in the structure of the banking system rendered it more fragile when the international crisis hit. Available evidence on other European countries suggests that Italy was not an isolated case. The study contributes to the literature on banking crises during the Great Depression and the effects of banking competition on financial stability.</p>","PeriodicalId":47868,"journal":{"name":"Economic History Review","volume":"77 4","pages":"1442-1476"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ehr.13340","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140079762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}