Review of Economic Dynamics最新文献

In this paper we highlight a few striking features of CEO compensation in the US from 1994 to 2020. For the purpose of measuring both the level and sensitivity of compensation, we define the latter as the year–on–year change in the portion of the executive's wealth tied to the firm. Compared to a narrower definition often adopted in the literature to measure levels, the cross-sectional distribution displays much higher skewness and variation. Each year, a sizable fraction of chief executives lose money. During the second decade of this century, the award of options kept declining, while stock grants became more plentiful. In net, the dollar value of CEOs' position in their respective company did not keep up with the growth in capitalization. This contributes to explaining why the semi-elasticity of compensation with respect shareholder wealth has declined.

For decades credit rating agencies were viewed as trusted arbiters of creditworthiness and their ratings as important tools for managing risk. The common narrative is that the value of ratings was compromised by the evolution of the industry to a form where issuers pay for ratings. In this paper we consider both an investor-pays and an issuer-pays set-ups and show that if the investor-pays version can overcome the free-rider problem it is efficient, and otherwise leads to under-provision of information; while if the issuer-pays can force disclosure, it is efficient, but otherwise it leads to less revealing information because of the systematic distortion in revealed information along with over-investment in information. We show that in both these arrangements credit ratings have value in equilibrium and how reputation insures that, in equilibrium, ratings will reflect sound assessments of credit worthiness. We argue that regulatory reliance on ratings and the increasing importance of risk-weighted capital in prudential regulation have more likely contributed to distorted ratings than the matter of who pays for them.

Cross-phenomenon restrictions associated with returns to labor mobility can inform calibrations of productivity processes in macro-labor models. We exploit how returns to labor mobility influence effects on equilibrium unemployment of changes in (a) layoff costs, and (b) distributions of skill losses coincident with quits (“quit turbulence”). Returns to labor mobility intermediate both effects. Ample labor reallocations observed across market economies that have different layoff costs imply that a turbulence explanation of trans-Atlantic unemployment experiences is robust to adding plausible quit turbulence.

The last decades have seen large improvements in digital advertising technology that allowed firms to target better specific consumer tastes. This research studies the relationship between digital advertising, the rise of varieties, and economic welfare. A model of advertising and varieties is developed, where firms choose the intensity of digital ads directed at specific consumers as well as traditional ads that are undirected. The calibrated model shows that improvements in digital advertising have driven the rise in varieties over time. Empirical evidence is presented using detailed micro data on firms' products and advertising choices since 1995. Causal analysis using exogenous variation in consumers' differential access to the internet supports the suggested mechanism.

After 162 years of political unification, Italy still displays large regional economic differences. In 2019, the per capita GDP of Lombardia was 39,700 euros, but Calabria's per capita GDP was only 17,300 euros. We build a two-region, two-sector model of the Italian economy to measure the wedges that could account for the differences in aggregate variables between the North and the South. We find that the largest driver of the regional disparity in per capita output is the difference in total factor productivity, followed by fiscal redistribution. These two factors, together, account for more than 70 percent of the output disparity between the North and the South.

We examine the intensive and extensive margins of labor supply in an incomplete-markets framework where productivity keeps growing. What are, in particular, the long-run implications for who will work how much, and how the distribution of economic welfare among households will change? We insist the relative strengths of income and substitution effects to be such as to match historical and cross-country observations. That is, hours will fall toward zero as productivity and income rise, while wages per hour will keep rising and be consistent with stable income shares for labor and capital. Despite this rather drastic path toward zero hours worked, we find that few features of the distribution of outcomes in the population are affected much at all by productivity growth. In particular, the relative distribution of hours worked and of consumption will look very similar to the case without productivity growth.

Heathcote et al. (2010) conducted an empirical analysis of several dimensions of inequality in the United States over the years 1967-2006, using publicly-available survey data. This paper expands the analysis, and extends it to 2021. We find that since the early 2000s, the college wage premium has stopped growing, and the race wage gap has stalled. However, the gender wage gap has kept shrinking. Both individual- and household-level income inequality have continued to rise at the top, while the cyclical component of inequality dominates dynamics below the median. Inequality in consumption expenditures has remained remarkably stable over time. Income pooling within the family and redistribution by the government have enormous impacts on the dynamics of household-level inequality, with the role of the family diminishing and that of the government growing over time. In particular, largely due to generous government transfers, the COVID recession has been the first downturn in fifty years in which inequality in disposable income and consumption actually declined.

We explore the complementarity between a central bank and a financial stability Fund in stabilizing sovereign debt markets. The central bank pursuing its mandate can intervene with public sector purchasing programs, buying sovereign debt in the secondary market, provided that the debt is safe. The sovereign sells its debt to private lenders, through market auctions. Furthermore, it has access to a long-term state-contingent contract with a Fund: a country-specific debt-and-insurance contract that accounts for no-default and no-over-lending constraints. The Fund needs to guarantee gross-financial-needs and no-over-lending. We show that these constraints endogenously determine the ‘optimal debt maturity’ structure that minimizes the Required Fund Capacity (RFC) to make all sovereign debt safe. However, the Fund may have limited absorption capacity and fall short of its RFC. The central bank may be able to cover the difference, in which case there is perfect complementarity and the joint institutions act as an effective ‘lender of last resort’. We calibrate our model to the Italian economy and find that with a Fund contract its ‘optimal debt maturity’ is 2.9 years with an RFC of 90% of GDP, which is above what the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) could reasonably absorb, but may be feasible with an ECB Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) intervention. In contrast, the average maturity of Italian sovereign debt has been circa 6.2 years, with a needed absorption capacity of around 105% of GDP, which may call for a maturity restructuring to ease the activation of TPI.

How should the U.S. confront the growing revenue needs driven by higher spending requirements? We investigate the mix of potential tax increases that generate a given revenue need at the minimum welfare cost and evaluate its macroeconomic impact. We do so in the context of a life-cycle growth model that captures key aspects of the earnings and wealth distributions and the non-linear shape of taxes and transfers in place. Our findings show that a proportional consumption tax combined with a lump-sum transfer to all households and a reduction in income tax progressivity consistently emerges as the best alternative to minimize welfare costs associated with a given increase in revenue. A 30% long-run increase in Federal tax revenue requires a consumption tax rate of 27.8%, a transfer of about 12% of mean household income to all households, and a reduction of top marginal income tax rates of more than 5 percentage points—output declines by 7.9% in the long run. While transfers are substantial, smaller transfers can accomplish most of the reduction in welfare costs. We find no role for wealth taxes in increasing revenues or minimizing welfare costs.

We reconsider the fiscal consequences of an aging population in Japan that were reported in Hansen and İmrohoroğlu (2016). That paper predicted that the net debt to GNP ratio would reach 250 percent in 2021, while the actual net debt to GNP ratio was roughly constant at about 120% from 2011 to 2019. Here we study the role played by higher tax revenues, lower spending, and lower interest rates than were assumed in the previous paper. Most importantly, we consider the role played by Japanese government bonds held by the Bank of Japan in enabling this period of debt stability. We conclude that the stable net debt to output ratio is predicted to be temporary and reach 250 percent before 2040.