Review of Economic Dynamics最新文献

英文中文

IF 2.1 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Review of Economic Dynamics

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2026.101322

Zhe (Jasmine) Jiang , Zinan Wang

This paper studies the distributional outcomes of protectionism. First, we investigate the short-run distributional effects on workers with different skill levels by estimating structural vector autoregressions (VARs) using high-frequency measures of temporary trade barriers for the United States. We then estimate a panel VAR for a sample of thirty-six countries using the applied tariff rates. Across our empirical exercises, we find robust evidence that protectionism reduces the skill premium but increases the employment ratio between high-skilled and low-skilled workers. To rationalize these findings, we build a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model featuring asymmetric search-and-matching (SAM) frictions, capital-skill complementarity (CSC) in production, and producer dynamics. Our model results replicate the empirical patterns. Our counterfactual analysis highlights the interaction between asymmetric SAM and CSC in qualitatively shaping the distributional patterns of protectionism, with producer dynamics magnifying these effects quantitatively.

本文研究了保护主义的分配结果。首先，我们利用美国临时贸易壁垒的高频测量方法，通过估计结构向量自回归（var），研究了不同技能水平工人的短期分配效应。然后，我们使用适用关税税率估算36个国家样本的面板VAR。在我们的实证研究中，我们发现强有力的证据表明，保护主义降低了技能溢价，但提高了高技能工人和低技能工人之间的就业率。为了合理化这些发现，我们建立了一个两国动态一般均衡模型，该模型包含不对称搜索与匹配（SAM）摩擦、生产中的资本-技能互补性（CSC）和生产者动态。我们的模型结果复制了经验模式。我们的反事实分析强调了不对称的SAM和CSC之间的相互作用，定性地塑造了保护主义的分布模式，生产者动态在定量上放大了这些影响。

引用次数: 0

Firm dynamics, monopsony, and aggregate productivity differences 企业动态、垄断和总生产率差异

IF 2.1 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Review of Economic Dynamics

Pub Date : 2026-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2025.101321

Tristany Armangué-Jubert , Tancredi Rapone , Alessandro Ruggieri

This paper studies how labor market power affects firm dynamics and aggregate productivity. We build a dynamic model of neoclassical monopsony with occupational choice, firm growth, and productivity-enhancing technology adoption. Labor market power lowers efficiency and leads to aggregate output losses by distorting the allocation of labor, entrepreneurship, and innovation decisions. The model is consistent with cross-country evidence of higher life cycle firm growth and higher productivity investment in more competitive labor markets and can explain 25 percent of the differences in aggregate productivity across countries. We find that about 85 percent of the losses are attributable to the lack of technology adoption induced by weaker labor market competition, suggesting that efficiency losses may be greater than those estimated by previous studies.

本文研究劳动力市场力量如何影响企业动态和总生产率。本文建立了一个考虑职业选择、企业成长和生产率提高技术采用的新古典垄断动态模型。劳动力市场力量降低了效率，并通过扭曲劳动力、企业家精神和创新决策的配置，导致总产出损失。该模型与跨国证据一致，即在竞争更激烈的劳动力市场中，更高的生命周期企业增长和更高的生产率投资，可以解释各国总生产率差异的25%。我们发现，大约85%的损失可归因于劳动力市场竞争减弱导致的技术采用不足，这表明效率损失可能比以前的研究估计的要大。

引用次数: 0

Entry decision, the option to delay entry, and business cycles 进入决策、延迟进入的选项和业务周期

IF 2.1 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Review of Economic Dynamics

Pub Date : 2025-12-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2025.101319

Ia Vardishvili

This paper demonstrates that the option to delay entry plays an important role in shaping the business cycle behavior of new firms. Using a model calibrated to U.S. firm dynamics, I show that the timing option endogenously generates a countercyclical opportunity cost of entry: during recessions, elevated risk of failure increases the value of waiting, which raises the effective cost of entry. I provide empirical evidence consistent with firms strategically delaying entry in response to changing aggregate conditions. Quantitatively, this channel significantly amplifies firm selection at entry and nearly doubles the cyclical volatility of new firm creation. Overall, variation in the number and composition of entrants accounts for 18 % of aggregate employment fluctuations—a contribution more than halved in a model without the option to delay. Ignoring this channel may also lead to misleading predictions about how new firm entry responds to policy interventions.

本文论证了延迟进入的选择对新企业经济周期行为的形成起着重要作用。我使用一个针对美国企业动态校准的模型，证明了时机选择内生地产生了反周期的进入机会成本：在经济衰退期间，失败风险的增加增加了等待的价值，从而提高了进入的有效成本。我提供的经验证据表明，企业在应对不断变化的总体条件时，会在战略上推迟进入。从数量上讲，这一渠道显著地放大了进入时的企业选择，并使新企业创建的周期性波动几乎翻了一番。总的来说，进入者数量和构成的变化占总就业波动的18%——在没有选择延迟的模型中，这一贡献减少了一半以上。忽视这一渠道也可能导致对新企业进入如何响应政策干预的误导性预测。

引用次数: 0

Sources of rising student debt in the U.S.: College costs, wage inequality, and delinquency 美国学生债务上升的来源：大学费用、工资不平等和拖欠

IF 2.1 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Review of Economic Dynamics

Pub Date : 2025-11-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2025.101318

Heejeong Kim, Jung Hwan Kim

This paper examines the quantitative implications of rising college costs, wage inequality, and delinquency for the growth of student debt in the U.S. Rising college costs and wage inequality are introduced as exogenous inputs into an incomplete-markets overlapping-generations model with choices of college attendance, student loans, and delinquency. In the benchmark economy, aggregate student debt rises by $314 billion between 1985 and 2014, accounting for approximately 64 % of the observed rise in undergraduate student loans in the U.S. The rise in college costs is the primary driver of the increased borrowing, while the rise in income risk and the decline in student ability lead to higher delinquency rates. Increasing delinquency significantly amplifies debt accumulation: in a counterfactual economy without the option of becoming delinquent, debt increases by only $178 billion. Finally, we show that income-driven repayment (IDR) plans can substantially moderate debt growth, leading to an increase of only $169 billion. This effect arises because IDR reduces delinquency rates by offering greater repayment flexibility.

本文考察了大学成本上升、工资不平等和拖欠对美国学生债务增长的定量影响。大学成本上升和工资不平等作为外生输入引入了一个带有大学出勤率、学生贷款和拖欠选择的不完全市场重叠代模型。在基准经济中，1985年至2014年间，学生债务总额增加了3140亿美元，约占美国观察到的本科学生贷款增长的64%。大学成本的上升是借款增加的主要驱动因素，而收入风险的上升和学生能力的下降导致了更高的拖欠率。拖欠行为的增加显著地放大了债务积累：在一个没有拖欠选择的反事实经济中，债务只增加了1780亿美元。最后，我们表明，收入驱动型还款（IDR）计划可以大幅减缓债务增长，仅增加1690亿美元。产生这种效应是因为IDR通过提供更大的还款灵活性来降低拖欠率。

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引用次数: 0

Go big or buy a home: The impact of student debt on career and housing choices 做大还是买房：学生债务对职业和住房选择的影响

IF 2.1 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Review of Economic Dynamics

Pub Date : 2025-11-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2025.101317

Marc Folch , Luca Mazzone

Student debt decreases post-bachelor school enrollment and earnings growth but does not delay first-time home ownership. We introduce a life-cycle human capital model with wealth heterogeneity and financial frictions and show that high debt balances distort career choices because returns to further education depend on current income. Student debt impacts home ownership in two ways. First, it deters ownership via the traditional wealth channel. Second, it increases ownership by discouraging further education in favor of early labor market entry. Finally, we discuss the impact of student borrowing under different loan repayment schemes.

学生贷款降低了本科毕业后的入学率和收入增长，但不会推迟首次购房。我们引入了一个具有财富异质性和财务摩擦的生命周期人力资本模型，并表明高债务余额扭曲了职业选择，因为继续教育的回报取决于当前收入。学生贷款以两种方式影响房屋所有权。首先，它阻碍了通过传统财富渠道的所有权。其次，它通过阻止进一步教育而支持早期进入劳动力市场来增加所有权。最后，我们讨论了在不同的贷款偿还计划下学生借款的影响。

引用次数: 0

Time averaging meets Heckman, Lochner, and Taber and Ben-Porath 时间平均符合Heckman， Lochner， Taber和Ben-Porath

IF 2.1 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Review of Economic Dynamics

Pub Date : 2025-11-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2025.101309

Sebastian Graves , Victoria Gregory , Lars Ljungqvist , Thomas J. Sargent

The Heckman et al. (1998a) (HLT) model includes credit markets and within-period labor supply indivisibilities, two essential features of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006) “time-averaging” models. But by assuming inelastic labor supplies until a mandatory retirement age, it shuts down time-averaging. We activate time-averaging by endogenizing retirement ages. Our addition of a baseline social security system puts all workers at corner solutions of their retirement decisions, letting our model reproduce most outcomes in HLT's model. By dislodging workers from those corners, social security and tax reforms raise the aggregate labor supply elasticity and can bring about a “dual labor market.” HLT's Ben-Porath human capital technologies generate steeper earnings profiles for college-educated workers that in our model make their labor supplies more resilient to tax and social security reforms than high school workers' labor supplies. But nonconvexities inherent in the Ben-Porath technologies can bring “tipping points” at which tax increases cause workers who at lower tax rates had chosen long careers and made substantial human capital investments to jump discretely to choosing much shorter careers and doing much less on-the-job human capital accumulation.

Heckman et al. (1998a) （HLT）模型包括信贷市场和时期内劳动力供给不可分割性，这是Ljungqvist和Sargent（2006）“时间平均”模型的两个基本特征。但是，通过假设劳动力供应在法定退休年龄之前没有弹性，它关闭了时间平均。我们通过内生退休年龄激活时间平均。我们增加了一个基本的社会保障系统，使所有工人都处于退休决定的边缘解决方案，使我们的模型重现了HLT模型中的大多数结果。社会保障和税收改革通过将工人从这些角落转移出去，提高了总劳动力供给弹性，并可能带来“双重劳动力市场”。HLT的Ben-Porath人力资本技术为受过大学教育的工人创造了更陡峭的收入曲线，在我们的模型中，这使得他们的劳动力供应比高中工人的劳动力供应更能适应税收和社会保障改革。但本-波拉斯技术固有的非凸性可能带来“引爆点”，即增税会导致那些在较低税率下选择长期职业并进行大量人力资本投资的工人，转而选择更短的职业生涯，更少地进行在职人力资本积累。

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引用次数: 0

Technological change and insuring job loss 技术变革和失业保险

IF 2.1 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Review of Economic Dynamics

Pub Date : 2025-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2025.101308

J. Carter Braxton , Bledi Taska

We examine the role of technological change in shaping insurance to the unemployed. We integrate technological change, occupation choice, and employment risk into a Bewley-style economy to examine the optimal combination of retraining subsidies and public insurance transfers for unemployed workers. We find that the optimal policy introduces a retraining subsidy to unemployed workers and increases the generosity of transfers to the unemployed relative to current U.S. policy. The utilitarian government incorporates retraining subsidies as part of an optimal policy as they provide additional, longer run, consumption insurance after job loss while imposing only modest increases in distortionary taxes. In the absence of technological change, a utilitarian government sets a lower subsidy on the tuition cost of retraining as earnings declines after job loss are less persistent.

我们考察了技术变革在塑造失业保险中的作用。我们将技术变革、职业选择和就业风险整合到一个比利式经济中，以检验失业工人再培训补贴和公共保险转移的最佳组合。我们发现，最优政策引入了对失业工人的再培训补贴，并相对于当前的美国政策增加了对失业人员的转移支付的慷慨程度。功利主义政府将再培训补贴作为最优政策的一部分，因为它们在失业后提供额外的、长期的消费保险，同时只适度增加扭曲性税收。在没有技术变革的情况下，功利主义政府对再培训学费的补贴较低，因为失业持续时间较短后，收入会下降。

引用次数: 0

Corrigendum to “Socially Optimal Search Intensity in Over-the-Counter Markets” [Review of Economic Dynamics, Volume 53, July 2024, Pages 224-282] “场外市场的社会最优搜索强度”的勘误[经济动态评论，第53卷，2024年7月，224-282页]

IF 2.1 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Review of Economic Dynamics

Pub Date : 2025-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2025.101303

Shuo Liu

引用次数: 0

Job ladders by firm wage and productivity 按固定工资和生产率划分的工作阶梯

IF 2.1 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Review of Economic Dynamics

Pub Date : 2025-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2025.101307

Antoine Bertheau , Rune Vejlin

Using a unique dataset that combines daily employment spell information with firm-level accounting data from Denmark, we explore workers' progression up firm wage and productivity ladders. We find that: (1) Total Factor Productivity (TFP) emerges as a more effective indicator of the job ladder than the average wage paid, with more workers experiencing employer-to-employer transitions from lower to upper tiers of the productivity ladder compared to the wage ladder. (2) Recessions have a cleansing effect when using the productivity job ladder: Lower productivity firms experience a steeper decline in employment growth compared to their higher-tier counterparts. In contrast, due to decreased poaching, high wage firms exhibit greater employment reductions, leading to a sullying effect when using the wage job ladder. High productivity firms also experience greater employment cyclicality due to decreased poaching during recessions. However, firms at the lower end of the productivity spectrum face a more pronounced employment reduction during recessions as they intensify layoffs and reduce hiring from the unemployment pool. (3) Indirect productivity measures, such as sales per worker, can hide or even reverse the cleansing effect of recessions.

我们使用一个独特的数据集，将日常就业信息与丹麦的企业层面会计数据相结合，探索工人在企业工资和生产力阶梯上的进步。我们发现：(1)与平均工资相比，全要素生产率（TFP）成为了一个更有效的工作阶梯指标，与工资阶梯相比，更多的工人经历了从生产率阶梯的较低层次到较高层次的雇主到雇主的转变。(2)当使用生产率就业阶梯时，衰退具有清洁效应：与生产率较高的企业相比，生产率较低的企业在就业增长方面的下降幅度更大。相比之下，由于偷猎行为的减少，高工资公司的裁员幅度更大，从而在使用工资工作阶梯时产生了玷污效应。由于衰退期间偷猎的减少，高生产率的公司也经历了更大的就业周期性。然而，在经济衰退期间，生产率较低的企业面临着更明显的就业减少，因为它们加大了裁员力度，并从失业人群中减少了招聘。(3)间接的生产率指标，如人均销售额，可以掩盖甚至逆转衰退的清洁效应。

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引用次数: 0

Optimal contracts with hidden risk 隐含风险的最优契约

IF 2.1 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Review of Economic Dynamics

Pub Date : 2025-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2025.101306

Rui Li , Noah Williams

Recent years have seen episodes of managers subjecting firms to large losses. We develop a dynamic moral hazard model where a manager may divert funds, and also take actions yielding current payoffs, but increasing risks of losses. We show that pay-for-performance contracts exacerbate the risk management friction, then characterize the optimal risk management contract. We solve two examples. One is explicitly solvable, and the optimal contract can be implemented with simple instruments including “clawback” of promised bonuses. The second example shows that it may be optimal for the owner to forgo risk management, allowing the manager to take excess risk.

近年来，经理人让公司蒙受巨额损失的事件时有发生。我们开发了一个动态的道德风险模型，在这个模型中，经理可以转移资金，也可以采取产生当前收益的行动，但会增加损失的风险。研究结果表明，绩效薪酬契约加剧了风险管理摩擦，并对最优风险管理契约进行了刻画。我们解两个例子。一个是明确可解的，最优合约可以通过简单的工具实现，包括承诺奖金的“追回”。第二个例子表明，所有者放弃风险管理可能是最优的，允许管理者承担超额风险。

引用次数: 0

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