Abstract Philosophical inquiry strives to be the unencumbered exploration of ideas. That is, unlike scientific research, which is subject to ethical oversight, it is commonly thought that it would either be inappropriate, or that it would undermine what philosophy fundamentally is, if philosophical research were subject to similar ethical oversight. Against this, I argue that philosophy is in need of a reckoning. Philosophical inquiry is a morally hazardous practice with its own risks. There are risks present in the methods we employ, risks inherent in the content of the views under consideration, and risks to the subjects of our inquiry. Likely, there are more risks still. However, by starting with the identification of these three risks we can demonstrate not only why an ethics of practice is needed but also which avenues are the most promising for developing an ethics for philosophical practice. Although we might just be in the business of asking questions, we do not merely, in virtue of engaging in philosophical inquiry, absolve ourselves of responsibility for the risks that inquiry incurs.
{"title":"Risky Inquiry: Developing an Ethics for Philosophical Practice","authors":"Rima Basu","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2023.39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2023.39","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Philosophical inquiry strives to be the unencumbered exploration of ideas. That is, unlike scientific research, which is subject to ethical oversight, it is commonly thought that it would either be inappropriate, or that it would undermine what philosophy fundamentally is, if philosophical research were subject to similar ethical oversight. Against this, I argue that philosophy is in need of a reckoning. Philosophical inquiry is a morally hazardous practice with its own risks. There are risks present in the methods we employ, risks inherent in the content of the views under consideration, and risks to the subjects of our inquiry. Likely, there are more risks still. However, by starting with the identification of these three risks we can demonstrate not only why an ethics of practice is needed but also which avenues are the most promising for developing an ethics for philosophical practice. Although we might just be in the business of asking questions, we do not merely, in virtue of engaging in philosophical inquiry, absolve ourselves of responsibility for the risks that inquiry incurs.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"275 - 293"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49118676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Alex Byrne contends that women are (simply) adult human females, claiming that this thesis has considerably greater initial appeal than the justified true belief (JTB) theory of knowledge. This article refutes Byrne's thesis in the same way the JTB theory of knowledge is widely thought to have been refuted: through simple counterexamples. Lessons are drawn. One lesson is that women need not be human. A second lesson is that biology and physical phenotypes are both irrelevant to whether someone is a woman, and indeed, female in a gendered sense. A third lesson is that trans women, cis women, alien women, and robot women are all women because to be a woman is to be an adult gendered female. This article does not purport to settle complex normative questions of ethics or justice, including whether the ordinary meaning of woman ought to be retained or changed—though I do note plausible implications for these debates. This article does purport to settle what the ordinary meaning of woman is, and in that regard contribute to important conceptual ground-clearing regarding what constitutes an ameliorative or revisionary definition of woman.
{"title":"Trans Women, Cis Women, Alien Women, and Robot Women Are Women: They Are All (Simply) Adults Gendered Female","authors":"Marcus Arvan","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2023.38","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2023.38","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Alex Byrne contends that women are (simply) adult human females, claiming that this thesis has considerably greater initial appeal than the justified true belief (JTB) theory of knowledge. This article refutes Byrne's thesis in the same way the JTB theory of knowledge is widely thought to have been refuted: through simple counterexamples. Lessons are drawn. One lesson is that women need not be human. A second lesson is that biology and physical phenotypes are both irrelevant to whether someone is a woman, and indeed, female in a gendered sense. A third lesson is that trans women, cis women, alien women, and robot women are all women because to be a woman is to be an adult gendered female. This article does not purport to settle complex normative questions of ethics or justice, including whether the ordinary meaning of woman ought to be retained or changed—though I do note plausible implications for these debates. This article does purport to settle what the ordinary meaning of woman is, and in that regard contribute to important conceptual ground-clearing regarding what constitutes an ameliorative or revisionary definition of woman.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"373 - 389"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46030167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article looks at the implications of medical colonialism in Canada for the feminist concept of care. Because medical colonialism is an ongoing material relation where “good” settler care cannot be separated from Indigenous dispossession, I defend the view that care and violence can be coextensive and suggest that a decolonial care ethic needs to disrupt the directionality of care as flowing from agential carers toward colonized care-receivers. I argue that contemporary medical colonialism should indeed be understood as a form of care if structural harm is to be addressed in practice, and trouble the notion of inclusion at work in some contemporary theories of care. By finding demands for assimilationist “participatory inclusion” in examples of government-run, Indigenous-serving care services, I caution against the implicit settler-colonial assumptions in notions of “caring democracies” and “caring societies” on the welfare-state model. If care is political and can participate in the normative pressures of civic assimilation, then to “decolonize” it through refraction, disruption, infiltration, disconnection, re-appropriation, and resistance also means to “decolonize” citizenship and civic life in the interests of Indigenous self-determination, rather than presumed inclusion in settler-state processes.
{"title":"Medical Colonialism and the Power to Care: Unsettling Participatory Inclusion in the Settler-State Care Paradigm","authors":"Eva Boodman","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2023.24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2023.24","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article looks at the implications of medical colonialism in Canada for the feminist concept of care. Because medical colonialism is an ongoing material relation where “good” settler care cannot be separated from Indigenous dispossession, I defend the view that care and violence can be coextensive and suggest that a decolonial care ethic needs to disrupt the directionality of care as flowing from agential carers toward colonized care-receivers. I argue that contemporary medical colonialism should indeed be understood as a form of care if structural harm is to be addressed in practice, and trouble the notion of inclusion at work in some contemporary theories of care. By finding demands for assimilationist “participatory inclusion” in examples of government-run, Indigenous-serving care services, I caution against the implicit settler-colonial assumptions in notions of “caring democracies” and “caring societies” on the welfare-state model. If care is political and can participate in the normative pressures of civic assimilation, then to “decolonize” it through refraction, disruption, infiltration, disconnection, re-appropriation, and resistance also means to “decolonize” citizenship and civic life in the interests of Indigenous self-determination, rather than presumed inclusion in settler-state processes.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"330 - 352"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43761540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article argues that shifts between deontological and virtue-ethical moral reasoning hamper public moral conversations about misogyny and racism. Using examples ranging from sexual assault to police violence, I show that when someone is accused of committing a moral wrong, they often respond by shifting from deontological to virtue-ethical modes of analysis. This kind of “toggling” between the two enables a person to claim that they are “a good person” even when they have violated important moral rules. In this way, toggling shuts down or makes incoherent our efforts to call one another to moral account, especially (but by no means exclusively) when we are attempting to address issues of systemic oppression and discrimination, including misogyny and racism.
{"title":"Toggling: How Shifts between Deontology and Virtue Ethics Undermine Public Moral Discourse about Gender and Race","authors":"Sarah Zager","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2023.25","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2023.25","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article argues that shifts between deontological and virtue-ethical moral reasoning hamper public moral conversations about misogyny and racism. Using examples ranging from sexual assault to police violence, I show that when someone is accused of committing a moral wrong, they often respond by shifting from deontological to virtue-ethical modes of analysis. This kind of “toggling” between the two enables a person to claim that they are “a good person” even when they have violated important moral rules. In this way, toggling shuts down or makes incoherent our efforts to call one another to moral account, especially (but by no means exclusively) when we are attempting to address issues of systemic oppression and discrimination, including misogyny and racism.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"294 - 315"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45142415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Colonial Invasion and Environmental Degradation in Wangari Maathai's Unbowed: A Memoir – CORRIGENDUM","authors":"Garima Rawat, V. Gaurav","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2023.55","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2023.55","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"451 - 451"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43360860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Phoebe Friesen, Jordan Goldstein, G. Rawat, Vivek Kumar Gaurav, Linda Daley, Kathleen H. Lennon, Cambridge Rachel Alsop
{"title":"HYP volume 38 issue 2 Cover and Front matter","authors":"Phoebe Friesen, Jordan Goldstein, G. Rawat, Vivek Kumar Gaurav, Linda Daley, Kathleen H. Lennon, Cambridge Rachel Alsop","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2023.53","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2023.53","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"f1 - f4"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41848200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Force of Nonviolence: An Ethico-Political Bind. Judith Butler. New York: Verso, 2020 (ISBN: 9781788732765)","authors":"D. Taylor","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2023.47","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2023.47","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45473382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From Spinster to Career Women: Middle-Class Women and Work in Victorian England. Arlene Young. Montreal and Kingston; London and Chicago: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2019 (ISBN: 978-0-7735-5706-2)","authors":"Anna J. Brecke","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2023.50","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2023.50","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41585980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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